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This thesis seeks to examine the existing EU frameworks for data-sharing for law 
enforcement purposes, both within the EU and between the EU and third countries, the 
data protection challenges to which these give rise, and the possible responses to those 
challenges at both EU and global levels. The analysis follows a bottom-up approach, 
starting with an examination of the EU internal data-sharing instruments. After that, it 
studies the data transfers conducted under the scope of an international agreement; and 
finally, it concludes by discussing the current international initiatives for creating 
universal data protection standards.  
As for the EU data-sharing instruments, this thesis demonstrates that these systems 
present shortcomings with regard to their implementation and usage. Moreover, each 
instrument has its own provisions on data protection and, despite the adoption of a 
Framework Decision in 2008, this has not brought about a convergence of data 
protection rules in the JHA field. A similar multiplicity of instruments is also found 
when the EU transfers data to third countries for the purpose of preventing and 
combating crimes. This is evident from examining the existing data-sharing agreements 
between the EU and the US. Each agreement has a section on data protection and data 
security rules, which again differ from the general clauses of the 2008 Framework 
Decision. This study demonstrates the influence of US interests on such agreements, as 
well as on the ongoing negotiations for an umbrella EU-US Data Protection Agreement. 
One possible way to ensure a high level of EU data protection standards in the field of 
law enforcement in the face of US pressure is by enhancing the role of Europol. This 
EU Agency shares information with EU member states and third countries. This thesis 
demonstrates that Europol has a full-fledged data protection framework, which is 
stronger than most of the member states’ privacy laws. However, taking Europol rules 
as a reference for global standards would only partially achieve the desired result. The 
exchange of data for security purposes does not only involve law enforcement 
authorities, but also intelligence services. The recent NSA revelations have shown that 
the programmes used by these bodies to collect and process data can be far more 
intrusive and secretive than any current law enforcement system.  
In view of the above, this thesis explores the potential of CoE Convention 108 for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data and 
 
 ii 
the Cybercrime Convention as the basis for a global regime for data protection in law 
enforcement. This thesis concludes that an optimum global data protection framework 
would entail a combination of the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention and the 
Cybercrime Convention. The cumulative effect of these two legal instruments would 
bind both law enforcement and intelligence services in the processing of data. In sum, 
by promoting the Europol approach to data protection and existing Council of Europe 
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Given the unique power of the state, it is not enough for leaders to say: Trust us, we 
won’t abuse the data we collect.  For history has too many examples when that trust has 
been breached. Our system of government is built on the premise that our liberty cannot 
depend on the good intentions of those in power; it depends on the law to constrain 
those in power.1 
 
US President Obama 
 
1.1.  Subject Matter and Aims 
 
We are in the midst of a war against terrorism. This is the message that governments 
around the world repeat to society every time they launch a new security measure. 
Travellers’ details, financial information, facial recognition programmes and users’ 
activity on the Internet are just some of the data that are being increasingly accessed and 
processed by law enforcement authorities for security purposes. The main objective of 
such governmental surveillance is to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute 
terrorism and other serious criminal offences.  
Although the world has recently been subjected to several acts of terrorism, the wave 
of terror in which we are currently immersed has its origin in the attacks of 9/11, carried 
out by the terrorist group Al-Qaeda. One week after the attack, the UN Security Council 
issued a Resolution calling for global cooperation between the UN contracting parties to 
criminalise all forms of terrorism.2 Governments, therefore, deemed it necessary to 
establish a coordinated worldwide security system. After that event, they intensified 
their mutual cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism. Unfortunately, new attacks 
ocurred, and this time they took place within the European borders. On the morning of 
11 March 2004, coordinated bombings of commuter train in Madrid (Spain) killed 191 
people and wounded 1,800. Similarly, on 7 July 2005 a series of coordinated suicide-
bomb attacks took place on London’s public transport system, killing fifty-six people 
and injuring over 700. Both attacks were led by Al-Qaeda. Most recently, on 7 January 
2015, two French nationals linked to Al-Qaeda killed 12 people in the offices of the 
satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris.  
                                                
1 Press release ‘Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence’, Department of Justice, 
Washington D.C., 17.01.2014. 
2 UN Resolution 1373(2001), 28.09.2001. 
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All of these events have triggered the European Union (EU) to enhance its counter-
terrorism policy, increasing police cooperation within and beyond the European 
territory. In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon brought significant developments with regard to 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The new treaty also permitted the 
adoption of the Stockholm Programme,3 as well as the EU Internal Security Strategy.4 
Both documents emphasised the importance of achieving greater coherence between 
external and internal elements of the work in the AFSJ.  
Many of the measures the EU has adopted consist of the processing and sharing of 
data among law enforcement authorities. The main bone of contention for each of these 
instruments is their potential clash with the EU fundamental right to data protection. 
Data protection is a rather new issue due to the astounding advances in computer 
science and technology of the latter half of the 20th century. It primarily prevents data 
from being misused or lost by private and public entities. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) foresees in Article 12 that ‘no 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence’. The rights to privacy and data protection are thus universal rights and, 
accordingly, the principles and scope of that right should be understood in the same way 
around the world. However, in practice, this is not the case. For instance, many security 
agreements regarding the collection, processing, storage and transfer of personal data 
for law enforcement purposes have been concluded between the US and the EU. One of 
the key tensions during the negotiations of each of these agreements has been related to 
data protection. This is because the EU and the US have numerous legal differences 
they had to face with respect to data protection and privacy matters, and these 
differences have not always been easy to reconcile in the agreements. 
However, this divergence is not only found between the EU and the US systems. The 
EU itself has fragmented laws regarding the processing and protection of personal data 
for law enforcement purposes. This internal fragmentation within the EU causes legal 
insecurity for the EU citizens who seek to protect their personal data. Although Article 
8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrines the right to data protection, this 
has been further developed by specific EU and national laws. Yet, such sectoral laws are 
not consistent with each other, and it ultimately causes a lack of legal protection for the 
individual. 
                                                
3 OJ C 115, 04.05.2010, pp. 1-38. 
4 COM(2010) 673 final, 22.11.2010. 
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The purpose of this research lies in examining the challenges and feasibility for a 
global data protection framework in the field of law enforcement, through looking at the 
EU and its network of external relations as regards data sharing for law enforcement 
purposes and data protection. Global standards for privacy and data protection are 
crucial because the sharing of data no longer has any physical borders. In the age of the 
Internet anyone can learn about and search for just about anything using computers that 
can save, store, and transmit data, as well as by using smart phones, which can do all of 
the above. These inventions have changed the way we live exponentially. Since any 
piece of information can be communicated and shared rapidly from almost anywhere in 
the world, global standards that pose limits to the processing of personal data are more 
necessary now than ever before. 
Many studies have focused on the right to data protection in the area of security. For 
instance, De Busser,5 Boehm,6 Hillebrand,7 O’Neill8 and Tzanou9 have recently 
published studies on data protection in the area of EU counter-terrorism and criminal 
law. All of these studies analyse the internal/external dichotomy of the AFSJ, as well as 
some data-sharing agreements between the EU and the US. Yet, the existing literature is 
fragmented and does not offer a full overview of the current EU data-sharing 
instruments and their data protection rules.  
This thesis aims to achieve a full-fledged analysis of the existing EU frameworks for 
data-sharing for law enforcement purposes within the EU and between the EU and third 
countries, the data protection challenges to which these give rise, and possible responses 
to those challenges at both the EU and global levels. In order to do so, I will first 
analyse and expand the current literature and laws on data-sharing activities among law 
enforcement authorities within and beyond the EU. After that, I will suggest 
mechanisms at the EU and the international levels that could offer adequate data 
                                                
5 De Busser E 2009, Data Protection in EU and US Criminal Cooperation: A Substantive Law Approach 
to the EU Internal and Transatlantic Cooperation in Criminal Matters between Judicial and Law 
Enforcement Authorities, Maklu Publishers, Antwerpen.  
6 Boehm F 2012a, Information Sharing and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
Towards Harmonised Data Protection Principles for Information Exchange at EU-level, Springer, Berlin. 
7 Hillebrand C 2012, Networks in the European Union. Maintaining democratic legitimacy after 9/11, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
8 O’Neill M 2012, The Evolving Counter-Terrorism Legal Framework, Routledge Research in EU Law, 
New York. 
9 Tzanou M 2012, The added value of data protection as a fundamental right in the EU legal order in the 




protection standards when the information is processed for the prevention and combat 
of terrorism and other serious crimes. 
 
1.2.  Limitations of the Research 
 
The scope of this research has certain limitations. First, it is important to highlight that it 
is conducted solely from an EU perspective. The US legal framework is only 
scrutinized to the extent that it is relevant for an EU-US comparison. An analysis of the 
US security measures based on the processing of data is beyond the scope of the present 
study. 
Second, this research focuses on EU law but there are some matters that are not 
looked at. For example, it does not include a full analysis of the existing EU legislation 
and CJEU case law on data protection, but only specific data-sharing rules and cases 
that fall within the area of law enforcement. Moreover, it contains no details about the 
history of EU data protection law. The study is contemporary and the instruments under 
consideration have been mostly adopted in the last decade.  
In addition, it does not examine data processing activities of all EU agencies within 
the AFSJ. Particularly, the study of Frontex and Eurojust is omitted because, even if 
they may process information for law enforcement purposes, they are fundamentally 
composed of custom and judicial authorities respectively. Therefore, the only EU 
agency that is an object of study is Europol.  
CFSP measures are only considered to the extent that they are adjacent to law 
enforcement. Furthermore, the ‘smart borders package’ consisting of the Entry and Exit 
System (EES) and the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) is excluded from this 
thesis since the Commission proposals note that data is not going to be used for law 
enforcement initially. Only after two years from the entry into force of the regulations, 
will the necessity for data access by law enforcement authorities be assessed. 
Finally, it must be mentioned that this study is fundamentally legal and political. The 
historical and social issues related to the causes of terrorism, criminal activities, 
ideologies, etc. are not tackled.10 
 
 
                                                
10 For an analysis on this matter, see Bures O 2011, EU Counterterrorism Policy. A Paper Tiger?, 
Ashgate, Surrey, pp. 10-27. 
 
 5 
1.3.  Methodology and Source Materials 
 
My methodological approach combines both descriptive and normative perspectives. 
Regarding the descriptive approach, it explains in detail the main EU instruments for 
sharing information for law enforcement purposes, the EU-US international agreements 
for the exchange of data, the functioning of Europol, and the EU data protection rules. 
To do so, it conducts an exhaustive study of the legal documents of the EU (treaties, 
regulations, Council decisions, directives, etc.) as well as secondary sources such as 
academic articles, reports and books in the area of data protection and the AFSJ. In 
addition, the present work takes into consideration personal interviews that I conducted 
during internships at the EDPS, from July to October 2012, and at the Europol HQ, 
from May to July 2013. While working for these EU bodies I had the opportunity to talk 
to experts and officials that provided me with relevant information on data protection 
matters. Understanding the current EU laws on data protection for law enforcement is 
critical before venturing into the normative component of this thesis. 
The normative approach focuses on the issues to be considered for the establishment 
of global data protection standards in the field of security. I am seeking to examine the 
current conflict between different regimes to look at what legal rules are available to 
resolve them. I also identify the appropriate level at which the rules should be adopted, 
and I discuss those parties that do manage to strike a balance between data protection 
and security. 
 
1.4.  Terminology 
 
This thesis uses a number of concepts that need further clarification. First of all, the 
terms ‘data protection’ and ‘privacy’ are utilised throughout the chapters according to 
an accepted legal meaning of each. While data protection and privacy are closely linked, 
they are not identical. Privacy is the individual right of control over one’s body, home, 
property, thoughts, feelings, secrets, and identity. In contrast, data protection relates to 
all information on identified or identifiable persons, but it does not protect legal 
persons. It relates to the most essential data that can identify a person (for instance, 
 
 6 
name, fingerprints, ID number, or photographs).11 Despite the differences, privacy and 
data protection complement each other as rights. They both encompass the obligation 
for public and private entities to respect the most intimate information that belong to an 
individual. Numerous jurisprudence of the CJEU has shown that these two rights are 
closely linked, although they are not identical.12 
For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of ‘law enforcement purposes’ and 
‘counter-terrorism purposes’ are not synonyms, since the former is broader than the 
latter. However, on some occasions, I will treat counter-terrorism as an example of law 
enforcement, although it may also be other things. 
Regarding the concepts of ‘data’ and ‘information’, these do not differentiate in 
meaning. Nevertheless, in strict terms, data is the unstructured, raw collected facts and 
figures. When such data is structured and placed within a context, it transforms into 
information.  
The concepts of ‘field of security’ or ‘security actors’ encompass police, intelligence, 
and military agents. Concepts of ‘terrorism’, ‘law enforcement’, ‘organised crime’ and 
‘serious crimes’ do not differentiate among them for the purpose of this thesis. Lastly, 
the term ‘processing of personal data’ is interpreted in the sense of Article of 2(b) of the 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. According to this provision, it includes the 
‘collection, recording, organisation, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction’. 
 
1.5. Structure of Study 
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters, including an introduction and a conclusion. It 
follows a bottom-up approach. From an EU perspective, the establishment of global 
data protection standards can only be conceived consistently if common laws on data 
protection already exist among member states of the EU (hereinafter, member states). 
Therefore, the first chapter of this thesis will begin by studying the EU information 
systems and databases that fall under the ‘internal’ dimension of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ). It will assess both the lack of implementation and use of 
                                                
11 For a detailed discussion of the distinction between the two terms, see Kokott J & Sobotta C 2013, ‘The 
distinction between privacy and data protection in the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’, 
International Data Privacy Law, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 222-228. 
12 See, for instance, C-131/12, 13.05.2014, and C-293/12, 08.04.2014. 
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these EU legal instruments. It will also highlight the expansion of data-sharing 
instruments in the EU. In the last ten years, data-sharing laws that were originally 
created for ensuring the border management and the internal market in the EU have 
been applied in the field of law enforcement. Chapter 1 will critically analyse the 
different data protection provisions in each of these EU instruments and explains how it 
brings fragmentation of the data protection rules in the AFSJ.  
Furthermore, in order to set a standard for global data protection laws, the EU and 
the US would need to agree on the right balance between security and privacy. Chapter 
2 will examine how, after 9/11, external pressures (especially from the US) have 
influenced the EU political and legal environment. In particular, a number of 
international agreements have been concluded between the EU and the US for the 
exchange of crime-related information. The chapter will offer a substantive assessment 
of the EU-US data-sharing agreements and related issues of concern. It will particularly 
discuss the divergent data protection clauses in each of the agreements. In order to 
achieve global data protection standards, the EU and US laws on privacy in the field of 
law enforcement first need to be aligned. 
Chapter 3 deals with Europol. It discusses the possibility that Europol data protection 
rules may become a model to follow for law enforcement authorities’ data exchanges 
within and beyond the EU borders. It sets out the agency’s procedures for the exchange 
of data with member states and third countries, by focusing in particular on the use of 
SIENA. It also discusses the main features of the proposed Europol regulation, and it 
compares the data protection standards of the agency with those applied by law 
enforcement authorities in the member states. It then examines Europol’s data 
exchanges beyond the EU, paying special attention to the relationship between the 
agency and the US. 
There is a close cooperation between law enforcement authorities and intelligence 
services. In the prevention and investigation of crime, these bodies often exchange 
intelligence with each other. But what are the safeguards applicable for data collected or 
accessed by intelligence services? Chapter 4 will provide an analysis of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) programmes and its secret collaboration with the member 
states. It will assess whether the EU could set up data protection rules for the exchange 
of intelligence, despite the Treaty of Lisbon’s exclusion of ‘national security’ matters. It 
will also examine the scope and relevance of Article 39 TEU, and the feasibility of 
using this clause as a way to clarify IntCen’s data transfers. 
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After analysing the challenges and issues of concern for the setting up of global data 
protection standards in the field of security, Chapter 5 will present initiatives for 
establishing international data protection principles. Particularly, it will specifically look 
at the OECD Privacy Guidelines, the APEC Privacy Framework, the UN Guidelines for 
the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, the Council of Europe 1981 
Convention and the Cybercrime CoE Convention. These are all proposals from 
international forums or organisations on the establishment of global data protection 
rules. After a careful examination, it will suggest a combination of the two CoE 
Conventions as the most adequate regulatory system to create a global data protection 
framework. It will also explain how the EU has acquired an important role in 
influencing the CoE in the field of data protection. 
In summary, this thesis will identify specific challenges that the EU needs to 
overcome in the field of law enforcement in order to achieve global rules on data 
protection and privacy. It will conclude that the establishment of an international data 
protection framework for data processed for security purposes requires the EU first to 


















Chapter 1: Data exchanges for law enforcement purposes within the 
EU 
 
This analysis of the feasibility for the establishment of global data protection standards 
in the area of law enforcement will begin by examining the existing EU legislation on 
these matters. The first observation to be made is that member states were originally the 
only competent to legislate in the field of criminal law. National governments enjoyed a 
wide discretion in the adoption of security measures, creating significant differences 
between member states’ criminal systems.13 The same diversity existed for the particular 
rules on the collection and processing of data in the prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of crimes. The main problem resulting from this disparity was the lack 
of police cross-border police cooperation in the exchange of relevant information during 
a criminal investigation. 
Since 9/11, and especially after the Madrid and London attacks in 2004 and 2005 
respectively, the EU has significantly expanded its role within the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) in the area of data enchange by adopting a number of legal 
instruments and systems that would add value to the traditional bilateral criminal-related 
data exchanges between member states.  
In the first chapter of this thesis, I will attempt to concisely review the tools available 
within the EU for exchanging information between law enforcement authorities. It will 
demonstrate the growth in the creation of data-sharing tools used for security purposes 
at the EU level. This expansion includes systems that initially fell under the scope of 
border management and commercial policies. This thesis seeks to find out whether these 
multiple systems and actors are consistent with each other or not. It will also examine if 
these measures are actually effective in preventing and detecting crimes, or if they are 
rather weak in practice.14 
After that, the EU data protection legislation covering the use of these systems and 
databases will be studied. It will specifically examine whether all these instruments 
                                                
13 Luchtman M 2011 ‘Choice of forum in an area of freedom, security and justice’, Utrecht Law Review, 
vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 44-101. 
14 Bures O & Ahern S 2007, ‘The European Model of Building Regional Cooperation Against Terrorism’ 
in Uniting against Terror. Cooperative nonmilitary responses to the global terrorist threat, eds. D 
Cortright & GA López, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Massachusetts, pp. 187 and 223; 
Bures 2011, pp. 245-254. 
 
 10 
operating within the EU offer the same data protection standards for the individuals 
whose data are processed.  
For the last twenty years the EU has been adopting measures in order to approximate 
national data protection legislations. Yet, the field of law enforcement has always been 
subject to special rules and conditions due to the intergovernmental nature of criminal 
laws. Therefore, this chapter will explore the successes and shortcomings that the EU is 
encountering in the establishment of harmonised data protection rules in the field of law 
enforcement. 
 
1. Origin, evolution and scope of the EC/EU legislation on the processing of 
personal data for criminal matters 
 
In the current distribution of competences between the EU and its member states, 
criminal law is, to a large extent, subject to the jurisdiction of each Member State. 
Consequently, twenty-eight criminal codes coexist in the EU.15 Some countries, due to 
their own national background, are characterised as having strong provisions on 
terrorism and other crimes (particularly, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Greece, 
Italy and Portugal), while others do not include many criminal offences in their national 
laws. In the same way, some legal jurisdictions of the member states allow for certain 
elements of extraterritoriality when it comes to prosecuting for crimes, while others do 
not foresee it at all.16  
Today, there is neither an EU institution with operational police powers, nor a 
unified EU criminal jurisdiction.17 Yet, current crimes and offences are often difficult to 
locate in a well-defined country or territory. Often these might be committed in more 
than one country, or even on different continents. The cross-border dimension of crime 
has prompted the establishment of a system of ‘multilevel governance’ on security 
matters,18 in which the EU has progressively adopted measures that coordinate member 
states’ security actions.  
                                                
15 Yet, it is worth noting that there is no ‘criminal code’ in either the UK or Ireland. In those countries,  
criminal law operates on the basis of a mixture of common law and statutes. 
16 For instance, legal jurisdictions of England and Wales allow extraterritoriality for the prosecution of 
crimes, independent of the provisions in the limited number of EU framework decisions, and more 
recently directives, about the establishment of jurisdiction.  
17 Lööf R 2008, Defending liberty and structural integrity: a social contractual analysis of criminal 
justice in the EU, Ph.D thesis, European University Institute, Florence, p. 131. 
18 Lavenex S & Wichmann N 2009, ‘The external governance of EU Internal Security’, Journal of 
European Integration, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 89. 
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The first instruments enabling a cross-border cooperation among member states date 
back to before the Treaty of Lisbon. Before Lisbon, there was no legal basis in the 
Treaties stating that the EU was competent to set up minimum rules on criminal matters. 
Therefore, the existing secondary legislation on that area was quite dispersed. The EU 
nonetheless found a way to legislate on criminal matters by enacting either 
intergovernmental measures within the scope of the former third pillar or directives as 
part of the former first pillar (the European Communities’ pillar).19 With respect to the 
first-pillar legal instruments, a few instruments such as the PNR agreements, the API 
Directive and the now void Data Retention Directive were adopted. Also, regarding the 
former third pillar on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), numerous intergovernmental 
measures for cooperation in law enforcement have come into force since the seventies. 
The Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and political Violence (TREVI) Group was 
established by the European Council in 1976. Its function was to coordinate effective 
counter-terrorism responses among European governments by organising regular 
meetings at the ministerial level.20 The TREVI Group worked on the development of 
Europol (firstly called Europol Drugs Unit (EDU)) and on the definition of ‘terrorism’.21 
In 1979, two new EU initiatives were launched in the field of terrorism: an agreement 
on the application of the European Convention of Terrorism between the member states, 
and the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT). The PWGT was later absorbed 
by the TREVI Group,22 and integrated in the JHA since 1992 with the Maastricht 
Treaty.  
In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced provisions that gave new competences 
to the EU in the field of criminal law. On the one hand, according to the principle of 
subsidiarity, the EU had competence to regulate on criminal matters as long as member 
states were unable to do so.23 On the other hand, Article 31(e) TEU called for the 
                                                
19 See, for instance, case C-170/96 Commission v. Council (Airport Transit Visas) [1998] ECR I-2763, 
case C-176/03 Commission v. Council (Environmental Penalties) [2005] ECR I-7879, joined cases C-
317/04 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council (Passenger Name Recognition) [2006] ECR I-4721, case C-
440/05, Commission v. Council (Ship Source Pollution) [2007] ECR 2007 page I-09097, and case C-
91/05 ECOWAS judgment (SALW), [2008] ECR page I-03651. 
20 Bunyan T 1993 ‘Trevi, Europol and the European state’, Statewatching the new Europe, pp. 1-5. 
21 O’Neill 2012, p. 18. 
22 Kurth Cronin A & Ludes JM 2004, Attacking terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy, Georgetown 
University Press, Washington D.C., p. 154. 
23 For a deeper analysis of the principle of subsidiarity in the field of criminal law, see Baumeister P 2008, 
‘Das Subsdiaritätprinzip und seine Bedeutung im Bereich der polizeilichen und justiziellen 
Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen’, Alternativenentwurf Europol und europäischer Datenschutz, eds. Jürgen 




establishment of minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of terrorist acts and 
penalties. The treaty set rules for the first time on JHA, and TREVI was officially 
dissolved.24 Two other Working Groups on criminal matters were established that year: 
the Terrorism Working Group (TWG) and the Working Party on Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters. While the first was composed of member states’ interior ministers 
and focused on law enforcement cooperation against internal security threats, the latter 
promoted mutual recognition of criminal acts and judgments within the EU. In essence, 
the idea of cooperating against terrorism and cross-border crimes became an EU priority 
with the Treaty of Maastricht.  
Particularly relevant for this thesis is the role of Europol. Europol started functioning 
as the EDU within the framework of TREVI III, dealing mainly with drug-trafficking 
and money-laundering cases. In 1995, it extended its competences and covered also 
counter-terrorism investigations.25 Rules governing this body were first enclosed in the 
Europol Convention, which was ratified by all member states in 1999. From that 
moment, Europol became the European law enforcement organisation responsible for 
assisting member states 24/7 in the prevention and combat of serious forms of crime. 
Today, Europol is the largest AFSJ agency,26 covering any crime that affects the 
common interest of the EU, as well as those serious crimes affecting two or more 
member states.27  
In 1997, three other initiatives were incorporated as part of the JHA. First, the 
Counter-Terrorism Working Group or COTER was established. It deals with current 
issues in the area of international cooperation against terrorism. Second, the 
Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime was created.28 It draws up guidelines for 
the coordinated fight against organised crime. Lastly, the Council established the Article 
36 Committee (CATS). This committee coordinates the competent Council working 
groups in the field of police and judicial cooperation and prepares relevant work of the 
Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER).29 
The AFSJ has its origins in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999. Although the policy 
                                                
24 O’Neill 2012, p. 18. 
25 O’Neill 2012, pp. 71-72. 
26 Boehm F 2012b, ‘Information sharing in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – Towards a 
common standard for data exchange between agencies and EU information systems’ in European Data 
Protection: In Good Health?, eds. Gutwirth S, Leenes R, de Hert P & Poullet Y, Springer, Berlin, p. 177. 
27 Europol is thoroughly examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
28 Now replaced by the Working Party on General Matters. 
29 CATS has now turned into the COSI Committee, regulated in Article 71 TFEU. 
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has no recognised definition to date, numerous scholars have tried to make sense of this 
new concept in their studies. In that sense, Wolf, Wichmann & Mounier define it as: 
 
‘An attempt to provide an overall strategic orientation to punctual measures 
adopted in the policy area of JHA, such as border management, the fight against 
terrorism and the fight against organized crime.’30 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam established in Article 61(e) TEU that the Council needed 
to adopt measures in the area of police and judicial cooperation that would enshrine a 
high level of security and would conform to the TEU. The treaty amended some 
provisions of the JHA policy area. For instance, policies on border checks, asylum and 
immigration were moved from the former third pillar to the first, enhancing the 
Community’s jurisdiction to adopt measures on criminal matters. Likewise, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) became competent to decide on the AFSJ 
legislation that fell under the scope of the first pillar. However, provisions on police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained as former third-pillar policies. 
Consequently, the only way for the EC to legislate on such areas was by widely 
interpreting criminal measures as part of the scope of either customs union or internal 
market policies.31   
Thus, by the end of the nineties the EU had launched some initiatives to approximate 
national measures in the field of criminal matters. Among them, the Tampere 
Conclusions of 1999 are to be highlighted. They set up the European Police Chiefs Task 
Force as a forum where high-ranking national policemen could discuss cross-border 
security matters. Also, in the Tampere Conclusions the European Council pinpointed 
the need for a ‘common effort […] to prevent and fight crime and criminal 
organisations throughout the Union’.32 However, the ratification of some of these 
measures was slow, and they were only accelerated after the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001. 
                                                
30 Wolff S, Wichmann N & Mounier G 2009, ‘The external dimension of justice and home affairs: A 
different security agenda for the EU?’, European Integration vol. 31, no. 1, p. 10. 
31 This is examined in section 3.2.3 of this chapter with respect to the void Directive 2006/24/EC. 
32 European Council. Tampere Conclusions, 15-16.10.1999. 
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The 9/11 attacks had a significant impact on the EU legislation, particularly on the 
adoption of new laws within the scope of the AFSJ.33 The first EU action plan on 
terrorism was adopted on 16 October 2001 and it enabled intelligence services of the 
member states to exchange information and to increase their cooperation.34 Likewise, 
the creation of the Counter-terrorism Group (CTG) and the CP 931 Working Party35 
took place right after the attacks. The EU also adopted the European Security Strategy, 
in which it announced its aim of contributing to the global security through external 
actions.36  
The Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC) enacted many resolutions for 
the prevention and fight against terrorism to be implemented by its contracting parties 
(including all EU Members). But resolutions from the UNSC are not self-executing and 
they required a national enforcement mechanism. Therefore, the EU had to adopt 
measures implementing such UN resolutions before they were incorporated in the 
domestic laws of the member states. Especially important was the Common Position 
2001/930/CFSP on countering terrorism,37 which implemented the UNSC Resolution 
1373 (2001). Similarly, Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism provided for the first time a common definition for the crime of terrorism 
among the member states, and it obliged them to implement that crime in their criminal 
codes.38  
The EU security measures for the exchange of information increased dramatically 
after 9/11. Data exchanges between member states and EU bodies became a crucial tool 
for the prevention of future similar attacks. Nevertheless, more terrorist attacks 
occurred: on 11 March 2004 when bombs were simultaneously detonated on the 
commuter train system in Madrid and, one year later, on 7 July 2005, similar bombings 
took place on three underground trains and a bus in central London.  
                                                
33 Hayes B & Jones C 2013, ‘Catalogue of EU Counter-Terrorism Measures Adopted since 11 September 
2001’, SECILE: Securing Europe through Counter-Terrorism – Impact, Legitimacy & Effectiveness, p. 
25. Available from <secile.eu> [22 October 2014]. 
34 Council of the European Union, 12800/01, ‘Note from the Presidency. Co-ordination of 
Implementation of the Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism’, 16.10.2001.  
35 OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, pp. 93-96. 
36 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy, A secure Europe in a better World, 
12.12.2003. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 
37 OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, pp. 90-92. 
38 OJ L 164, 22.06.2002, pp. 3–7. 
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The EU institutions launched several initiatives after the attacks in Madrid and 
London. The European Council issued a declaration39 in 2004, which was reaffirmed in 
2005.40 They highlighted the need to adopt common measures on the retention of 
telecommunications data as soon as possible. In response to both declarations, the 
Commission launched a series of communications41 suggesting ways how to improve 
the coordination of counter-terrorism activities inside the EU institutions and how to 
enhance the member states’ access to information. These communications also proposed 
the establishment of an integrated approach in the fight against terrorism. In 2005, two 
other EU instruments came into force: Council Decision 2005/671/JHA on the exchange 
of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences,42 and the Hague 
Programme.43 Even though this programme has been described as relatively timid by 
some scholars,44 it contained several recommendations for the intensification of police 
cooperation within the EU, and the establishment of systems for the cross-border 
exchange of information.  
The Madrid bombings motivated the creation of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator 
(CTC) in 2004.45 The CTC is tasked with monitoring and implementing the EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This strategy sought the exchange of information and 
cooperation concerning terrorist offences and was finally adopted in 2005.46 The EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy was based on four main pillars: prevention, protection, 
pursuit and response. Although the role of the CTC has been often criticized for not 
having any executive powers, this figure exerts significant influence in numerous 
decisions in the field of counter-terrorism.47 
One day before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, several EU measures related 
to the exchange of information in the field of law enforcement were adopted.48 The 
                                                
39 Council of the European Union, Declaration on combating terrorism, 25.03.2004. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/79637.pdf 
40 Council of the European Union, Declaration on condemning the terrorist attacks on London, 
13.07.2005 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/85703.pdf 
41 COM(2004) 376 final, 18.05.2004; COM (2004) 429 final, 16.06.2004; COM(2004) 698 final, 
COM(2004) 702 final, COM(2004) 701 final and COM(2004) 700 final, 20.10.2004. 
42 OJ L 253, 29.09.2005, pp. 22-24. 
43 OJ C 53, 03.03.2005, pp. 1-14. 
44 For instance, Bures 2011, p. 70. 
45 The current CTC is Gilles de Kerchove. 
46 Council of the European Union, 14469/4/05 REV 4, 30.11.2005.  
47 Mackenzie A, Bures O, Kaunert C & Léonard S 2013, ‘The European Union Counter-terrorism 
Coordinator and the External Dimension of the European Union Counter-terrorism Policy’, Perspectives 
on European Politics and Society, vol. 14 no. 3, pp. 325-338. 
48 These EU measures are Framework Decision 2009/902 setting up a European Crime Prevention 
Network (EUCPN) and repealing Decision 2001/427; Decision 2009/917 on the use of information 
 
 16 
main reason for this was to avoid the new EU policy-making procedure, in which the 
European Parliament (EP) would vote for those security measures within the scope of 
the AFSJ in co-decision with the Council. 
When the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in December 2009, the legal paradigm 
changed. One of the main amendments was the removal of the pillars and the shared 
competence between the EU and its member states on the AFSJ,49 including data-
sharing security measures.50 The Treaty of Lisbon also incorporates an explicit legal 
basis for the approximation of national criminal laws in Article 83 TFEU. According to 
this clause, the EU can establish: 
 
‘Minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in 
the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the 
nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common 
basis’.  
 
Thanks to this provision, the EU has expanded the definition of terrorism and it has 
also established a common list of terrorist groups. These EU common rules seek to 
complement national criminal laws, without replacing them. This is explicitly 
underlined in Article 276 TFEU, which states that: 
 
‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no jurisdiction to review 
the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law-
enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities 
incumbent upon member states with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security.’ 
 
The EU can also create rules on how to ensure the implementation of EU measures at 
the national level.51 According to Protocol 36, attached to the Treaty of Lisbon, member 
                                                
technology for customs purposes; Decision 2009/934 adopting the implementing rules governing 
Europol’s relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified information; 
Decision 2009/936 adopting the implementing rules for Europol analysis work files; Decision 2009/968 
adopting the rules on the confidentiality of Europol information. 
49 Article 3(2) TFEU and Article 4(2)(j) TFEU. 
50 Articles 82(1) and 87(2)(a) TFEU. 
51 See for instance, Directive 2013/40/EU for the harmonisation of criminal sanctions and procedures 
against cyber attacks, OJ L 218, 18.08.2013, pp. 8-14. 
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states had to implement those EU instruments consisting of the exchange of data among 
law enforcement (formerly adopted under the third pillar) by 1 December 2014.52 
Article 10(4) of the protocol foresaw the possibility that the UK would not implement 
such instruments as long as the notification was made at least six months before the 
expiration of the transitional period. The UK notified its intention to opt-out in 201353 
and later opted back in again to 35 measures.54 Today, the UK is bound by some of the 
current EU data-sharing systems – but not all of them.55  
The Treaty of Lisbon also includes the participation of the EP and the CJEU in the 
decision and review of EU measures for the fight against terrorism and organised crime. 
Lastly, the solidarity clause of Article 222 TFEU binds member states to provide 
assistance and to mobilise all instruments and resources at their disposal in case of a 
terrorist attack. 
After the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the fear of a new terrorist attack within 
the EU reappeared, and France and Germany were the main targets.56 In consequence, 
new EU measures in the field of criminal law were enacted. The Commission released 
communications announcing its intentions to strengthen the EU counter-terrorism and 
criminal policies,57 and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Information Exchange for an 
Information Management Strategy was subsequently established.58 
Particularly relevant is the adoption of the Stockholm Programme in December 
2009,59 in an attempt to assess the evolution and achievement of policies that were part 
of the AFSJ. In it, the Commission highlighted the primary concerns, and it introduced 
                                                
52 List of the former third pillar acquis: Council of the European Union, 9930/14, 19.05.2014. 
53 Letter from the European Parliament President to the Commission on UK JHA OPT-OUT, 02.08.2013; 
and letter from the Commission President to the European Parliament, 5.9.2013. See also UK House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘Pre-Lisbon Treaty EU police and criminal justice measures: the 
UK’s opt-in decision’, Ninth Report of Session 2013–14, 29.10.2013. On the consequences of this 
exception, see the Proposal for a Council Decision determining certain consequential and transitional 
arrangements concerning the cessation of participation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland in certain acts of the Union in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, COM(2014) 596 final, 
26.09.2014. 
54  Miller V 2014 ‘The UK block opt-out in police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters: recent 
developments’, House of Commons, International Affairs and Defence Section, Standard Note: 
SN/IA/6930, 10.11.2014. 
55 For instance, the UK has decided to rejoin SIS II, CIS, ECRIS, Eurojust, Europol and the Swedish 
initiative, to name but a few. See ‘Protocol 36 to the Treaty of Lisbon on transitional provision: the 
position of the United Kingdom’, European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs 2014 – 2019, November 2014. 
56 Kaunert C 2012 ‘Conclusion: assessing the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism –ten years on’, 
European Security, vol. 21 no. 4, p. 578. 
57 COM(2010)386 final, 20.07.2010 and COM(2011) 573 final, 20.09.2011. 
58 Council of the European Union, 16637/09, 25.11.2009. 
59 OJ C 115, 04.05.2010, pp. 1-38 
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broad recommendations within the AFSJ. Likewise, the programme identified the 
increasing amount of data exchanged among member states during criminal 
proceedings, and it referred to the current data-processing instruments. 
The Stockholm Programme was put into action by the Council and the Commission. 
In February 2010 the Council released a ‘Draft Internal Security Strategy for the 
European Union: Towards a European Security Model’,60 while in November that year 
the Commission issued a detailed communication on ‘The EU Internal Security Strategy 
in Action: five steps towards a more secure Europe’.61 At the same time, the Council 
adopted Decision 2010/131/EU,62 which set up the Standing Committee on Internal 
Security (COSI). According to Article 3(1) of that decision, the COSI’s purpose is to 
facilitate and ensure effective operational cooperation and coordination between police 
and customs authorities. COSI is also responsible for helping ensure consistency in the 
activities of Eurojust, Europol, Frontex and other relevant bodies that may be invited to 
attend the Committee’s meetings as observers.63 Yet, its meetings have often been 
criticised because they gather only national law enforcement officials from member 
states, but not bodies in charge of fundamental freedoms and rights (e.g. privacy 
rights).64 
Regarding the data-sharing measures for law enforcement purposes, the Commission 
released communications in 2010 and 2012.65 In them, it underlined that ‘no new EU-
level law enforcement databases or information exchange instruments are […] needed at 
this stage’.66 However, the paradigm changed after the terrorist attacks occurred in Paris 
on 7 January 2015. After this tragedy, Ministers of Home Affairs of the member states 
met in Paris to decide on the adoption of new counter-terrorism measures within the 
EU. These will reinforce the police and intelligence cooperation in the exchange of 
crime-related information. However, at the time of writing this thesis, there is no 
certainty as to the exact measures that will be proposed. Therefore, this thesis will only 
                                                
60 Council of the European Union, 5842/2/10, 23.02.2010. 
61 COM(2010)673 final, 22.11.2010; Council of the European Union, 16797/10, 23.11.2010. 
62 OJ L 52, 03.03.2010, p. 50. 
63 Article 5 of Decision 2010/131/EU. 
64 Scherrer A, Jeandesboz J & Guittet EM 2011, ‘Developing an EU internal security strategy, fighting 
terrorism and organised crime’. European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies. Policy 
Department C: Citizens’ rights and Constitutional Affairs. Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affaires, 
Brussels, p. 45. 
65 COM(2010)385 final, 20.07.2010 and COM(2012)735 final, 07.12.2012. 
66 COM(2012)735 final, 07.12.2012, p. 2. 
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analyse the data-sharing instruments and databases that are functioning today within the 
field of security.  
 
2.  EU data-sharing instruments for law enforcement purposes  
 
Two methods for the exchange of crime-related information within the EU can be 
distinguished. The first one refers to the traditional mutual legal assistance (MLA) 
procedure between member states. It is a pure bilateral contract that allows member 
state ‘A’ to request specific information from member state ‘B’, and the latter has the 
obligation to transfer it. This system has been commonly used within the EU to gather 
evidence, information about previous convictions, fingerprints and many other relevant 
data during a criminal investigation.  
However, after 9/11 and especially after the Madrid and London terrorist attacks, the 
EU has been seeking a stronger integration of its member states within the AFSJ. 
Therefore, a number of EU instruments have been adopted to centralise and coordinate 
the exchange of information. These serve as an alternative to the traditional MLA 
procedures and deepen the EU integration in the field of criminal matters. The sections 
below will analyse whether these systems work in a consistent manner, and whether 
they offer sufficient data protection safeguards. 
 
2.1. The use of traditional mutual legal assistance procedures within the EU 
 
In order to understand the raison d’être of the European information systems, a few 
words about the functioning of the traditional mutual legal assistance (MLA) procedures 
are needed. The MLA procedures could be defined as the first step to reach a full 
mutual recognition among member states. Mutual recognition is regulated in Article 
82(2)(a) TFEU and it was first created as part of the EU economic policy. Resulting 
from the establishment of the single market, member states had to find the way to 
recognise goods and products from other EU countries as equivalent in quality as their 
own domestic products. Today mutual recognition applies to other legal areas that are 
not harmonised at the EU level, such as criminal law. The new European Investigation 
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Order (EIO), examined below, is one example of a measure applying mutual 
recognition in criminal matters.67  
As noted above, member states differ in their criminal procedural systems. Thus, 
when a criminal investigation is carried out in one member state by a particular national 
judicial authority, the procedures and laws enforced do not coincide in other EU 
countries.68 This hinders the efficient cooperation between member states in the 
exchange of criminal information. Therefore, both the Tampere and the Hague 
Programmes defined mutual recognition as the cornerstone of the EU judicial 
cooperation.69 
In cases where mutual recognition is not possible, the traditional mutual legal 
assistance (MLA) procedures can still apply. The Commission defines the MLA 
procedure as: 
 
‘The cooperation between different countries for the purpose of gathering and 
exchanging information, and requesting and providing assistance in obtaining evidence 
located in one country to assist in criminal investigations or proceedings in another.’70 
 
                                                
67 Some other examples are Framework Decision 2005/214 on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to financial penalties, 24 February 2005; Framework Decision 2006/783 on the application of 
the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, 6 October 2006; Framework Decision 
2008/909 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters 
imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their 
enforcement in the European Union, 27 November 2008; Framework Decision 2008/947 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with the view to 
the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions, 27 November 2008; Framework Decision 
2009/299 amending Framework Decision 2002/584, 2005/214, 2006/783, 2008/947, thereby enhancing 
the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the 
absence of the person concerned at the trial, 26 February 2009; and Framework Decision 2009/829 on the 
application, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition to 
decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention, 23 October 2009. 
68 Jones C 2011, ‘Implementing the “principle of availability”: The European Criminal Records 
Information System, The European Police Records Index System, The Information Exchange Platform 
for Law Enforcement Authorities’, Statewatch Analysis, p. 5. Available from <www.statewatch.com> [22 
October 2014]; Sayers D 2011, ‘The European Investigation Order Travelling without a “roadmap”’, 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, p. 3; Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen G & Surano L 2008, 
‘Analysis of the future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the European Union’, Institute for 
European Studies, Université Libre de Bruxelle, ECLAN Report, p. 23. Available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/mutual_recognition_en.pdf [23 October 2014]. 
69 Tampere European Council Conclusions, 15-16.10.1999; Council of the European Union, 14898/13, 
16.10.2013, p. 3. 
70 European Commission, ‘Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition’, Available from 




The main distinction between the mutual recognition and the MLA regimes is the 
power of the executing authority: under the mutual recognition system, the national 
judicial authority directly orders the foreign authority to recognise and execute a 
decision. The grounds for refusal by the foreign authorities are very limited here. In 
contrast, the MLA regime gives the foreign Member State the discretion to refuse the 
execution of the order.71 This section focuses exclusively on the analysis of the MLA 
procedure, since it predominates in the exchange of information among law 
enforcement forces. 
Mutual legal assistance was originally only regulated by the Council of Europe. In 
particular, the Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters (hereinafter, MLA 
Convention) dates back to 1959 and has been ratified by all member states.72 It is 
accompanied by two protocols, signed in 1978 and 2001. Although EU member states 
adopted rules on mutual legal assistance since 1959, the establishment of a MLA 
procedure within the EU to assist cross-border exchanges of information for law 
enforcement purposes became a major necessity back in mid-1990s.73 During those 
years the Treaty of Amsterdam and Tampere European Council called for an 
enhancement of MLA in criminal matters as part of the programme for developing an 
AFSJ.74  
MLA procedures were reinforced in 2000. That year, the Council adopted an act 
supplementing the MLA Convention between the member states (hereinafter, EU MLA 
Convention).75 It was accompanied by a protocol,76 which came into force in 2005. The 
EU MLA Convention includes new mechanisms for the exchange of information within 
the EU such as the creation of Joint Investigation Teams (hereinafter, JITs).77 JITs were 
first regulated in the Council Framework Decision 2002/465/JHA78 and consist of an 
agreement signed by two or more member states to conduct a criminal investigation 
together for a limited period. 
                                                
71 Mangiaracina A 2014, ‘A new and controversial scenario in the gathering of evidence at the European 
level: The proposal for a Directive on the European Investigation Order’, Utrecht Law Review, vol. 10, 
no. 1, pp. 115-116. 
72 Council of Europe, European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 20.4.1959.  
73 The Joint Action 98/427 on good practice in mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (OJ L 191, 
07.07.1998), was adopted within this context. 
74 Jones 2011, p. 9. 
75 OJ C 197, 12.07.2000, pp. 1-23. 
76 OJ C 326, 21.11.2001, pp. 1-8. 
77 Article 13 EU MLA Convention. Later JITs were further regulated in Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, 
OJ L 253, 29.09.2005, pp. 22-24. 
78 OJ L 162, 20.06.2002, pp. 1-3. 
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Although MLA procedures have been designed to enable a fluent communication 
among EU police and judicial authorities, their use has been subject to several problems 
in practice. First, MLA procedures consist of a flexible and discretionary system that 
requires a case-by-case consideration by the requested member state. This procedure 
creates uncertainty because it is the requested country that decides whether it wants to 
provide the information or not. Second, the procedure does not always involve a court 
authorisation over the particular information collected.79 Finally, the MLA Convention 
does not include rules on automated processes and response times for requests. 
Although Article 5(4) of the EU MLA Convention obliges the requested authority to 
inform without delay, there is no mandatory rule on the length of the procedure, so it 
tends to be slow. All of these issues cause uncertainty for the actors participating in the 
MLA procedures, since the system varies from one country to the other, and from case 
to case. 
Trying to overcome the flaws of the MLA procedures, the EU decided to adopt 
complementary legal instruments, which facilitated the cooperation of law enforcement 
authorities in the exchange of data. These are the Swedish initiative, the Prüm 
Decisions, the ECRIS Decisions, and the EIO initiative.  
 
2.2.  Post-9/11 data-sharing instruments  
 
The Madrid terrorist attacks of 2004 highlighted the necessity to create a better system 
for accessing and exchanging crime-related information between member states. In that 
sense, the Hague Programme noted that ‘full use [had to] be made of new technology 
and that there [had to] be reciprocal access to national databases’.80 At that time, the EU 
had only a few instruments regulating cross-border law enforcement data exchanges, 
such as the Europol and Eurojust Conventions, the EU Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters 2000, and the Council Framework Decision on Joint 
Investigation Teams. 
In particular, MLA procedures had too many limitations, since they were only 
designed to share information bilaterally and, as described above, it can take months 
from the moment a member state receives the information requested from another 
                                                
79 EDRI 2013, ‘An introduction to Data Protection’, EDRI Papers, no. 6, p. 18. Available from: 
http://www.edri.org/files/paper06_datap.pdf [23 October 2014]. 
80 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, recital 7. OJ L 210, 06.08.2008, pp. 1-11. 
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member state. For those reasons, the EU established other legal instruments to be 
implemented by member states in order to accelerate, simplify and intensify the 
cooperation between them in the exchange of information. 
The first instrument adopted by the EU for improving the cooperation among EU 
member states in the exchange of criminal information was Council Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA81 (hereinafter, the Swedish initiative or the Framework 
Decision) in 2006. According to Article 1 of the Framework Decision, it has the 
following purpose: 
 
‘To establish the rules under which Member States’ law enforcement authorities 
may exchange existing information and intelligence effectively and expeditiously for 
the purpose of conducting criminal investigations or criminal intelligence operations.’  
 
This Framework Decision requires complying with the ‘principle of availability’,82 
which guarantees the requesting Member State ‘equivalent access’83 to that offered to 
the internal authorities. This principle, which was first introduced in the Hague 
Programme,84 means that a Member State cannot request conditions stricter than those 
required for its national law enforcement authorities for a purely internal case.85 
Regarding the time limits, Article 4 establishes that transfers for urgent cases86 should 
not exceed eight hours from the moment the request is sent. In contrast, non-urgent 
requests may take up to fourteen days until the requesting Member State receives the 
information.  
The Swedish initiative was later complemented by the Prüm procedures. Prüm is a 
decentralised system of national databases that dates back to 2005. That year, five 
member states – Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Austria – signed the Prüm Convention,87 which aimed at achieving a closer cooperation 
between member states in the investigation of crimes with a potential cross-border 
                                                
81 OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, pp. 89-100. 
82 Council of the European Union, 15278/11, 14.10.2011, p. 2. 
83 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Strengthening law 
enforcement cooperation in the EU: the European Information Exchange Model (EIXM), 
COM(2012)735, 07.12.2012, p. 2. 
84 The Hague Programme, point 2.1. 
85 Article 3 of Swedish initiative. 
86 Member states agreed that the notion of urgency should be interpreted in a restricted manner. Council 
of the European Union, 15278/11, 14.10.2011, p. 4. 
87 Council of the European Union, 10900/05, 07.07.2012. 
 
 24 
dimension. As in the Swedish initiative, it sought ‘to overcome lengthy mutual legal 
assistance bureaucratic procedures by establishing a single national contact point’.88 
Through these contact units, member state ‘A’ could send a request to Member State 
‘B’ to check whether the latter had DNA, fingerprint, or vehicle data for a specific 
target. If so, a ‘hit’ would be sent to the requesting Member State and, only then, that 
country would be able to send a second request for accessing such data.89 
Originally, the Prüm Convention was a purely intergovernmental agreement and, 
therefore, it fell outside the scope of the EU treaties. Criticism about the lack of 
transparency90 led to a change in the Prüm Convention’s nature in 2008. A proposal to 
integrate Prüm into the EU laws was presented in January 2007 by the German 
Presidency of the Council91 and, one year later, the provisions of the treaty were 
transposed into EU instruments by Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA92 and 
2008/616/JHA93 (hereinafter, the Prüm Decisions).  
The Prüm Decisions are based on the main provisions of the former Prüm 
Convention, but they improve and speed up the exchange of information.94 Exchange 
mechanisms for DNA, fingerprint (FP) and vehicle registration data (VRD) of the Prüm 
Convention have also been transposed into the legal framework of the EU.95 In the new 
instrument, a distinction is made between DNA and FP exchange on the one hand, and 
VRD on the other. For the first two categories of data, which are biometric, the 
mechanism operates on a ‘hit/no-hit’ basis,96 and the related personal data are only 
provided in response to a separate follow-up request. In other words, in the case of a hit, 
the national contact point conducting the search receives only a confirmation, but never 
                                                
88 Töpfer E 2011, ‘Europe’s emerging web of DNA databases’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 21 no. 1. 
Available from http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=30566 [23 October 2014]. 
89 Soleto Muñoz H & Fiodorova A 2014, ‘DNA and law enforcement in the European Union: Tools and 
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90 European Parliament, ‘Working Document on a Council Decision on the stepping up of crossborder 
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93 OJ L 210, 06.08.2008, pp. 12-72. 
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crisis situations, OJ L 210, 06.08.2008, pp. 73-75. 
95 COM(2012) 735, 07.12.2012, p. 4. 
96 The hit/no hit system means that DNA profiles or fingerprints found at a crime scene in one Member 
State can be compared with profiles held in databases of other member states. 
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the information on the DNA or FP samples.97 After a hit, the requesting authorities are 
required to use pre-existing bilateral or multilateral agreements (e.g. MLA procedures, 
the Swedish initiative, etc.) for obtaining the necessary biometric data.98 
Along with the Swedish initiative and the Prüm Decisions, a further instrument was 
launched in 2004:99 the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS). 
Designed for the exchange of information on convictions among member states, ECRIS 
was the successor of the Network of Judicial Registers, a tool set up by Germany, 
France, Spain and Belgium in 2003. In 2005, the Commission released a white paper 
shaping the initiative100 and, a few months later, the Council adopted Decision 
2005/876/JHA on the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record,101 
which was later amended as Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA.102  
In the course of any national criminal proceeding, ECRIS allows police and judicial 
authorities to obtain information about all previous convictions registered in 
other member states. With the same purpose, the Commission adopted two other legal 
instruments in 2009: Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA on the exchange of 
information extracted from criminal records,103 and the Implementation of the Council 
Decision 2009/316/JHA on the establishment of the European Criminal Records 
Information System104 (hereinafter, the ECRIS Decisions). The ECRIS Decisions 
established rules among member states for the exchange of information on convictions 
and data extracted from criminal records. Through this system, any EU country could 
access comprehensive information on the offending history of any EU citizen, 
irrespective of the country in which the person was convicted. As a result, the 
possibility for offenders to escape their criminal past simply by moving from one 
Member State to another was extinguished.  
As for the mechanisms for communication, messages are transmitted by the ECRIS 
software installed in every Member State. This software is programmed to notify the 
                                                
97 Hernanz 2011, p. 8. 
98 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, recital 10. 
99 COM(2010) 385 final, 20.07.2010, p. 12. 
100 European Commission, White Paper on exchanges of information on convictions and the effect of such 
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102 OJ L 220, 15.08.2008, pp. 32-34. 
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 26 
end of the data retention after thirty days. Regarding the categories of data, the system 
allows the sending of fingerprint imagery and alphanumerical data.105 
The last of the EU data-sharing instruments to be studied in this chapter is the 
European Investigation Order (EIO). The EIO is a judicial decision issued by a Member 
State in order to have one or several specific investigative measure(s) carried out in 
another Member State with the purpose of gathering evidence.106 The EU decided to 
establish a comprehensive system for obtaining evidence in cross-border dimension 
cases107 after some member states complained that existing instruments for sharing 
evidence constituted a fragmentary regime.108 These countries submitted an initiative to 
the EP and the Council on which they proposed a Directive for the EIO. The proposal 
was officially launched in April 2010,109 but this was not adopted until April 2014.110 It 
is based on Article 76(2) TFEU and binds all member states except for Denmark and 
Ireland.111  
The current ways of obtaining evidence from abroad are either by commission 
rogatoires or letters of request.112 As seen above, MLA procedures have often been 
criticised for being slow and inefficient. In this sense, the EIO has partially replaced 
those systems of criminal evidence-exchange by integrating them into a single, efficient 
and flexible instrument for obtaining evidence. Based on the mutual recognition 
principle, it facilitates judicial cooperation, simplifying the procedure through a single 
instrument, and helping national law enforcement agencies become more effective in 
the combat of cross-border crime.113  
As regards the types of data processed, the EIO applies to almost all investigative 
measures,114 regardless of the type of evidence.115 It includes bank data, phone records, 
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DNA, statements from suspects or witnesses, the interception of communications, 
analyses of documents, and fingerprints, to name but a few.116 Moreover, the EIO 
Directive is not only used to exchange existing evidence, but it also shares information 
that does not yet exist but might be necessary for an investigation. For example, France 
requests that Spain monitors certain suspects in real time, or asks it to obtain DNA 
samples and fingerprints.117 The evidence does not exist yet, but this activity can still be 
requested through an EIO. 
In conclusion, the growth of global terrorism in the last fifteen years has entailed the 
creation of several data-sharing instruments within the EU borders. These multilateral 
instruments coexist with the MLA procedures and they have the purpose of establishing 
better cooperation in the exchange of criminal information among member states. 
Leaving aside the debated added value of these instruments in practice,118 the next 
section identifies their shortcomings in the terms of their implementation and use. 
 
2.3. Shortcomings in the implementation and use of EU legal instruments for 
exchanging criminal information 
 
The Swedish initiative, the Prüm Decisions, the ECRIS Decisions and the EIO initiative 
aim at facilitating the exchange of criminal information among police and judicial 
agents. However, these instruments have presented two main problems in practice: an 
enormous delay in their implementation, and confusion regarding how and when these 
systems should be used.  
 
2.3.1.  Delay in the implementation 
 
There is a general transposition failure among member states associated with the EU 
counter-terrorism measures.119 This problem has been apparent in all aforementioned 
                                                
116 Articles 24-27 of the EIO Directive. 
117 Mangiaracina 2014, p. 120. 
118 There are some scholars who believe that the EU offers a very little added value to the existing 
security measures of its member states. In this sense, see Bossong RS 2008, ‘The Action Plan on 
combating terrorism – A flawed instrument of EU security governance’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 46 no. 1, pp. 27-48; Coolsaet R 2010, ‘EU counterterrorism strategy: value added or 
chimera?’, International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 4, pp. 857-873; Bures 2011. 
119 Argomaniz J 2010, ‘Before and after Lisbon: legal implementation as the ‘Achilles heel’ in EU 
counter-terrorism?’, European Security, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 297-316. 
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EU data-sharing instruments except for the EIO Directive, which member states have 
time to transpose until 22 May 2017.120 
Several member states have not yet implemented the Swedish initiative.121 In 
September 2014 the Council released new guidelines for accelerating the 
implementation process and use of this system. Member states were requested to fill out 
a factsheet with the list of information that is directly accessible to their national law 
enforcement authorities, other authorities, and private entities. Information that requires 
a prior court order to be accessed, the languages used, Single Point of Contact (SPOC) 
and their contact details were also requested. That information was communicated by 1 
October 2014,122 but the implementation process in these countries is not yet finalised. 
In the case of the Prüm Decisions, although all member states have now legally 
transposed them the system is not yet fully operational. In particular, a few member 
states have not yet installed the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) 7.0 for DNA 
data searches system,123 and none of them have it up and running.124 The same occurs 
with the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) for fingerprints, which is 
only partially operational in all member states.125 The European Car and Driving 
License Information System (EUCARIS) for vehicle registration data searches is more 
successful that the previous two programmes, but in only thirteen countries is it fully 
active.126 Lastly, member states had to send a data protection questionnaires to the 
Council before the implementation of Prüm,127 but only nineteen of the twenty-eight 
member states have submitted them to date.128  
With regard to ECRIS, all member states implemented the system by April 2012, but 
many of them still lack the technical infrastructure to connect their criminal records 
                                                
120 Article 36 of EIO Directive. 
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125 Annex 4 of Council of the European Union, 5124/4/14 REV 4, 27.06.2014, pp. 18-21. 
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systems.129 In order to fix this, in October 2014 the Council released guidelines 
describing ECRIS technical specifications to be followed by member states.130 
Moreover, the system might change in the near future, since the Commission is 
considering adding a supplementary index in the programme that stores criminal records 
from non-EU nationals who have committed crimes in a member state.131  
There are many factors that explain the lack of implementation and usage of the EU 
information systems. Some of the reasons given include: the absence of political will, 
the existence of institutional weaknesses in some countries, and the fact that before 
Lisbon the Commission had no control over these measures because they were part of 
the third pillar.132   
Particularly, the lack of political will is the main cause of the slow transposition of a 
counter-terrorism measure. Not all member states see the establishment of law 
enforcement measures as a priority at national level. In fact, even the member states that 
feel most threatened by terrorism do not always implement those measures on time.133 
Another additional problem is the lack of institutional resources. Some member states 
do not have the adequate structures to make the systems fully operational. For instance, 
in June 2014, only three member states (Denmark, Ireland and the UK) had national 
legislations on the establishment of DNA databases in the terms of Prüm.134 Other 
member states lack the personnel training necessary to use these instruments.135 All of 
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Statewatch Analysis, p. 3. Available from www.statewatch.com [31 October 2014]; Argomaniz 2010, p. 
306. 
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2.3.2.  Complexities in the usage  
 
Many scholars have identified a lack of coherence in many aspects relating to the 
current EU counter-terrorism policy,136 which includes inconsistencies among 
instruments like the Swedish initiative, the Prüm Decisions the ECRIS Decisions and 
the EIO initiative. It is probable that after they are fully implemented, their use by law 
enforcement authorities might still be confusing. The reason is that these legal tools 
have been designed to complement each other but sometimes their functionalities may 
overlap. This will cause uncertainty for the national authorities about when to use the 
particular instrument. The risk is that national police forces decide to use informal 
mechanisms of communication instead, in a way to circumvent the complexities of the 
existing EU instruments. 
A first difficulty detected in these legal systems refers to the channels used for 
exchanging the information. Some of the systems incorporate new channels, but not all. 
For instance, the Swedish initiative takes place via the existing channels for 
international law enforcement cooperation, and the choice of channel is left to the 
member states.137 Annex B of the decision mentions ENU/Europol Liaison Officers, 
Interpol National Central Bureau (Interpol NCB), SIRENE and Liaison Officers, but 
other options such as mutual assistance channels can be used. Similar channels are 
offered in the Prüm Decisions: Europol Liaison Officer, Interpol NCB, Sirene and 
bilateral Liaison Officers.138 In contrast, in ECRIS the interconnection among national 
law enforcement authorities is carried out via the Commission’s s-TESTA (Secured 
Trans European Services for Telematics between Administrations) network – which is 
a common communication infrastructure providing an encrypted network.139 Finally, in 
the case of the EIO, various options for channels are available, since data can be 
transmitted from the issuing authority to the executing authority ‘by any means capable 
of producing a written record’.140 
                                                
136 Eckes C 2011, ‘The legal framework of the European Union's counter-terrorist policies: full of good 
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Some member states will use the European Judicial Network (EJN) as a channel.141 
The EJN consists of a secure telecommunication system that prevents or minimises the 
risk of inappropriate access to personal data,142 and provides contact points that establish 
direct connection between the issuing and executing authorities involved.  
Therefore, too many channels are available. In this regard, the Council is currently 
working on setting up a Single Point of Contact (SPOC) in every Member State for 
international law enforcement information exchanges. SPOCs seek to improve the use 
of all these existing platforms for exchanging information, by constituting a ‘one stop 
shop’ for all of them. The SPOC will manage under the same structure the Europol 
National Unit (ENU), the Interpol National Central Bureau (NCB), the SIRENE 
Bureau, the foreign liaison officers, the Swedish Framework Decision, the Prüm 
Decisions, and the regional/bilateral contact points. It will also access databases of SIS, 
VIS, Eurodac, CIS, Europol (SIENA), Interpol, etc., and will be the unit in charge of 
replying to any international request sent to the Member State.143 
In conclusion, this section has detected shortcomings in the implementation and use 
of the EU data-sharing systems, which are negatively affecting the EU multilateral 
cooperation in the AFSJ.  The correct use of the measures is only possible after all 
member states fully implement them. Because of the challenges mentioned above, 
several member states have opted for exchanging criminal records through other 
traditional/CoE MLA procedures discussed above. MLA procedures are particularly 
attractive to law enforcement authorities because they allow free-text exchange of 
messages subject to lower levels of scrutiny.144 However, as seen above, this procedure 
entails many problems regarding the efficiency and duration. Law enforcement 
authorities have also opted for exchanging data through regular email accounts or phone 
calls. A clear example of this practice was the communication between France and 
Spain in the past during investigations into the Spanish terrorist group ETA. None of the 
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EU provisions on cross-border policing precluded bilateral arrangements.145 Thus, these 
two countries did not use any EU channel for exchanging information, nor did they 
involve any EU agency such as Europol or Eurojust. This is even more problematic 
since crime-related information is not exchanged through secure channels, meaning it 
can also be easily intercepted and exposed. 
 
3. Expanding the information sources of member states: Data collected for non-
criminal reasons but ultimately used for law enforcement  
 
As pointed out by Hijmans & Scirocco, ‘information tends to be used if it exists’.146 The 
EU has gradually increased the number of information systems and databases accessible 
to law enforcement authorities. Particularly, the EU has amended legislation regulating 
the collection of personal data for commercial and border management purposes to 
allow the law enforcement sector to process such data. When personal data collected for 
one specific purpose is further accessed or processed for another purpose, this might 
infringe the ‘purpose limitation principle’. This principle is included in Article 5(b) of 
108 CoE Data Protection Convention,147 Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 95/46/EC and 
Article 3 of EU Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.148 The following sections examine 
the systems and databases through which the EU has gradually widened the use of 
personal information for law enforcement purposes. 
 
3.1.  European information systems created for border management purposes 
 
In November 2010 the Commission released a Communication on a comprehensive 
approach on personal data protection in the EU.149 The communication discerned twenty 
different AFSJ actors dealing with the collecting and processing of personal data at the 
EU level. The list included the following European Information Systems: Schengen 
Information Systems (SIS/SIS II), Visa Information System (VIS), Customs 
                                                
145 Bi-lateral arrangements had their own security arrangements and mechanisms, outsite the scope of the 
EU. 
146 Hijmans H & Scirocco A 2009, ‘Shortcomings in EU data protection in the third and the second 
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Information System (CIS) and Eurodac. All of these were originally created for border 
control purposes; yet, terrorist attacks that have occurred in the last ten years have 
caused a shift in the use of these systems.  This section examines how data collected by 
SIS, VIS, CIS and Eurodac can be now processed for law enforcement purposes too.150 
 
3.1.1.  Background 
 
The Schengen Information System (SIS) has its origins in the Schengen Agreement 
concluded in 1985. It regulated the control of member states’ external borders, and the 
third-country nationals entering the EU territory. At first, only five member states 
signed the agreement: Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and West 
Germany. These member states implemented the agreement through the 1990 Schengen 
Agreement Application Convention (SAAC).151 From that moment, they became part of 
the Schengen Area. This area was established to abolish internal checks and create a 
common external border, reinforcing the security measures to combat illegal 
immigration.152 The SAAC included a chapter referring to Schengen Information 
System (SIS) and the Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry 
Bureaux (SIRENE). SIS consisted of a joint information system composed by national 
sections of each Member State that could rapidly and effectively transfer data relating to 
border checks and movement of persons to a central database. SIRENE was the channel 
used to exchange information. 
SIS came into operation in 1995.153 Its purpose is to strengthen the cooperation 
between immigration, police and custom authorities154 for the maintenance of public 
order and State security.155 Member states have the possibility to issue an alert on people 
a) wanted for arrest, b) in connection with police investigations or criminal proceedings, 
and c) to be refused entry to the entire Schengen area. It also informs on lost or stolen 
                                                
150 Other envisaged systems like the Enty/Exit system and the Registered Traveller Programme might also 
be used for law enforcement purposes in the future. However, since they are not yet in force they are not 
part of this study. 
151 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
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Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders ("Schengen Implementation Agreement"), 
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153 Articles 92-119 SAAC. 
154 Article 92 SAAC. 
155 Article 93 SAAC. The concept and scope of ‘State security’ or ‘national security’ is discussed in 
chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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vehicles, firearms, identity documents and bank notes.156 Searches through SIS produce 
a ‘hit’, which specifies the action to be taken against the person who is denied the entry 
to the Schengen area.157 There are currently more than 41,000 individuals included in 
SIS, and the system produces more than 1,000 hits every month.158 It is worth adding 
that, as a result of the Paris attacks of 7 January 2015, the Commission has released a 
new proposal for a regulation of the Schengen Border Code that will intensify the police 
controls at the borders, for both EU and non-EU citizens.159 
With respect to the Visa Information System (VIS), established in 2004 by Council 
Decision 2004/512/EC (2004 VIS Decision),160 it aimed at supporting the EU common 
visa policy by establishing a common identification system for data on short-stay visas 
among member states. VIS is based on a centralised system called the Central Visa 
Information System (CS-VIS), connected to an interface in each member state (the 
National Interface (NI-VIS)) via the communication infrastructure161 between the CS-
VIS and the NI-VIS.162 In order to implement the 2004 VIS Decision a regulation was 
adopted in 2008.163 That new instrument stated that the main objectives of VIS were: i) 
to facilitate the visa application procedure, ii) to prevent ‘visa shopping’, iii) to facilitate 
the flight against fraud, iv) to facilitate checks at external border crossing points 
between member states, v) to assist in the identification of any person who may not 
fulfil the requirements for entry or stay on the territory of member states, vi) to facilitate 
the application of Dublin II Regulation,164 and vii) to contribute to the prevention of 
threats to the internal security of any of the member states.165  
VIS did not become operative until 2011.166 It processed one million visa 
applications during the first year,167 and more than four million during 2012-2013.168 
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The system is rapidly expanding year by year. In 2012 and 2013 it enhanced its 
competence to cover the entire African continent, the Near East, the Gulf Region; and it 
expects to cover the entire world by the end of 2015.169  
 The Customs Information System (CIS) has its origin in the Convention on the use 
of information technology for customs purposes,170 and the convention on mutual 
assistance and cooperation between customs administrations.171 These were created to 
combat smuggling. CIS was signed in 1995 but it did not come into force until 2005, 
after being ratified by all member states. The convention was replaced by a regulation 
adopted under the scope of the first pillar.172 It regulated the collection of information on 
persons for the specific purposes of sighting and reporting, discreet surveillance and 
specific checks. CIS was thus used if there was enough evidence suggesting that the 
target has committed, is committing or will commit actions in breach of customs or 
agricultural legislation.173 
Regarding the asylum seekers' data, in 1995 a convention determining the state 
responsible for examining applications for asylum in one of the member states of the 
former European Communities (Dublin Convention)174 was signed. The examination 
was conducted through a centralised system that compared the asylum applicants’ 
fingerprints. It was called Eurodac and its main purpose was to assist in determining 
which member state was responsible for examining an application for asylum. At the 
same time, it also prevented cases of asylum shopping175 and refugees in orbit.176 
Eurodac was first regulated in 2000 by a council regulation177 binding those countries 
that had implemented the Dublin acquis – namely, all member states plus the EFTA 
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states.178 Eurodac started its operations in 2003 and it established a centralised system 
that connected all twenty-eight national access points. 
 
3.1.2.  Shift from border control to law enforcement purposes 
 
What the above-mentioned systems have in common is that they eventually altered their 
original objectives, becoming today effective tools in the prevention, detection and 
investigation of crimes, in addition to their original roles. This change was a direct 
consequence of the 9/11 attacks,179 since before 2001 very few EU instruments for 
exchanging migrants’ data were used for law enforcement purposes.180 This tendency 
emerged in 2005, the year in which SIS/SIS II, VIS, and CIS started to expand their 
initial purposes. 
In December 2014, the Commission recommended intensifying the use of SIS by 
custom and law enforcement authorities for persons trying to enter the Schengen area.181 
However, law enforcement's access to the SIS is not new. In 1990, the SAAC 
introduced the possibility for police authorities to access data collected by the visa part 
of the system.182 Later, the EU adopted two new legislative measures that granted 
competence to law enforcement authorities: Council Regulation 871/2004183 and 
Council Decision 2005/211/JHA.184 Europol also gained access to a limited amount of 
data entered into SIS.185  
However, SIS was a system with limited capabilities, since it could only technically 
serve a maximum of eighteen countries. Because of the number of entries in the system 
was increasing every year,186 the EU expressed the need to develop a second generation 
SIS (SIS II), which would incorporate the latest developments in the field of 
information technology.187  
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SIS II was first proposed as a package by the Commission on 31 May 2005188 and 
adopted in December 2006189 (SIS II Regulation) and June 2007 (SIS II Decision).190 
However, before the new system was completed, Portugal proposed a transitional 
system called ‘SISone4all’ that would enable the inclusion of the new member states. 
The system was temporarily called ‘SIS 1+’ and it was regulated in Council Decision 
2008/839/JHA191 and Commission Regulation 1104/2008.192 Three years later, the 
Commission launched a recast proposal193 on migration from SIS 1+ to SIS II, and SIS 
II finally became operational in April 2013. 
The SIS II Decision194 seeks to ensure a higher level of security within the AFSJ, by 
improving the conditions and procedures for alerts with respect to third-country 
nationals, as well as the exchange of supplementary information for the purpose of 
refusing their entry into a member state.195 SIS II also introduces the possibility to 
gather biometric data, such as fingerprints and photographs,196 from persons wanted for 
arrest, missing persons, persons sought to assist with judicial procedures (e.g. 
witnesses), and persons subject to discreet checks.197 SIS II has a capacity of 100 million 
alerts and it is composed of three systems:198 a) a central system (CS-SIS II), b) a 
national system (NI-SIS II) in each member state, and c) a communication infrastructure 
between C-SIS II and NI-SIS II, via SIRENE Bureaux. Each Member State has a 
SIRENE Bureau. If an alert is sent, supplementary information might be supplied 
through this channel.199  
 Regarding visa information, 2008 Council Decision200 enhances Article 3 of the 
previous VIS Regulation by allowing law enforcement authorities to access VIS data.201 
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Besides immigration and asylum authorities, and authorities responsible for carrying out 
checks at external border crossing points, 2008 Council Decision granted access to 
national law enforcement authorities, Europol, as well as third countries or international 
organisations. These bodies gained access on 1 September 2013.202 
CIS data is also used for law enforcement purposes today. Besides the ‘traditional’ 
CIS, established by the above-mentioned first pillar Regulation (EC) 766/2008, a 
Council decision within the scope of the third pillar was adopted in 2008 (hereinafter, 
the CIS Decision).203 The main purpose of the CIS Decision is ‘to assist in preventing, 
investigating and prosecuting serious contraventions of national laws by making 
information available more rapidly’.204 According to Article 5 of the CIS Decision, data 
entering into CIS is to be used by law enforcement authorities for the purposes of 
sighting and reporting, discreet surveillance, specific checks and strategic or operational 
analysis.205  
The CIS Decision regulates the Customs Files Identification Database (FIDE).206 
FIDE allows national custom authorities, Europol and Eurojust to identify competent 
authorities of other member states that have investigated cases involving a particular 
person or business. The information can only be obtained if the case deals with serious 
crimes within less than twelve months, or with a sanction of at least 15,000 €.207 The 
Commission manages the collection of information,208 including personal data, in the 
following categories: commodities; means of transport; businesses; persons; fraud 
trends; availability of expertise; items detained, seized or confiscated; and cash 
detained, seized or confiscated.209 
Finally, a proposal for the amendment of the Eurodac Regulation was released by the 
Commission in December 2008.210 Nine months later, the Commission, influenced by 
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the Council,211 issued an amendment of this proposal in form of a package – a 
regulation212 and a Council decision213 – introducing the possibility for member states' 
law enforcement authorities and Europol to access Eurodac’s central database for the 
purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of serious criminal offences. The 
proposed Council decision addressed the possibility for law enforcement authorities to 
cooperate in the exchange of fingerprints. However, with the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission decided to withdraw the provisions referring to the 
access for law enforcement purposes from the proposed package, and it presented a new 
proposal for regulation similar to that of 2008.214 Yet that proposal was also replaced by 
a new one in May 2012,215 which reintroduced the law enforcement provisions into a 
single instrument. It sought the alignment with the aforementioned SIS II and VIS 
databases in the identification of suspected perpetrators of terrorist or serious crimes, 
and was adopted in June 2013,216 applying to all member states except Ireland and 
Denmark.217  
Therefore, the EU has been modifying some of the instruments originally designed to 
control illegal immigration within the European borders, sharing the information 
obtained with law enforcement authorities for the prevention and investigation of 
crimes. It is worth noting that, except for CIS, all other systems are managed by a new 
EU Agency called the EU Agency for large-scale IT systems (or eu-LISA), which 
became operative in December 2012. The agency ensures that the information 
exchanged through such IT systems is secured and complies with the relevant data 
protection legislation. It also issues periodical reports on technical aspects to the EP and 
the Council,218 and annual activity reports to the EU Council Delegations.219 This 
centralisation of the management in one single institution is to be viewed with 
optimism. It will strengthen the relationships between JHA actors, and will increase the 
consistency among existing data-sharing systems in the field of law enforcement. 
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3.2. EU data-sharing instruments created under the basis of the EU internal 
market clause 
 
EU measures originally created to control external borders are not the only ones 
experiencing an expansion of the purposes for which they are used. As the EDPS 
pointed out ‘[t]here is now a tendency to require that private actors cooperate with law 
enforcement authorities on a systematic basis’.220 This section looks at some of the 
current private entities’ databases that were originally been established within the scope 
of the internal market provision (Article 114 TFEU). The data they collect was 
primarily used for commercial reasons, but now it is also used for purposes related to 
the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of a crime. This analysis 
focuses on three particular cases: i) passenger data collected by EU airline companies, 
ii) financial data collected by the Belgian company SWIFT, and iii) data collected by 
European telecommunication and information society services.  
 
3.2.1.  Exchange of passenger data within the EU 
 
More than 1.4 billion passengers pass through EU airports every year.221 Aviation 
security has been one of the priorities within the EU internal security policy, seeking to 
‘keep up with the continuous innovation demonstrated by terrorist groups’.222 In that 
sense, the Council adopted the Advanced Passenger Information system (hereinafter, 
API system or APIS)223 in 2004, and the Commission proposed the EU Passenger Name 
Record Directive (hereinafter, EU PNR Directive) in 2011. In order to understand these 
instruments, it is necessary first to briefly introduce their international counterpart: the 
EU-US PNR Agreement.224  
In response to the 9/11 attacks, the US authorities adopted measures that obliged 
airlines taking off, landing or flying through the US territory to turn over all their flight 
booking and departure data to the US government. This information is referred to as 
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Passenger Name Record or PNR data. PNR data is defined as a record of the itinerary of 
a travelling person saved in the database of an airline, usually during the booking 
process.225 
The EU-US PNR Agreement was first signed in 2004, after adopting Commission 
Decision 2004/535/EC226 and Council Decision 2004/496/EC.227 The conclusion of the 
agreement was based on ex Article 95 TEC (the internal market clause)228 in 
combination with the implied powers doctrine.229 The choice of this legal basis was 
made upon the consideration that the collection of PNR data by private companies was 
a purely economic activity, necessary for the sale of an airplane ticket. In fact, for 
decades, airline companies had customarily stored their passengers’ personal data in 
private databases for commercial purposes. It was only after 9/11 that the US authorities 
began to seize and transfer such data to public databases for the fight against terrorism. 
The EP, supported by the EDPS, challenged the decisions before the CJEU. The EP 
argued that the EU-US PNR Agreement had been adopted under the wrong legal basis 
since the main objective did not concern the internal market, but a matter of public 
security and criminal law (third pillar). The CJEU agreed with the EP and in May 2006 
it annulled the decisions that enabled the PNR Agreement.230 The Court observed that 
even if it were true that data was originally collected for commercial purposes, the use 
of such data had later changed from private to public hands. The Court found that the 
main purpose of the agreement was the prevention and combating of terrorism and, 
therefore, it considered that the measure should fall under the scope of the former third 
pillar and not as part of the Community law. 
The Court’s choice to annul the 2004 EU-US PNR Agreement entailed negative 
consequences for the enforcement of the EU data protection legislation. Subsequent 
EU-US PNRs adopted in 2006231, 2007232 and 2012233 moved the matter from the first 
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pillar (ex Article 95 TEC) to the third pillar (ex-Article 24(1) TEU) and therefore, 
Directive 95/46/EC was no longer applicable.234 
Another EU instrument for the identification of passengers was the Advance 
Passenger Information System (APIS). Parallel to the adoption of the EU-US PNR 
Agreement, the Council approved a directive235 obliging air carriers to communicate 
passenger data from those persons arriving into the EU from third countries. According 
to the directive, when passengers checked in for a flight, airline companies would 
collect the full name, gender, date of birth, nationality, country of residence, type of 
travel document, and the travel document's number. That information would be then 
transferred to public authorities and retained for twenty-four hours.236 The APIS was 
adopted under the first-pillar basis of ex Article 62(2)(a) and Article 63(3)(b) TEC237 
(current Articles 77 and 79 TFEU). These provisions regulate the improvement of 
border control and the combating of irregular migration. Interestingly, both EU-US 
PNR Agreement and APIS Directive referred to the European Council Declaration on 
combating terrorism to justify the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger 
data.238 However, the PNR Agreement was a third-pillar instrument while the APIS 
Directive was part of the Community law. The reason why the second PNR Agreement 
was not based on ex Articles 62(2)(a) and 63(3)(b) TEC, like APIS, has no clear 
explanation to date.239 
The necessity to clarify the real purpose of processing advance passenger 
information (API) was identified by Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
(hereinafter, the Art. 29 WP) in 2006240 and 2013.241 Yet, although API collection and 
processing has led to a few legal disputes related to data protection issues,242 in general 
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the API Directive has been less controversial than the PNR systems.243 One reason is the 
limited number of items collected through APIS, and the short time of data retention. 
Moreover, the API Directive only requires the transfer of data after a request, whereas 
PNR agreements oblige the airline companies to systematically transmit data.244 Lastly, 
API does not allow any kind of intelligence analysis on the travel patterns, while PNR 
systems do.245 
During the negotiations of the PNR agreements, the EP voiced its concerns about the 
lack of reciprocity on PNR matters. With the adoption of these international 
agreements, passenger data was transferred from the EU to the US, but not vice versa. 
The trigger for the initial discussions on the possibility to create an EU PNR scheme 
was the failed car bomb attacks in London and at Glasgow Airport in June 2007.246 In 
November that year, the Commission launched a proposal for a Council framework 
decision247 with the aim to: 
 
  ‘[H]armonise Member State's provisions on obligations for air carriers operating 
flights to or from the territory of at least one Member State regarding the transmission 
of PNR data to the competent authorities for the purpose of preventing and fighting 
terrorist offences and organised crime.’248  
 
 However, in November 2008 the EP refused to issue a formal opinion on the 
proposal for not granting enough protection for the individual rights.249 Therefore, in 
February 2011, the Commission presented a new proposal for an EU PNR Directive, 
this time with an impact assessment attached.250 As in the current EU-US PNR 
Agreement, the main purpose is the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution 
                                                
243 ‘API, PNR, threat assessments, and data-mining: Member states push for access to travellers' personal 
data for customs authorities’, Statewatch, 22.02.2013.  
Available from <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/feb/12customs-pnr1.htm> [2 November 2014]. 
244 Kaunert C, Léonard S & MacKenzie A 2012, ‘The social construction of an EU interest in counter-
terrorism: US influence and internal struggles in the cases of PNR and SWIFT’, European Security, vol. 
21, no. 4, p. 486. 
245 Argomaniz J 2009, ‘When the EU Is the “Norm-taker”: The Passenger Name Records Agreement and 
the EU’s Internalization of US Border Security Norms’, Journal of European Integration, vol.31 no.1, p. 
129. 
246 Argomaniz 2009, p. 130. 
247 COM(2007) 654 final, 06.11.2007. 
248 COM(2007) 654 final, 06.11.2007, p. 6. 
249 European Parliament, B6-0615/2008, 20.11.2008. 
250 SEC(2011) 132 and SEC(2011) 133 final, 02.02.2011. 
 
 44 
of terrorist offences, serious crimes,251 and serious transnational crimes. Unlike the 2004 
EU-US PNR Agreement, the EU PNR Directive is based on Articles 82(1)(d) and 
87(2)(a) TFEU and its main purpose is the prevention, combat and investigation of 
crimes.252 Thus, we can observe a change in the purpose for collecting passenger data in 
the 2004 EU-US PNR Agreement and the APIS, and this EU PNR Directive.  
 The proposed EU PNR Directive also shows that the Commission has not always 
been consistent in the choice of legal basis for measures that regulate the exchange of 
information in the field of transport. On 6 May 2014, the CJEU decided to annul 
Directive 2011/82/EU facilitating the cross-border exchange of information on road 
safety related traffic offences.253 That directive had been adopted under the legal basis of 
Article 87(2) TFEU, which is the same one used in the proposal for the EU PNR 
Directive. However, the Court agreed with the Commission that the main purpose of the 
instrument was to improve transport safety in the sense of Article 91(1)(c) TFEU, rather 
than to generally exchange information for criminal matters, as establishesd by Article 
87(2) TFEU.254 Accordingly, one month after the ruling, the Commission launched a 
new proposal – this time based under Article 91 TFEU.255 
 The EU PNR Directive could also have been adopted under Article 91 TFEU. Both 
Directive 2011/82/EU and the EU PNR Directive are internal instruments consisting of 
the exchange of cross-border information collected by transport companies (air and road 
transport) aiming at increasing the police cooperation, as well as the passenger safety. If 
the EU PNR Directive was based on Article 91 TFEU, data-sharing activities would fall 
within the scope of Directive 95/46/EC, and the UK, Ireland and Denmark could not 
opt-out of the Directive. 
As it stands now, the EU PNR Proposal allows the collection of up to nineteen 
categories of data from both EU and non-EU citizens by airline companies at the 
moment of the ticket purchase. These will be sent to specific Passenger Information 
Units (PIUs) in the Member State prior the flight departure.256 The PIUs will be in 
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charge of cross-checking the data for predetermined criteria. In the case of a positive 
match, the specific data will be evaluated. Data will be encrypted from the moment they 
are collected by airline companies. It will be then stored in the specific PIU for five 
years. The goal is that, during that period of time, such data will produce information 
linked to subsequent passengers.257 On the substance of the instrument, it is unclear 
whether it will apply exclusively to flights entering and leaving the EU, or also to intra-
EU flights.258 Likewise, it is unconfirmed that data collected will only belong to air 
passengers entering the EU, or whether it will also include persons arriving by boat, 
railway or vehicles.259 In addition, questions as to the quality of encryption, the data 
subject’s right of access, and the role of the data protection authorities260 are still on the 
table.  
The EP was doubtful about the necessity of collecting data from all types of 
passengers – suspects and non-suspects. Therefore, in April 2013 the proposal was 
rejected by the European Parliament Civil Liberties Committee (LIBE)261 and, 
consequently, the EP suspended its voting in 2014.262  
However, the terrorist attacks that occurred in Paris on 7 January 2015 revived the 
debate as to the necessity for an EU PNR system to combat terrorism. In order to 
prevent member states from installing national PNR regimes or the Commission from 
launching a new proposal,263 the LIBE Committee finally suggested amendments on the 
2011 proposal.264 Among them, it suggests replacing the broad concept of ‘serious 
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crimes’ for ‘serious transnational crimes’, retaining data for only four years in cases of 
serious transnational crimes, collect data for intra-EU flights, and enhancing the 
conditions for transferring PNR data to third countries. The PE will vote on these 
amendments on 25 March 2015. 
 
3.2.2.  Exchange of financial data within the EU 
 
Law enforcement authorities of the member states also expressed interest in accessing 
EU citizens’ financial data. In 2000, a Council decision on the cooperation between 
financial intelligence units of the member states for exchanging information was 
adopted.265 Yet, the creation of an EU system for the exchange of financial data was 
postponed in 2001 due to the 9/11 attacks: at the time the exchange of financial data 
between the US and the EU was the priority.  
In December 2001, two Europol-US agreements were concluded for the exchange of 
information related to global financial movements.266 They were part of the so-called 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), established in secret by the Bush 
Administration to pull EU citizens’ data from a private company, the Society for the 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). SWIFT was based in 
Belgium, but the US authorities were able to access the data because it also had servers 
located in the US. Thus, depending on where the EU citizens’ data was being processed, 
the company had to comply with either Belgian national laws implementing Directive 
95/46/EC (first pillar)267 or US laws. In this sense, the company always processed EU 
citizens’ data through its servers located in the US in order to avoid potential clashes 
with European laws. 
The TFTP was uncovered in 2006 by the New York Times.268 It created a big debate 
within the EU and as a result SWIFT decided to move all of its servers completely to 
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the territory of the EU member states.269 Since financial data from EU citizens were now 
processed on EU soil, the company had to comply with EU data protection laws. 
Consequently, the Commission urged the drafting of an agreement enabling data 
transfers from the EU to the US. 
In the EU the only instrument for the prevention and combat of terrorist financing 
was Directive 2005/60/EC.270 It was introduced as a consequence of the Madrid attacks 
and it obliged financial institutions within the EU to control and store their clients’ data. 
If any suspicious transaction was noticed, it was to be communicated to the designated 
authorities. Nevertheless, that directive raised concerns about data protection, 
transparency and accountability rights.271 Also, the fact that the banks were responsible 
for detecting terrorist transactions made the system quite ineffective since, clearly, the 
banks’ primary mission is not related to national security.272 
On 30 November 2009, the SWIFT Agreement came into force. The agreement was 
adopted under the scope of the ex-third pillar, with a combined legal basis of former 
Articles 24 and 38 TEU. The SWIFT Agreement was provisionally applied after 
signature, but this was then abrogated after the negative EP vote in February 2010.273  
In the summer of 2010, a second SWIFT Agreement (SWIFT II) was adopted. One 
of the changes it included was the future creation of an EU programme equivalent to the 
US TFTP, called the European Terrorist Finance Tracking System (TFTS). In 2015, the 
scope and features of this system are still unclear. The only thing that is known is that 
the main goal of the TFTS will be to restrict the amount of bulk information that the US 
selects, processes and decrypts, by setting a control on EU soil. Likewise, the system 
seeks to increase the EU contribution to the detection of terrorist financing,274 gaining 
autonomy from the US leads. 
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In July 2011, the Commission launched a communication called ‘A European 
terrorist finance tracking system: available options’,275 which was amended in 
November 2013.276 The Commission proposed three different available options for the 
TFTS.277 All of them conform to Article 72 TFEU about the EU legal limitations in the 
field of internal security:278  a) the EU TFTS Coordination and Analytical Service, b) the 
EU TFTS Extraction Service, and c) the FIU Coordination Service.279 They are hybrids 
between a full EU-centralised database and a decentralised national system. However, 
their feasibility in practice is still doubtful. The EU has not yet a reached full 
cooperation among its member states in the field of security, and the EP argues that the 
necessity of such system has not been sufficiently justified. 280 
In contrast, the Council has always supported the initiative, stating that it will ensure 
grater efficiency in the processing of information by police and intelligence agencies.281 
Indeed, the system might be advantageous in the sense that it will increase the exchange 
of intelligence within the EU, which many national intelligence services have long 
resisted.  
The Commission has not launched any formal proposal for a TFTS yet, but other 
new initiatives seem to be accommodating the creation of this future system: on the one 
hand, the Commission proposed a directive and a regulation that will repeal Directive 
2005/60/EC on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.282 It is based 
on Article 114 TFEU (the internal market provision) so the data collected, processed 
and stored by Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) will have to comply with Directive 
95/46/EC. The proposal is currently under negotiation in the Council and the EP.283 On 
the other hand, the Council has included a provision on the cooperation between 
Europol and national FIUs in the proposed Europol Regulation. Although some member 
states have expressed their reservation on that issue, the provision as suggested by the 
Council allows the FIUs to collaborate with the EU agency through ENUs.284 It makes 
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the aforementioned option for establishing a FIU Coordination System very probable, 
considering that the mirroring TFTP Agreement also involves Europol in the 
supervision of data requests. 
The establishment of the TFTS would require the adjustment of the existing EU-US 
TFTP Agreement.285 In this sense, the EDPS has argued that a better analysis should be 
conducted on the impact that a future EU TFTS will have on the SWIFT Agreement.286 
This issue might be one of the reasons why the Commission has delayed the proposal. 
In any event, if a proposal is finally released, the TFTS will be another example of how 
police authorities in EU member states are progressively expanding the EU security 
measures. 
 
3.2.3.  Exchange of telecommunication data within the EU 
 
Information collected and stored by telecommunication service providers (TSP)287 and 
information society services (ISS)288 has also been increasingly accessed by law 
enforcement authorities in the last fifteen years. The reason is the emerging use of 
broadband Internet and mobile devices by organised criminal bands and terrorists.289 
One example is found in the Madrid bombings of 2004, where terrorists used pre-paid 
SIM cards to detonate the bombs. Consequently, the EU adopted the Data Retention 
Directive and the Cyber Security Directive, which gave police authorities access to 
telecommunication data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
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a. Data Retention Directive 
 
Before 2006, the only mechanism to request telecommunication data was through the 
MLA procedures. As seen above, MLA requests can often be a very lenghty and 
inefficient process. Therefore, the Commission decided to adopt an instrument that 
would facilitate the retention, access and use of telecommunication data for law 
enforcement purposes: the Data Retention Directive.290 It was adopted in 2006 with the 
purpose of harmonising domestic rules on the retention of traffic data stored by TSP for 
‘the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crimes’.291 
The Data Retention Directive was annulled by the CJEU in April 2014. The 
annulment did not come as a surprise, since the directive was controversial from the 
outset. The proposal was launched by the Council in order to establish in the EU a 
similar tool to the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (hereinafter, the Patriot Act).292 The 
Patriot Act was enacted in October 2001 following the 9/11 attacks as a measure to 
combat terrorism and money laundering activities. Section 215 of Patriot Act allows US 
law enforcement officials to collect metadata from TSPs located within the US territory 
during a criminal investigation. Yet, it is not only data from US citizens and residents 
that is processed through the Patriot Act. Third countries’ data (including EU citizens’ 
data) can also be accessed by the US authorities if they have been collected by a TSP 
located in the US, according to Section 702 of the Patriot Act.293 
In order to prevent alleged clashes between the Patriot Act and the EU laws, the 
adoption of a similar piece of law in the EU became a necessity. Originally, the Council 
proposed that a retention provision was included in Directive 95/46/EC, but the EP 
rejected that proposal. Finally, the provision was included in Directive 2002/58/EC.294 
According to Article 15, ‘Member States may, inter alia, adopt legislative measures 
providing for the retention of data for a limited period justified on the grounds laid 
down in this paragraph’.  
The nature of the instrument was also an issue of debate. The Council proposed to 
draft a framework decision on data retention (a third pillar instrument), whereas the EP 
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suggested adopting it in the form of a directive (a first pillar instrument).295 In the end, 
the Commission followed the EP’s suggestions and it launched a first-pillar proposal for 
a directive on data retention based on ex Article 95 TEC. The directive came into force 
in March 2006.  
Four months later, Ireland, supported by Slovakia, challenged the directive before the 
CJEU. Ireland argued that the legislation should be adopted as a third-pillar measure 
because its purpose was clearly t0 combat serious crimes. That was the argument that 
the Court itself had followed in the previous PNR case, in which the Court concluded 
that when private companies collected personal data, even if the original purpose was 
purely economic, the measure could not fall under the scope of the internal market 
provision if data was later used for law enforcement. On the contrary, the Commission 
justified the legal basis for the Data Retention Directive by stating that it imposed direct 
obligations on TSP, rather than on governments.  
Although it was expected that the Court would follow the precedent established in 
the PNR decision, this was not the case. In Ireland v. Parliament,296 the Court 
contradicted its own jurisprudence by creating an artificial distinction between the 
reason for storing data and the purpose for processing such data.297 Under that new test, 
the Court held that as long as the data was initially stored by a TSP to cover commercial 
activities, the directive was correctly adopted under the basis of ex Article 95 TEC. The 
Court added that ‘the obligations relating to data retention have significant economic 
implications for service providers in so far as they may involve substantial investment 
and operating costs’ (para. 68).  
The argument used by the Court for PNR data transfers was then no longer valid.298 
Many scholars have speculated about the reasons why the Court changed its own 
argument.299 A possible justification could be related to the different nature of the two 
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instruments. The EU internal market clause was easier to justify in a directive than in an 
international agreement, whose scope exceeds the territory of the ‘EU internal market’. 
Another justification could be found in the categories of the data collected. In the PNR 
case, airlines were required to collect specific data that, before the agreement, was not 
collected at all. In contrast, the Data Retention Directive required operators to retain 
data that was already collected for commercial purposes.300 Finally, another explanation 
could be that the Court sought to harmonise data retention rules within the EU with its 
new decision. Such harmonisation would have been difficult to achieve in the PNR 
agreements because third countries were involved.301 
The directive established that member states could adopt domestic laws that obliged 
TSPs to retain data for a period of no less than six months and no more than two years. 
The categories of data retained in a communication were: a) the source; b) the 
destination; c) the time, date and duration: d) the type; e) the equipment; and f) the 
location.302 However, in 2011 the Commission released an evaluation report that found 
that many provisions of the directive were too broad. For example, the main purpose 
was the prevention, combat and investigation of ‘serious crimes’, but the scope of that 
term was interpreted differently depending on the Member State. Some countries 
decided that a serious crime would be any offence with a minimum of one-year prison; 
whereas others decided to retain data related to all kinds of criminal offences.303 Another 
controversial issue concerned the public actors that were able to access the data. These 
were not the same in all member states, and nor was the type of authorisation required 
for that access.304 
In 2012, two new preliminary rulings on the validity of the Data Retention Directive 
were issued before the CJEU.305 This time, the challenges did not concern the adequacy 
of its legal basis, but they questioned the substance of the instrument. The preliminary 
rulings claimed a potential clash between the directive and the rights enclosed in 
Directive 95/46/EC, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR (especially, the 
right to privacy and data protection). In that sense, between 2008 and 2012, several 
constitutional courts of the member states had found that national laws implementing 
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301 Docksey 2014. 
302 Article 5 Directive 24/2006/EC. 
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the directive were contrary to their constitutional rights.306 The two preliminary rulings 
were supported by the EDPS, who argued that the directive did not comply with the 
necessity principle, its purpose was not sufficiently precise, and it had not considered 
less-intrusive data retention mechanisms.307 
In its defence, the Commission released a report with numerous cases in which the 
Data Retention Directive had helped in preventing and investigating crimes.308 
However, the report did not convince the CJEU, and in April 2014 the Court followed 
the Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón309 and ruled that the directive was invalid for violating 
Directive 95/46/EC, as well as Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter:  
 
‘[T]he obligation to retain for a certain period, data relating to a person’s private 
life and to his communications, constitutes in itself an interference with the right 
guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter. Furthermore, the access of the competent 
national authorities to the data constitutes a further interference with that fundamental 
right. […] The fact that data are retained and subsequently used without the subscriber 
or registered user being informed is likely to generate in the minds of the persons 
concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant surveillance.’310 
 
 The case is especially relevant since it is the first time that the CJEU has annulled an 
entire directive because of its incompatibility with the provisions of the EU Charter. 
Specifically, the main reason for the annulment was that the data retained failed to 
comply with the necessity and proportionality tests. Law enforcement authorities were 
able to access all EU citizens’ communications even if there was no link to or evidence 
of any threat. No exceptions and distinctions depending on the categories of data were 
provided, either. Therefore, the Court considered that the nature of that measure was 
abusive. 
                                                
306 Particularly, Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Cyprus. 
307 Opinion of the EDPS on the Evaluation report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), 31.05.2011. 
308 For instance, it helped German police to identify individuals supporting the Al-Qaeda and the 
Uzbekistan Islamic Movement by distributing propaganda through Internet, and it allowed the 
identification of the person who uploaded a video on a terrorirst organisation in an Internet forum in 
2010.  For the complete list of cases, see European Commission, DG Home, ‘Evidence for necessity of 
data retention in the EU’, March 2013. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/pdf/policies/police_cooperation/evidence_en.pdf [2 November 2014]. 
309 Advocate General’s Opinion in Joined Cases  C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland  and C-594/12 Seitlinger 
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 After the ruling, the Art. 29 WP urged member states and the Commission to 
evaluate the consequences at the domestic and the EU level.311 Although Commissioner 
Malmström stated that ‘Member States' national legislation is not directly concerned by 
the judgment’,312 national data retention laws are indeed subject to the ruling. As Peers 
explains, national laws have to comply with the provisions of the Charter (and the 
general principles of law) when implementing EU law.313 In that sense, several member 
states have started to invalidate or amend their implementation laws after the judgment, 
in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.314 As for a future data retention 
directive, the Commission has not yet started any preparations, and no replacement is 
expected in the near future. It could be that the EU will not adopt a new data retention 
instrument at all in the future, considering that the court has been very clear in 
highlighting the intrusion it causes to the EU fundamental rights to data protection and 
privacy. 
 The potential implications of this decision for other data retention measures in the 
EU are unclear. Many questions need to find an answer yet, one of these issues being 
the future of other large-scale data retention systems after this judgment. Likewise, it is 
unclear to what extent the EU legislation / agreement needs to specify how Charter 
rights will be complied with. In this regard, a study concluded that the EU-US PNR 
Agreement, the EU PNR proposal, the EU-US TFTP agreement and the future EU 
TFTS could all be affected by this decision.315 Any of these measures could be now 
challenged before the CJEU using the same arguments as in the Data Retention 
decision.  
 In contrast, the Legal Service of the EP has noted that the Data Retention judgment 
‘does not […] have any direct consequences for the validity of any other EU act’.316 The 
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Legal Service has thus underlined that each EU act benefits from a ‘presumption of 
legality’, so formally they remain valid. It has also noted that existing international 
agreements like PNR and SWIFT will not be reviewed by the CJEU in the sense of 
Article 218(11) TFEU, since this procedure can only be conducted before the 
international agreement is adopted.317 
 Lastly, another important issue emerging from the CJEU decision is the link the court 
poses between Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and Article 8 of the ECHR. This close 
connection shows the important role of the EU in referencing other international 
organisations in the field of data protection. There is no doubt that the decision will be 
taken into consideration in the event of the establishment of global principles for data 
protection. 
 
b.  Cyber Security Directive 
 
Because of the high number of cyberattacks suffered by private entities within the 
EU,318 in February 2013 the Commission released a Cyber Security Strategy319 and a 
proposal for a directive on network and information security (hereinafter, Cyber 
Security Directive).320 Likewise, in August of that year the existing Council Framework 
Decision on attacks against information systems321 was replaced with a directive.322 
The purpose of the proposed Cyber Security Strategy is to ‘ensure a high common 
level of network and information security (NIS)’. It was proposed under the basis of 
Article 114 TFEU (internal market clause), which, again, casts doubt on the adequacy 
of such choice323 because of the involvement of law enforcement authorities in the data 
exchanges. 
The proposed Cyber Security Directive will not only bind TSPs but also a broad 
category of ‘market operators’. These are listed in Annex II of the proposal as: a) e-
commerce platforms, b) Internet payment gateways, c) social networks, d) search 
                                                
317 This is actually the case of the proposed EU-Canada PNR Agreement, which is being reviewed by the 
CJEU since November 2014.  
318 For instance, in the UK alone 821 cyberattacks were registered in 2011. O’Brien KJ 2013, ‘Europe 
weighs requiring to disclose data breaches’, New York Times, 16 January. Available from 
<www.nytimes.com> [02.03.2015]. 
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321 OJ L 69, 16.03.2005, pp. 67-71. 
322 OJ L 218, 14.08.2013, pp. 8-14. 




engines, e) cloud computing services, f) application stores, g) energy, h) transport, i) 
banking, j) financial market infrastructures, and k) the health sector. In addition to the 
market operators, there are two other kinds of actors taking part in the prevention and 
investigation of cybercrimes: the NIS authorities and the law enforcement authorities. 
As illustrated in Table 1.1., both the NIS authorities and the law enforcement authorities 
are to be represented at the domestic and EU levels.  
 
Table 1.1. 
 NIS authorities Law enforcement 
authorities 
EU level Commission/ENISA 
CERT-EU 





National level National CERTS 
NIS 
National Cyber Crime Units 
 
 
Regarding the competent national authorities for NIS, they are regulated in Article 6 
of the proposed Cyber Security Directive. Article 7 and Annex I of the directive set up 
the Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), which may be part of the 
competent NIS authorities but this will not be mandatory. At the EU level, the European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) will act according to the 
subsidiarity principle, as stated in Article 8 of the proposed directive. 
The law enforcement authorities also have a relevant role to play in this Cyber 
Security Strategy. For that reason, the proposal raised some concerns as to the adequacy 
of the legal basis, which addressed cybercrime as an internal market matter and not as 
an internal security issue. The National Cybercrime Units will be created to combat 
cyber crimes in the different member states, while in the EU the Cybercrime Centre 
(EC3) and Eurojust are the bodies in charge of that development. All law enforcement 
authorities will be directly connected with the NIS entities, and they will share 
information with each other.324 The infrastructure used for the criminal-related data 
exchanges will be the existing secure information-sharing system TESTA.325 
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The proposal for a Cyber Security Directive has raised strong criticism326 due to the 
following aspects: on the one hand, there is an expansion of the obligation to report data 
breaches beyond the traditional telecommunication databases:327 not only will TSPs be 
accessed by law enforcement authorities, but all ‘market operators’ will be subject to the 
directive. Hence, ENISA and member states’ powers exceed those granted under the 
void Data Retention Directive. On the other hand, there are doubts on the data breach 
notification regime established in the proposal, since the criteria do not coincide with 
the proposed EU Data Protection Regulation. In addition, the proposal does not include 
a clear separation of breaches caused by mere negligence from those resulting from 
cybercriminals.328 In that sense, the EDPS pointed out that: 
 
‘A clear distinction should be made between accidental events, which are 
incidents that have occurred on a network or an information system, and malicious 
actions, which could have a connection with cybercrime.’329  
 
In March 2014 the EP released 138 amendments on the directive that are currently 
being discussed at the Council.330 The directive is expected to be adopted in 2015, but 
the recent annulment of the Data Retention Directive could raise new debates about the 
adequacy of the legal basis and substance of this proposal. 
 
c.  The use of mutual legal assistance for accessing telecommunication data 
 
The traditional instrument for police and judicial authorities to access 
telecommunication data stored in TSPs is the MLA procedure. The Commission 
launched the Data Retention Directive and the Cyber Security Directive to facilitate the 
access of data for law enforcement purposes. However, the results have not been very 
successful. Whereas the Data Retention Directive has been annulled by the CJEU for 
being contrary to EU laws, the substance of the proposed Cyber Security Directive is 
                                                
326 ‘ENDitorial: Questions On The Draft Directive On Cybersecurity Strategy’, EDRI Newsletter, vol. 11 
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being questioned for issues like the broad scope of the term ‘market operators’ and the 
expanded powers granted to ENISA. 
Therefore, many law enforcement authorities have returned to the MLA procedures 
for intercepting telecommunication data from a TSP located in another Member State. 
This procedure is established in Articles 17 to 22 of the EU MLA Convention. It can 
also apply when law enforcement authorities need data collected and stored beyond the 
EU territory (e.g. in the US), but only if the two countries have previously signed a 
MLAT. For instance, the US has MLATs with the majority of member states, and even 
with the EU as a whole.331 They cooperate with each other, sharing electronic 
information between their law enforcement authorities.  
If police officers need to request specific information from a TSP, the first thing they 
need to know is where the headquarters of that particular private company is located as 
this will indicate the jurisdiction that the company is bound to. There are two ways to 
send a request to a TSP located in another Member State or a third country: a) the 
informal process, developing a direct relationship with the private entity or making the 
request through the police authorities of the requested country, and b) the formal 
process, sending the MLA request to the department of justice of the requested country, 
which will submit it to the competent court for the necessary warrant.332 
Each private company decides in which circumstances it will accept an informal 
request. For instance, the popular social network Twitter, which has its main 
headquarters in the US, answers requests made by governmental authorities of EU 
member states by distinguishing between i) emergency requests, where there is a risk of 
death or serious injury to a person, and ii) non-emergency requests. Regarding the 
emergency requests, Twitter is available 24/7 and in such cases it responds without 
delay. In the non-emergency cases, requests need to be issued formally via the US 
courts through MLA.333 
Within the EU, one of the main problems with the use of MLA procedures is that 
each Member State has its own criminal legal system, which contains specific 
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requirements and conditions for accessing TSP’s data. For instance, some member 
states require a prior court order, whereas others permit the authorisation by the 
Secretary of State or a senior official.  
In sum, as demonstrated by this study, the EU has adopted many instruments for the 
purpose of facilitating the exchange of information among law enforcement authorities. 
However, all of them reveal shortcomings with regard to their use and implementation. 
In the particular case of data collected by the TSP, the situation is no better. Since the 
Data Retention Directive was declared void by the CJEU and the proposed Cyber Crime 
Directive has been shelved by the Council. The next section examines an additional 
problem: all these data-sharing instruments contain different data protection rules, 
which leads to a fragmented EU data protection framework in the field of law 
enforcement. 
 
4. The EU data protection legislation under the scope of the AFSJ 
 
This study has identified and analysed the main EU instruments for processing 
information for law enforcement purposes. Any data processing requires compliance 
with data protection rules. In this sense, the Council of the European Union has 
emphasised that: 
 
  ‘Information exchange in the context of EU law enforcement cooperation will at 
all times respect the fundamental rights of citizens, in particular where it concerns the 
protection of personal data.’334  
 
The main object of this section is to analyse the current and future laws regulating 
the protection of personal data collected, processed, stored and transferred within the 
EU for law enforcement purposes. It attempts to discern whether the EU has an 
effective data protection framework in the field of law enforcement, since this is the 
first step forward for achieving the establishment of global data protection principles in 
the area of security. 
The analysis starts with an examination of the origins and evolution of the general 
data protection legislation before and after the Treaty of Lisbon. The specific data 
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protection laws within the AFSJ are detailed next. The premise is that, although data 
protection legislation is harmonised at the EU level when it is encompassed within the 
internal market clause, the scope and limits of the EU protection of personal data are 
still very unclear when the processing is carried out for law enforcement purposes. This 
is added to the fact that general EU data protection laws might overlap with those data 
protection provisions included in each of the existing data-sharing instruments and 
systems in the field of criminal matters. The overall goal of this last analysis is to 
identify the flaws, if any, of the EU data protection rules applicable for data processing 
in the field of law enforcement. 
 
4.1.  General data protection rules in connection with the AFSJ 
 
4.1.1. Origins of the EU data protection legislation  
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) play an important role as the main influences of the EU data 
protection framework. On the one hand, the OECD released a Recommendation of the 
Council concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data (OECD Privacy Guidelines)335 in September 1980. On the other 
hand, in 1981 the Council of Europe adopted the 108 Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (the 108 CoE 
Data Protection Convention).336 Unlike the OECD Privacy Guidelines, the standards and 
values of the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention are binding for all CoE Contracting 
Parties.337 
The OECD Privacy Guidelines and the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention include 
the same foundational principles: i) the collection limitation principle, ii) the data 
quality principle, iii) the purpose specification principle, iv) the use limitation principle, 
v) the security safeguards principle, vi) the openness principle, vii) the individual 
participation principle, and viii) the accountability principle.338  
                                                
335 OECD, Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy 
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As noted above, both frameworks served as the source of inspiration for the later EU 
data protection legislation. At first, the EU based data protection laws on its internal 
market clauses: Article 100a TEC (later amended as Article 95 TEC) and Article 286 
TEC. Therefore, the Community had full competence to legislate on data protection 
matters. The reason behind the choice of the legal basis was simple. The creation of a 
common market had brought the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, 
and with it, a free flow of personal data from one Member State to another. The 
objective was to systematise the substantial increase in the cross-border movement of 
personal data because of the intensification of social and economic activities within the 
EU. That came along with the technological progress for processing and exchanging 
data that emerged during the early nineties. Directive 95/46/EC was thus crucial to 
avoid a situation where that member states adopted different national laws on data 
protection. 
 
4.1.2.  Impact and scope of Directive 95/46/EC 
 
Directive 95/46/EC339 is the first and main EU legislative act that regulates the 
protection of personal data within the EU. As explained above, the establishment of the 
EU internal market by the Maastricht Treaty increased significantly the quantity of 
personal data collected and stored for economic purposes. The free circulation of goods, 
services, persons and capital among member states led to the proliferation of databases 
in private companies and industries that interacted in the European market. Under these 
circumstances, Directive 95/46/EC was drafted as the legislative tool that would 
coordinate the collection, processing and storage of various personal data obtained for 
commercial reasons. 
Directive 95/46/EC was inspired by the core privacy principles established in the 
OECD Privacy Guidelines and the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention. These were 
included in Directive 95/46/EC, and later implemented in the domestic legal 
frameworks of the member states. Particularly, the directive contains the following 
rules: the principle of lawfulness and fairness; the purpose limitation principle; the 
principle of adequacy; the principle of accuracy and necessity; data have to be kept no 
longer than necessary; the prohibition of the processing of special categories of data; the 
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right to data access; the right to erasure, blocking and deletion of data; the data subject’s 
right to object; the legal prohibition on automated decision making; the confidentiality 
and security of processing; the obligation to notify the supervisory authority about the 
processing; the need for independent supervision; the obligation to establish appropriate 
technical measures against destruction, loss, alteration or unauthorised access or 
disclosure; and the obligation to establish provisions on remedies, liability and 
sanctions.340 
From the moment Directive 95/46/EC came into force, member states started a 
reform of their domestic laws on data protection. However, the scope of the directive 
included a limitation: Article 3(2) expressly refrained from addressing those activities 
concerning public security, defence or state security. Hence, the member states retained 
the sole competence to legislate on the data processed by the judicial and police 
authorities. 
The scope and limits of Article 3 was not always fully clear to member states during 
the implementation process. Therefore, the CJEU set jurisprudence on the interpretation 
of this provision. In the Österreichischer Rundfunk341 and Lindqvist cases,342 the Court 
showed a great flexibility in the interpretation of Article 3 regarding the connection 
between the internal market and the economic activity at stake.343 In the first case, the 
Court found that the Austrian provision requiring private entities to inform the Austrian 
Court of Audit about the names and salary of their employees fell under the scope of the 
directive. In particular, the Court ruled that: 
 
‘The applicability of Directive 95/46 to situations where there is no direct link 
with the exercise of the fundamental freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty is 
confirmed by the wording of Article 3(1) of the directive, which defines its scope in 
very broad terms.’ (para. 40) 
 
  Therefore, the directive has often applied even when the data processing activity was 
not directly linked to the internal market. Likewise, in Lindqvist, a catechist had set up a 
home page on the Internet containing information about herself and various members of 
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her parish, without their consent. The Court found that the mention of an individual on 
an Internet home page fell under the scope of Directive 95/46/EC. Even if the creation 
of a web page did not constitute any economic activity (it was a non-profit-making 
activity), it concluded that: 
 
‘Charitable or religious activities such as those carried out by Mrs. Lindqvist 
cannot be considered equivalent to the activities listed in…Article 3(2) of Directive 
95/46 and are thus not covered by that exception.’ (para. 45) 
 
In both cases the CJEU interpreted the scope of the directive broadly. The same 
occurred a few years later in the case of Ireland v. Parliament on the Data Retention 
Directive, mentioned above. In that case the CJEU inferred that a measure related to 
criminal law fell under the former EC competence if it was necessary to achieve the 
effectiveness of an EU policy.344 In conclusion, the Court has often345 offered a wide 
interpretation of the scope of Directive 95/46/EC346 when determining whether the 
purpose for processing data was linked to the EU internal market policy.  
 
4.1.3. Applicability of Regulation (EC) 45/2001 within the AFSJ 
 
Regulation (EC) 45/2001347 was adopted for the purpose of regulating data processed 
among the EU institutions and bodies ‘insofar as such processing is carried out in the 
exercise of activities all or part of which fall within the scope of Community law’.348 
This regulation mirrors the majority of principles of Directive 95/46/EC and, although it 
is only applicable for data exchanges within the former first pillar, it has also developed 
a role under the scope of the AFSJ.  
One example is found in the European information systems that were part of the 
former first-pillar bodies.349 In particular, until 1 December 2012, the Commission had a 
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relevant role in managing the systems of Eurodac, VIS and SIS. However, since 
December 2012, the EU agency eu-LISA has replaced those tasks.  
Although Eurodac, VIS, SIS and also CIS were all initially established under the 
scope of the first pillar as border control instruments, as seen above, their scope has 
been extended to the field of criminal matters. The Commission was (and it still is, in 
the case of CIS) the institution in charge of the processing of personal data, in 
conjunction with the national authorities of the member states. In theory, Regulation 
(EC) 45/2001 only applies for data processed in the field of border control. However, in 
practice, it is very difficult to separate the purpose of border management from that of 
law enforcement, especially if the data collected is the same for both cases. Therefore, 
by extension, Regulation (EC) 45/2001 would also apply for information collected by 
Eurodac, VIS, SIS and CIS that is ultimately used for preventing, combating and 
investigating crimes. 
Another case in which the Commission has to comply with Regulation (EC) 45/2001 
is for the processing of personal data included on blacklists for terrorism suspects. The 
EU adopted Common Position 2002/402/CFSP350 and Regulation (EC) No 881/2002351 
as restrictive measures based on the freezing of funds of certain persons and entities 
associated with Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban. They were 
implementing UNSC Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002). 
Restrictive measures were always composed of an intergovernmental instrument (a 
common position or a Council decision) and an EC/EU instrument (a EC regulation or 
Council regulation). The Commission includes the names of the persons whose funds 
are to be frozen. Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 has already been amended more than 
220 times to date.352 Every time the Commission processes personal data for listing or 
deleting terrorists, it needs to comply with the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 
45/2001.  
Finally, the majority of AFSJ agencies are also bound to the Regulation (EC) 
45/2001. However, there is a difference between the agencies that were part of the first 
pillar before Lisbon, and those that fell under the scope of the third pillar. In the case of 
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Frontex,353 which was a first-pillar agency, it is subject to all provisions of the 
Regulation (EC) No 45/2001. In contrast, EU law enforcement agencies like Europol or 
Eurojust, which were former third-pillar bodies, are only bound to the core principles of 
Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.354 However, Europol and Eurojust mandates will be 
replaced by new legislative instruments soon355 and, when they enter into force, 
Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 will fully apply for these agencies.  
 
4.1.4. The Treaty of Lisbon and the new data protection paradigm 
 
Before Lisbon, Article 286 TEC was the provision regulating data protection within the 
first pillar. For data processing within the scope of the second and third pillars, the EU 
competence was limited to secondary legislation in the field. According to several 
CJEU decisions,356 international law was usually ranked more highly than EU secondary 
law but below EU primary law (EU Treaty provisions). Consequently, international 
agreements confronting EU secondary legislation on data protection for law 
enforcement purposes would always prevail. 
The Treaty of Lisbon significantly changed the European framework regarding the 
protection of personal data. With the abolishment of pillars, the EU and its member 
states shared competences for legislation on data processed for criminal matters. Also, 
Articles 16 TFEU and 39 TEU were introduced as new legal bases for the right to data 
protection. 
Article 16 TFEU replaces former Article 286 TEC. According to this new provision, 
the right to data protection is now applicable to all EU sectors. This right is entirely EU 
primary law and prevails over any international agreement confronting it. Likewise, 
Article 16(2) TFEU expands the scope of the provision by stating that rules on data 
protection are not only bound to EU institutions, bodies, agencies and offices, but also 
to ‘Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Union 
law’. Hence, EU data protection legislation is today not only applicable to former first-
pillar activities, but also to former second- and third-pillar matters, including data 
processing activities in the field of law enforcement. Some of these activities are 
                                                
353 Recital 19 of Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union. OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, pp. 1-11. 
354 Article 39 ECD. 
355 COM(2013) 173 final, 27.03.2013; COM(2013) 535 final, 17.07.2013. 
356 For instance, Case C-162/96 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3633, para. 46. 
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expressly foreseen in the Treaty. This is the case for the use of biometrics,357 the 
freezing of funds,358 border management,359 and the data processed for the prevention, 
detection and investigation of crimes,360 to name a few. Moreover, Article 216 TFEU 
enables the EU to conclude international agreements in cases specified by the Treaty, 
when it is necessary for achieving a EU objective, or if is provided for a legally binding 
EU act. This is, for example, the legal basis of the most recent EU-US PNR agreement, 
studied in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
Regarding the institutional amendments, before the Treaty of Lisbon the EP did not 
have any legislative role to play in the formulation of third-pillar laws. It was consulted 
but its opinion was not always taken into account in the negotiations of an international 
agreement. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the EP participates in the ordinary legislative 
procedure and, therefore, it now has the right to veto EU international agreements. In 
this sense, Article 218 TFEU enshrines the so-called ‘consent procedure’, in which the 
EP needs to approve those international agreements adopted through ordinary 
legislative procedure. Likewise, the EDPS has enjoyed greater powers since the Treaty 
of Lisbon. The role of this body is no longer limited to the areas falling under the 
former first pillar. Now, the EDPS’ supervisory tasks cover all EU institutions and 
bodies, including areas outside the scope of what used to be ‘Community law’.361  
The new EU data protection legislation increases the role of the CJEU on these 
issues, too. For example, before the Treaty, the Court did not address aspects relating to 
data protection when it clashed with individual restrictive measures in the field of 
security. Now the Court is able to examine any EU act and international agreement 
based on the processing of information for law enforcement purposes and to issue an 
opinion on the compatibility with the provisions of the Treaty.362 Therefore, the fact that 
there is an explicit EU provision on the right to data protection, together with the new 
binding nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, provides 
the Court with more instruments to protect that right. 
The status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter, 
the Charter) is also amended with the Treaty of Lisbon. Before the Treaty, the Charter 
was considered as part of the soft law for the courts, being a quasi-legal instrument with 
                                                
357 Article 77(3) TFEU. 
358 Article 75 TFEU. 
359 Article 77(2)(d) TFEU. 
360 Article 87(2)(a) TFEU. 
361 European Data Propection Supervisor, Annual Report 2010, p. 18. 
362 Article 218(11) TFEU. 
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no legally binding force. In contrast, the provisions of the Charter are now part of the 
hard law. Thus, they have a binding nature and the same value as the treaties.363 As seen 
above, the right to data protection is included as a fundamental right in Article 8 of the 
Charter.  
It is worth mention here that the Treaty of Lisbon also includes a provision on the 
EU accession to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).364 Although the 
accession procedure has been recently put back by the CJEU Opinion 2/13,365 a future 
adhesion would allow the use of Article 8 ECHR on the right to respect for private and 
family life within the scope of the EU law. 
In the view of the foregoing, Article 16 TFEU, the new nature of the Charter and the 
anticipated EU accession to the ECHR have caused a reinforcement of the EU right to 
data protection. However, in line with the exception of 108 CoE Data Protection 
Convention, Article 8(2) of the ECHR recognises that interferences of a public authority 
with a person's right to privacy may be justified as necessary in the interest of national 
security, public safety or the prevention of crime. This paragraph justifies that, in some 
circumstances, the EU and the member states can put collective security before the right 
to privacy.  
 In the same way, the Treaty of Lisbon has foreseen specific data protection rules in 
the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). According to Article 
39 TEU, the Council can adopt a special decision laying down the rules relating to data 
protection. If that occurs, Article 16 TFEU would be derogated for the processing of 
personal data for activities under the scope of the CFSP, and new rules would apply.  
 The relationship between Articles 16 TFEU and 39 TEU is today still unclear, since 
it is unknown in which situations Article 39 TEU will be applicable. It is presumed that 
Article 39 TEU, together with Declarations 20 and 21,366 was introduced with the 
expectation that there will be situations in which general EU data protection laws might 
clash with third countries’ security rules. In such situations, new standards will be 
adopted.  
                                                
363 Blasi Casagran C 2012, ‘The reinforcement of fundamental rights in the Lisbon Treaty’ in The 
European Union after Lisbon, ed. Søren Dosenrode, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Surrey, pp. 79-80. 
364 Article 6(2) TEU. 
365 CJEU, Opinion 2/13, 18.12.2014. 
366 Declaration 20 recalls that this legal framework includes specific derogations when rules on the 
protection of personal data have direct implications for national security; and Declaration 21 
acknowledges that data protection in the fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police 
cooperation may require provisions specific to this area. 
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 As part of the CFSP, rules adopted under Article 39 will exclude the control of the 
CJEU and the EP. In particular, no instrument based on this provision can be challenged 
before the CJEU,367 and the decision-making process will only involve the Council, but 
not the EP. However, Article 39 TEU has never been used to date. Therefore, it remains 
to be seen what purpose lies behind this provision, and the level of data protection that it 
will introduce for data processing activities within the scope of external security. 
 The Treaty of Lisbon has also introduced two protocols that weaken Article 16 
TFEU. On the one hand, Protocol 21 states that the UK and Ireland are not always 
bound to Article 16 TFEU in the processing of personal data within the field of police 
and judicial cooperation. On the other hand, Protocol 36 foresees a number of 
transitional provisions, by which EU acts and international agreements adopted before 
the treaty will be preserved. According to this protocol, the Commission has only been 
able to challenge an ex-third-pillar instrument under Article 258 TFEU since 1 
December 2014, and this has not occurred yet. The same condition applies for the CJEU 
revision of third-pillar instruments adopted before the Treaty of Lisbon. Therefore, with 
these new powers, the CJEU could now start procedures against pre-Lisbon instruments 
like Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA or the Prüm Decisions.  
 
4.2.  Sector-specific data protection legislation within the AFSJ 
 
Today there is no unified EU approach on data protection within the field of law 
enforcement. In fact, many data exchanges conducted by national law enforcement 
authorities are still entirely subject to national criminal laws. According to Article 3(2) 
of Directive 95/46/EC, EU data protection laws do not apply ‘in any case to processing 
operations concerning public security, defence, State security…and the activities of the 
State in areas of criminal law’. This provision has been an obstacle every time the EC 
has attempted to incorporate new data-sharing instruments in the field of security. The 
third pillar had its own provisions, which regulated transnational law enforcement as 
opposed to national and state security, but no provisions were originally foreseen to 
protect data within the scope of that pillar. Thus, before 2008, the only solution for that 
was to ‘mask’ these laws as part of one of the EC former policies, as occurred with the 
2004 EU-US PNR agreement and the Data Retention Directive. 
                                                
367 However, a possible way for the Court to review data processing agreements under the basis of Article 
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In 2008 that paradigm changed. The EU adopted a framework decision under the 
former third-pillar on data protection aspects falling within the scope of police and 
judicial matters. Although it was seen as an improvement, the instrument was criticised 
from the beginning for being very broad, for giving too much room for implementation 
to the member states. This section analyses the scope and shortcomings resulting of 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. After that, a comparison will be made between the 
framework decision and the proposal for a directive on data protection in the field of 
criminal matters.  
 
4.2.1. The limited scope of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA  
 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (hereinafter, FD 2008/977)368 was adopted as the 
first EU data protection instrument in the field of the former third pillar. The necessity 
to have EU law that would regulate cross-border exchanges of law-enforcement 
information was first stressed in the Hague Programme four years earlier.369 
FD 2008/977 was proposed in 2005370 and it included rules on data subjects’ rights, 
supervisory authorities, data processing and data transfer similar to those established in 
Directive 95/46/EC. However, the first draft proposal was significantly modified 
because of its lack of precision in several provisions.371 A new proposal was not 
launched until 2008. 
FD 2008/977 was based on former Articles 30(a) and (b) TEU – today Articles 87-88 
TFEU. The main purpose of the act was to ensure that data made available between 
member states had a high level of data protection while guaranteeing public safety.372 It 
included data protection rules such as the lawfulness and fairness of data processing; the 
purpose limitation principle; accuracy of the processing; the rights to erasure, blocking 
and deletion of data; appropriate technical measures against destruction, loss, alteration 
or unauthorised access or disclosure; rules on confidentiality and data security; 
remedies, liability and sanctions; and the obligation for an independent supervision.373 
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Law enforcement authorities would need to comply with the act every time data was 
transferred to another Member State for the ‘prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties’.374 However, it 
would not apply to purely internal situations in which information was collected and 
used for one single Member State. That was a criticism that was levelled at the 
instrument after its adoption.375 Other issue of complaint referred to the nature of the 
instrument: One the one hand, member states’ compliance with a framework decision 
cannot be enforced by the Commission and, on the other hand, the instrument was 
limited by the subsidiarity principle.376 Being the AFSJ an area of shared competence 
between the EU and the member states, national laws on data processing for security 
purposes might still apply if an action can be more effectively taken at national, regional 
or local levels. 
The fact that data protection principles of FD 2008/977 were not fully equivalent to 
Directive 95/46/EC was also seen as controversial.377 For instance, FD 2008/977 does 
not contain any provision prohibiting the processing of special categories of data. 
Instead Article 6 FD 2008/977 states that data on race, politics, religion or philosophical 
beliefs, trade-union membership, health or sex life are permitted if strictly necessary 
and under adequate safeguards.378 Another difference is found in the requirement to 
notify and inform the data subject. This condition is included in recital 26 of FD 
2008/977, but according to recital 27 national laws can determine exceptions to it. The 
individual right to access is not equivalent in the two instruments either. Recital 29 of 
the Framework Decision introduces that right similarly to Directive 95/46/EC. Yet, 
paragraph 2 of Article 17 FD 2008/977 establishes a number of restrictions in its 
applicability. Also, unlike Directive 95/46/EC, the Framework Decision does not 
foresee the individual’s right to object, and includes several vague derogations of the 
                                                
374 Recital 6 of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
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requirement of prior consent before transferring data to third countries or international 
bodies.379 Lastly, both the Directive and FD 2008/977 specify powers for an 
independent data protection authority for the oversight; but the Framework Decision 
does not establish any body similar to the Art. 29 WP within its scope. 
The major disappointment as regards the content of FD 2008/977 was the exclusion 
of several sector-specific EU legislative instruments from its scope.380 For instance, the 
framework decision does not apply to data processed by Europol, Eurojust, Schengen 
Information System (SIS), Customs Information System (CIS), Prüm, existing 
agreements with third countries (e.g. PNR agreements),381 and other existing EU acts on 
the exchange of criminal-related information.382 Although such instruments contain their 
own particular data protection rules and usually refer to the data protection principles of 
the Council of Europe, a general fully-fledged regime through FD 2008/977 would have 
ensured a minimum data protection threshold for all EU information systems.383  
That said, it can be concluded that, although the adoption of FD 2008/977 brought 
some progress with respect to the protection applicable to that data processed within the 
field of criminal law, the instrument has several shortcomings. One of them is the 
exclusion of data processed by Europol, Eurojust, SIS, CIS, Prüm, international 
agreements with third countries and any other existing EU act on data exchanges (e.g. 
the Swedish initiative). FD 2008/977 is thus only applicable to data exchanges through 
mutual assistance procedures (according to CoE and EU MLA provisions), VIS, ECRIS 
and Eurodac systems. The need for a new legislative act on data protection for police 
and judicial matters in the EU emerged because of these limitations, especially after the 
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4.2.2. EU data security classification regime  
 
Below, a few lines are dedicated to the current classification regime on data security 
within the EU. First of all, it is worth highlighting that data protection is directly linked 
to data security. Such a link was not considered in the nineties, with the adoption of 
Directive 95/46/EC. However, a few years later, with the rapid progress of new 
technologies and the factual vulnerability of the digital law, the establishment of 
security measures became crucial.  
In 2011 the Commission adopted Council Decision 2001/264/EC,384 which was 
amended in 2004,385 2011386 and 2013.387 Its regulatory framework is divided into 
security rules for data in the industrial sector and provisions dedicated to national 
security.388 It also classifies the levels of security into four categories: restricted, 
confidential, secret or top secret.389 The classification of the particular data processed is 
decided at the discretion of the Member State. 
Interestingly, Europol is excluded from the Council decision’s legal framework. The 
agency has its own data security classification, which was first established in Council 
Act of 3 November 1998. Although the Europol act is in many aspects similar to the EU 
data security legislation – the security classification, for instance – this duplicity of rules 
supposes a fragmentation in the processing of information within the EU. Moreover, the 
proposed EU data protection directive for judicial and police cooperation also includes 
specific data security rules, which will complement the existing EU data security 
framework.390 This proposal is examined in the next section. 
 
4.2.3. Proposal for a directive on data protection for police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters 
 
FD 2008/977 does not fulfil the criteria of Article 16 TFEU because it does not apply to 
domestic data processing activities and it excludes the participation of the EP.391  
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Therefore, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, FD 2008/977 needed to be 
amended or replaced. In this sense, Declaration 21 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon 
enables the EU to adopt specific rules on data protection within the police and judicial 
sectors, taking due account of the specific nature of these fields.  
The Stockholm Programme was the first post-Lisbon initiative to establish new 
legislation within the AFSJ, including rules on the management of the flow of 
information for security purposes.392 Later, the European Council and the Commission 
concretised the programme by adopting a communication393 and a strategy394 with the 
purpose of dealing with EU data protection rules within the AFSJ. The communication 
launched by the Commission was the first step for laying down a new EU data 
protection framework. It pinpointed some new challenges such as the impact of new 
technologies, the lack of harmonisation on data protection legislation among member 
states, the not enterily satisfactory schemes of international data transfers, and an 
ineffective and incoherent data protection framework. The Commission also put 
forward some key objectives like increasing transparency, ensuring greater control over 
one's own data, raising awareness about the risks related to the processing of personal 
data, strengthening rules on consent, harmonising the conditions for the processing of 
sensitive data, and establishing effective remedies and sanctions. Finally, the 
Commission referred to the need to revise data protection rules in the area of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
As a result, on 25 January 2012 the Commission launched two proposals: the 
Proposal for the General Data Protection Regulation (hereinafter, the proposed 
Regulation)395 and the Proposal for Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection 
Directive (hereinafter, the proposed Directive).396 This study focuses only on the latter.  
The proposed Directive will repeal current FD 2008/977.397 If we compare the two 
instruments, a number of improvements can be discerned in the future act. For instance, 
the proposed Directive will confer direct effect on individuals; it will be subject to the 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights; it involves the EP in the legislative procedure and it 
will fall within the jurisdiction of the CJEU.398  
As for the substance of the proposal, it enhances the scope of application of the FD 
2008/977: it will not only apply to cross-border data exchanges within the EU, but also 
for the processing of personal data at the purely national level. Some member states 
have opposed to this new issue, arguing that if the directive regulates national data 
processing, it might be contrary to the EU subsidiarity principle. Other member states 
have expressed doubts about the feasibility of harmonising data protection laws in the 
field of law enforcement,399 or they simply find the data protection rules in the current 
FD 977/2008/JHA sufficient.400  
The proposed Directive also includes small improvements as for individual rights, 
like the obligation to notify data subjects about the processing of their data.401 
Unfortunately, rights like the duty to inform402 and the right of access403 are subject to 
numerous exceptions. In this regard, the Art. 29 WP has argued that the possibility to 
exempt entire categories of personal data from these rights should be deleted from the 
proposal.404  
Particularly interesting is the provision on different data processing procedures 
depending on the category of the data subjects (suspects, convicts, victims, witnesses, 
contacts or associated persons, and other persons).405 For instance, Article 8(1) states 
that personal data classified as ‘sensitive’406 cannot in principle be processed.407 This 
general rule has been another issue of debate at the domestic level, since many national 
law enforcement authorities consider that sensitive data may be relevant for a criminal 
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investigation and, therefore, should be processed.408 In fact, the majority of member 
states prefer the wording in the FD 2008/977, which is not formulated as a prohibition.  
 Although the proposed Directive improves the current framework decision, 
numerous aspects have brought disappointment among the pro-privacy community. One 
of these issues was that an unofficial proposal leaked in November 2011409 offered 
better safeguards for the individuals than the final version released in January 2012.410 
By way of example, the final proposal does not contain any mention of data protection 
impact assessments, which was originally included in the leaked draft.411 Another 
criticism refers to the removal of Article 1(5) of the FD 977/2008. This provision 
establishes that the framework decision cannot preclude member states from providing 
higher data protection safeguards than those established in the law. A similar provision 
is not found in the current proposal, even though some member states have already 
expressed the will to adopt stricter domestic rules than those in the proposal.412 
Further discontent relates to the data retention rules in the proposal. Article 24 of the 
proposed Directive states that personal identification will be allowed for the data 
processing ‘as far as possible’. This ambiguity is reinforced in Article 4 paragraph (e) of 
the proposal, which establishes that ‘data will be kept in a form which permits 
identification of data subjects for no longer than it is necessary for the purposes for 
which the personal data are processed’. The risk of this wording is that the information 
could be used for multiple investigative purposes with no temporal limitation.413  
The annulment of the Data Retention Directive has also stirred up debate over the 
lack of precise rules on public-private cooperation, profiling measures, and the need to 
define the term ‘serious crime’ in the proposed Directive. As Boehm and Cole noted, 
the proposal should be revised to include the Court’s argumentation on such aspects.414 
Although the inclusion of an independent supervisory authority supposes ‘a big step 
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forward’,415 these authorities will have very limited powers. In that sense, the Art. 29 
WP recommended extending Article 46 of the proposed Directive on supervisory 
authorities’ powers and adding the possibility to access ‘all necessary documents for the 
exercise of their investigative powers’.416 That change would offer a complete 
supervision on the processing of data within the field of police and judicial cooperation, 
aligning it to Directive 95/46/EC. 
 Furthermore, the fact that the proposal has not been adopted in the form of a 
regulation has drawn criticism from various EU data protection ‘watchdogs’. In 
particular, the EDPS,417 the Art. 29 WP418 and the EP419 expressed their disappointment 
about this issue. They highlighted the inadequate level of protection in the proposed 
Directive as being greatly inferior to the proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation.420 In contrast, some member states have argued that the whole data 
protection package should be released in the form of a directive as a way to overcome 
any overlap between the two proposals.421 In the end, the separation of instruments (a 
regulation and a directive) will remain. The Commission has justified the specific nature 
of the proposed Directive by referring to Declaration 21 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
acknowledges specific rules for the protection of personal data in the field of criminal 
matters. In addition, the majority of member states prefer a directive to a regulation 
because they do not want to lose national sovereignity in the field of criminal law. 
The proposed Directive does not specify if it will operate in cases where data is 
collected by private entities for internal market purposes but later processed by police 
authorities. In my view, it will depend on who is conducting the data processing 
activity. If it is carried out by a public authority then the proposed Directive will apply; 
but if a private company is the data processor instead, it will fall under the scope of the 
proposed Regulation. In this regard, the Council has clarified that if a private entity 
collects data for commercial purposes and it has a legal obligation to share it with law 
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enforcement bodies, the proposed Regulation applies (for example, data stored by TSPs, 
airline companies and financial entities).422  
Article 2(3) of the proposed Directive explicitly excludes from the scope of 
application the processing of data by EU institutions, bodies and agencies.423 It means 
that, for instance, data processed by Europol will not be covered by the proposal.424 As a 
result, the divergence of data protection frameworks within the AFSJ will remain in the 
future. The proposal has thus missed the opportunity to finally set up minimum EU 
rules for data exchanges carried out within the field of police and judicial cooperation.425  
In conclusion, despite the proposed Directive bringing significant progress with 
regard to the data protection rules in the field law enforcement, it will not end the 
current fragmentation of rules. Many EU information systems will be excluded from the 
scope of the proposal, which means that it will not achieve full harmonisation of EU 
data protection rules in the field of law enforcement. 
 
4.3. Comparative study of the specific data protection provisions in EU data-
sharing instruments  
 
As mentioned above, both the current FD 2008/977 and the proposed data protection 
directive on police and judicial matters explicitly exclude numerous EU data-sharing 
instruments. The reason for such limitation was mainly political, since some member 
states thought that by centralising data protection rules in one single act, they would 
lose authority over the way they regulate security measures. Both the current FD 
2008/977 and the proposed Directive include a clause stating that any prior specific 
rules on data protection will always take preference over the act.426 Yet, only the 
framework decision foresees that if sector-specific rules on data protection are more 
restrictive than those in the act, the former will apply.427  
                                                
422 Council of the European Union, 11109/14, 30.06.2014, p. 5. 
423 This has been criticised by the Committee of the Regions, see OJ C 391, 18.12.2012; and by Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, Finland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and Sweden. 
424 This is addressed in chapter 3 of the present study. 
425 In this sense, the EP, supported by the EDPS,425 has proposed an amendment for extending the scope 
of the proposal to EU institutions, bodies and agencies,425 but it needs to be approved by the Commission 
and the Council. ‘Additional EDPS comments on the data protection reform package’, European Data 
Protection Supervisor, 15.03.2013, p. 12; LIBE AM 270-272. 
426 Article 28 of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, Article 59 of proposed Directive. 
427 Recital 40 of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
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The majority428 of EU data-sharing instruments within the AFSJ include data 
protection provisions. Some of these instruments are preventive measures and store data 
from untargeted individuals, while others process data as a response to a specific 
criminal investigation. The main problem stemming from these instruments is that they 
do not have their data protection rules aligned with each other. Not even the preventive 
measures themselves contain similar rules.  
Preventive tools are specifically the proposals for an EU PNR system and an EU 
TFTS, the APIS, the SIS/SIS II, the VIS, the Eurodac, and the CIS.429 Table 1.2. 
presents a comparison of such instruments in light of four different criteria: data 









Entities with data access Rights of data 
subject 
EU PNR 30 days, and 5 
years in a 
masked out state 





EU TFTS Undefined Undefined FIUs or Europol/Eurojust Undefined 
APIS 24 hours 9 Border authorities Judicial redress 
SIS/SIS II 5 or 10 years 
max.  
Review after 1 
or 3 years. 
10/15 Border authorities; police and 
customs authorities; judicial 
authorities; visa and immigration 
authorities; Europol and Eurojust; 






VIS 5 years max. 34 Border authorities; visa and 
immigration authorities; designated 
law enforcement authorities; Europol; 





                                                
428 This is not the case in Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of 
information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, OJ L 253, 29.09.2005, pp. 22-24. 
429 The Data Retention Directive was initially included in the matrix, but it was removed after it was 
declared void by the CJEU. 
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Eurodac 10 years; or 2 
years  
12 National asylum authorities; designed 





CIS 3 years; 6 years, 
or 10 years max. 
Review after 1 
year. 
14 Designated customs administrations; 







The first thing that is evident from Table 1.2. is that none of these measures for the 
prevention of crimes coincides from a data protection perspective. The retention of 
information goes from twenty-four hours, in the case of APIS,430 up to ten years in SIS 
and Eurodac systems. After the CJEU declared void the Data Retention Directive, many 
conclusions can be made regarding these retention rules. The first is that the majority of 
these retention periods are longer than that established in the annulled directive, which 
ranged from six months to two years. In the case of the PNR Directive, the period of 
thirty days does not impede PIUs from accessing unmasked data after that period, so the 
real retention period is five years. Therefore, in line with the aforementioned Court 
decision Commission v. Ireland and / or Digital Rights Ireland, these periods of time 
could be contrary to the EU principles of necessity and proportionality.431  
As for the number of items collected, they also vary significantly from one 
instrument to another. For example, CIS has fourteen data categories, whereas VIS 
collects thirty-four different items. In all cases the data can easily disclose a wide range 
of information about individuals, such as their dietary habits are, what type of card they 
are paying with, who they are travelling with, etc. All this information can easily clash 
with the right to private live432 and, similarly to the Data Retention Directive, be 
contrary to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Regarding the authorities and institutions allowed to access the information, API is 
the less intrusive system. All the others allow access to law enforcement authorities,433 
                                                
430 Article 6(1) Council Directive 2004/82/EC. 
431 Boehm & Cole 2014, pp. 67-68 and 80. 
432 Boehm & Cole 2014, p. 69. 
433 This is the case of SIS/SIS II, VIS, Eurodac, CIS and Data Retention Directive. See Article 27 SIS II 
Regulation, Article 3 VIS Decision, Article 5 and 6 of 2012 Eurodac Proposal, Article 7 CIS Decision 
and Article 4 Data Retention Directive, and Article 21 ECD. 
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or even Europol434 and Eurojust.435 The main issue of concern is that these broad 
categories of actors may translate into a very high number of people with access to 
personal data. For instance, nobody knows what the PIUs composition in the PNR 
Directive is going to be, or who the ‘verifying authorities’ of Eurodac are. As Boehm 
and Cole point out, this imprecision ‘leaves room for an arbitrary expansion of the 
persons who may access the data sets’.436 They also propose the appointment of an 
independent body among law enforcement authorities for the control of the access.437  
Finally, the rights guaranteed to individuals are insufficient in most of the measures. 
In fact, only the proposed EU PNR Directive offers all basic rights – i.e. right to access, 
right to delete or correct, blockage of data, judicial redress, right to compensation – 
aligned to Directive 95/46/EC. 
Considerably different is Table 1.3. on EU instruments processing information for 
specific criminal investigations, rather than as a preventive tool. I refer particularly to 








Entities with data 
access 
Rights of data subject 
Prüm 
Decisions 
2 years max. 10 Competent law 
enforcement authority 
Right to access, right to 
delete or correct, 




_ 15 Competent law 
enforcement authority 
_ 
ECRIS Until they are 
deleted in the 
Member State 
13 Competent law 
enforcement authority 
_ 
EIO _ 11 Competent judicial and 
law enforcement 
authority 
General mention art.14, 
judicial redress 
                                                
434 Like in SIS/SIS II, VIS, Eurodac and perhaps the EU TFTS. See Article 7 VIS Decision, Article 7 of 
Eurodac Regulation, and section 6 of the TFTS communication. On VIS access, see ‘European police to 
gain access to visa database’, Statewatch, 26.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/apr/05eu-vis-europol.html [4 November 2014]. 
435 Like in SIS/SIS II and perhaps the EU TFTS. 
436 Boehm & Cole 2014, pp. 70, 79. 





Following the same matrix as before, Table 1.3. shows that, rather than a divergence 
among data protection rules, the main problem among these instruments is a lack of 
rules per se. Therefore, it is not possible to carry out an adequate comparison.  
The consequence of having a data-sharing instrument with poor data protection rules 
is that it might lead to abuses by law enforcement authorities. For example, in ECRIS 
the consequence of not restricting data processing to specific purposes means that 
member states can easily use the data for purposes other than criminal proceedings.438 
Likewise, in the case of the EIO Directive, nothing is said about the possibility to make 
copies of the evidence – nor the retention periods for such copies.439 For all these 
measures, except for Prüm, the FD 2008/977 applies subsidiarily.440 However, as 
explained above, the framework decision is very broad and does not cover certain 
aspects of the particular data processing activity. 
It is not a coincidence that the Prüm Decision is the only instrument offering a full-
fledged data protection framework. A data protection regime in Prüm is particularly 
important due to the explicit exclusion of this measure from the FD 2008/977 and from 
the proposed Directive. This exclusion does not translate into a lower data protection 
framework, but quite the opposite: Article 25 of Council Decision 2008/615 establishes 
the condition that a Member State can only participate in the exchange of Prüm data if it 
demonstrates a compliance with all data protection requirements.441 No similar 
provision is found in the FD 2008/977 and the Proposal for Police and Criminal Justice 
Data Protection Directive.  
Data security provisions included in FD 2008/977 will also apply those systems 
which do not contain specific rules on classified information. For instance, the proposed 
EU TFTS442 and SIS II443 include data security requirements, while the Prüm Decisions, 
the Swedish initiative, the EIO and the ECRIS do not.  In the cases where no reference 
is made on data security, the general rules established in Council Decision 2001/264/EC 
and its amendment in Council Decision 2011/292/EU apply by default.444 
                                                
438 Article 6(2) of Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA. 
439 Mangiaracina 2014, p. 125. 
440 Article 18a of EIO Decision; Recital 18 of ECRIS Decision.  
441 Soleto Muñoz & Fiodorova 2014, p. 159. 
442 Section 4.3 of the TFTS Communication. 
443 Article 10 and Article 16 of SIS II Regulation. See also O’Neill 2012, p. 80. 
444 O’Neill 2012, p. 80. 
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When looking to understand the reason for the lack of a consistent data protection 
framework in almost all of the aforementioned instruments we might consider their 
specific raison d’être: all these instruments are used as a response to specific criminal 
investigations and data processed is already focused on a particular target. Therefore, 
any data protection limitation could potentially obstruct the ongoing criminal 
investigation. In any case, the EDPS has already called for an alignment of such 
instruments with the propos Proposal for Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection 
Directive.445 
 
4.4. The purpose limitation and the necessity principles 
 
There are two data protection principles that have been especially controversial in all 
EU data-sharing systems. These are the purpose limitation principle and the necessity 
principle.  
Looking first at the purpose limitation principle, it is established in Article 6(1)(b) of 
Directive 95/46/EC. According to the Art. 29 WP, it consists of collecting personal data 
‘for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes’ that must ‘not be further processed in a 
way incompatible with those purposes’.446 This has often been challenged by the 
increasing ‘function creep’ of the existing European information systems. A function 
creep is the gradual expansion of the use of a system or database, beyond the purpose 
for which it was originally intended,447 which is exactly what has happened in many of 
the aforementioned systems. They were initially created either to develop the European 
borders or for commercial purposes, but they have been ultimately used – or are 
expected to be used – as tools for the detection and investigation of crimes.  
For instance, the VIS was created to support the common visa policy, and Eurodac 
was established to prevent asylum seekers from filing multiple asylum applications in 
different member states simultaneously. Yet, data processed through these systems are 
now accessed by law enforcement authorities of member states and by Europol to fight 
terrorism. Therefore, once the information is collected and stored in the EU centralised 
systems, it can easily be used for other purposes. Likewise, before the adoption of PNR 
                                                
445 European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘Strengthening law enforcement cooperation in the EU: the 
European Information Exchange Model’ (EIXM), 29.04.2013, p. 7. 
446 Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation, WP 203, 02.04.2013. 
447 European Data Protection Supervisor, Eurodac Opinion, 05.09.2012, p. 5.  
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agreements, booking details (PNR data) collected by airline companies were only 
processed for commercial purposes. However, the initial collection of PNR data does 
not correspond today to the final processing based on law enforcement purposes. 
Another example is found in Article 5(5) of the EU PNR Proposal. It leaves the door 
open to add other offences to the list established in Articles 1 and 2 of the EU PNR 
Proposal. According to this provision, it could occur that an police agent requests PNR 
data invoking the exception of Article 5(5) to investigate a minor offence that is not 
included onthe list.448 That would weaken the original purpose for which the proposal 
was drafted. In this sense, the Art. 29 WP has considered that all the above-mentioned 
cases are incompatible with the purpose limitation principle.449  
At this stage, one might wonder what limits should apply in the processing of 
personal data. According to the Art. 29 WP, the limit should be set by the necessity 
principle. All instruments include a clause about their compliance with the necessity and 
proportionality principles. The Art. 29 WP has stressed that the purpose limitation 
principle should be restricted for any processing in which the data is not necessary to 
safeguard important interests (Article 13 Directive 95/46/EC). However, the problem is 
that there are no strict parameters for assessing the necessity to access EU information 
systems’ data by law enforcement authorities. Therefore, in order to conduct an 
objective examination of the necessity and proportionality, impact assessments in the 
use of instruments should be always conducted.450 Unfortunately, the Commission has 
not always carried out impact assessments before adopting data-sharing systems. For 
example, the Eurodac proposal launched by the Commission in May 2012 did not 
include any impact assessment. The EDPS was the first to react to this, arguing that the 
Commission did not demonstrate any substantive reason for which asylum seekers’ data 
was needed. It then urged the Commission to provide solid evidence and reliable 
statistics for the need to access Eurodac data.451 The Europol Joint Supervisory Body 
(JSB) also published a report in October 2012 examining that particular aspect on 
Eurodac access. It stated that there was a ‘lack of evidence that such access is actually 
                                                
448 Boehm & Cole 2014, p. 66. 
449 WP 203, pp. 68-69. 
450 On impact assessments regarding privacy, see Wright D & de Hert P 2012, ‘Privacy Impact 
Assessment’, Springer, Berlin. 
451 EDPS, Eurodac Opinion, 05.09.2012. 
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necessary and proportionate for countering terrorism and other serious crimes’.452 The 
JSB also noted that: 
 
‘Europol's mission to support the EU in preventing and combating all forms of 
serious international crime and terrorism cannot be seen as separate from the mission of 
national law enforcement authorities in these crime areas.’453  
 
The JSB also called for a careful assessment and demonstrable evidence of the 
necessity for Europol’s access. Consequently, the Council later issued a document with 
examples of real cases where the comparison of fingerprint data taken at a crime scene 
had contributed to a criminal investigation.454 In fact, member states are interested in 
encouraging the function creep, allowing them to expand accessible systems during the 
investigation of a crime.  
The principles of purpose limitation and necessity were acknowledged by the CJEU 
in the recent ruling Commission v. Ireland and Digital Rights Ireland. The Court 
annulled that directive precisely because the necessity of the retained data was not 
justified. The argument of the Court was that the interference applied ‘even to persons 
for whom there is no evidence capable of suggesting that their conduct might have a 
link, even an indirect or remote one, with serious crime’.455  
The same processing of an untargeted person’s data occurs in all other instruments 
studied in this chapter. Therefore, it remains to be seen if the fact that since December 
2014 the CJEU has had jurisdiction over former third-pillar measures results in more 
challenges before the court. Using the same argumentation as in the Data Retention 




In the last fifteen years, the EU has contributed significantly to the adoption of 
instruments for the prevention and combat of terrorism and other serious crimes. This 
first chapter has conducted a comprehensive analysis of the measures facilitating the 
                                                
452 Opinion of the Joint Supervisory Body of Europol 12/52, with respect to the amended proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of EURODAC, 
10.10.2012. 
453 Joint Supervisory Body Opinion, p. 3. 
454 Council of the European Union, 16990/12, 03.12.2012. 
455 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, 08.04.2014, para. 58. 
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exchange of information among member states for law enforcement purposes. Many 
legal instruments (e.g. the Swedish Initiative and the Prüm Decisions) and information 
systems (e.g. SIS, VIS and Eurodac) have been added to the traditional MLA 
mechanism for exchanging crime-related data.  
This chapter has identified divergent data protection rules in the existing EU data-
sharing instruments, which would ultimately impede the establishment of global data 
protection standards for security purposes. Moreover, there is a delay in the 
implementation and a lack of use of these measures. As a result, law enforcement 
authorities often apply MLA procedures or even informal communication tools for the 
exchange of data with other member states.  
This chapter has also scrutinised whether it is possible to approximate these rules and 
achieve a common EU data protection framework for the information shared for law 
enforcement purposes. In order to do that, an in-depth analysis of the data protection 
laws within the AFSJ has been conducted. It has determined that the Treaty of Lisbon 
has clearly reinforced the protection of personal data. However, the Treaty establishes 
limitations when data is processed for law enforcement purposes. These restrictions are 
seen in Article 39 TEU, Declaration 21 and Protocol 36.  
Moreover, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA and the proposed Directive on data 
protection for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters have been minutely 
examined and compared. Although the proposed Directive introduces many new aspects 
(e.g. the coverage of pure domestic data transfers, a bigger role from the EP, and the 
CJEU revision), its wording is still disappointing from a data protection perspective. 
The main dissatisfaction stemming from the proposed Directive is the restricted scope 
of the instrument. It excludes data processed by EU agencies such as Europol and 
Eurojust, Prüm transfers, data exchanged through SIS and CIS, as well as data collected 
by private companies and later processed by law enforcement authorities. This last 
limitation sets aside the processing of PNR data, SWIFT data and data collected by 
TSPs. Another problem is that other EU instruments might find their provisions 
overlapping with the proposed Directive, causing confusion and uncertainty: in some 
situations there will be two or more systems applicable; while in others there will be no 
applicable instrument at the EU level at all.456  
                                                
456 Hijmans & Scirocco 2009, p. 1524. 
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In light of the foregoing considerations, it can be concluded that too many 
instruments and data protection frameworks are converging in the AFSJ. The current 
complexity of the security environment within the EU blocks the possibility to apply 
common data protection standards for the information shared among law enforcement 
agents. The major consequence of this issue is that, if personal data is not equally 
protected within the EU, the risk of disparities increases for data transfers between the 




























Chapter 2: Data exchanges for law enforcement purposes between the 
EU and a third state 
 
Terrorism and other serious crimes are not always demarcated within a specific 
territory. A terrorist group might commit an attack in France today, and repeat a similar 
atrocity in Chicago tomorrow. Therefore, member states and the EU itself have 
strengthened their cooperation with police forces in third countries. As a result, the EU 
is now competent to adopt international agreements with third countries in the fight 
against globalised terrorism and other serious crimes. 
 After an examination of the EU instruments that collect and exchange information 
among member states for the prevention, combat, investigation and prosecution of 
crimes, this chapter will focus on the exchange of information beyond the European 
borders. The feasibility of a global data protection framework will depend to great 
extent on the consistency among current agreements between the EU and third 
countries. If international agreements for the exchange of information among law 
enforcement authorities do not yet have common data protection rules, it will make the 
establishment of a universal catalogue of data protection principles difficult to achieve. 
 This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will examine the great external 
influences, especially from the US, on current EU counter-terrorism measures. The 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 caused an increase in the number of measures 
taken by the EU for the collection, processing and storage of personal data. These 
measures regulate not only the exchange of information within the EU but also with 
non-EU countries. Within this context, I will assess the main EU external data-sharing 
instruments. My contention is that, although the EU has influenced certain third 
countries’ norms, the US rules have mostly shaped the EU security norms. In other 
words, as the EU is widening its role in the global security environment, it also becomes 
a ‘norm-taker’ when US counter-terrorism measures based on the exchange of 
information are at stake. In order to prove this point I will thoroughly analyse the 
agreements on mutual legal assistance, passenger name records (PNR), financial data, as 
well as air and maritime security partnerships between the EU and the US. 
The second part of this chapter will study the data protection safeguards for transfers 
carried out between the EU and a third country. In Chapter 1 I have concluded that there 
is no consistent EU data protection framework in the field of law enforcement. Does it 
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imply that data protection provisions of international agreements between the EU and a 
third country are likewise discrepant? I will examine this below.  
 
1. The external dimension of the AFSJ in the fight against terrorism 
 
1.1. Origins and evolution 
 
Although the original purpose of the AFSJ was to provide a framework in which the EU 
and its member states could cooperate for increasing public order, internal peace and 
security, a parallel external mission has been developed over the last ten years. Threats 
to the EU internal security have often been originated outside the EU territory.457 To 
respond to these threats, the EU institutions have engaged in joint actions with third 
countries.458  
The external dimension of the AFSJ stemmed from three correlative events: i) the 
initiatives in the Tampere European Council of 1999; ii) the global impact of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11; and iii) the external strategy proposed in the Hague Programme 
since 2005.459 These three episodes acted as ‘critical junctures’ or key moments that led 
the EU to conduct institutional reforms in its external security policy.460 Yet, differences 
need to be distinguished between the Tampere European Council and the other two 
events. 
First, the main goal of the Tampere European Council461 was to make better use of 
the EU competences in the field of external relations. In that sense, the Conclusions of 
the Presidency underlined the need to achieve a greater coherence between internal and 
external policies of the EU (point 59 of the Conclusions). A closer cooperation between 
the Council and the Commission was encouraged. The external dimension of the AFSJ 
                                                
457 Wolff, Wichmann  & Mounier 2009, p. 11; Lavenex & Wichmann 2009, p. 84; Wesser RA, Marin L & 
Matera C 2011, ‘The external dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ in Crime 
within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. A European Public Order, eds. Eckes C & 
Konstadinides T, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 277. 
458 Pawlak 2009a, ‘The external dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Hijacker or 
hostage of cross pillarization?’, Journal of European Integration, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 33. 
459 Wesser, Marin & Matera 2011, pp. 179-180. 
460 Sarah Wolf also identifies also the massacre of 1972 Munich Olympic Games as a ‘critical juncture’. 
See Wolf S 2009, ‘The Mediterranean Dimension of EU Counter-terrorism’, European Integration, vol. 
31, no. 1, p. 139. 
461 See the Presidency conclusions of the Tampere European Council (15–16 October 1999). Available 
from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm [19 November 2014]. 
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as defined in Tampere was not supposed to be an independent policy, but rather an 
action complementing the internal AFSJ.462 In this sense, the declaration stated: 
 
‘All competences and instruments at the disposal of the Union, and in particular, 
in external relations must be used in an integrated and consistent way to build the area 
of freedom, security and justice.’463 
 
The purpose of enhancing external relations within the AFSJ launched in Tampere 
was later reiterated in the Santa Maria da Feira European Council,464 as well as in the 
‘Multi-Presidency Work Programme’ on external relations released by the Council in 
July 2001.465 
 The 9/11 terrorist attacks had a substantial political impact on the AFSJ legislation. 
Only ten days after the attacks, the European Council conducted a meeting with all the 
heads of the member states in order to discuss the EU cooperation with the US and how 
to achieve the strengthening of EU counter-terrorism measures.466 The same discourse 
took place during the European Council of Seville one year later.467  
 In 2003, the former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), Javier Solana, drafted a European Security Strategy. It stressed the new 
multidimensional nature of security468 in which the EU had to contribute to global 
security through its external action.469 Frequent dialogue began between the EU and US 
officials in order to harmonise police, judicial and border control policy matters. The 
counter-terrorism policy thus became a priority on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 Many international agreements on border security and criminal matters were signed 
between the EU and the US shortly after the attacks. The EU–US agreements on 
extradition and mutual legal assistance,470 as well as the agreements between Europol 
                                                
462 Wesser, Marin & Matera 2011, p. 180; Cremona M 2008a, ‘EU External Action in the JHA Domain: A 
Legal Perspective’, EUI Working Papers Law 2008/24, European University Institute, Florence, pp. 3. 
463 Presidency conclusions of the Tampere European Council, para. 59. 
464 Santa Maria da Feira European Council, Conclusion of the Presidency, 19-20.06.2000. 
465 Council of the European Union, 10741/01, 12.07.2001. 
466 European Council, ‘Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting’, 
21.09.2001. 
467 European Council, ‘Seville European Council Presidency Conclusions’ 21–22.06.2002, pp. 31-34. 
468 Longo F 2013, ‘Justice and Home Affairs as the new dimension of the European security concept’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 37. 
469 Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy, A secure Europe in a better World, 
12.12.2003.  
470 These agreements are examined in section 2 of this chapter. 
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and the US471 were two of these. In addition, the External Security Strategy of 2003 
increased the role of the Council in the decision-making process for measures falling 
under the external dimension of the AFSJ. 
Lastly, the Hague Programme, approved in November 2004, also had a significant 
impact on the expansion of the external dimension of the AFSJ. The programme was a 
direct consequence of the Madrid terrorist attack of 2004, in which synchronised 
detonations of bombs were carried out in the city’s commuter train system. The Hague 
Programme aimed at strengthening the cooperation between law enforcement agencies 
of member states, while consolidating the internal/external nexus of the AFSJ. On 7 
July 2005, a similar attack occurred on three underground trains on a bus in central 
London. The European Council issued several declarations after these attacks,472 
highlighting the need to adopt common measures on the retention of 
telecommunications data as soon as possible. 
The Commission also launched a series of communications473 encouraging the 
coordination of counter-terrorism activities among EU institutions and member states. 
These communications suggested the establishment of an integrated approach on the 
fight against terrorism, which would give the Commission a more direct involvement in 
both internal and external security policies. During that period, the Counter-terrorism 
Working Group (COTER)474 and the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy475 
were also established. Both initiatives dealt with external aspects of terrorism. 
The Hague Programme emphasised the necessity to establish coherence between the 
internal and the external dimensions of the AFSJ in the fight against terrorism. As in the 
former Tampere Declaration, the Hague Programme considered that external police 
operations had the ultimate purpose of improving the internal security of the EU.476 The 
external dimension of the AFSJ became a priority in the EU agenda and, therefore, the 
European Council invited the Council and the Commission to draft strategies on that 
matter.477 As a result, in 2005 the Commission released a communication for ‘a strategy 
                                                
471 These agreements are examined in Chapter 3 of the present thesis. 
472 Council of the European Union, ‘Declaration on combating terrorism’, 25.03.2004; Council of the 
European Union, ‘Declaration on condemning the terrorist attacks on London’, 13.07.2005. 
473 COM(2004) 376 final, 18.05.2004; COM (2004) 429 final, 16.06.2004; COM(2004) 698 final, 
COM(2004) 702 final, COM(2004) 701 final and COM(2004) 700 final, 20.10.2004. 
474 Council of the European Union, 9791/04, 25.05.2004. 
475 Council of the European Union, 14469/4/05, 30.11.2005. 
476 OJ C 53, 03.03.2005, pp. 1-14, point 2.4. 
477 OJ C 53, 03.03.2005, pp. 1-14, point 4. 
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on the external dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’.478 The 
communication underlined that the external dimension of the AFSJ had to be conceived 
as a projection of the internal AFSJ. That communication served as a basis for the 
Council ‘Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and 
Justice’.479 Together with the Council and the Commission, the EP also promoted the 
external dimension of the fight against international terrorism,480 despite its limited 
competences in the EU decision-making process at that time.481 
In order to comply with the US demands, the EU concluded many international 
agreements in the field of security. However, the appropriate legal basis for those 
agreements was not entirely clear since they had a cross-pillar nature.482 Some of them 
were adopted under the internal market clause (e.g. the 2004 EU-US PNR 
Agreement)483 through the Community implied powers;484 while others were adopted 
under the scope of the third pillar. That was the case of the 2006 and 2007 EU-US PNR 
Agreements.485 The Commission used Article 24 TEU in conjunction with Article 38 
TEU as the legal bases for concluding such agreements.486  
New legal bases for the AFSJ were included in the Treaty of Lisbon. Particularly, the 
treaty includes express provisions for the conclusion of international agreements in two 
matters: immigration and asylum.487 However, it does not add any general legal basis for 
the conclusion of international agreements in the AFSJ. It is a step backwards compared 
to the pre-Lisbon legal framework. Before Lisbon, Article 38 TEU was the legal basis 
to conclude international agreements under the scope of the AFSJ, but the provision was 
removed with the Treaty of Lisbon, so now agreements on criminal cooperation are 
based on EU implied powers. 
There are, however, many issues in the Treaty of Lisbon that have contributed to the 
strengthening of the external dimension of the AFSJ. According to Article 21(3) TEU, 
                                                
478 COM(2005) 491 final, 12.10.2005 
479 Council of the European Union, 14366/3/05, 30.11.2005 
480 OJ C 287 E, 29.11.2007, pp. 524-535.  
481 O’Neill 2012, p. 166. 
482 Wesser RA 2010, ‘Cross-pillar Mixity: Combining Competences in the Conclusion of EU International 
Agreements’ in Mixed Agreements Revisited. The EU and its Member States in the World, eds. Hillion C 
& Koutrakos P Hart Publishing, pp. 30-55; Cremona 2008a, p. 16; Wesser, Marin & Matera 2011, p. 291. 
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external objectives of the EU do not only refer to general external policy issues, but also 
to those ‘external aspects of its other policies’ like the external dimension of the 
AFSJ.488 Also, the abolishment of pillars ends with the distinction between the first and 
third-pillar matters of the AFSJ. All fields are now reviewable by the CJEU. Likewise, 
the Treaty of Lisbon removes the separation between the EU and EC international 
agreements, now gathered under one single legal basis: Article 218 TFEU. The new 
procedure for concluding international agreements allows both member states and the 
EU to participate in the negotiations. The EP is involved in the legislative procedure 
too, but in a more limited way: in some cases it has to approve the agreement (Article 
218(6)(a) TFEU);489 whereas in others it only has a consultative role (Article 218(6)(b) 
TFEU).490  
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, new initiatives within the scope of the external 
dimension of the AFSJ have been released. The first instrument launched was the 
Stockholm Programme in December 2009.491 The programme highlighted that the 
external dimension was crucial to the successful implementation of the objectives of the 
programme.492 Also, it sought a ‘greater coherence between external and internal 
elements of the work’ in the AFSJ.493 The two main priorities of the programme in 
relation to the external dimension of the AFSJ were the control of migration flows on 
the one hand, and the improvement of security in Europe on the other.494 The 
programme also included new policies connected to external threats such as the fight 
against cybercrime.495  
According to the Stockholm Programme, an Internal Security Strategy (ISS) was to 
be drafted by the Council and the Commission. In this regard, the Council released a 
‘Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security 
Model’,496 and the Commission issued a communication on ‘The EU Internal Security 
Strategy in Action: five steps towards a more secure Europe’.497 The Commission’s 
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communication established clear objectives, which included the disruption of 
international crime networks with the creation of a EU PNR Directive, and the 
prevention of terrorism by cutting off terrorists’ access to funding and materials and by 
following their transactions. The ISS, like the Stockholm Programme, considered that 
the internal security was increasingly dependent on external security matters.498  
All the EU institutions approve the existing link between the ISS and external 
security measures.499 They acknowledge that internal and external aspects of the EU 
security are complementary and, therefore, stronger coordination between policies 
should be promoted. Likewise, AFSJ agencies such as Europol, Eurojust and 
FRONTEX have strengthened their competences in the field of external action, and they 
are currently able to conclude cooperation agreements with third countries and non-EU 
organisations. 
 
1.2. Data exchanges for security purposes. The blurry line between the AFSJ and 
the CFSP/CSDP  
 
As Cremona states, there is not one single external policy within the scope of the 
AFSJ.500 Instead, this area is constituted by several integrated policies that, to some 
extent, are to be achieved in cooperation with third countries. These include the 
immigration policy, the counter-terrorism policy, and the fight against organised and 
serious crime, among others.501 For the purpose of this study, the following paragraphs 
will focus solely on the law enforcement area and, particularly, on measures consisting 
of the processing of information for security purposes.  
As seen earlier, the number of counter-terrorism measures adopted by the EU 
institutions has dramatically increased in the last decade, leading to an expansion of the 
AFSJ. Yet, counter-terrorism is not an exclusive AFSJ matter. The events of 9/11 also 
strengthened the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common 
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Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) areas through new military missions and 
partnership agreements with third countries.502 Before the attacks, neither the CFSP nor 
the CSDP were conceptualised as tools for fighting terrorism503 but, in the aftermath of 
9/11, many EU institutional documents started to consider the CFSP/CSDP as necessary 
tools in this area.504 As a result, it has not always been easy to distinguish which 
counter-terrorism activities belong to the AFSJ and which are part of the 
CFSP/CSDP.505  
The Treaty of Lisbon has sought to ensure consistency between the CFSP/CSDP and 
the AFSJ by incorporating Article 21(3) TEU.506 The Treaty has also created a new 
body: The European External Action Service (EEAS), which is led by the EU High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The fact that the 
High Representative is both president of the Foreign Affairs Council and Vice-President 
of the Commission shows the EU’s aim of ensuring consistency of the Union’s external 
action.507 The strategic link between the CFSP/CSDP and the AFSJ is also stressed in 
the Stockholm Programme. It highlights that ‘CSDP missions also make an important 
contribution to the Union’s internal security in their efforts to support the fight against 
serious transnational crime’.508  
Determining which counter-terrorist activities that are part of the CSDP and which 
fall under the AFSJ is not always clear-cut. That debate is found, for instance, in 
missions carried out by police agents beyond the EU territory. The EU has eleven 
civilian CSDP operations ongoing in Ukraine, Georgia, the Palestinian Territories, 
Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Niger, and the 
                                                
502 Wolf S 2009, ‘The Mediterranean Dimension of EU Counter-terrorism’, European Integration, vol. 
31, no. 1, p. 146. 
503 Ferreira-Pereira LC & Oliveira Martins B 2012, ‘The external dimension of the European Union's 
counter-terrorism: an introduction to empirical and theoretical developments’, European Security, vol. 21, 
no. 4, p. 541. 
504 See Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 
2001; Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 25.3.2004; and Conceptual Framework on the ECDP 
dimension of the fight against terrorism.  
505 Cremona 2008a, p. 7; Longo 2013, pp. 29-46; Monar 2012, p. 46; Wesser, Marin & Matera 2011, p. 
277; Trauner & Carrapiço 2012, pp. 11-12; Wolff, Wichmann & Mounier 2009; Kurowska X & Pawlak P 
2009, ‘Introduction: The Politics of European Security Policies’, Perspectives on European Politics and 
Society, vol. 10 no. 4, pp. 474-485; Schroeder UC 2009, ‘Strategy by Stealth? The Development of EU 
Internal and External Security Strategies’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 10 no. 4, 
pp. 486-505. 
506 It establishes that ‘the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action 
and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and 
shall cooperate to that effect’. 
507 Article 18(4) TEU. 
508 Stockholm programme, point 7.1. 
 
 95 
group of Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles, Tanzania and Yemen. Likewise, it has four 
military missions in Somalia, Atalanta, Mali and the Central African Republic.509 In the 
theoretical framework, Article 43(1) TEU establishes that civilian and military 
operations ‘may contribute to the fight against terrorism’.510 In practice, military bodies 
are often seen on the scene after a terrorist attack. For instance, Spanish military forces 
were deployed at several train stations in Spain after the attacks of 11 March 2004,511 
and France deployed more than 10,000 military troops after the recent shootings in 
Paris.512 
A lot of information is processed during civilian and military missions. Police agents 
who are part of a CSDP mission often gather intelligence and pass it to agencies 
concerned with internal security (e.g. Europol, FRONTEX513 and CEPOL) and member 
states’ law enforcement officers.514 For instance, one of the main focuses of the civilian 
mission in Niger is to find ‘ways for the different authorities responsible for security to 
collect and share information’.515 Likewise, the mission strategy in Mali includes the 
exchange of operational information for combating the illicit trafficking of cocaine.516 
As for the mission taking place in Moldova and Ukraine, the mandate includes the 
improvement of cross-border cooperation and information exchange to prevent and 
detect smuggling, trafficking of goods and human beings, and customs fraud.517 Most 
recently, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has signed a cooperation 
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arrangement with the European Gendarmerie Force518 that also covers the exchange of 
classified information collected during the CSDP missions.519 
 Another example of data processing in the area of external security is found in the 
different associations,520 partnerships521 and cooperation agreements that the EU 
concludes with third countries.522 The majority of these agreements are not CFSP 
instruments, but mixed agreements. Yet, they tackle issues related to international 
security and defence diplomacy. Since 2005523 they have included clauses on 
confidentiality of data for the fight against terrorism. These provisions are called 
‘counter-terrorism clauses’ and allow the EU to obtain information collected by third 
countries on terrorist groups and networks. They are usually elaborated on a case-by-
case basis,524 but follow similar templates.525  
Despite the recent EEAS efforts to clarify the way data is exchanged between CFSP 
bodies and AFSJ agencies,526 more detailed information is needed. It is unclear, for 
example, how information gathered during CSDP missions is disseminated at the EU 
level by the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen) and by the Intelligence Division 
of the European Military Staff.527 IntCen belongs to the EEAS and its mandate tackles 
both internal and external security areas. It is composed of more than 100 staff 
members, 70% of which are intelligence officials in the member states.528 One of 
IntCen’s basic functions is the exchange of intelligence and the drafting of terrorism 
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assessments as part of its counter-terrorism analytical task.529 IntCen analysts often 
travel to crisis zones and CSDP operation locations to gain the necessary data for their 
counter-terrorism reports.530 Yet, it is not clear whether all IntCen data exchanges fall 
under the scope of the CFSP, or whether some of them belong to the AFSJ.531 
 
1.3. Questioning the scope and purposes of Article 39 TEU 
 
In light of the foregoing considerations, it is important to examine the legal 
consequences of considering a counter-terrorism measure as part of the external 
dimension of the AFSJ, or as part of the CFSP/CSDP.  
In certain areas, the Treaty of Lisbon has incorporated dual legal bases, one under the 
scope of the CFSP and one as a non-CFSP policy. The reason for that is to offer two 
different decision-making processes for the same purpose: one is adopted under the 
ordinary legislative procedure, while the other falls under the unanimous decision of the 
Council. There is no prioritisation in the application of these two legal bases. The CJEU 
is responsible to decide case-by-case the suitable legal basis.532 
The CJEU has issued a landmark case that will probably have an impact on the 
unclear dichotomy between CFSP and AFSJ. In the ruling, the CJEU decided the 
adequate legal basis on EU restrictive measures on the freezing of assets. Before the 
Treaty of Lisbon, restrictive measures against individuals within the EU were adopted 
under ex Articles 60 and 301 TEC. Article 301 TEC was the basis for economic 
sanctions against third states, and Article 60 was the legal basis for necessary urgent 
measures on the movement of capital on payments to the third countries concerned (e.g. 
freezing funds). However, it was not clear whether economic sanctions could be 
adopted against individuals, since they were not explicitly regulated in the treaties.  In 
Kadi, the CJEU solved that question by applying together ex Articles 60, 301 and 308 
TEC as the legal basis for economic sanctions against individuals.533 
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 The Treaty of Lisbon incorporates two different legal bases dealing with restrictive 
measures regarding the freezing of assets. Each of them has specific aims and functions: 
Article 215 TFEU (replacing Article 301 TEC) regulates the adoption of restrictive 
measures against individuals – economic and non-economic. In contrast, Article 75 
TFEU establishes that the EP and the Council, through the ordinary legislative 
procedure, need to adopt administrative measures on capital movements and payments 
such as ‘the freezing of funds, financial assets or economic gains belonging to, or 
owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities’. 
 Thus, instruments under Article 75(1) TFEU are adopted under the ordinary 
legislative procedure by the EP and the Council, whereas measures authorised under 
Article 215 TFEU require a CFSP act approved by the Council on a joint proposal from 
the High Representative and the Commission. Here, the EP is only informed thereof.  
The controversy arose with regard to the EU Council Regulation534 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002. That Regulation implemented a UN Resolution about the 
freezing of funds of certain persons and entities associated with Osama bin Laden, the 
Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban. It was adopted on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU 
and not on the basis of Article 75 TFEU. The EP argued that the contested regulation 
was adopted under the wrong legal basis. It maintained that Article 75 TFEU was the 
right basis for adopting restrictive measures aimed at combating terrorism. However, 
the Council took the opposite position. It claimed that the contested regulation against 
international terrorism pertained to the CFSP, because it fell under the scope of the 
EU’s external action. Furthermore, the Council made a distinction between international 
or external terrorism, on the one hand, and internal terrorism, on the other. 
This lack of clarity on the proper legal basis persisted among the EU institutions535 
and legal scholars536 until the CJEU issued the decision in July 2012. The CJEU decided 
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that the proper legal basis for adopting the EU Council Regulation of freezing of funds 
was Article 215 TFEU.537 That decision supported the Advocate General Bot’s 
reasoning.538 Bot had considered that the action came from the international stage and, 
therefore, the objective of preserving peace and strengthening international security had 
to be regarded as falling within the sphere of the CFSP. To the same conclusion, the 
CJEU explained that ex Articles 60 and 301 TEC mirrored Article 215 TFEU and not 
Article 75 TFEU.539 The court’s arguments were based on the idea that Article 215 is 
appropriate where the EU is implementing an UN policy and there is a CSFP decision to 
that effect. In contrast, Article 75 TFEU may be used for the non-UN security measures. 
The judgment is a clear evidence of how decisive the interpretation of the CJEU can be, 
even when the contested legislation falls within the scope of the CFSP.  
However, the argument used by the court to justify the legal basis of restrictive 
measures have not fully solved the blurry delimitation of CFSP and AFSJ competences 
in the field of external security measures. Another CFSP/AFSJ duality of legal basis 
needs to be interpreted by the Court. This time the controversy arises with regard to 
Article 16 TFEU and Article 39 TEU concerning the right to data protection. The Treaty 
of Lisbon offers in Article 16 TFEU a specific provision regarding the protection of 
personal data within the EU territory. It establishes that ‘everyone has the right to the 
protection of personal data concerning them’. Yet, the treaty has also included a way of 
enacting specific data protection rules in the context of the CFSP. Article 39 TEU states 
that, in derogation of Article 16(2) TFEU, the Council can adopt a special decision 
laying down the rules relating to data protection and the free movement of such data 
when member states are acting within the field of CFSP.  
The relationship between Article 16 TFEU and Article 39 TEU is unclear. There is 
no document specifying in which cases Article 39 TEU should apply, derogating the EU 
data protection general rules. It is, however, apparent that Article 39 will limit the role 
of the CJEU and the EP. The CJEU will not solve any question relating to the 
interpretation and application of Article 39, unless it refers to the determination of the 
proper scope of the two articles to ensure compliance with Article 40 TEU. Regarding 
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the EP, this institution will be excluded from the decision-making process of any 
instrument based on Article 39 TEU. 
 However, there is positive a way of interpreting the existence of Article 39 TEU. 
One could see the provision as a tool for ensuring that data protection also applies in the 
CFSP sphere, in contrast to the pre-Lisbon regime. For instance, recent PNR agreements 
with the US, Canada and Australia have been based on Article 82(1)(d) TFEU and 
87(2)(a) TFEU, in conjunction with Article 218(6)(a) TFEU. These international 
agreements fall under the scope of the AFSJ and they have been brought forward under 
Article 16 TFEU. Yet, it could occur that a future data-sharing agreement for security 
purposes is based on Article 39 TEU. This legal basis would guarantee minimum data 
protection safeguards, avoiding a divergent regulation among member states.  
 As will be examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis, a possible use of Article 39 could 
emerge from the information gathered by EU IntCen as well as police agents in CSDP 
missions. From the opinion of the Advocate General Bot in the Mauritius case540 it 
could also be deduced that Article 39 TEU applies in the collection of records of pirates 
operating off Somalia, which are then made available to the Union.541   
Either way, the fact that Article 39 TEU has never been used today shows how far 
the external dimension of the AFSJ can reach. The EDPS has recommended the the 
Commission present, as soon as possible, common rules for the CFSP based on Article 
39 TEU.542 Only with a clarification from the Commission or from the CJEU, we will be 
able to discover what purpose this provision intends to fulfil.  
 
2. International agreements for exchanging information  
 
The EU has developed many partnerships with strategic countries for cooperating in the 
exchange of crime-related information. For instance, a special link has been established 
between the EU and Russia for the fight against terrorism based on a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU),543 a cooperation agreement with Europol,544 and a Joint 
Statement on counter-terrorism.545 Another example is found in the agreement on 
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mutual legal assistance in criminal matters between the EU and Japan.546 That 
agreement brought both parties closer in terms of the management of criminal justice. 
Finally, it is no coincidence that any partnership agreement between the EU and a third 
country would include a ‘counter-terrorism clause’.  
The following analysis will focus mainly on the bilateral cooperation between the 
EU and the US. The reason for this delimitation is that the cooperation between these 
parties constitutes the most developed to date, tackling numerous (if not all) important 
legal issues regarding the EU external security instruments.  
The EU maintains a very close relationship with the US authorities. They established 
diplomatic relations as early as 1953, and their cooperation was formalised for the first 
time in 1990.547 In the last decade, numerous agreements have been adopted between the 
two parties.548 Also, foreign policy, collective security and trade issues have been 
discussed in regular transatlantic meetings.549  In the particular field of security, the EU 
has always cooperated closely with the US. After World War II, the US became the 
protector of the European countries against the Soviet Union through the Marshall Plan 
and the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In exchange, the 
EU supported the US interests during the American-Russian confrontation. In the post-
Cold war era, the US interests in protecting Europe decreased and this brought 
uncertainty about what role NATO was going to play.  
However, during the nineties both actors continued cooperating in diverse security 
issues.550 They set up a partnership for security areas through the following events: a) 
annual EU-US Summit meetings,551 b) the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), c) 
the Joint EU-US Action Plan, d) the 1999 Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD), 
and e) the Transatlantic Group on Counter-terrorism. 
The existing security cooperation between the two has expanded into the field of 
criminal matters since 2001, following the 9/11 attacks. The US enlarged its counter-
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terrorism policy on the basis of the start of a ‘war on terror’, and it called for the support 
to all countries, threatening that they were either with them or against them.552 
Essentially, the US authorities were interested in establishing closer cooperation with 
the EU institutions and its member states because there were at that time many visa-
exempt Western European jihadists553 who could easily fly to the US. In fact, Al-Qaeda 
cells had already been detected in some member states, and several individuals were 
arrested in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK as coordinators of the 
9/11 attacks.554 NATO invoked its collective defence clause six hours after the event.555 
According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty ‘[t]he Parties agree that an armed 
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them’. Moreover, on 20 September of that year, the EU Justice and Home 
Affairs Council adopted eight broad initiatives encouraging the cooperation with the 
US556 and, one month later, George W. Bush suggested the Commission enhance their 
cooperation on counter-terrorism measures.557  
The collaboration with the US in the field of law enforcement became a top priority 
within the EU. Many US agencies included international relations departments and, 
simultaneously, the DG JHA in the European Commission enhanced its external 
competences.558 However, initially the EU and the US developed different counter-
terrorism approaches: while the US counter-terrorism strategy focused on the increase 
of military measures and the use of force, the EU counter-terrorism programme tended 
to prioritise preventive measures through law enforcement and intelligence agencies.559 
Therefore, the EU has usually been identified as a ‘civilian’ or ‘soft power’ because it 
promotes non-military and non-coercive measures; whereas the US has been defined as 
a ‘hard power’, which exports its values with the use of force if necessary.560 
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The influence of the US security strategy within the EU is today unquestionable. 
Specific examples of this impact are found in the 2003 European Security Strategy, 
which was adopted after the US National Security Strategy in 2002;561 the EU-US 
agreements on security matters, influenced by the 2004 Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act562 and the 2004 EU-US Declaration on combating 
terrorism;563 or the creation of the overall EU Counter-terrorism Strategy of 2005.564 
They all indicate the important role played by the US authorities in shaping EU 
interests. 
 Under the Treaty of Lisbon, new forms of cooperation between the EU and the US 
were established. The EU-US ‘Declaration on Counter-terrorism’ of 2010,565 and 
President Obama’s National Security Strategy (NSS) for Counter-terrorism of 2011566 
show how the EU-US partnership continues to be a priority on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Through these strategies, both parties have agreed to prioritise preventive 
measures over military intervention.567 As a result, they organise regular meetings 
between the EU institutions and the Secretary of State, the US Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to address counter-terrorism issues.568  
Many divergences remain, however, between the EU and the US in addressing 
security challenges. They have tried to prove their similar goals by emphasising shared 
transatlantic values such as democracy, rule of law, market economy and human 
rights.569 However, in reality, the two parties have not always shared the same objectives 
in addressing security challenges. This lack of an ‘alliance of values’ has resulted in a 
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decrease of mutual trust between them, especially after the Snowden revelations,570 as 
will be analysed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
The next section analyses the current data-sharing agreements between the EU and 
the US based on security matters. It focuses specifically on the Mutual Legal Assistance 
(MLA) agreement, the Passenger Name Records (PNR) agreement, the SWIFT 
agreement, and the EU-US agreements on air and maritime security partnership. The 
analysis will demonstrate that there is a clear US influence in each of these agreements. 
After that, returning to the already mentioned blurry line between the CFSP and the 
AFSJ, the implications resulting from the choice of an AFSJ legal basis for all 
international agreements adopted between the EU and the US will be examined.  
 
2.1. Data-sharing agreements between the EU and the US 
 
There are different ways to exchange crime-related information between the EU and the 
US. De Busser distinguishes between judicial requests through rogatory letters, 
subpoenas issued by national courts, informal contacts between police authorities, and 
the prior adoption of an agreement between both parties.571 This section examines only 
the latter of these four suppositions. 
As explained above, not only are member states able to conclude data-sharing 
agreements in the field of law enforcement with third countries572 but the EU itself also 
has the competence for that. A few agreements between the EU and the US on the 
collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information have been 
concluded using Articles 87(2)(a) and 218 TFEU (ex Articles 24 and 38 TEU). In fact, 
having the EU as a partner has been very attractive for third countries, which have often 
preferred to submit one single initiative to the Union as a whole, rather than to negotiate 
criminal issues with each Member State individually.573  
The necessity for data-sharing agreements has emerged from the increasingly 
transnational nature of crimes, which often affect multiple countries or even multiple 
continents. These agreements have expanded considerably after 9/11. They are part of 
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the external dimension of the AFSJ, and they mainly address issues on international 
criminal justice (e.g. the MLA treaties) and cooperation on law enforcement (e.g. the 
PNR agreements). The following sub-sections examine the main agreements concluded 
between the EU and the US consisting in the exchange of information for the 
prevention, combat, investigation and prosecution of crimes. 
 
2.1.1. The EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement  
 
The EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (EU-US MLA Agreement) was 
concluded two years after the 9/11 attacks, because of the continuous US pressures 
expressing the need to access data from police authorities and telecommunication 
service providers (TSPs) located in any of the EU countries. As an example, since the 
EU-US MLA Agreement is in force, judiciary authorities on both sides have access to 
bank accounts and can get financial data for the investigation of a crime.  
The EU-US MLA Agreement was not the first instrument of mutual assistance 
between both parties. Before the conclusion of that agreement, sixteen countries in 
Europe had already signed bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) with the 
US authorities,574 and some existing UN Conventions also included mutual legal 
assistance clauses.575 At the EU level, the Council of Europe has had a Convention on 
MLA since 1959, and the EU adopted a Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters between the member states and the European Union a year before the 9/11 
attacks.576  
On 20 September 2001, The JHA Council announced the initiation of negotiations 
for an EU-US judicial cooperation agreement. In a letter sent by the former US 
President George W. Bush to the Commission President Prodi on 16 October 2001, it 
was requested that ‘[w]henever possible, permit urgent MLAT requests to be made 
orally, with follow-up by formal written requests’.577 The mandate for negotiating the 
agreement was adopted on 26 April 2002, the day that the Commission negotiations 
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Luxembourg (1997), Poland (1996), Romania (1999), Spain (1990), the UK (1994 and amended 2001). 
575 For instance the Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Drugs, the Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism, Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), Convention 
against Corruption. See De Busser 2009, pp. 312-313. 
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with the US Department of Justice (DoJ) began. The agreement was signed the 
following year on 25 July 2003. For the first time578 the Commission used ex Articles 24 
and 38 TEU579 as legal bases for concluding an international agreement between the EU 
and a third country in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters.580 
When the EU-US MLA Agreement was adopted, only Bulgaria, Finland, Malta, 
Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia did not already have a bilateral MLAT with the US.581 
According to Article 3 of the agreement, existing bilateral treaties between member 
states and the US would remain in force, so there would be no replacement with the EU-
US MLA Agreement. Moreover, pursuant to Article 14 a possibility to conclude future 
bilateral treaties with the US remained open. As for the new provisions included in the 
agreement, Article 4 restricted the banking secrecy, Article 5 allowed the creation of 
Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), Article 6 permitted videoconferences and Article 9 
gave the possibility to share information as evidence before a court. 
However, a lack of use of MLA instruments between the EU (or its member states) 
and the US has been identified in recent years. Problems commenced with the 
ratification process of the EU-US MLA Agreement. Some of the member states have 
been extremely slow in ratifying the agreement, which only came into force on 1 
February 2010.582 But even after the ratification, member states have raised other issues 
of concern about the use of this instrument. In the last questionnaire sent by the 
Council,583 the Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovakia complained about 
the enormous length of time that the whole procedure takes from the issuing of a request 
to its execution.584 Likewise, Spain highlighted obstacles in executing requests about e-
mail content information at an early stage of an investigation because, according to the 
Spanish system, information can only be provided by a Spanish judge after the pre trial 
investigation. Finally, a problem regarding the lack of use of the MLA channel among 
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member states has been identified. Many countries often acquire data stored by 
companies in another country without any mutual legal assistance request. The same 
occurs with data stored by US authorities; member states usually contact them 
informally through email.585  
From the US side, the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies also detected some current problems regarding the use of MLA 
procedures. First of all, the Group noted that the procedure is slow, taking on average 
ten months or longer. There is also no online submission form for such procedures, so 
many governments do not know how to send a request, or what the formal requirements 
are. In addition, the steps to follow are too long. When a MLA request is sent to the US, 
the Office of International Affairs (OIA) first examines it; then it sends it to the US 
Attorney of the district where data is held; and finally the Department of Justice also 
needs to explore the request.586 It makes the procedure significantly protracted and 
inefficient.  
 
2.1.2. Agreements on passenger name records  
 
Another agreement influenced by the US counter-terrorism policies is the Passenger 
Name Records (PNR) Agreement. Although the Commission confirmed that the need 
for a EU-US PNR Agreement derived from the general EU counter-terrorism strategy, 
scholars have demonstrated that it has been shaped by the US requirements.587 In fact, 
the agreement was a direct consequence of a US law adopted in November 2001,588 
under which any EU airline company with flights taking off or landing within the US 
territory was obliged to provide the Bureau of Customs Border Protection (CBP) with 
electronic access to PNR data.589 
Airline companies have been collecting and exchanging registration data for 
passenger arrangement purposes for more than sixty years now.590 However, before 
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2001, US law enforcement authorities could only access the necessary data by manual 
means, on a case-by-case basis and with a prior court order by a European judge.591 
After 9/11, new US laws obliged all airline companies to systematically transfer 
passenger data of flights arriving in, transiting through, and exiting the country through 
electronic means before the flight departure.  
PNR data has thus become an asset in the fight against terrorism. It includes 
information on the name of the passenger, the itinerary, supplemental information such 
as baggage and special requests, and data on the changes made. The CBP collects 
around sixty-eight million PNR a year.592 This information is then stored in a common 
format in the Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is a custom-designed system 
used by the CBP officers at the Passenger Analysis Unit to detect individuals at high 
risk of committing terrorist crimes, or other crimes punishable by prison sentences of 
three-years prison or more.593 The system has a module called ATS-Passenger (ATS-P), 
which identifies flight numbers arriving or leaving the US territory. It then processes 
information on passenger and crew members of the particular flight prior to entry into 
or departure from US territory. It also deploys an override mechanism, by which it 
registers those flights that, for unforeseen reasons, need to land on US soil.594 
The ATS is used in conjunction with other databases such as the Advance Passenger 
Information System (APIS) for biographical information; the Terrorist Screening 
Database (TSDB) for certain goods entering the country; the DHS Watchlist Service 
(WLS); the Electronic System for Travel Authorisation (ESTA); and the US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In addition, results of queries from the 
FBI’s Interstate Identification Index and the National Insurance Crime Bureau’s 
database are stored in the ATS.595 By creating patterns linked to potential criminals (a 
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practice known as ‘profiling’ or ‘data mining’),596 PNR data has helped the CBP identify 
around 1,750 suspicious cases every year.597 
If any airline company decided not to comply with the post-9/11 mandate, it could 
suffer serious consequences, such as the removal of all landing rights within the US 
territory, the exclusion from the American market, and fines of up to $5,000 for each 
passenger whose data were not transferred. However, by complying with the US laws, 
EU airline companies were infringing the EU legal framework, and particularly 
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data. Article 25 of the directive 
establishes that any third country receiving data from member states need a prior 
adequacy decision from the Commission; and the US border control authorities did not 
have any. 
In an effort to avoid conflicts between the US law and the existing EU data 
protection legislation, the Commission asked the US authorities for an extension to 
comply with the new rules598 and decided to start formal negotiations for the 
establishment of a PNR agreement with the US. The agreement would solve the 
problem of infringing Directive 95/46/EC because it would include adequate data 
protection standards in the sense of Article 25 of the directive. 
The Commission, in December 2003, launched a communication on the PNR global 
approach599 and, two months later, the Council authorised the start of negotiations with 
the US.600 The main institutions that took part in the negotiations were the Commission 
(DG RELEX) from the side of the EU, and the Department of State on behalf of the 
US.601 The EP was only consulted under ex Article 300 TEC. Therefore, neither the EP 
resolution opposing the EU-US PNR agreement,602 nor the warning to go to the CJEU 
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for an opinion of compatibility with the Treaties603 were taken into consideration by the 
Commission. 
After the adoption of Council Decision 2004/496/EC on the conclusion of an 
agreement between the European Community and the US on the processing and transfer 
of PNR data by air carriers to the US DHS, the Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection,604 the (first) EU-US PNR Agreement was formally concluded in Washington 
D.C. on 28 May 2004. As seen in Chapter 1 of this study, the EU-US PNR Agreement 
was signed under ex Article 95 TEC. Since the main debate referred to the adequacy of 
the data protection in the agreement, the US guaranteed an adequate protection of 
passenger data on 6 July 2004.605 Similarly, the Official Journal of the European 
Communities published (on the same day) Commission Decision 2004/535/EC on the 
adequate protection of personal data contained in PNR transfers.606  
In 2004 the EU-US Policy Dialogue on Border and Transport Security (PDBTS) was 
established. It was constituted by homeland security officials from both sides of the 
Atlantic that would informally discuss issues related to security in the area of 
transportation. Unsurprisingly, neither the EP nor the national data protection 
authorities participated in those meetings.607 
As the EP had announced, it challenged Council Decision 2004/496/EC and 
Commission Decision 2004/535/EC before the CJEU. The EP argued that, on the one 
hand, the agreement constituted a breach of the fundamental principles of Directive 
95/46/EC and, on the other hand, it was based on the wrong legal basis. 
It has been explained in Chapter 1 that in May 2006 the Court based its decision 
exclusively on the legal basis matter, and it annulled the Commission decision and the 
Council decision for not being founded on the appropriate provision. The EU rushed the 
negotiations and the adoption of a second EU-US PNR Agreement, which was 
provisionally adopted in October 2006.608 This time the agreement fell under the scope 
of the former third pillar and it was concluded between the EU (not the EC) and the US, 
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culminating with Council Decision 2006/729/CFSP/JHA.609 As noted above, 
international agreements on data transfers signed under the basis of the first pillar had to 
comply with the ‘adequacy principle’ of Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC. Yet, it was 
not the case when the agreements fell under the third pillar, where member states could 
apply their own standards. Thus, while that new agreement solved airline companies’ 
concerns of infringing the EU data protection legislation, new concerns arose within the 
EU, this time because the new agreement no longer required ‘adequate’ data protection 
safeguards for international transfers.  
According to ex Article 24(1) TEU, the negotiations of the second PNR agreement 
were conducted by the Council, which authorised the participation of the Presidency 
and the Commission.610 As for the role of the EP, it enjoyed only an ‘observer’ status, 
despite maintaining bilateral contact with the US authorities.611 
The second PNR Agreement expired on 31 July 2007 and it was immediately 
replaced by a third agreement.612 The third EU-US PNR Agreement was signed and 
provisionally applied through Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA.613 That agreement 
was considered an effective tool by the US authorities. Americans stated that, thank to 
the agreement, they identified during 2008 and 2009 more than 3,000 individuals with 
potential ties to terrorism. For example, the Mumbai attacks’ plotter David Headley, 
who was arrested in 2008 at Chicago’s airport, was identified through his PNR data. 
Faisal Shahzad, the perpetrator of the failed NYC Time Square bombing in May 2010, 
and Najibullah Zazi, who pleaded guilty to plotting to bomb New York City subways,614 
were also arrested after the US police had access to their PNR. 
However, the 2007 EU-US PNR Agreement was never formally concluded because 
the EP never gave consent to the proposal.615 The reason for this was mainly that many 
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MEPs were not convinced by the agreement but they did not want to reject it because 
they thought it could create legal uncertainties for travellers and airline companies.616 
Therefore, they decided to postpone the vote.617 As in the previous agreement, the role 
of the EP, the national DPAs and the EDPS was very limited. However, the 
establishment of the High Level Contact Group on data protection offered a new 
oversight on data transfers.618 
In 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon abolished the previous division of EU policies in 
pillars. Although the 2007 EU-US PNR Agreement was expected to remain operational 
until 2014, the EP’s postponement of the vote, combined with the fact that not all 
member states had ratified the agreement,619 made the drafting of a new PNR agreement 
between the EU and the US a matter of urgency. Therefore, in September 2010 the 
Commission issued a new ‘global external PNR strategy’,620 which was welcomed by 
the EP.621 
Negotiations for the fourth PNR agreement with the US authorities were officially 
launched in December 2010.622 Despite the opposition from the US government to 
modify the 2007 EU-US PNR Agreement,623 these negotiations between the 
Commission and the US were successfully concluded in May 2011.624 The new proposal 
for the EU-US PNR Agreement was officially released in November 2011.625 It was 
signed on 14 December 2011 under the substantive legal basis of Articles 82(1)(d) and 
87(2)(a) TFEU. The procedure for the adoption of the agreement followed the wording 
of Article 218 TFEU. Particularly, paragraph 6 of Article 218 TFEU gives new 
competences to the EP, which is now required to give its consent before concluding 
specific international agreements.  
Compared to the previous agreement, the current EU-US PNR Agreement includes 
new safeguards for passengers. For instance, data is only retained for six months, before 
it passes to another database where it is depersonalised and ‘marked’. In addition, there 
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are more restrictions regarding the personnel authorised to access data, and there is 
more legal certainty regarding the judicial redress.626 Finally, airline companies are now 
obliged to provide passenger details up to ninety-six hours before the flight departure, in 
comparison with the seventy-two hours required under the 2007 EU-US PNR 
Agreement.627 
The agreement was very well received among member states.628 Even the EP, which 
voiced initial concerns,629 found that having that agreement was better than having no 
agreement at all, thus the majority of MEPs voted in favour (409 in favour and 226 
against).630 After being approved by the EP631 and the Council,632 the agreement entered 
into force on 1 July 2012 and it will be up for automatic renewal by 2019 at the latest.633  
 
2.1.3. SWIFT agreements 
 
Another EU-US agreement that has been largely influenced by US requirements is the 
SWIFT Agreement. Although the EU has always tried to justify the adoption of such an 
agreement as beneficial for the fight against terrorism in Europe and ‘necessary to 
ensure protection of EU citizens' privacy,634 the present section proves that the EU 
followed the US mandate as regards the content of both the first and the second SWIFT 
agreements.  
On 11 September 2001 the US and the EU started to exchange financial data. In 
December 2001, two US–Europol agreements were concluded in order to facilitate the 
exchange of information related to global financial movements.635 They were part of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), created by the Bush administration after 
                                                
626 Further analysis on data protection safeguards in PNR agreements is found in section 3.2.1 of this 
chapter. 
627 Travis, A 2011, ‘US to store passenger data for 15 years’, The Guardian, 25 May. Available from 
<www.theguardian.com> [21 November 2014]. 
628 All member states except Austria and Germany approved the agreement in December 2011. Archick 
2013, p. 15. 
629 Pop V 2011, ‘Unhappy MEPs to approve passenger data deal’, EU Observer, 11 November. Available 
from <http://euobserver.com/justice/114252> [21 November 2014]. 
630 Archick 2013, p. 15. 
631 European Parliament, P7_TA-PROV(2012)0134, 19.04.2012. 
632 Council of the European Union, 9186/12, PRESSE 173, 26.04.2012. 
633 Archick 2013, p. 9; MEMO /13/1054, 27.11.2013, p. 3. 
634 European Commission, MEMO/13/1060, 27.11.2013.  
635 Agreement Between the United States of America and the European Police Office, 6.12.2001; 
Supplemental Agreement Between the Europol Police Office and the United States of America on the 
Exchange of Personal Data and Related Information, 20.12.2002. 
 
 114 
9/11 as one of the counter-terrorism measures resulting from Executive Order 13224636 
and the UN Resolution 1373 (2001).637 
Under the TFTP the US authorities were able to pull EU citizens’ data from the 
private company the Society for the Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT). The programme was secret and it did not involve the EU at all, since the 
company was based in Belgium but had servers located in the US territory, particularly 
in Virginia. The US could only get the financial data from SWIFT in the form of 
standardised messages by sending administrative subpoenas to the institution. The 
programme was very attractive for the US law enforcement sector, since the company 
collects personal data from 10,000 financial institutions in more than 200 countries.638 
Although SWIFT executives always insisted that the transfers were not voluntary,639 
SWIFT never contested the subpoenas.640 The US gathered information from up to 12.7 
million financial transactions a day,641 and once the information was pulled, messages 
were stored for a period of 124 days.642 
The TFTP was uncovered in 2006 by the New York Times643 and from that moment 
many concerns were raised within the EU about its potential violation of EU data 
protection laws. Even though the company always processed EU citizens’ data through 
its servers located in the US, due to the fact that SWIFT headquarters were in Belgium 
the company had to comply with Belgian national law implementing Directive 
95/46/EC.  
In November 2006, the Art. 29 WP issued an opinion stating that the programme 
breached EU data protection laws.644 SWIFT joined the Safe Harbour principles in 2007 
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and, that same year, the company decided to move its servers completely to Europe,645 
relocating its servers in Virginia (US) to Switzerland.646 This made the need for an 
agreement enabling SWIFT transfers in compliance with EU laws particularly urgent. 
The EP released two resolutions in 2006 and 2007647 calling for the adoption of an 
agreement, which would regulate SWIFT data transfers to the US. These claims 
convinced the German Presidency of the Council about the necessity for an agreement 
with the US Department of the Treasury that avoided potential clashes with EU data 
protection laws.648  
On 30 November 2009, under the legal basis of the former Articles 24 and 38 TEU, 
the EU and the US signed the first official SWIFT Agreement, exactly one day before 
the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. The agreement became operational on 1 February 
2010 and it was supposed to be applied temporarily until 31 December of that year. 
However, the legal basis to conclude international agreements changed with the Treaty 
of Lisbon and so did the powers of the EP: since the Treaty of Lisbon the Council can 
only adopt a decision authorising the conclusion of an agreement after obtaining the 
consent of the EP.649 Under these new competences, the LIBE Committee wrote a report 
on 5 February 2010 recommending the rejection of the interim SWIFT agreement.650  
The main concerns expressed by the EP related to privacy. In particular, it stated that 
a) there was a lack of necessity and proportionality of the agreement, b) it did not 
respect the purpose limitation principle, c) it did not foresee any judicial remedy for EU 
citizens, d) data were transferred by a pull system, causing the storage of ‘bulk data’,651 
and e) it was necessary to establish a EU TFTP to process the data within the EU. 
Despite intense lobbying from the Commission, member states and the US 
authorities, on 11 February 2010 the EP rejected the adoption of the SWIFT 
                                                
645 Cremona 2011, p. 13, Curtin 2011, p. 6; Suda Y 2013, ‘Transatlantic politics of data transfer: 
Extraterritoriality, counter-extraterritoriality and counter-terrorism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
vol. 51 no. 4, p. 782. 
646 MacKenzie 2012, p. 107 
647 OJ C 287 E, 29.11.2007, pp. 349; OJ C 303 E, 13.12.2006, p. 843. 
648 OJ C 166, 20.07.2007, pp. 18-25. 
649 Article 218(6) TFEU. 
650 European Parliament, ‘Recommendation on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of 
the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program’, PE 438.440v02-00, 05.02.2010. 
651 It is defined as ‘the authorised collection of large quantities of signals intelligence data which, due to 
technical or operational considerations, is acquired without the use of discriminants (e.g. specific 
identifiers, selection terms, etc.)’. See ‘Signals Intelligence Activities’, The White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, 17.01.2014, p. 3. 
 
 116 
Agreement.652 The rejection was interpreted as a protest by the EP against the 
Commission and the Council because it was not consulted during the negotiations.653 
Also, the EP rejection reflected the significant power that the institution gained with the 
Treaty of Lisbon. The EP plays now an important role in the negotiation of international 
agreements.  
The adoption of a second SWIFT agreement was imperative. In the months that 
followed there was no agreement in place so data transfers to the US were conducted 
through the existing EU-US MLA Agreement, as well as through the MLATs between 
member states and the US.654 Yet, as seen earlier, this procedure is usually quite slow 
and inefficient.  
The Council restarted negotiations with the US authorities for the new agreement 
during the spring of 2010.655 Unsurprisingly, the EP played a predominant role during 
the negotiations. Yet, not all the changes proposed by this institution were finally 
fulfilled.656 In any case, the EP voted in favour of that second agreement by 484 votes to 
109, 657 and it was signed on 28 June 2010. 
The second SWIFT agreement was based on Articles 87(2)(a) and 88(2) TFEU on 
police cooperation. It certainly introduced many of the EP suggestions such as i) the 
possibility of administrative and legal redress for EU citizens in the US (Article 18),658 
ii) the competence for Europol to approve the requests sent by the US Treasury 
Department (Article 4), iii) the introduction of an independent observer appointed by 
the Commission based in Washington D.C. (Article 12), iv) provisions on retention and 
deletion of data (Article 6), and v) plans for and equivalent TFTP in the EU (Article 
11). 
 The EP’s demands that were not included in the agreement referred particularly to 
the removal of bulk data and the pull system, as well as the establishment of a judicial 
oversight. Since these issues are important safeguards to be considered in any adequate 
data protection framework, some scholars believe that this second permanent agreement 
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is not very different from the first interim agreement.659 Other aspects subject to 
criticism in the new SWIFT agreement relate to the lack of necessity, the length of the 
retention period (five years),660 and the vagueness of the US requests in order to collect 
SWIFT data.661  
As will be analysed in Chapter 3, the new SWIFT agreement involves Europol in the 
transfer of financial data to the US. In this regard, the EP662 raised concerns because 
Europol, which is in charge of verifying the US compliance of the agreement, did not 
initially provide any updated written information about the requests from the US 
Treasury Department and the compliance with the European data protection standards. 
A dispute on document secrecy between the Council and the EP ended up with a CJEU 
decision in favour of the EP in July 2014.663 The Council argued that the disclosure of 
the US requests to the EP would have a ‘[negative] impact on the European Union's 
negotiating position’. However, the argument did not convince the Court because no 
evidence had been provided showing that the secrecy was necessary to prevent a ‘risk of 
a threat to the public interest’. Thus, that CJEU decision reinforces EU transparency 
rules in the context of international agreements.664  
 
2.1.4. EU-US agreements on air and maritime security partnership 
 
This study has already analysed one agreement between the EU and the US on air 
security: the EU-US PNR agreement. This is the most controversial legal instrument for 
transferring data collected regarding transatlantic flights, but it has not been the only air 
security measure. Other agreements have also been adopted since 9/11 in order to 
exchange information between the EU and the US related to air transport. Similarly, in 
the area of maritime transport, new security measures such as the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) have been adopted. Transport security issues have become one of the 
main topics on both sides of the Atlantic. Also, regular dialogues, between the EU and 
the US on security has taken place since 2004.665 Following the same contention as in 
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the previous sections, I will demonstrate that the US transport security measures enacted 
after 9/11 have had a great influence on the EU rules relating to transport security 
matters. 
 I will look first at the EU security measures adopted within the scope of aviation – 
besides the already studied EU-US PNR agreement. In September and October 2001, 
EU Transport Ministers at the European Council organised several meetings for the 
adoption of new EU counter-terrorism measures.666 A few days later, The Commission 
launched a proposal for a regulation on establishing common rules in the field of civil 
aviation security.667 It was approved on 16 December 2002668 and it consisted of 
preventative measures that ensured air transport security within the EU. Interestingly 
enough, the first recital justified the adoption of this regulation as though the EU had 
actually been threatened: 
 
               ‘The criminal acts committed in New York and Washington on 11 September 
2001 show that terrorism is one of the greatest threats to the ideals of democracy and 
freedom and the values of peace, which are the very essence of the European Union.’ 
 
The regulation included minimum measures to be implemented by member states, 
such as surveillance activities, control access, pre-departure checks, security screening 
for passengers, or handling of checked-in baggage. These were specified in the annex of 
Commission Regulation (EC) 226/2003 and classified as secret.669 The regulation on air 
security was amended in 2008.670 The new text simplified and harmonised the measures 
that the member states had adopted, and it increased the levels of security in the field of 
civil aviation. 
Simultaneously, the US introduced new security measures for passengers arriving by 
aircraft on the US territory. One of these measures consisted in tightening air transport 
entry requirements for passengers coming from countries included in the US Visa 
Waiver Program (VWP). The VWP allows citizens of certain countries to travel to the 
US territory without a prior visa as long as they do not stay for more than 90 days. After 
9/11, the US ordered all countries benefiting from the VWP to start issuing computer-
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coded passports, so that terrorists could not use fake passports to enter the US.671 
Accordingly, the Commission issued a decision in 2005 on the specifications for storing 
passport holder’s facial images and two fingerprints in the chip of the passport.672 This 
type of biometric data had to be present in passports of all VWP designated countries 
after 28 August 2006.673 
Within the EU, twenty-two of the twenty-eight member states are VWP designated 
countries674 (in contrast, the US has visa excemption in all member states).675 Therefore, 
the EU and the US decided to start sharing information collected from the passports of 
passengers booking transatlantic fights, including biometric data. That information was 
not only useful for identifying passengers travelling across the Atlantic, but also for 
sharing information about any lost and stolen passports.676 
Further requirements were introduced in 2007 for countries benefiting from the 
VWP: the US authorities established the web-based ESTA, by which since January 
2009 all citizens from VWP designated countries flying to the US had to submit 
biographical information and answer a few questions,677 at least two days before the 
fight. An ESTA application costs fourteen dollars but applying for it does not guarantee 
its approval.678 If the citizen receives the authorisation, ESTA approval is valid for two 
years and covers multiple entries. However, approved citizens will still need to submit 
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biometric identifiers (including fingerprints and photographs) upon arrival every time 
they fly to the US. Citizens whose ESTA application is denied will need a US visa to 
enter the country.  
Not only have EU passengers flying to the US been closely monitored over the last 
decade, but also cargo security of air transport was strengthened after the attacks. 
Today, the totality of cargo on passenger planes is screened in the EU following the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.679 On 29 
October 2010 the effectiveness of this counter-terrorism measure was proven, when an 
improvised explosive device was found within the cargo of two aircrafts arriving from 
Yemen.680 That incident triggered the release of a European Action Plan in December 
2010 for the harmonisation of security controls within the EU for cargo coming from 
non-EU countries.681 Recently, the EU has adopted new legislation to enhance the 
security of cargo on aircrafts entering the EU682 and, at the same time, it has concluded 
an EU-US agreement on air cargo security partnership, through which both parties 




This leaflet might be found in your checked suitcase 
 if your baggage has been inspected by the TSA. 
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Besides the information exchanged between the EU and the US regarding passengers 
and cargo entering the US by air, maritime cargo screening between the EU and the US 
has likewise been reinforced. Within the EU territory alone there are more than 1,200 
seaports and about 4,000 port facilities.684 At the time the 9/11 attacks occurred, only 
2% of the 12,000 million containers shipped every year to the US territory were being 
inspected.685  
For the US-bound containers coming from the EU, the US launched the so-called 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) in mid-2002. It initially applied to eight ports in 
Europe.686 The US then sought to increase the number of ports participating with the 
CSI and it started bilateral negotiations on container security with several member states 
(particularly, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
Spain and Sweden). The US main objective was to reinforce the security of maritime 
transport by installing US custom officers at European ports where they could examine 
high-risk containers before they reach the US.687 These officers submitted containers to 
X-ray and radiation scanners and sent a report with the results twenty-four hours before 
the arrival of the container to the US territory.688  
However, shortly after the system was operational, it was found that it infringed the 
EU laws, particularly the EU-US customs cooperation and mutual assistance accord of 
1997.689 According to these agreements, the former European Communities were the 
only competent authority in customs matters,690 so member states could not adopt any 
independent agreement with the US on these issues. 
The US threatened the EU with restricting its market access if the required security 
measures were not in place,691 so the EU decided to adopt an agreement on EU-US 
maritime transport security.692 In parallel, the EU passed legislation on enhancing ship 
and port facility security in 2004 and 2005.693   
The EU-US agreement for intensifying and broadening customs and container 
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security cooperation was in force in 2004.694 That agreement gave the US a solid legal 
basis to extend the number of stations in EU ports where the US was able to pre-screen 
maritime cargo containers. However, the establishment of US officers in EU ports 
needed the express consent of the member states.695 Today, ten member states 
participate in the CSI,696 and the initiative covers more than the 86% of all maritime 
containerised cargo destined for the US.697 
Therefore, the influence of the US over EU maritime security measures is 
unquestionable. In particular, the EU adopted a directive enhancing port security in 
2005,698 and a Commission regulation laying down revised procedures for conducting 
inspections in the field of maritime security entered into force in 2008.699 In addition, a 
communication700 with a road map701 was launched by the Commission in 2009 seeking 
to integrate maritime surveillance and exchange of information among member states, 
and also with third countries.702 Regarding the EU-US cooperation in this field, since 
May 2012, both countries have established mutual recognition of their shipper 
programmes by designating specific companies as ‘trusted traders’.703 Moreover, they 
cooperate closely in the sharing of intelligence about particular threats through the 
Container Security Advanced Information Networking (CONTAIN). 
 
2.2. Issues of concern in the agreements 
 
2.2.1. Legal basis implications 
 
Before Lisbon, the EU divided its policies in three pillars: the first on Community 
policies, the second on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the third on 
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. This structural division had 
significant legal implications since the role of the EU (formerly, the European 
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Communities) was greater for policies under the scope of the first pillar than in the other 
two intergovernmental pillars. The legislative procedure under the first pillar required 
qualified-majority voting (QMV) in the Council and simple majority in the EP. In 
contrast, for second and third-pillar decisions there was no participation of the EP and 
any country could block a proposal in the Council because it required unanimity of its 
members. 
Questions about the adequacy of the legal basis were raised regarding those measures 
that intertwined different policy areas. The process was known as cross-pillarisation and 
the choice of legal basis ultimately depended on the preferences of member states and 
EU actors. For example, there were cases in which member states preferred to conclude 
an international agreement under the former third pillar to get more control in the 
decision-making and implementation process. For instance, as mentioned above, an 
international agreement in the third pillar was only adopted if all member states voted in 
favour: once approved, the Commission lacked the competence to force any member 
state to comply with it.  
Thus, the choice of the legal basis of any legislative act depends on the main 
objective that such law seeks to achieve. It is quite common that an EU instrument 
pursues more than one goal. For example, a law can protect the environment and 
criminalise a particular behaviour at the same time. If that law establishes that the 
protection of the environment is the main objective, then the proper legal basis falls 
under the former first pillar (ex Article 174 TEC). Yet, if the law mainly focuses on 
sanctioning individuals and companies that conduct non-environmentally friendly 
activities, then a third-pillar legal basis should apply. 
As regards the first/third pillar dichotomy, a debate arose because former European 
Communities adopted several EC acts that involved internal security matters.704 That 
was the case of first EU-US PNR Agreement. Airline companies initially collected PNR 
data for commercial reasons, and only later law enforcement authorities started to 
request them for security purposes. The fact that the processing of data was based on 
two purposes allowed a margin of discretion as for the most ‘adequate’ legal basis for 
the measure. The first EU-US PNR agreement in 2004 used ex Article 95 TEC as legal 
basis (first pillar), while subsequent EU-US PNR agreements of 2006, 2007 and 2012 
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were based on third-pillar provisions.705  
The choice of different PNR legal bases had enormous implications. The first PNR 
agreement was adopted under the scope of the first pillar and, therefore, it involved both 
the Council and the EP in the decision-making process. According to ex Article 300(7) 
TEC, it also bound all member states without any room for exceptions. One of the 
reasons why member states and EU institutions decided to resort to a first-pillar 
instrument was because they wanted to gain more control in the way they executed 
sensitive security-related problems.706 Also, by choosing a first-pillar legal basis for the 
first EU-US PNR Agreement, they ensured that it would comply with Directive 
95/46/EC. In contrast, the 2006 and 2007 PNR agreements were subject to other 
decision-making rules. They were intergovernmental instruments so they needed 
unanimous consent in the Council, with no approval by the EP. As for the data 
protection safeguards, Directive 95/46/EC was no longer applicable. Member states 
(and not the European Communities) were the main competent authorities to control the 
data protection ‘adequacy’ of the transfers. 
The Treaty of Lisbon kept the legal basis in the ‘third pillar’ for the 2012 EU-US 
PNR Agreement, but here the EP participated in the negotiations. Regarding the data 
protection standards, the agreement includes provisions regulating the protection of 
personal information, but it falls outside the scope of the general EU data protection 
legal framework. These provisions are carefully examined in section 3.2.1 of this 
chapter. 
Besides the confusing first/third pillar division, another recent legal debate has 
referred to the ambiguous separation between second- and third-pillar measures. It was 
not always clear when a measure fell under the scope of CFSP, and when it was an 
AFSJ instrument. The reason for this confusion is that there is no specific provision in 
the EU treaties indicating the objectives of AFSJ external actions: Article 67 TFEU 
enumerates the general purposes of the AFSJ, but nothing is said about its external 
dimension. Likewise, Article 21 TEU lists the EU overall security objectives to be 
fulfilled through the EU external policies but it does not concretise which policy 
conducts what. In that regard, the AG Bot stated in the case C-658/11:  
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‘The distinction between these two Union policies [the CFSP and the AFSJ] is 
made difficult because they are both connected to the imperative of security. The 
objectives of safeguarding the security of the Union and strengthening international 
security are assigned to the Union as objectives of the Union’s external action under 
Article 21(2)(a) and (c) TEU. At the same time, ensuring a high level of security is also 
an objective of the AFSJ in accordance with Article 67(3) TFEU.’707 
 
Precisely because of this lack of specific rules, the EU has made use of its implied 
powers to adopt international agreements within the scope of the external dimension of 
the AFSJ. 
The Council has had some political discretion for deciding whether a measure falls 
under the scope of the CFSP or under the AFSJ (former second/third-pillar division).708 
This appreciation is ultimately subject to interpretation by the CJEU in the terms of 
Article 40 TEU. Interestingly, the Council has usually chosen to adopt data-sharing 
security measures under the scope of the external dimension of the AFSJ instead of 
using a CFSP provision. For instance, agreements on security procedures for the 
exchange of classified information, the 2006 and 2007 EU-US PNR agreements and the 
first temporary SWIFT agreement were all adopted under the basis of ex Articles 24 and 
38 TEU. However, as seen above, intelligence gathered by organisations like the 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and IntCen would fall under the scope of the 
former second pillar.  
My theory, after a careful examination of this CFSP/AFSJ division, is as follows: 
The choice of pillar on security issues depends on two factors: a) the specific purpose of 
the law and b) the actors involved.  
Following the argument of AG Bot in the Mauritius case, if the the main purpose of 
the measure is the internal security of the EU then it should be adopted on an AFSJ 
legal basis; whereas if the main purpose is preserving the international security, then the 
CFSP should be used (eg the Mauritius case). However, the difficulty here is in 
deciding when the security objective is really internal or international. 
As regards the subjects involved, two main categories of actors can process 
information for security purposes: law enforcement authorities and intelligence services. 
If data is gathered by the diplomatic or intelligence services, then the legal basis for 
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data-sharing agreements falls under the scope of the second pillar. In contrast, 
agreements on data processed by law enforcement authorities fall under the third-pillar 
framework.  
As in the first/third-pillar discussion, the choice of legal basis under the second or the 
third pillars has legal implications. Agreements adopted under a third-pillar legal basis 
need the approval from both the EP and the Council, and they can be challenged before 
the CJEU. Contrary to this, second-pillar measures require unanimous consent by the 
Council, no participation of the EP and no control by the CJEU. Member states are here 
the only competent authorities to control the ‘adequacy’ of data processing; at least until 
the scope of Article 39 TEU is finally determined. 
 
2.2.2. Public-private partnership 
 
During the investigation of a crime, law enforcement authorities often require 
information that has been originally collected by private companies. The privatisation of 
security gained importance during the nineties,709 and it increased significantly after the 
9/11 attacks. The public-private partnerships (PPPs) are present in all member states and 
they work both ways: law enforcement agencies are able to access information collected 
by private parties, and these companies can also access some police databases (see, for 
instance, the TIDE database).710  
 This section focuses only on the access that the law enforcement sector has to data 
collected by private companies. The phenomenon is seen with regard to passenger data 
collected by airline companies through PNR systems, financial records collected by 
banks and other similar institutions like SWIFT and, above all, data stored by 
telecommunication service providers (TSP).  
A great number of TSPs are located in the US and, therefore, they are bound by US 
laws. This is the case of Google Inc., Yahoo Inc., Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, 
Dropbox and Whatsapp, to name a few. Despite having their headquarters in the US, 
these companies process personal data from users around the world. Such valuable 
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710 The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) is a US classified database where names of 
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information has not only caught the attention of publicity and marketing companies, but 
also of police and judicial authorities within and beyond the US borders. 
Companies like Google, Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Dropbox and Apple publish 
transparency reports every six months (or yearly, in the case of Dropbox) with the aim 
of keeping users informed about governments’ requests for access or suppression of 
their data.711 The number of requests varies from country to country. In the EU, 
Germany, France and the UK are leading the lists of data requests, as shown in a recent 
comparative study conducted by the NGO Silk.712 
It has been seen above that MLA procedures are normally used by law enforcement 
authorities in the EU to request information located in the US, and vice versa. For 
instance, if Spanish authorities as Facebook to disclose an inbox message of a Spanish 
user, they will need to follow the procedure established in the MLA concluded between 
the US and Spain. The procedure consists of a request to the Office of International 
Affairs of the United States Department of Justice, which will then be reviewed by the 
Counter-terrorism Department and, finally, submitted to a federal court, which will 
issue the court order that authorises the data transfer.713  
In principle, the provider (e.g. Facebook) will not send the records directly to the 
requesting country, but this is not always the case. Besides the formal MLA procedure, 
US companies can decide to provide law enforcement authorities with information 
through an alternative informal process. In fact, employees of big tech companies do not 
always understand the functioning of the MLA procedure when they receive a 
government request.714 Therefore, they often choose the informal approach over the 
formal MLA, because they simply find it is easier. 
Informal contact can be established directly with the TSP or by sending an 
application to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. For instance, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Twitter replies to requests made by governmental authorities of member 
states only if these are emergency requests. In contrast, for the rest of cases, requests 
should be issued via US courts by a letter rogatory, or through MLATs.715 Likewise, 
                                                
711 Transparency reports available from www.dropbox/transparency; 
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714 ‘Law Enforcement Disclosure Report’, Vodafone, June 2014, p. 65. Available from 
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Facebook will informally provide information to law enforcement bodies if the 
company has strong reason to believe it is necessary in order to: detect, prevent and 
address fraud and other illegal activity; to protect ourselves, you and others, including 
as part of investigations; or to prevent death or imminent bodily harm.716 
The situation is made much more complex when law enforcement agencies 
requesting information are located within the US and the data is stored in servers placed 
within the EU borders. In theory, the rules should be the same, but in practice the US 
police authorities barely use MLATs when data is in the EU. Even when the general 
rule is that US judicial authorities should send a MLA request to the EU judicial courts 
of the country where the information is stored, a recent judgment shows that it rarely 
occurs. In the Microsoft case,717 the company was requested to hand over information 
stored in its Irish servers to the US authorities. The request was accompanied by a 
search warrant718 but it did not use the MLA procedures. Search warrants need to prove 
probable cause but their effects are limited to the US territory. Even though the 
information was stored within the EU borders (particularly, in Ireland), on 25 April 
2014, Judge James C. Francis obliged Microsoft to provide the data. The US judge 
concluded that no extraterritoriality principles would apply to the case, since Microsoft 
has no verification system checking every user who registers in the system. For that 
reason, the judge considered that denying search warrants in the EU would be 
advantageous to those individuals who are aware of this flaw and use the account for 
criminal purposes. 
From the judgment it can be deduced that US judicial and police authorities see 
MLA procedures as slow and laborious and, consequently, they are constantly looking 
for other ways to circumvent such laws. Judge Francis was concerned about a clause 
included in most of the MLATs which allows the requested party to deny assistance if it 
deems that the request would be ‘contrary to important public policy’ or involves ‘an 
offense of a political character’.719 He also noted that any search using MLATs had to be 
                                                
716 Facebook data use policy, available from https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/other [22 
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717 ‘In the matter of a warrant to search a certain e-mail account controlled and maintained by Microsoft 
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executed in accordance with the laws of the requested party.720 Since the US does not 
have MLATs with all countries, relying only on these procedures would, in his view, be 
extremely risky.721 
Therefore, it can be concluded that non-MLA means of obtaining information from 
private entities are increasingly used by law enforcement authorities on both sides of the 
Atlantic, but especially by the US. The main concern from the privacy perspective is 
that police authorities do not always have a court order for accessing content data stored 
in TSPs, so this practice lacks external oversight.722 Within this context, the former 
Vice-president of the European Commission Viviane Reding stated in that, as a general 
rule, data should only be exchanged via judicial authorities, and not directly through a 
citizen or company.723 She added that ‘asking the companies directly should only be 
possible under clearly defined, exceptional and judicially reviewable situations’.724  
In contrast, the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies 
has been encouraging private companies to send records directly to the requesting 
country.725 According to the group, this mechanism would shorten the length of time 
that the procedure takes on average (ten months). 
 
3. The EU data protection legislation for international data transfers in the field of 
law enforcement 
 
As seen in previous sections, EU citizens’ data is not only exchanged among law 
enforcement authorities in the member states, but might also be transferred beyond the 
EU. One of the main debates on international data transfers concerns the applicable data 
protection standards. The EU has often been accused of applying double standards when 
conducting data transfers, depending on whether these are sent to third countries or are 
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purely intra-European data flows. This section focuses on the data protection safeguards 
that apply to data transfers beyond the EU. It will be crucial for determining the 
feasibility of global data protection rules. If the EU already has a consistent data 
protection framework for data transferred to third countries, EU laws could be used as a 
model at the international level. 
This analysis is divided into three parts. First, it examines the provisions on 
international data transfers included in Council Decision 2008/977/JHA as well as the 
draft Directive on Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection. The main goal of this 
analysis is to determine whether these provisions offer the same level of protection as 
the provisions applicable for internal EU data transfers. Second, it evaluates the data 
protection provisions included in the main international agreements between the EU and 
the US. Particularly, the EU-US PNR agreement, the SWIFT agreement, and the EU-
US agreement on data security are examined. Lastly, the EU and the US data protection 
regimes are compared. This comparison starts by identifying the differences in the 
conception of the right to privacy, followed by an analysis of the current attempts to 
approximate the two legal frameworks in the field of privacy.  
 
3.1.  EU secondary law  
 
3.1.1. International data transfers according to Council Decision 2008/977/JHA 
 
When the EU adopted the first data protection law in 1995, it included a provision for 
data exchanges beyond the EU borders. It specified the conditions that a third country 
had to comply with for sharing personal data with an EU country.726 According to 
Article 25(1) of Directive 95/46/EC: 
             
  ‘The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of 
personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after 
transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national 
provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third country in 
question ensures an adequate level of protection.’ (Emphasis my own).  
 
                                                
726 Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC. 
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The Art. 29 WP later clarified that the level of protection of a third country is 
considered ‘adequate’ if it complies with the following principles: i) purpose limitation 
principle, ii) data quality and proportionality, iii) transparency, iv) security principle, v) 
sensitive data, vi) the right of access, rectification and opposition, and vii) restrictions 
on onward transfers.727 
However, Directive 95/46/EC does not cover data transfers to third countries for law 
enforcement purposes. Member states were initially the only competent authorities to 
adopt legislation regulating data transfers in the field of security. As a result, there were 
situations in which one Member State could consider data protection standards of a 
particular third country (e.g. Nigeria) to be adequate, whereas another Member State 
could prohibit any exportation of data to that same third country because its data 
protection standards were not deemed to be high enough.728 
In 2001 an additional protocol of 108 CoE Data Protection Convention was adopted. 
This solved the problems of the disparity of rules regarding data were transferred to 
third countries for law enforcement purposes. According to Article 2 of the protocol, 
parties could send data to non-Contracting Parties only ‘if that State or organisation 
ensures an adequate level of protection for the intended data transfer’. However, that 
article presented two main limitations. First, paragraph 2 included broad derogations of 
the adequacy requirement,729 and second, the adequacy requirement for transborder 
flows did not apply if a Contracting Party had not ratified the protocol, and not all CoE 
members have ratified it.730 
Eight years later, the Commission adopted Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (FD 
2008/977).731 According to recitals 23 and 24, and Article 13(1)(d), data transfers to 
third countries could only take place if ‘the third state or international body concerned 
ensures an adequate level of protection for the intended data processing’. Also, that 
provision establishes an equivalent adequacy mechanism to that of Article 25 of 
Directive 95/46/EC for international data transfers in the field of the common market. In 
both cases, the criteria taken into account for any data transfer operation are:  
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‘[T]he nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing 
operation or operations, the State of origin and the State or international body of final 
destination of the data, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third 
State or international body in question and the professional rules and security 
measures.’732 
 
The main disappointment of Article 13 is that it includes the same broad and 
ambiguous derogations as the additional protocol of 108 CoE Data Protection 
Convention.733 In this regard, a Member State can still send data to non-EU members 
without complying with the adequacy criteria if it is for a legitimate specific interest or a 
public interest. Moreover, in contrast to Directive 95/46/EC, the FD 2008/977 gives a 
broad margin to member states to decide on specific adequacy parameters. In other 
words, each Member State assesses the adequacy level according to its own discretion. 
We must not forget that it is still the competence of the member states, and not the EU, 
to regulate in the field of criminal matters. 
It is worth highlighting here that council framework decisions do not have direct 
effects for individuals. In consequence, EU citizens whose domestic legislation opposes 
or does not fully comply with the EU instrument cannot invoke it directly. Another 
debate stems from recital 38 and Article 26 of FD 2008/977. These provisions state that 
this framework decision is: 
 
‘[W]ithout prejudice to any obligations and commitments incumbent upon 
Member States or upon the Union by virtue of bilateral and/or multilateral agreements 
with third States existing at the time of adoption of this Framework Decision.’  
 
Hence, the 2007 EU-US PNR Agreement existing at that time fell outside of the 
scope of this law. In fact, every international data-sharing agreement has its own data 
protection provisions.  
Therefore, it is can be concluded that there is today no common EU legal framework 
regulating data transfers in the field of law enforcement. This situation will probably 
remain the same in the coming years, considering that the proposal for a new EU data 
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protection law on crime-related data transfers does not include any change on that issue.  
 
3.1.2. International data transfers according to the Proposal for a Police and 
Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive 
 
On 25 January 2012, the European Commission launched two proposals dealing with 
data protection matters: the General Data Protection Regulation734 and the Police and 
Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive.735 This section examines only the latter, 
which regulates the processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes. 
The proposal for Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive (hereinafter, 
the proposal or the proposed directive) will repeal the current Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA when it enters into force.736 As seen in Chapter 1, the wording 
of the proposal is ambiguous. Although it states that it does not apply to data processing 
operations falling outside the scope of Union law,737 Chapter V and recitals 45, 46, 48 
and 49 regulate transfers of personal data to third countries and international 
organisations. Unfortunately, neither the current FD 2008/977 nor the proposal includes 
a definition of an ‘international data transfer’. A proper definition of this term would 
clarify, for example, whether the countries that are part of the European Economic Area 
are considered third countries or not.738 
 Regarding the specific provisions dealing with international data transfers, Article 33 
of the proposal establishes that transfers to third countries may only take place if they 
are necessary for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties. Moreover, Articles 34 and 35 of the 
proposal establish that the Commission will be the institution in charge of deciding 
whether or not an international transfer is adequate in terms of data protection.739 So it 
will no longer be the Member State deciding on the adequacy of data protection rules in 
the third country, but any international data transfer bill needs the consent of the 
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Commission. Despite the criticism from some member states,740 this new role of the 
Commission will approximate the proposal for the current adequacy procedure of 
Directive 95/46/EC.741  
Finally, Article 36 of the proposal enables the derogation of appropriate data 
protection safeguards when: i) it is necessary to protect the vital or legitimate interests 
of the data subject, ii) it is essential for the prevention of an immediate and serious 
threat to the public security, iii) for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection 
or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and iv) for the 
establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.742 From this provision it can be 
deduced that future clashes between data protection safeguards and counter-terrorism 
measures will be solved by derogating individual rights in the best interest of collective 
security.  
Thirteen non-EU countries have adequate data protection systems to date.743 It means 
that, in the remainder of third countries, derogations of data protection standards can be 
accepted as long as they are proved to be ‘necessary’.744 In Chapter 1, it has been shown 
that the scope and limits of the necessity principle are often ambiguous, and there is the 
risk that it is interpreted too broadly. In this sense, the EDPS has argued that ‘any 
derogation used to justify a transfer needs to be interpreted restrictively and should not 
allow the frequent, massive and structural transfer of personal data’.745 
Article 36 of the proposal does not guarantee that data transferred to third countries 
with no adequacy decision will not be misused. Given the recent decision from the 
CJEU considering the Data Retention Directive as contrary to the EU laws, Article 36 
should be modified. The Court highlighted the importance of an independent overseer 
for data transfers to third countries. Yet, neither national DPAs nor the EDPS can 
control the use of the data once it is transferred to a third country with no adequate legal 
framework.746 
A further obstacle is detected in the data protection principles of Article 4 of the 
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proposal. Although this provision lists the same data protection principles as those in 
Article 6 of Directive 95/46/EC, the proposed directive is more limited in terms of its 
scope. For instance, these principles will not apply for previous international 
agreements in the field of police and judicial cooperation. According to Article 60, 
previous international agreements (e.g. the EU-US MLA agreement) will remain 
unamended for the five years after the directive enters into force. Assuming that the 
proposal enters into force in 2016, they would not be amended until 2021. 
Another limitation is found in those EU instruments that regulate the processing of 
data collected by private entities for commercial purposes and then transferred to law 
enforcement authorities. This is the case of PNR data. The proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation will deal with cross-border data flows resulting from the 
functioning of the internal market. In contrast, the proposed directive will address the 
processing of personal data for police and criminal matters. But what legal instrument 
will bind data processing operations combining both commercial and security purposes? 
As noted by the EDPS,747 that might be a controversial issue in the future, since both 
legislative proposals do not have the same level of data protection. It might occur that, 
for the same operation, one country applies the regulation standards, whereas another 
Member State bases its laws on the proposed directive.748  
In conclusion, neither the current FD 2008/977/JHA nor the future directive on data 
protection in the field of law enforcement offer a full-fledged legal framework when a 
Member State transfers personal data to law enforcement authorities beyond the EU. 
One of the obstacles mentioned in this section is that these instruments do not apply for 
data transfers that fall within the scope of a specific data-sharing agreement concluded 
between the EU and a third country. Therefore, it is now necessary to examine whether 
data protection provisions in the main international agreements are similar to those 
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3.2. Data protection provisions in the main international agreements between the 
EU and the US 
 
Many international agreements regarding the exchange of information for law 
enforcement purposes have been signed between the EU and the US to date. Each of 
these agreements includes their own data protection provisions. This section examines 
the data protection provisions of the main EU-US agreements based on the exchange of 
information for security reasons: the PNR agreement, the SWIFT agreement and the 
agreement on the security of classified information. No study is carried out on the CSI, 
because the maritime information that the EU transfers to the US does not contain 
personal data. Likewise, no analysis is conducted as regards the EU-US MLAT because 
the agreement does not include provisions on data protection, except for the purpose 
limitation rule in Article 9. This lack of data protection clauses in the MLAT is however 
corrected by the fact that the agreement is currently subject to the FD 2008/977.  
This study seeks to unveil whether all these agreements have the same data 
protection provisions or not. If it is concluded that each agreement has it own 
provisions, it means that different levels of protection are applied to EU citizens’ data 
depending on the particular instrument. It would ultimately complicate the 
establishment of global data protection rules in the field of security. 
 
3.2.1. Data protection in the EU-US PNR agreement 
 
The current EU-US PNR Agreement was adopted in 2012. Before examining it, it is 
pertinent to observe what data protection provisions were included in the previous PNR 
agreements.  
The first draft of the 2004 EU-US PNR Agreement collected 38 PNR categories of 
data. However, during the negotiations of the agreement, this dropped from 38 to 34.749 
Moreover, there was no possibility for EU citizens to access their data and to have 
judicial redress.750 Two particular aspects of that first agreement are, however, positive. 
The first is that data was retained for only three years and six months.751 The other is 
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that the CBP used a ‘push-system’, through which airlines retained control over their 
databases for the CBP requests. That system lowered the chances for abuses by law 
enforcement agencies.752  
As seen earlier, the 2004 EU-US PNR Agreement was found to be in breach of EU 
laws. The ground used by the EP to challenge the agreement was mainly an 
infringement of the fundamental principles of Directive 95/46/EC. Yet, that issue was 
never properly examined by the CJEU, which focused its decision on the examination 
of the applicable legal basis. The CJEU ruling gave airline companies an escape route, 
as before the judgment they found themselves in a catch-22 situation because they could 
not comply with the conflicting US and Community obligations. As for the EU citizens, 
the court decision resulted in lower data protection safeguards: prior to the ruling, the 
agreement fitted under the scope of the internal market provision and, consequently, 
European institutions had competence to enforce citizens’ fundamental rights and 
principles. In contrast, subsequent agreements of 2006753 and 2007754 fell outside the 
scope of the first pillar and, therefore, adequacy levels required by Directive 95/46/EC 
were no longer applicable. The Council became the only institution entitled to decide on 
the mandate of the agreement, and the EP had no formal say in the negotiations.  
The 2007 EU-US PNR Agreement decreased the protection of personal data in the 
following issues: first, data was no longer processed through the push method, but 
through the pull method. This means that the subjects in charge of processing personal 
data changed from private actors (air carriers) to public entities (law enforcement 
agencies), and the US authorities were now competent to extract data from the airlines’ 
databases. Second, data was to be kept for seven years from the moment of collection, 
and then moved to an inactive database for a further eight years. This meant a total 
retention period of fifteen years, in contrast to the three and a half years of the previous 
agreement. Third, the DHS, and not the CBP, was the competent authority for the 
processing of data. This change had negative implications, since it gave access to PNR 
data not only to that specific body, but also to all other US agencies with counter-
terrorism functions. Fourth, information (including sensitive data)755 received at the 
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DHS could be easily transferred to foreign authorities. Finally, PNR data was used to 
detect more criminal offences than the previous agreement.756 
Notwithstanding the general decrease of data protection, a few positive aspects of the 
2007 EU-US PNR Agreement need to be highlighted. The main one is the fact that the 
number of categories of PNR data collected was reduced from 34 to 19. However, many 
scholars have stated that the shorter list did not necessarily mean that less data were 
included. De Busser used the example of the number of bags. The 2007 agreement 
included a single category of ‘all baggage information’, whereas the 2004 agreement 
added the elements ‘bag tag numbers’, ‘number of bags’ and ‘general remarks’ 
regarding a passenger's luggage.757 Another positive feature was that the 2007 EU-US 
PNR Agreement foresaw the conducting of periodical reviews to check the compliance 
with privacy measures.758 That was not required in the 2004 agreement. 
The current 2012 EU-US PNR Agreement759 includes many improvements in terms 
of data protection in comparison with the previous agreements. With regard to the 
method used to transfer data, it prescribes the ‘push method’, a process by which airline 
companies collect PNR data in their databases and then transfer such data to the 
respective government authorities. The push system is a sign of progress, considering 
that 2007 EU-US PNR agreement used the ‘pull method’ for transferring data. Under 
the old pull method, the US authorities had access to all data in airline companies’ 
databases. Consequently, data was collected and processed under US laws, preventing 
EU data protection laws from being enforced.  
However, this ‘push method’ is not fully implemented in practice: in 2013 the 
Privacy Office found that the 68% of air carriers had already transitioned to that system, 
but the ‘pull’ method was still used by 15 air carriers.760 In that sense, the Commission 
has asked airline companies to fully move to the ‘push’ method, since it is required by 
Article 15(4) of the agreement.761 
                                                
756 Archick 2013, p. 14. 
757 De Busser 2009, p. 374. 
758 In this sense, a Joint Review took place in the Autumn of 2008, and a second one was carried out in 
February 2010. See ‘A report on the use and transfer of Passenger Name Records between the European 
Union and the United States’, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Office, 03.07.2013, p. 9; 
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for Passengers Engaged in International Travel’, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Office, 
05.11.2011, p. 6.  
759 OJ L 215, 11.08.2012, p. 5-14. 
760 SEC(2013) 630 final, 27.11.2013, pp. 14-15; ‘A report on the use…’, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Privacy Office, 03.07.2013, pp. 5 and 17. 
761 COM(2013) 844 final, 27.11.2013, p. 2. 
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Data retention periods are also improved in the current agreement. In fact, the DHS 
had to introduce changes to the technology of the ATS in order to adapt to the 
requirements of Article 8. Authorised ATS users have access to an active database up to 
five years. Yet, PNR data are depersonalised after six months.762 That means that after 
that period, authorised ATS users can only see the record locator, the reservation 
system, the date record, and the itinerary.763  Thus personal data are no longer visible. A 
repersonalisation is still possible, but it lasts for a maximum of twenty-four hours. In 
addition, it requires prior authorisation by a supervisory agent and proof that there is a 
specific threat or risk. After five years, data is moved to a dormant, non-operational 
database. Data transferred to this dormant database will be retained for ten years in 
cases of transnational crime information (five years less than under the previous 2007 
EU-US PNR Agreement), and for fifteen years in cases of terrorism information. 
During that period, access will only be possible with the approval of a senior DHS 
official designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security. After ten or fifteen years, 
PNR data will be automatically deleted, and no repersonalisation will be possible.  
 As for the categories of data collected, the agreement keeps the same number of 
items as those in the 2007 agreement: air carriers will provide a maximum of nineteen 













                                                
762 The Commission has argued that the six months have to start to count from the moment the 
information is loaded in ATS, and not from the moment PNR data is updated in ATS. See COM(2013) 
844 final, 27.11.2013, p. 3; SEC(2013) 630 final, 27.11.2013, p. 18. 
763 ‘A report on the use and transfer of Passenger Name Records between the European Union and the 
United States’, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Office, 03.07.2013, p. 16. 
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As seen in the Table 2.1., there is no information on racial or ethnic origin, political 
views, religion, or sex life of the individual. However, if sensitive data is collected by 
an air carrier (e.g. concerning the health or dietary requirements of the passenger), it 
will be subject to special treatment. The ATS-P has programmed certain codes that 
detect and filter ‘sensitive’ information. These codes automatically mask the 
information to prevent routine viewing. If an authorised ATS user retrieves information 
classified as ‘sensitive’, that access will be emailed within twenty-four hours to the CBP 
management,764 and the information will be deleted after thirty days.765 
As for the individual rights included in the current EU-US PNR Agreement, any 
passenger of any nationality has in principle the right to access, rectify and delete the 
information that the CBP has processed about him/her. Data can be accessed by sending 
a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. If the disclosure is rejected, there is an 
appeal procedure and the individual can go to the federal court as the last instance. In 
2011 there were 220,000 FOIA requests,766 and from July 2012 to March 2013, the CBP 
received a total of 21,606 requests, 27 of which were specifically on PNR (none of them 
was from EU citizens).767 The majority of requests came from immigration and custom 
agencies,768 and they were apparently processed within 38 days on average.769  
For the purposes of this study, I followed the procedure of three data requests to the 
CBP from EU citizens (in particular, from France, Spain and Hungary) during the years 
2013 and 2014. None of them was completed in 38 days. In fact, in 2015 none of the 
applicants has received the information yet. The only application that the CBP replied 
was to inform the applicant their request had been rejected. The other two remain 
unanswered by the US government.770  
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This is the permanent message that shows for the two unanswered applications 
 
Even if the CBP eventually sends the data, this delay of over one year must be 
viewed with disappointment, especially considering that a similar PNR data request sent 
to the Australian government was completed after only 15 days.771  
Provisions on onward transfers are also found in the agreement. Data stored in ATS 
can be shared with non-DHS governmental agencies (within or beyond the US) after 
verifying that the requester has a need to know the information by the requester.  
The use and disclosure of PNR data is regulated in the Customs and Border 
Protection Directive.772 According to this law, requesters need to sign specific PNR 
disclosure forms in which they agree to treat the information provided as confidential 
and not to send it on other third parties without prior DHS authorisation.773 The system 
logged 589 disclosures when the last PNR joint review took place in April 2013, and 
only one came from the EU.774 
Data security measures are also present in the agreement. The DHS has noted that: 
 
‘[U]sers may only access PNR through ATS-P, which can only be accessed 
through a web-based user interface over the DHS infrastructure or remotely through 
secure-encrypted mobile devices for certain CBP officers in foreign locations and at 
                                                
771 See Annex II of this thesis. 
772 SEC(2013) 630 final, 27.11.2013, p. 3. 
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 142 
Ports of Entry.’775  
 
Thus, the CBP network can only be accessed by authorised users through secure 
encrypted devices requiring a password.776 Any internal sharing is logged locally on 
hard copy, and data requests from non-DHS agencies are also retained and audited. 
Regarding the overseeng of PNR transfers, audits of the use of ATS-P are carried out 
every six months by the CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs. If the audits show that a user 
has conducted an unauthorised access or disclosure, it may result in criminal 
sanctions.777 Therefore, all PNR users need to undergo privacy training and pass an 
examination before using ATS. Finally, independent supervision is conducted by the 
Chief Privacy Officer, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector 
General, the US Government Accountability Office and the US Congress.778 Also, since 
February 2012, a new Privacy Oversight Team has been incorporated in the DHS 
Privacy Office. It deals with privacy investigations, privacy complaint handlings and 
redress, among other tasks.779 
The agreement explicitly states that decisions cannot be based solely on automated 
processed data. This provision aims to prevent illegal profiling.780 This clause is 
particularly important considering the numerous errors that have been committed in the 
past due to the lack of investigation into hits of potential suspects of terrorism. The case 
of Maher Arar is an example. Arar is a dual citizen of Canada and Syria who was 
denied entry into US territory on 26 September 2002. The decision was taken after the 
Department of State’s cross-matched passenger information from APIS and identified 
Arar as a ‘special interest’ alien who was suspected of terrorism and described as armed 
and dangerous. The inspectors of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) 
arrested him at the US airport and returned him to Syria, where he was subjected to 
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778 European Commission, MEMO/13/1054, 27.11.2013, p. 2. 
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beatings and torture for over a year. Finally, he was found innocent and released to 
Canada.781 
Even though the EU-US PNR Agreement incorporates several provisions that limit 
the collection, use and storage of EU citizens’ data by the DHS, some rules may still be 
contrary to EU laws. The recent CJEU decision to annul the Data Retention Directive 
provided valuable guidance about what practices by which law enforcement authorities 
violate the right to data protection of EU citizens. In a study requested by the LIBE 
Committee, Boehm identified many provisions of the agreement that would contradict 
the CJEU judgment. Particularly, these are Article 4 on the purpose, Article 8 on the 
data retention, Article 14 on the oversight, Article 15(5) on the ad-hoc ‘pull’ method, 
Article 17(1) on the onward transfers and Article 21 on the rights of the data subject.782 
Therefore, after the judgment,783 this agreement would need to be revised and adapted in 
accordance with the parameters established by the Court. 
 
3.2.2. Data protection in the SWIFT Agreement 
 
From 2001 to 2009, the Belgian company SWIFT transferred financial data from EU 
citizens to the US authorities without any formal agreement. As mentioned earlier, 
SWIFT’s headquarters were in Belgium and, consequently, Belgian Data Protection 
Law (which implemented Directive 96/46/EC) was applicable. On 30 November 2009 
the EU and the US signed the first SWIFT Agreement, which authorised the transfer of 
financial data to the US Department of the Treasury for the prevention, investigation, 
detection, or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist financing. The agreement was vetoed 
by the EP in February 2010, on the basis that adequate data protection safeguards were 
lacking (see section 2.1.3 above). By mid-June 2010, the second and current SWIFT 
Agreement was adopted, this time approved by the EP.  
Regarding the data protection provisions of the current SWIFT Agreement, some of 
them differ from those found in the EU-US PNR Agreement. For instance, data 
categories in SWIFT refer to the originator and/or recipient of a transaction, including 
                                                
781 For the details of Maher Arar’s case, see ‘The removal of a Canadian citizen to Syria’, Department of 
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http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIGr_08-18_Jun08.pdf [23 November 2014]. 
782  Boehm & Cole 2014, pp. 58-65. 




name, account number, address, and national identification number.784 Once the data 
enters the database of the US Department of the Treasury, it is retained for ‘no longer 
than necessary to combat terrorism or its financing’, with five years being the maximum 
retention period.785 This does not coincide with the provisions established in the EU-US 
PNR Agreement, which processes up to nineteen categories of data and permits 
passenger data to be retained for up to fifteen years. 
 Articles 12 and 13 of the SWIFT Agreement regulate the supervision of data 
transfers. It requires the establishment of independent overseers, one appointed by the 
Commission786 and the other by the US Department of the Treasury. They perform 
regular checks on the TFTP database (or ‘black box’) to confirm that it complies with 
the extraction requirements.787 In particular, overseers control that any extraction is 
based on the value of data for the investigation, prevention, detection, or prosecution of 
terrorism or its financing; the processing is necessary and proportional; and it includes 
adequate data security measures (Article 5 of the agreement). If any search or extraction 
appears to be in breach of the data protection safeguards of Article 5, overseers will then 
report and block that operation.788 
Articles 14, 15, 16 and 18 of the agreement refer to the individual rights, namely, the 
rights to data access, right to rectification, erasure and blocking of inaccurate data, and 
non-discriminatory administrative and judicial redress. In the particular case of data 
access, any individual can request data that the US Department of the Treasury has 
control over via the national data protection authority (DPA). The DPA then sends the 
formal request to the US authorities.  
During the current study, I myself sent a request for my own SWIFT data to the 
Spanish DPA. I requested access to my financial data in April 2014, and the Spanish 
DPA sent the request to the US Department of the Treasury. One year later, I received 
as a response that the US Department of the Treasury was ‘unable to confirm or deny 
the existence of any responsive records’.  The letter then added that the disclosure of 
such information could identify subjects of ongoing counterterrorism investigations or 
harm national security.789 From this response, there are two possible conclusions: Either 
I have been particularly targeted as a suspect of a serious crime by the US authorities, or 
                                                
784 Article 5(7) of SWIFT Agreement. 
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789 See Annex III of this thesis. 
 
 145 
the letter I recieved is a standarised answer for any data request. Either way, it is very 
worrisome. Therefore, in line with the recommendation made in an EP study about the 
TFTP, there is a real need for ‘making the right to access, rectification, erasure, 
blocking and administrative and judicial redress a reality’.790 
Some data protection provisions are the same in PNR and SWIFT agreements. For 
instance, data is extracted via the push method in both agreements. Article 4(6) of 
SWIFT Agreement establishes that it is the designated provider (i.e. SWIFT) that 
provides the data directly to the US Treasury Department. Moreover, SWIFT needs to 
keep a detailed log of all data transferred to the US.  
Another similarity is found in the provision regulating onward transfers (Article 7 of 
the agreement). In line with the current PNR agreement, data can be shared with law 
enforcement, public security and counter-terrorism authorities in the United States; with 
member states; and with third countries. SWIFT also mentions Europol, as a possible 
receptor of the data. The narrow link between the US Department of the Treasury and 
Europol stems from the fact that the latter verifies that each request ‘is tailored as 
narrowly as possible to minimise the amount of data requested’.791 This practice is 
thoroughly examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Finally, the agreement also coincides 
with the current PNR agreement792 in the obligation to obtain prior consent of the 
competent member states’ authorities before EU citizens’ data are shared. 
It can therefore be concluded that, although there are some equivalences as regards 
the push method and the onward transfers in both the PNR and SWIFT data exchanges, 
we find many differences in the data protection provisions included in SWIFT and PNR 
agreements. Moreover, as with the EU-US PNR Agreement, the recent CJEU decision 
on the Data Retention Directive might have some implications for the SWIFT 
Agreement. In particular, the fact that SWIFT data is transferred in bulk, the lack of an 
independent administrative oversight and the absence of notification to the data subjects 
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3.2.3. EU-US agreement on the security of classified information 
 
The protection of data is closely related to the establishment of data security. In fact, the 
implementation of data protection always requires the existence of data security 
measures. In this sense, Article 17(1) of Directive 95/46/EC states: 
 
            ‘Member States shall provide that the controller must implement appropriate 
technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or 
unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, in 
particular where the processing involves the transmission of data over a network, and 
against all other unlawful forms of processing.’ (Emphasis my own) 
 
Classified information routinely includes personal data. EU data security legislation 
was first adopted in 2001 through Council Decision 2001/264/EC,794 which was later 
amended by Decision 2011/292/EU.795 The EU also concluded an agreement with the 
US authorities on common standards for the security of classified information.796 The 
agreement has lower data protection safeguards than the SWIFT and the PNR 
agreements. These only regulate the establishment of minimum standards of security 
(Article 4.1), the purpose limitation principle (Article 4.3), the prohibition of onward 
transfer without prior consent (Article 4.4), encryption measures (Article 9.2), and 
oversight rules (Article 12). 
There are two other controversies as regards the data security agreement between the 
EU and the US. First, the security classification of Article 3 sets out different categories 
depending on the law enforcement authorities that have collected the information. EU 
authorities use a classification that distinguishes between: a) top secret, b) secret, c) 
confidential and d) restricted (Article 3(b)). Yet, when the information is sent by the US 
authorities, the classification is reduced to: a) top secret, b) secret, and c) confidential 
(Article 3(a)).  
The level of classification is always marked by the data provider. This lack of 
consistency might lead to ambiguities on both sides of the Atlantic about what is 
considered ‘classified information’ and what is not. Particularly, the fact that a 
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document labelled as ‘restricted’ is seen as classified information in the EU but not in 
the US might cause confusion about what parts of the document can actually be 
disclosed. In this sense, it could easily occur that restricted information is exposed to the 
public with no limitation once it is transferred to the US.  
Second, Article 9 establishes that ‘classified information shall be transmitted 
between the parties through mutually agreed channels’. This provision reflects the 
existing imprecision in the use of channels. The current discretion for the choice of 
channel could create problems of multiplicity of communication channels, and make it 
more difficult to implement common security measures for all data transfers. 
 Lastly, Article 19 states that ‘[n]othing in this Agreement shall alter existing 
agreements or arrangements between the Parties, nor agreements between the US and 
Member States of the European Union’. According to this provision, the agreement 
does not apply to other international agreements between the EU and the US such as 
PNR and SWIFT. This provision restricts enormously the scope of the agreement on 
classified information. Also, it does not solve the current discrepancies of data 
protection and security safeguards for specific transatlantic agreements. 
 Although the EU-US data security agreement is less problematic than data protection 
agreements,797 this section has identified some data security controversies. We have to 
look at data protection and data security as intertwined synergies. Therefore, having 
different rules on data protection and data security legal frameworks on both sides of 
the Atlantic affects the consistency of transatlantic data exchanges in the field of law 
enforcement.  
 
3.3. EU-US data protection regimes 
 
3.3.1. Different conceptions of privacy in the US and the EU  
 
Although the EU and the US have made huge efforts to show to the world that they 
share common values, common interests and common responsibilities,798 in practice 
many important divergences as regards their privacy laws are evident. This section 
focuses precisely on examining the differences between the EU and the US regarding 
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the notion of privacy.  
The main difference to be highlighted is that the EU considers ‘privacy’ as a human 
right, whereas the US tends to value it as a liberty over and against the state. This 
distinction has a historical explanation. The sensitivity that the EU has on privacy has 
its origins in the horror suffered by Jews during the Holocaust. The Nazis used public 
and church records to indentify Jewish people, so that they might be persecuted and 
ultimately be sent to concentration camps.799 As a result of those abuses, the idea of 
human dignity, as well as the protection of one’s identity have been significantly 
reinforced within the EU during the twentieth and twentieth-first centuries.800 
Besides the idea that every individual has the right to enjoy a private life (Article 7 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), the EU has taken a step further by establishing 
a ‘right to data protection’ (Article 8 of the Charter). In general terms, the main 
difference between the right to privacy and the right to data protection is that the latter is 
linked to the idea of self-determination, by which any individual should be able to 
decide how their data is processed. The right to data protection is thus connected to 
natural persons and it safeguards the human identity. In the US, laws only refer to the 
right to privacy, but EU laws treat these two concepts separately.801  
The right to data protection constitutes a ‘general principle of law’ within the EU, 
and it is also regulated in Article 16 TFEU. This fundamental right has long been 
protected by many rulings issued by the highest European and Member State courts, 
including the ECtHR.802 Likewise, the idea of data protection has been included in the 
constitutions of almost all member states. 
In contrast, the US Constitution does not regulate the right to privacy against all 
circumstances, but only protects individuals against governmental action, and within the 
limits established by the US Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment is the main 
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binding provision as regards the right to privacy. That clause offers protection to the US 
citizens – or non-US citizens who are long-term residents in the US – as long as they 
have suffered an unreasonable search and seizure by the US government. Yet, the US 
Constitution does not protect individuals against violations committed by non-
governmental actors. In such cases, the right to privacy can only be enforced through 
sectoral laws,803 self-regulation804 and privacy-enhancing technologies.805  
The EU-US divergence is also seen in the fact that in the US privacy is associated 
with a governmental obligation to refrain from taking specific actions. In other words, it 
is linked to a negative duty. Instead, the EU perceives the right to privacy as a positive 
duty: the government must not only abstain from conducting certain activities, but it has 
to ‘affirmatively protect privacy rights’.806 Thus, according to the EU perspective, it is 
not sufficient that EU governments refrain from carrying out unreasonable searches, but 
they have an additional positive obligation to make sure that no individual is unlawfully 
monitored by a third person (either governmental or non-governmental). 
At this point, one might ask: are privacy standards higher in the EU than in the US in 
the field of law enforcement? Although several academic studies conclude that privacy 
rights are similar on both sides of the Atlantic,807 I believe they are not.  
One of the main privacy flaws in the US (not present in the EU laws) relates to the 
great number of exemptions to the applicability of the purpose limitation principle. This 
principle is one of the core requirements of adequate data protection standards in the 
EU. However, it is not regulated in the US legal framework at all. In fact, since the 
adoption of the Patriot Act in 2001, the US government has been processing data that 
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was originally collected for other purposes.808 Particularly, Section 215 of Patriot Act 
increased the US government’s control over all communications collected by TSPs. 
Under that provision, US law enforcement and intelligence authorities are able to collect 
phone metadata of any US citizen without prior warrant.809  
Similarly, the EU adopted the Data Retention Directive. This law obliged European 
TSPs to store metadata for a period between six months and two years, depending on 
the Member State. The directive, however, was annulled by the CJEU in April 2014. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the grounds were the infringement of the purpose 
limitation, the proportionality and the necessity principles as stated in Directive 
95/46/EC, as well as Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.810   
 Another difference between the EU and the US concerns the retention periods. 
Precisely, the Data Retention Directive obliged phone companies to keep users’ data for 
a period of between six month and two years. As mentioned above, the directive was 
annulled by the CJEU for violating EU fundamental rights. If we compare this ruling 
with the situation in the US, we notice that there are no US laws for retention periods. 
Each TSP decides for how long it wants to retain its users’ data. For instance, Verizon 
keeps subscriber information from three to five years and call records for one year; 
whereas Sprint preserves subscriber information for an unlimited period, and keeps call 
details for approximately eighteen months. 
Another privacy weakness that we find in the US and not in the EU concerns the 
publication of criminal records, and the subsequent difficulties of ‘being forgotten’ even 
after having served a sentence. One example is found in several US States with regard 
to the so-called ‘Megan’s Law’. Megan was a seven-year-old girl who was tragically 
raped and killed in 1994 by her neighbour in New Jersey. The murderer had been found 
guilty of committing several sex offences on other young girls before, but people living 
in his neighbourhood were not aware of this. Therefore, a month after the murder, New 
Jersey passed the first ‘Megan’s Law’, by which any sex offender would be registered 
and publically identified on the Megan’s law website of the State. The law had the 
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purpose of informing other neighbours about the location of sex offenders, including the 




Open source: www.meganslaw.ca.gov (random search, face and name covered on my own) 
 
This example shows how in the US the freedom of expression, regulated in the US 
First Amendment, may often override the right to privacy if the purpose is justified, as 
in the case of sex offenders. No similar public database could ever exist in the EU. The 
right to freedom of speech is regulated differently in each Member State, and some give 
it higher importance than others. The EU courts have also been reluctant to keep 
criminal records indefinitely. In that sense, the ECtHR ruled in 2008 that DNA data of 
EU citizens arrested but never charged could not be retained permanently in police 
databases.812 As for the publication of criminal records on the Internet, judgments of 
national courts (constitutional courts’ rulings)813 are excluded from the indexes of search 
engines through robots.txt. This is a measure that avoids linking police and judicial 
records to the name of a person via search engines. Likewise, the CJEU has 
demonstrated that someone can be formally ‘forgotten’ from the indexes of search 
engines, even if their name is linked to the website of a newspaper, as long as the 
information is no longer accurate and relevant to society.814 In that particular case, the 
information to be removed revealed high social security debts that an individual had 
already paid off a long time ago. The CJEU argumentation for erasing information 
                                                
811 Megan’s Law website in California: http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov 
812 S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, [2008] ECHR 1581, 04.12.2008. 
813 Blasi Casagran C & Blasi Casagran E 2012, ‘Spain makes Google remove personal information from 
index’, Privacy, Laws & Business, International Report, no. 120, pp. 27-30. 
814 Case C-131/12, 13.05.2014. 
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could also be used to remove criminal data once the EU citizen has already served their 
sentence.  
 
3.3.2. Attempts to approximate the EU and the US privacy legislations 
 
The EU and the US have launched many initiatives to approximate their privacy laws, 
basing them on global principles and conventions that they have both signed. They have 
also already adopted a few bilateral instruments that seek to establish common privacy 
rules.  
As regards global principles subscribed to by the EU and the US, four main 
instruments can be distinguished: The OECD Privacy Guidelines, The APEC Privacy 
Framework, The Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), and The Council of 
Europe Cybercrime Convention. 
The OECD released recommendations concerning Guidelines governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (OECD Privacy 
Guidelines) in September 1980. The EU and the US are both members of the OECD. In 
fact, the OECD Privacy Principles are similar to those included in Directive 95/46/EC 
and member states’ data protection legislations. Therefore, the OECD is a key 
organisation for the establishment of adequate data protection safeguards for EU-US 
data transfers in the field of law enforcement. 
 The US became a formal participant of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's 
APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) framework on 25 July 2012. This 
framework creates privacy obligations for all APEC economies. With regard to the EU, 
it is not a formal member but the Art. 29 WP has produced a common referential815 for 
the requirements of the CBPR system and the EU Binding Corporate Rules.816 
Therefore, this framework could also serve as the basis to get the two legal frameworks 
closer. However, the main problem with the APEC and the OECD privacy rules is that 
they constitute non-binding instruments. Consequently, the US has not always 
implemented the principles enshrined in the OECD Guidelines and the APEC Privacy 
Framework accurately. For instance, rules on data quality or purpose limitation (both 
                                                
815 Joint work between experts from the Article 29 Working Party and from APEC Economies, on a 
referential for requirements for Binding Corporate Rules submitted to national Data Protection 
Authorities in the EU and Cross Border Privacy Rules submitted to APEC CBPR Accountability Agents. 
See also WP 212, 24.02.2014. 
816 It is examined in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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well-defined by the conventions) have not been transposed in the US legislation.817 
The US and the EU are also both subject to the Fair Information Practice Principles 
(FIPPs), released in 1973. These are core elements for all privacy laws around the 
world. In particular, they include principles such as transparency, individual 
participation, purpose limitation, data security, data usage, data access, auditing and 
accountability and redress. FIPPs were first embedded in the US Privacy Act of 1974, 
and they influenced later rules such as the aforementioned 1980 OECD privacy 
guidelines and Directive 95/46/EC. The FIPPs were created with the aim of 
harmonising privacy legislation applicable to any international data flow. Yet, as Wolf 
and Maxwell have pointed out, ‘[h]istorically, the EU and United States have taken 
divergent approaches to implementing the FIPPs’.818 Similarly, De Busser concluded 
that the FIPPs have not been sufficient to make EU and US data protection systems 
fully compatible.819 For data transfers in the field of law enforcement these principles 
have not been very helpful in approximating EU-US rules either. The US has often 
stated that all EU-US data-sharing agreements have been adopted in line with the 
FIPPs,820 but these principles are so broad that they have not prevented different privacy 
provisions from existing in each of the current EU-US data-sharing agreements (see 
section 3.2 above).  
The Council of Europe (CoE) Cybercrime Convention was signed by the US and all 
EU member states on 23 November 2001. It sets out a legal framework for police and 
judicial access to computer data. Among the safeguards guaranteed in the convention, 
there is the need for independent supervision (Article 15), and the use of mutual 
assistance requests in the absence of applicable international agreements (Article 27). 
Therefore, to some extent, the CoE Cybercrime Convention could provide a secure and 
effective EU-US framework for ensuring that electronic data is available to law 
enforcement authorities when needed for the investigation and prosecution of crimes. 
However, the scope of this convention is very specific, so it does not offer a complete 
data protection regime for the parties. 
                                                
817 De Busser 2009, p. 305. 
818 Wolf C & Maxwell W 2012, ‘So close, yet so far apart: The EU and U.S. visions of a new privacy 
framework’, Antitrust, vol. 26, no. 3, p. 8. 
819 De Busser 2009, p. 297. 
820 As regards the EU-US PNR Agreement, see the subcommittee Hearing: Intelligence Sharing and 
Terrorist Travel: How DHS Addresses the Mission of Providing Security, Facilitating Commerce and 
Protecting Privacy for Passengers Engaged in International Travel, 05.11.2011. Available from 
http://homeland.house.gov [23 November 2014] 
 
 154 
 Besides these multilateral instruments signed by the EU and the US, there are 
bilateral initiatives too. Two groups have been created with the purpose of bringing the 
two legal frameworks closer: the EU-US High Level Contact Group (HLCG) and the 
EU-US working group of data protection and privacy. The HLCG was established in 
2006. It is composed of senior officers of both the EU821 and the US822 sides, who are in 
charge of discussing the exchange of data between both parties in the field of law 
enforcement. In the words of the Council of the EU: 
 
‘[T]he goal of the HLCG was to explore ways that would enable the EU and the 
US to work more closely and efficiently together in the exchange of law enforcement 
information while ensuring that the protection of personal data and privacy are 
guaranteed.’823  
 
 This group identifies common principles and definitions within the field of data 
processing for law enforcement. In particular, these are the purpose 
specification/purpose limitation; integrity/data quality; relevant and 
necessary/proportionality; information security; special categories of personal 
information (sensitive data); accountability; independent and effective oversight; 
individual access and rectification; transparency and notice; redress; automated 
individual decisions; and restrictions on onward transfers to third countries.824  
The EU-US working group on data protection and privacy was set up in July 2013,825 
after the NSA scandal took place.826 The goal was ‘to establish the facts around U.S. 
surveillance programmes and their impact on personal data of EU citizens’.827 On the 
one hand, it comprised members of the Commission, the Presidency of the Council of 
the EU, the European External Action Service, the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, 
the Art. 29 WP and ten experts from EU member states. On the other hand, it involved 
the participation of the US Department of Justice, the US Office of the Director of 
                                                
821 They come from the European Commission and the EU Presidency (supported by the Council 
Secretariat). 
822 They come from the US Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS) and State (DOS). 
823 Council of the European Union, 9831/08, 28.05.2008. 
824 See Council of the European Union, 9831/08, 28.5.2008. On the principles, see also the Opinion of the 
European Data Protection Supervisor on the Final Report by the EU-US High Level Contact Group on 
information sharing and privacy and personal data protection, 11.11.2008. 
825 European Commission, MEMO 13/1059, 27.11.2013. 
826 See chapter 4, section 3. 
827 European Commission, MEMO/13/1059, 23.11.2013, p. 8. 
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National Intelligence, the US State Department and the US Department of Homeland 
Security.828 The Group organised three meetings in 2013829 and issued an exhaustive 
report in which it clarified all the legal issues regarding the controversial Section 215 of 
Patriot Act and Section 207 of FISAA.830 Yet, no new report has been published in 
2014, and it is not fully clear what the input of this group is, apart from clarifying 
technical questions on the transatlantic exchanges of personal data. 
Taking the above into account, we can conclude that none of the instruments seems 
to be sufficient for establishing a common data protection framework in the EU and the 
US, at least for the moment. It is precisely this need for a common regulatory system 
that triggered the negotiations for another legal instrument: the EU-US Data Protection 
Agreement, which is examined below. 
 
3.3.3. Towards an umbrella EU-US Data Protection Agreement 
 
Parallel to the specific agreements on data transfers concluded between the EU and the 
US in the last ten years, many attempts have been made in order to reach a general 
framework on data protection.  
The EP launched the first call for this Data Privacy and Protection Agreement 
(DPPA) in March 2009.831 One year later, in May 2010, the Commission drafted a 
mandate on the negotiation terms,832 which the Council authorised on 3 December 
2010.833 Negotiations officially commenced in March 2011.834 Since then, several 
meetings have taken place between the Commission and the US authorities. Also, the 
DHS Chief Privacy Officer has participated in these discussions, giving valuable input 
on the current US privacy laws.835 In November 2011, the EU and the US pledged in a 
                                                
828 European Commission, MEMO/13/1059, 23.11.2013, p. 9. 
829 One in Brussels on 22-23 July, one in Washington DC in 19-20 September and another in Brussels on 
6 November. 
830 These provisions are examined in Chapter 4 Section 2. MEMO/13/1059, 23.11.2013, pp. 9-10; Report 
on the Findings by the EU Co-chairs of the ad hoc EU-US Working Group on Data Protection, 
27.11.2013. 
831 OJ C 117 E, 06.05.2010, pp. 198-206. 
832 European Commission, IP/10/609, 26.05.2010. 
833 Commission Press Release on http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1661. 
834 European Commission, MEMO/11/203, 29.03.2011. 
835 Homeland Security, Privacy Office 2013 Annual Report, 1.11.2013, p. 69. 
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joint statement to finalise negotiations on a comprehensive DPPA,836 but as of February 
2015 these are still ongoing.  
The negotiations are advanced, and the EU and the US have already agreed on many 
provisions that the agreement will include.837 First of all, the agreement will only cover 
data transfers between the EU and the US for the prevention, investigation, detection 
and prosecution of crimes. Moreover, it is now clear that the agreement will not be used 
as a specific legal basis for transatlantic exchanges, but rather will be a general mandate 
for particular data-sharing agreements. Thus, the current PNR and SWIFT agreements 
will have to conform to the provisions of the DPPA, but these might include stricter 
additional safeguards. 
Regarding the substantive provisions of the agreement, the EU has moved forward to 
incorporate as many safeguards as possible. Although the US authorities were originally 
leading the negotiations on the content of the DPPA, the NSA revelations of 2013 
brought a change of leadership. After the revelations, the US needed to rebuild trust 
within the EU and therefore, it gave greater consideration to the initial 
recommendations made by Commission.  
The EU has achieved the inclusion of a provision on the need of prior consent of the 
original authority for onward transfers. Also, other stronger requirements will also be 
required if such onward transfer involves bulk data extracted from systems like PNR.838 
Other EU successes are the establishment of a non-discrimination clause between 
national and non-national data, the prohibition of basing decisions solely on the 
automatic processing of personal data (e.g. profiling systems), and provisions on data 
quality and integrity. Likewise, general provisions on access, modification and 
administrative redress will be available to any individual. Unfortunately, this might not 
be enough to stop the enormous delays that EU citizens encounter today when they 
request access to their PNR or SWIFT data.839 
The US has also committed to establish oversight mechanisms similar to those 
conducted by DPAs within the EU. It is not clear what US supervisory authority will be 
in charge of the oversight, but it will probably be a combination of Chief Privacy 
                                                
836 European Commission, MEMO/11/842, 28.11.2012. The same idea was also recalled in European 
Commission, MEMO/12/192, 12.03.2012. 
837 The last document on the negotiations was leaked in April 2014, see Council of the European Union, 
8761/14 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, 09.04.2014. 
838 Council of the European Union, 8761/14 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, 09.04.2014, p. 7. 
839 The author’s own experiences in this regard are detailed in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 of this chapter. 
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Officers, Inspector Generals and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.840 The 
fact that a number of different supervisory authorities operate in the US could pose a 
problem. However, the US authority will need to be independent, in line with the EU 
DPAs characteristics. In addition, EU and US oversight authorities will cooperate and 
consult each other through national contact points. 
For its part, the US has imposed its preferences in some of the provisions, especially 
in terms of data retention and data breach notification. As for data retention, the US has 
always resited setting specific data retention periods, suggesting that these should be 
decided in accordance to each party’s domestic laws.841 Therefore, the DPPA will not 
include specific periods of retention, but it will only state that data should not be kept 
‘for longer than necessary and appropriate’. The DPPA will also add that any specific 
data-sharing agreement will have to contain precise provisions on retention periods.842 
However, these retention periods will probably differ from one agreement to another, as 
is the case today with regard to the PNR and SWIFT agreements. 
As for the provision on data breach notifications, the US has set some limits. A 
leaked document confirms that ‘the incident would, in principle, be notified to both the 
provider of the data […] and […] the individual concerned’.843 This ambiguity is the 
result of the US pressures that insisted on notifying only serious breaches. In contrast, 
the Commission was supporting the notification of data breaches in all cases, excluding 
certain exemptions.844 In the end, there will be exceptions, but these will have to be 
exhaustively listed. 
 Three issues remain unresolved:  i) the judicial redress – particularly the possibility 
for EU citizens to obtain redress in the US, ii) the purpose limitation principle, and iii) 
the processing of sensitive data. In addition, the US seems reluctant to transpose the 
HLCG’s principle of proportionality845 into the agreement, arguing that this term is 
undefined in the US laws and, therefore, it could cause uncertainty in the US.846  
                                                
840 Council of the European Union, 8761/14 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, 09.04.2014, p. 14. 
841 European Commission, JUST/C3/MHB D(2011), 31.01.2012. 
842 Council of the European Union, 8761/14 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, 09.04.2014, p. 6. 
843 Council of the European Union, 8761/14 RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED, 09.04.2014, p. 9. 
844 European Commission, JUST/C3/MHB D(2011), 31.01.2012. 
845 About HLCG principles, see restricted document available from 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/mar/eu-us-dp-principles.pdf [23 November 2014]. 
846 European Commission, JUST/C3/MHB D(2011), 31.01.2012. For further information about the 
HLCG, see Callahan ME 2010, ‘New international privacy principles for law enforcement and security”, 
The Privacy Advisor, The Official Newsletter of the International Association of Privacy Professionals 
(IAPP), 1 January. Available from http://www.dhs.gov [23 November 2014]. 
 
 158 
As for the judicial redress, the Commission has been trying to enable EU citizens to 
obtain judicial redress in the US by establishing enforceable legal provisions in the 
agreement. The Commission has even requested that the US authorities amend the US 
Privacy Act of 1974 in order to include judicial redress for non-US citizens. However, 
the US Congress has been reluctant to do so. It has long maintained that EU citizens 
already have the possibility to use the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to get 
judicial redress and, therefore, the amendment is unnecessary.847 Yet, after the Snowden 
revelations,848 the Attorney General of the US, Eric Holder, finally promised to take 
action in order to guarantee that Europeans who do not live in the US can also have 
judicial redress.849 This is one of the issues that still need to be clarified for the future 
DPPA.  
Another aspect to be noted is that the DPPA will not cover data transfers carried out 
by intelligence services (e.g. between the NSA and the British GCHQ). Hence, it seems 
that this future project is not as ambitious as it was initially presented to be, and it will 
only partially help to establish common minimal standards on data protection between 
the EU and US.  
 
3.3.4. The norm-taking role of the EU 
 
Many studies have concluded that the US has shaped the EU’s security policy.850 This 
section will examine whether the EU has been a pure ‘norm-taker’851 of US counter-
terrorism rules, or if it has also influenced the US in the negotiations of data-sharing 
agreements. 
There is no doubt that, after the 9/11 attacks, the US strategy triggered the adoption 
of all the EU-US agreements described above. In 2001, the Bush administration called 
upon its allies (including the EU) to provide support and assistance to the US in order to 
combat terrorism. The US pushed the EU to change their national policies if necessary. 
                                                
847 Archick 2013, p. 16. 
848 It is examined in Chapter 4 of the present study. 
849 EU-U.S. Justice Ministerial in Athens: Vice-President Reding welcomes U.S. announcement on data 
protection umbrella agreement, European Commission - STATEMENT/14/208, 25.06.2014. 
850 Argomaniz 2009, pp. 119-121; de Hert P & Papakonstantinou V 2009, ‘The PNR Agreement and 
transatlantic anti-terrorism co-operation: No firm human rights framework on either side of the Atlantic’, 
Common Market Law Review 46, pp. 885-919; Hillebrand 2012, pp.127-128; and Trauner & Carrapiço 
2012, p. 6; Quesada Gámez M & Mincheva E 2012, ‘No data without protection? Re-thinking 
transatlantic information Exchange for law enforcement purposes after Lisbon’ in EU external relations 
law and policy in the post-Lisbon era, ed. Cardwell PJ, Springer, Berlin, p. 292. 
851 The notions of ‘norm-maker’ and ‘norm-taker’ are used by Argomaniz 2009, p. 127. 
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The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was clear on this point: 
 
‘When states prove reluctant or unwilling to meet their international obligations to 
deny support and sanctuary to terrorists, the United States, in cooperation with friends 
and allies, or if necessary, acting independently, will take appropriate steps to convince 
them to change their policies.’852 
 
 It has been confirmed by this study that when the EU adopted the SWIFT, PNR and 
CSI agreements, the negotiations were mainly led by the US needs. As for the PNR 
saga, the transfer of air passenger data to the US was not on the EU agenda as a counter-
terrorism measure before the adoption of the first PNR agreement.853 The US power 
over the EU legal framework was then seen in Parliament v. Council, ruled by the 
CJEU in 2006. The Court’s reasoning on the applicable legal basis revealed the 
increasing influence of US counter-terrorism measures on the EU. The US has also 
shaped subsequent PNR agreements, softening their data protection provisions. In fact, 
the EU passed the agreements because it was afraid that a refusal would cause the 
removal of some member states from the VWP.854 
With regard to the SWIFT agreement, this is another example of the EU becoming a 
‘norm-taker’ of US interests, especially considering that the EP could not fulfil all its 
expectations regarding SWIFT II, after it rejected the first agreement.855 SWIFT is up 
for renewal in 2015.856 There is a possibility that the EU will propose some changes for 
the renewal, especially with regard to data protection, but for the moment it is mainly 
the US at the helm. Finally, the CSI was also established because the US wanted to have 
US officers at EU ports. 
 All these international agreements have brought changes to the EU’s internal security 
policy. For instance, the future TFTS will mirror a similar US system,857 and the EU 
PNR proposal resembles to a great extent the EU-US PNR agreement. In this sense, the 
preamble of the EU PNR proposal justifies its relevance by stating: 
                                                
852 ‘The national strategy for combating terrorism’, Central Intelligence Agency, 17.12.2003. Available 
from www.cia.gov [31 October 2014]. 
853 Argomaniz 2009, p. 125. 
854 Suda 2013, p. 779. 
855 Kaunert, Léonard & MacKenzie 2012, pp.476, 487; Ripoll Servent & MacKenzie 2012, p. 73. 
However, de Goede argues that ‘the resolution of the SWIFT affair tried to support and solidify the 
position of the EU as a global actor with normative appeal’. De Goede 2012, p. 216. 
856 Archick 2013, p. 9. 




  ‘On the basis of an exchange of information with…third countries, the EU 
has been able to assess the value of PNR data and to realise its potential for law 
enforcement purposes. The EU has further been able to learn from the experiences of 
such third countries in the use of PNR data.’858 
 
The EU-US data-sharing agreements have also influenced international agreements 
between the EU and other third countries. Specially, PNR agreements between the EU 
and Australia or Canada show this tendency.  
I will provide a brief outline of these two agreements. About the EU-Canada PNR 
Agreement, the Canadian government adopted a Customs Act requiring API and PNR 
data from all passengers arriving from outside the Canadian frontiers. As in the US, the 
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) threatened to fine all those airline companies 
that failed to comply with the mandate. However, the EU had a temporary derogation of 
such requirements since the EU law on data protection was seen as contrary to the 
Canadian measures. Hence, an EU agreement needed to be adopted. In 2005 the 
Commission launched a proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of an 
agreement between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the 
processing of Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data.859 The proposed legislation had the purpose of preventing and combating 
terrorism and other serious crimes. Like the first EU-US PNR Agreement, it fell under 
the scope of the former Article 95 TEC. That international agreement was signed in 
2006,860 together with an adequacy decision.861 
Nonetheless, at that time, the CJEU was reviewing the adequacy of the legal basis 
used for the EU-US PNR Agreement, so the EP adopted a legislative resolution862 
rejecting the Canadian proposal, as well as instructing the Council not to conclude the 
agreement until the CJEU had delivered a verdict on the pending judgment. As seen 
earlier, the CJEU finally annulled Council Decision 2004/496/EC and Commission 
Decision 2004/535/EC so, consequently, the proposed council decision on PNR 
between the Community and Canada was never adopted. The adequacy decision expired 
                                                
858 COM(2007) 654 final, 06.11.2007. 
859 COM(2005) 200 final, 19.05.2005. 
860 OJ L 82, 21.03.2006, pp. 15-19. 
861 OJ L 91, 29.03.2006, p. 49. 
862 OJ C 157 E, 06.07.2006, pp. 464-465. 
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in September 2009, and thus a new and permanent agreement was required by that time. 
In November 2010, the EP adopted a resolution encouraging the Commission to open 
new negotiations on behalf of the EU.863 A new EU-Canada Agreement was signed on 
26 June 2014,864 but it is now awaiting the EP’s consent.  
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EP can refer international agreements to the CJEU 
before voting if the institution has doubts on their legality.  The EP has decided to make 
use of these new powers for the proposed EU-Canada PNR Agreement. Thus, using the 
arguments of the CJEU decision on the annulled Data Retention Directive, the EP has 
referred the proposal to the CJEU before it grants the approval.865 According to the EP: 
 
 ‘[T]here is legal uncertainty as to whether the draft agreement is compatible 
with the provisions of the Treaties (Article 16) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (Articles 7, 8 and 52(1)) as regards the right of individuals to 
protection of personal data; questions, further, the choice of legal basis, i.e. Articles 
82(1)(d) and 87(2)(a) TFEU (police and judicial cooperation) rather than Article 16 
TFEU (data protection).’866 
 
It remains to be seen whether the Court decides that the proposed EU-Canada PNR 
Agreement contradicts EU laws. If so, it could affect the validity of the current EU-US 
PNR Agreement as well as the EU-Australia PNR Agreement. 
A few years after 9/11 the EU decided to sign a PNR agreement with Australia. It 
was concluded in June 2008 between the Australian Customs Service and the EU.867 
However, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the EU found a need to 
amend that agreement. Negotiations for a new PNR agreement started on 2 December 
2010 and, six months later, the Commission launched the proposal for the new EU-
Australia PNR Agreement.868 On 22 September 2011 the Council gave the agreement 
                                                
863 European Parliament, P7_TA-PROV(2010)0397, 11.11.2010. 
864 Council of the European Union, ‘Signature of the EU-Canada Agreement on Passenger Name Records 
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the green light869 and it was successfully voted on by the EP on 27 October 2011. The 
EU-Australia PNR Agreement was adopted under the framework of the Treaty of 
Lisbon and, therefore, it required the EP’s approval.870 
The EU-Australia PNR Agreement clearly benefited from all the experience that the 
Commission had built up over many years during the negotiations of the EU-US PNR 
agreements. At the same time, the EU-Australia PNR Agreement871 served as a 
reference for subsequent PNR agreements with the US (adopted in 2012) and Canada 
(still pending adoption). The three PNR agreements that the EU has with the US, 
Australia and Canada have several similarities. They have the same provisions on 
purpose, adequacy level, processing of sensitive data, data security measures, oversight, 
transparency, access and correction of individual data, judicial redress, decisions based 
on automated processing, retention of data (five years),872 logging and documentation of 
data processing, transfers through the push method,873 and the number of categories of 
collected data (nineteen). 
However, it would be incorrect to say that all EU agreements for the exchange of 
data follow the US interests. It is today beyond a doubt that, like the US, the EU also 
has an enormous potential to influence third countries with respect to security policies. 
For example, in the SWIFT agreement, the EP promoted the elimination of bulk data 
transfers. Likewise, in the negotiations of the EU-US PNR agreement, the US originally 
sought to retain the data for fifty years.874 Thanks to the EP this period was finally 
reduced to fifteen years. Similarly, the Parliament succeded in ensuring that the PNR 
transfers were carried out via the push method.  
Moreover, the experience acquired by the Commission during the negotiations of the 
EU-US PNR agreements was of a great help for drafting other PNR agreements with 
third countries. The EU-Canada PNR Agreement is less intrusive than the EU-US PNR 
Agreement in terms of use of data (they will be used for offences punishable by at least 
four years in prison, versus the three years of imprisonment in the US agreement); 
                                                
869 Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, 
10093/11, 13.09.2011  
870 OJ C 322, 05.11.2011. 
871 OJ L 186, 14.07.2012, pp. 4-16. 
872 Surprisingly, Australian Customs Service retains data for five and a half years, six months longer than 
the US and Canada. 
873 Canada applied a push method from the beginning, in its first PNR agreement in 2005; and even 
though Australia did not define it clearly in its first agreement of 2008, the push method is expressly 
stated in its current PNR agreement with the EU. 
874 Suda 2013, p. 780. 
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deletion of sensitive data (in Canada data has to be deleted after fifteen days, whereas in 
the US it is after thirty days), notification of the use of sensitive data (not existing in the 
US agreement), depersonalisation of data (after thirty days in Canada, and after six 
months in the US), disclosure of data (in Canada there is no onward transfer of data), 
and the frequency of transfers for a particular flight (there is no similar provision in the 
US agreement). Australia also applies these safeguards as for the scope of serious crime 
(the offences need to be of at least four years imprisonment) and the frequency of 
transfers.875  
It can be thus concluded that, when security norms arrived from the US, the EU ‘did 
not simply subordinate to the security rules that the United States unilaterally 
strengthened’.876 The PNR schemes demonstrate that the EU has also contributed in 
establishing some limits to the US will. Recent improvements of data protection clauses 
are the result of years of negotiations and dialogue between the US authorities the EU 
institutions. These same data protection provisions are also found in the Australian and 
Canadian PNR agreements. Therefore, the EU also has an influence beyond the 
European borders on security issues, ensuring the compatibility if its international 
agreements with the EU data protection laws. 
 The number of PNR agreements concluded between the EU and third countries 
might increase in the coming years, including countries such as Japan, South Korea and 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.877 As Argomaniz points out, US norms in the field of 
counter-terrorism could easily become universal standards.878 However, there is one 
issue in which the EU could contribute and export its model globally: the EU data 
protection framework. The Union has always been characterised for having strong data 
protection and privacy laws, which have had an impact on many third countries, 
including the US.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This analysis has demonstrated the increasing influence of the US authorities in shaping 
EU security measures consisting of transatlantic data exchanges. The EU emergence as 
                                                
875 Yet, Australia establishes stricter security measures than Canada and the US as regards the 
depersonalisation of PNR data, which is only conducted after three years, in contrast to the thirty days in 
Canada and six months in the US. 
876 Suda 2013, pp. 783-784. 
877 Hernanz N 2011, pp. 6-7. 
878 Argomaniz 2009, p. 132. 
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an international actor goes hand in hand with the US lead in the adoption of 
international agreements between the two within the counter-terrorism environment. In 
line with the argument of many scholars,879 the EU’s role as foreign and security policy 
actor appears to be quite weak in practice. This study has confirmed that the EU has 
often adopted the US’s own approach in the trade-off between security and data 
protection. 
Each of the current EU-US data-sharing agreements has different data protection 
provisions. They also differ from the sections dedicated to data transfers to third 
countries in the current FD 2008/977 and the EU Proposal for a Police and Criminal 
Justice Data Protection Directive. The lack of harmonisation among these laws 
complicates the future establishment of an umbrella EU-US data protection agreement, 
as well as global data protection standards in the field of law enforcement. 
As for the question of whether the right to data protection is equally applicable when 
the data is only processed within the EU territory – rather than beyond the EU borders, 
the answer is partially negative. Although the general EU provisions of FD 2008/977 on 
international data transfers are very limited in scope, specific EU-US data-sharing 
agreements (and mainly, the PNR agreement) offer a complete data protection scheme 
for the exchange of information. The right to data protection is thus only weakened 
when the need for those data comes from beyond the EU territory and there is no 
specific international agreement in place. It has also been shown that, although the EU 
enjoys a specific legal basis on the right to data protection under Article 16 of the 
TFEU, the Treaty of Lisbon leaves the door open for the derogation of this provision if 
specific legislation is based on Article 39 TEU. This legal basis has never been used but 
it could eventually apply for CFSP measures.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that external factors have played a fundamental role in 
the existing data protection legislation within the EU. The US, in particular, has exerted 
powerful external pressures in order to establish the right balance between security and 
data protection within the EU, even if it has entailed the weakening of the latter in 
certain circumstances. Following this same path, global data protection standards in the 
area of security might also come to be largely influenced by US needs in the future. 
 
                                                
879 Matlary JH 2009, ‘European Union security dynamics. In the new national interest’, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke; Kaunert C & Zwolski K 2013, ‘The EU as a global security actor: A 




Chapter 3: The role of Europol in the exchange of information within 
and beyond the EU 
 
Within the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (hereinafter, the AFSJ), Europol 
is the agency that stores the largest amount of information. Its scope covers any crime 
affecting a common interest within the EU, organised crime, terrorism and other forms 
of serious crimes involving two or more member states. As noted in the Stockholm 
Programme, Europol is a ‘hub for information exchange between the law enforcement 
authorities of the Member States, a service provider and a platform for law enforcement 
services’.880 Europol also processes information from non-EU countries, since third 
countries have been increasingly involving it in their criminal investigations. 
The previous chapters have illustrated the challenges that the EU encounters in the 
exchange of crime-related information within and outside the European territory. After 
examining the main failures in the functioning of the EU data-sharing tools, this chapter 
will analyse whether the EU could enhance the use of Europol as a way to reduce the 
existing diversity of communication channels available for law enforcement authorities. 
 In addition, it will examine whether Europol’s legal framework offers strong data 
protection rules that could inspire the future data protection legal framework at the 
international level. As concluded in the previous chapters, the EU cannot become a 
global regulator on data protection in the field of law enforcement without first 
achieving a coherent framework among its own member states. Neither member states 
nor the Commission have been capable of achieving that coherence so far, and the 
proposed Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive does not seem to 
improve this situation either. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part will be an examination of 
whether Europol’s data protection regime could be used as a reference for member 
states when processing data within the EU for law enforcement purposes. The second 
part of this chapter will look at the international actorness of Europol in the field of 
security. It will analyse to what extent Europol influences (and will continue to 
influence) third countries’ data protection rules. I reserve the final section of this chapter 
for the analysis of the difficulties that currently exist with regard to the use of the 
agency’s data protection and data security standards within and beyond the EU. In short, 
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this study will help conclude whether Europol’s data protection system could be the 
solution for achieving an approximation of national data protection regimes for data 
transfers conducted within and beyond the EU borders.  
 
1. The origins and aim of Europol 
 
Europol was first regulated in the Treaty of Maastricht881 as a way to contribute to a 
safer Europe.882 It began functioning in 1994 as the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU), within 
the framework of TREVI III, which dealt with drug-trafficking and money-laundering 
cases. EDU had no competence to store personal data and the information collected 
could not be transferred to third countries or international bodies.883 
Europol extended its competences in 1995, covering for the first time counter-
terrorism investigations.884 Rules governing that body were enclosed in the Europol 
Convention, which was ratified by all member states in 1999. From that moment, 
Europol became the European law enforcement organisation in charge of assisting 24/7 
the competent authorities in member states and third countries for the prevention and 
combat of serious forms of crime. Yet, one of the main Europol’s limitations is that its 
officers are not armed and they have no power to arrest. Europol is principally a hub of 
information, which interconnects national law enforcement activities within the EU, 
coordinates joint operations, and receives and distributes information.885 
Since 9/11, several structural changes were implemented at Europol’s headquarters. 
One of them was the establishment of a new unit, the so-called Counter-terrorism Task 
Force (CTTF), comprised of police agents and intelligence analysts from the member 
states. In 2003, the mandate of this unit was amended and taken over by the Serious 
Crime Unit.886 The Commission encouraged member states to give enhanced operational 
competences to this unit.887 However, even today numerous member states are reluctant 
to do this, so the unit maintains its original powers. 
                                                
881 The first legal basis for the establishment of Europol was Article K1(9) and K3 of the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
882 Council of the European Union, 10036/12, 24.05.2012, p. 13. 
883 Hillebrand 2012, p. 61. 
884 O’Neill 2012, pp. 71-72. 
885 Data Protection at Europol, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, p. 7. 
886 Bures & Ahern 2007, p. 199. 
887 ‘European Commission Action Paper in Response to the Terrorist Attacks on Madrid’, European 
Commission, MEMO/04/66, 18.03.2004, p. 8. 
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Europol’s tasks have evolved since the moment the Europol Convention came into 
force. In fact, in Tampere (1999),888 Hague (2004)889 and Stockholm (2009)890 the 
Commission suggested enhancing the role of Europol in cooperation with the member 
states and other EU bodies. The main amendment has been the replacement of the 
convention by a Council decision. The Europol Council Decision (hereinafter, ECD) 
was proposed by the Commission in late 2006891 and finally adopted in April 2009.892 It 
came into force in January 2010, when Europol became a full EU agency. 
Today, Europol is the largest AFSJ agency. The list of crimes in which Europol can 
be involved is found in the annexes of the current ECD893 and the proposed Europol 
Regulation.894 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced significant changes with respect to 
Europol. First, the agency now has an explicit legal basis in Article 88 TFEU. This 
provision permits the amendment of Europol’s laws without having to be ratified first 
by the twenty-eight member states. In fact, the existence or Article 88 has triggered a 
process to replace the current ECD with the above-mentioned Europol Regulation,895 
proposed by the Commission in 2013. Another important change since the Treaty of 
Lisbon is that Europol’s activities are scrutinised by both the EP and the national 
parliaments. Moreover, Europol is now financed by the EU, and the agency is 
composed of EU staff.896 All of these new issues bring the agency closer to the current 
EU institutions.  
Europol is often involved in Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) to support member 
states in the preparation and coordination of criminal investigations. The JIT principle 
was first included in the Treaty of Amsterdam897 and it was later reinforced after the 
9/11 attacks.898 Europol can participate in JITs under three conditions: a) the 
involvement must be expressly requested by a Member State; b) the JIT must include at 
least two member states; and c) the offence investigated must fall under the Europol’s 
                                                
888 European Council. Tampere Conclusions, 15-16.10.1999. 
889 OJ C 53, 03.03.2005, pp. 1-14. 
890 OJ C 115, 04.05.2010, pp. 1-37. 
891 COM(2006) 817, 20.12.2006. 
892 OJ L 121, 15.05.2009, pp. 37-65. 
893 Annex of Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the Europol Police Office, OJ L121, 
15.5.2009, pp. 37-65. 
894 COM(2013) 173 final, 27.03.2013, Annex 1. 
895 Council of the European Union, Europol Work Programme 2012, 13516/11, 25.08.2012, pp.10. 
896 Boehm 2012b, p. 179. 
897 Ex Article 30(2)(a) TEU. 
898 OJ L 162, 20.06.2002, pp. 1-2. 
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mandate.899 If these conditions are met, Europol can be part of an investigation team for 
a fixed period of time. 
 
2. Europol’s data exchanges within the EU  
 
In addition Europol’s general purpose of supporting and strengthening national law 
enforcement authorities’ action in the prevention and combat of crimes,900 Article 5 
ECD lists a few other more specific tasks. One of these tasks is ‘to collect, store, 
process, analyse and exchange information’,901 usually sent by member states. As a 
result, large amounts of personal data are currently stored in Europol’s files. These are 
analysed by Europol officers and exchanged between its units, member states and even 
third parties.  
Europol offers strong data protection and data security safeguards in the processing 
of data. In fact, the Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) has described Europol’s data 
protection framework as one of the strongest in the world, because the agency has 
‘strict, tailor-made rules and efficient supervision arrangements’.902 This section pays 
special attention to Europol’s communication tool SIENA. It stands out for being a very 
secure system for data processing, and it also complies with the purpose limitation 
principle. Taking this as a premise, I scrutinise whether Europol’s data protection 
regime could be used as a reference for member states. This analysis also includes a 
study of the proposed Europol Regulation too.  
 
2.1. The increasing involvement of Europol in the data-sharing procedures within 
the EU 
 
As noted above, Europol is currently the biggest AFSJ agency, covering any serious 
crime affecting two or more member states, or the EU itself. Europol provides a 
platform for the exchange of criminal intelligence and information,903 processing a large 
                                                
899 de Buck B 2007, ‘Joint Investigation Teams: The participation of Europol officials’, ERA Forum, no. 
8, p. 257. 
900 Article 3 ECD. 
901 Article 5(1)(a) ECD and Article 4(1)(a) of Europol Regulation. 
902 JSB Opinion 13/31 with respect to the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training (Europol), 
10.06.2013, p. 2. 
903 COM(2012) 735, 07.12.2012, p. 4. 
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amount of data every day. A considerable part of such data is first collected by national 
law enforcement authorities,904 which follow the rules in the Council decision on the 
exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences.905 This act sets 
out the conditions under which the information has to be sent to Europol.906  
The common procedure for transferring information from a Member State to Europol 





As perceived from Figure 3.1., the contact point between Europol and member states 
is usually through the so-called Europol National Units (ENUs),907 although the 
proposed regulation allows establishing contact with any ‘competent authority of a 
Member State’.908 Thus, when it enters into force, Europol will be able to make direct 
contact with national law enforcement authorities without going through the national 
contact point.909 By having direct contact with law enforcement authorities in the 
member states, Europol will also prevent clashing police operations among member 
states in cross-border investigations. 
                                                
904 Data might also come from another EU agency or EU information system, private entities, third 
countries and international organisations. 
905 OJ L 253, 29.09.2005, pp. 22-24. 
906 Article 2 of Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, and Europol, TE-SAT 2012, EU Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Report, p. 43. 
907 Article 8 ECD. See also Disley E, Irving B, Hughes W& Patruni B 2012, ‘Evaluation of the 
implementation of the Europol Council Decision and of Europol’s activities’, RandEurope, The Hague, p. 
52. 
908 Article 7(5) of Europol Regulation. 
909 Recital 13 and Article 7(4) of Europol Regulation. 
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Each Member State has an ENU. They were introduced in 2010 with the adoption of 
the ECD. ENUs have access to the Europol Information System (EIS) when they need 
to search for information on individuals with factual indications or reasonable grounds 
to believe that they have committed (or will commit) criminal offences within the 
Europol's mandate. Before ENUs were established, such information was only 
accessible via Europol’s liaison officers.  
Although, as Chapter 1 of this thesis has shown, member states are free to choose the 
channel for exchanging information between them, ENUs are the only possible channel 
for exchanging information with Europol. ENUs are used in any case where Europol is 
involved, but they may also be used by member states to exchange information 
bilaterally for crimes outside Europol’s mandate. ENUs can exchange information 
directly or through the so-called Europol Liaison Officers, who are part of an ENU but 
stationed at Europol’s headquarters.910 Each ENU seconds at least one liaison officer to 
Europol in the Europol Liaison Bureaux,911 and there are currently a total of 160 liaison 
officers in The Hague.912 They provide Europol with information of the particular 
member state 24/7, and they assist in the exchange of information. Regarding the data 
access that liaison officers have to the national law enforcement’s databases, it varies 
from one country to another. For instance, in some member states such as Spain, liaison 
officers always need to contact the Spanish ENU in order to get access to Spanish police 
databases, whereas in Finland liaison officers have direct access to all Finnish 
databases. 
Member states have no clear obligation to provide information to Europol under the 
ECD;913 and the agency does not have, in principle, access to member states’ national 
law enforcement databases. Member states are divided when it comes to transferring 
information to Europol for the prevention and investigation of crimes. Some of them are 
convinced of the added value of the agency and rely on the support that Europol can 
give to their own work.914 They often request Europol’s assistance during the 
investigation of a crime. Yet, other member states do not provide Europol with 
                                                
910 COM(2012) 735, 07.12.2012, pp. 5-6, and Article 8 of Europol Regulation. For an exhaustive study on 
Europol Liaison Officers, see den Boer & Block 2013. 
911 Articles 8 and 9 Council Decision 2009/371/JHA. 
912 Council of the European Union, 10426/14, 06.06.2014, p. 20. 
913 Disley et al. 2012, p. 47. 
914 Vermeulen & Wills 2011, p. 17. 
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sufficient information,915 or they simply do not share information with Europol at all. 
This is mainly due to a lack of confidence and trust among such member states about 
the added value that the agency can provide.916 
Law enforcement authorities of member states can decide not to involve Europol in a 
criminal investigation by using other communication channels such as the Swedish 
initiative917 and Prüm decision.918 As seen in Chapter 1 these are multilateral EU 
instruments for exchanging criminal information among member states. However, the 
use of the Swedish initiative and Prüm decision does not always exclude Europol. For 
instance, Europol is informed of a request made through Swedish initiative each time 
this falls within the agency’s mandate.919 Likewise, Europol officials can issue a request 
using the Swedish initiative, in accordance with Europol’s laws.920 In such a case, the 
channel used is either the liaison officers or the ENUs directly, and the information is 
transferred via SIENA. Also, specific handling codes in addition to the conditions 
established in the Swedish initiative have to be fulfilled for such requests.921 After that, 
the information will be transmitted to the specific analysis work files (AWF), the 
Europol Information System, or the Europol Operational Centre.922 
Europol also has a role in the use of Prüm decisions. In January 2012, Europol’s 
Prüm Helpdesk and the Mobile Competence Team (MCT) were established. The 
purpose of both initiatives was to prepare a platform for experts, which would help 
member states implement and run Prüm systems.923 The MCT, operational since 18 July 
2011,924 transferred all its activities to the Europol’s Prüm Helpdesk in July 2013.925 
Hence, Europol is helping member states exchange DNA, fingerprint and vehicle 
registration data that might then be shared with the agency.  
                                                
915 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Law enforcement Cooperation and 
Training (Europol) and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA, 31.05.2013, pp. 7-8. 
916 ‘Europol: coordinating the fight against serious and organised crime. Report with evidence’, House of 
Lords, European Union Committee, 29th Report of Session 2007-2008, HL Paper 183, p. 24; Bures O 
2008, ‘Europol's fledgling counterterrorism role’, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20 no. 4, p. 498. 
917 OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, pp. 89-100. 
918 OJ L 210, 06.08.2008, 1-11 and OJ L 210, 06.08.2008, pp. 12-72. 
919 Council of the European Union, 9512/1/10 REV 1, 17.12.2010, p. 8. 
920 Article 6(2) of Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA. 
921 Council of the European Union, 15278/11, 14.10.2011, p. 4. 
922 Council of the European Union, 9512/1/10 REV 1, 17.12.2010, p. 9. 
923 Council of the European Union, 10036/12, 24.05.2012, pp.31; COM(2012)732 final, 07.12.2012, p. 8. 
924 Council of the European Union, 17761/11, 05.12.2011, p. 3. 
925 COM(2012) 732 final, 07.12.2012, p. 8. 
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Likewise, Europol has access to data obtained through VIS,926 SIS/SIS II,927 CIS928 
and Eurodac.929 This has raised concerns among numerous privacy experts, who have 
argued that it might undermine the EU fundamental principles of purpose limitation and 
non-discrimination.930 However, in my view the main concern regards the national 
police authorities’ data processing in the first place. Data processed by Europol goes 
through periodical auditing sessions, uses specific communication tools, and applies a 
common level of protection for all types of information. In contrast, national law 
enforcement authorities use diverse communication tools and standards when they 
exchange VIS, SIS, CIS and Eurodac data with each other. Therefore, member states 
could take Europol’s infrastructures and systems as a model, as well as SIENA as 
default communication tool. This is examined in the next section. 
 




Europol has its own communication tool, called the Secure Information Exchange 
Network (SIENA). It became operational in July 2009 and it is the backbone of 
Europol’s infrastructure. It consists of a tailor-made messaging system, which carries no 
risk of interception due to its secure and user-friendly design.931  
SIENA is not the first communication tool used by Europol. Before 2009, Europol 
used a system called Information Exchange System (InfoEx). It was established in 1996 
under the Europol Convention. However, in November 2005, with the prospect of a 
forthcoming legislative amendment in Europol, the idea for replacing InfoEx with a new 
application was proposed. SIENA was first discussed during the first half of 2007, and 
after an exhaustive privacy assessment by the JSB, it was approved by the Europol 
Management Board in July 2007. The designing of the new-generation communication 
tool commenced in October 2007. It offered a range of innovative functionalities such 
as the availability of the tool to the users of ENUs, Liaison Officers and Europol staff.  
                                                
926 Article 7 of VIS Council Decision 2008/633/JHA, OJ L 218, 13.08.2008, pp. 129-136. 
927 Articles 41, 42 and 43 of SIS II Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, OJ L 205, 07.08.2007, pp. 63–84. 
928 Articles 11 (1) and 12 (1) of CIS Council Decision 2009/917, OJ L 323, 10.12.2009, pp. 20–30. 
929 Article 7 of Eurodac Regulation 603/2013, OJ L180, 29.06.2013, pp.1-30. 
930 See, for instance, Boehm 2012c, p. 342. 
931 Disley et al. 2012, p. 78. 
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It has been seen above that Europol usually contacts member states through ENUs.932 
ENUs use SIENA as the communication tool with Europol. Likewise, SIENA is used 
by: a) Member states’ liaison officers, b) seconded national experts, c) Europol officials 
at Europol headquarters, d) some colleagues in other designated competent authorities 
besides ENUs, and e) some of the third parties with which Europol has concluded 
cooperation agreements.933 On 1 July 2009 SIENA became technically available for all 
ENUs, but member states needed time for its implementation. 
 
2.2.2. SIENA phases 
 
SIENA has been evolving since July 2009. The first phase (SIENA v1.0, v1.1 and v1.2) 
was available until March 2010, at which time the second version of this tool (SIENA 
v2.0) was adopted. The new version introduced functionalities such as the extension to 
other designated authorities in member states, and the access for third parties that had 
operational agreements with Europol. By mid 2011, SIENA v2.1 enhanced the 
availability to third parties holding a strategic agreement with Europol. 
SIENA v2.2 was operational for the period 2012-2013. It included new 
functionalities such as i) the integration with national systems;934 ii) the capability to 
multitask; and iii) the establishment of EMPACT to set impact priority in the messages 
(e.g. messages referring to the Western Balkans). 
SIENA v2.3 was implemented in the third quarter of 2013, and it introduced one 
major change: a Universal Message Format (UMF) Prüm form, through which a pdf 
form used for Prüm data exchanges was available within SIENA for member states. 
That provided a glimpse of the future link between Prüm and SIENA, enhancing its use 
in investigations in which Europol was not directly involved. That also solved the lack 
of a common communication channel following Prüm hits.935  
SIENA v2.4 incorporated the UMF II format. That was the second phase of the EU-
funded project led by Europol called the Universal Message Format. UMF is a 
structured data format in the SIENA messages that offers ‘an additional service for 
those member states that wish to automate parts of the workflows of international law 
                                                
932 Article 8 ECD.  
933 Disley et al. 2012, p. 78. 
934 For the moment only Germany benefits from this functionality, being able to use its own national 
channel, the SIENA and Interpol channel all at once. 
935 Council of the European Union, 10303/14, 28.05.2014, p. 7. 
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enforcement cooperation’.936 That phase of the UMF programme presented advantages 
in terms of cost savings, better use of resources, elimination of manual re-entry of data, 
and reduction of copying errors.937  
In 2014, SIENA III was established. It enhanced interoperability between the 
national case management and the system by offering features such as faster searches 
and task assignment tools.938 During 2015, the updated tool seeks to integrate the 
Europol Analysis System (EAS), convert the UMF to a human readable format, prepare 
the embedding of FIUs into SIENA, and explore the upgrade of the tool to carry 
confidential material, among other issues.939 
Taking the above-mentioned into account, SIENA’s evolution shows the clear 
intention of Europol to accommodate other EU channels like the Swedish initiative and 
Prüm in its own tailor-made communication tool. This tool brings national law 
enforcement authorities and Europol closer in the exchange of criminal information. 
 
2.2.3. The scope of SIENA  
 
95% of Europol’s information arrives through SIENA. It creates more than 38,000 
SIENA messages per month.940 The tool was originally developed for data exchanges 
between the agency and law enforcement agencies in the member states,941 but a 
growing number of non-EU countries and third parties have been added to the system 
through the conclusion of cooperation agreements.942  
Although in the majority of cases SIENA supports follow-up searches in the EIS, the 
tool can also be used for the exchange of information between member states outside 
Europol’s mandate.943 For instance, in 2012 member states used SIENA to exchange 
222,000 messages;944 but only in 53% of those was the information in the message 
shared with Europol.945  
                                                
936 Council of the European Union, Europol Work Programme 2012, 13516/11, 25.08.2012, p. 26. 
937 COM(2012) 735, 07.12.2012, p. 12. 
938 Council of the European Union, 6721/14, 20.02.2014, p. 2. 
939 Council of the European Union, Europol Work Programme 2015, 5250/15, 16.01.2015, p. 37. 
940 Council of the European Union, 10426/14, 06.06.2014, p. 13. 
941 European Commission, COM(2012) 735, 07.12.2012, pp.6. 
942 General Report on Europol's activities in 2011, Council of the European Union, 10036/12, 24.05.2012, 
pp. 20 and 23. 
943 Article 8(4) of Europol Regulation.  
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10426/14, 06.06.2014, p. 13. 
945 European Commission, COM(2012) 735, 07.12.2012, p. 6. 
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Europol, the Commission and the Council are now encouraging member states to use 
SIENA as the default system for exchanging crime-related information and 
intelligence.946 In this sense, a Single Point of Contact (SPOC) will be established in 
every Member State, which will use all existing communication tools, including 
SIENA. An extended use of SIENA will not replace the use of other reliable channels 
for exchanging information among member states,947 but it will integrate all of them into 
a single communication tool. 
 
2.2.4. Advantages of using SIENA as EU default communication tool 
 
SIENA is mostly used for communications between law enforcement authorities and 
Europol, but it can also be extensively used for other data-processing systems in the 
future. In this sense, for instance, the Commission announced in January 2015 that the 
updated version of the EU PNR Directive will establish SIENA as the channel to 
exchange data among national Passenger Information Units (PIUs), and also with 
Europol.948 In the same way, SIENA could be the tool for exchanging financial data 
according to the future TFTS, or even for exchanging data among intelligence services 
within the EU if they choose to use this tool.949 
There are several advantages in using SIENA as the default communication tool by 
national law enforcement authorities. First, the system is in line with the privacy-by-
design principle. As defined by the former EDPS Peter Hustinx, the principle of 
privacy-by-design means that ‘controllers should be able to demonstrate that 
appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that privacy requirements have been 
met in the design of their systems’.950 In fact, although this tool does not find any 
explicit legal basis in the ECD, the inclusion of the privacy-by-design principle and 
other data protection requirements have been present in SIENA since the very 
beginning. Throughout the different phases, SIENA has built a system that conforms to 
                                                
946  Council of the European Union, Europol Work Programme 2013, 17.07.2012, p. 24; COM(2012) 735, 
07.12.2012, pp. 9; Council Conclusions 7-8 June 2012; Council of the European Union, 10303/14, 
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conducted in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
950 Hustinx P 2012, ‘Ensuring stronger, more effective and more consistent protection of personal data in 
the EU’, NewEurope, 2 February. Available from <http://www.neurope.eu> [5 December 2014]. 
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Europol’s data protection and data security standards. For example, it only allows 
authorised staff to access the tool; and it processes specific categories of data in 
accordance to the purpose limitation principle. When a new SIENA request is launched 
by one of the authorised actors (e.g. if the Spanish ENU contacts the French Liaison 
Office for a child pornography investigation), a number of data categories need to be 
filled in. It includes the cybercrime area, EMPACT, crime-related content, handling 
codes,951 reliability (e.g. A1), priority (high, normal, low), and the deadline (e.g. 7 days).  
Second, the increasing use of SIENA among member states reduces the processing of 
mass data (e.g. bulk passenger lists) as a preventive measure. In Europol, mass data is 
only retained in very specific cases, and for a short period of time. Moreover, names 
included in mass lists are only disclosed after a positive hit. In contrast, if member states 
use other communication tools such as regular email, there is no tracking of the amount 
of data processed, nor the period of time it will be stored in the particular server. 
Third, SIENA is a multilingual interface, which permits operators at ENUs to 
communicate in their own national language.952 This makes the system very efficient, 
since it does not require any translation of the messages, which might slow down a 
criminal investigation.  
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned positive aspects, there would a few 
shortcomings if SIENA was established as the default communication tool within the 
EU. First, neither the current ECD nor the proposed Regulation953 contains any mention 
of SIENA. This is a missed opportunity to regulate and enhance the use of the tool. 
Second, a problem encountered in the use of SIENA is that some member states might 
prefer other channels instead. Some Member States do not see sufficient added value in 
Europol's tasks and findings,954 so they do not provide Europol with all the necessary 
information to fight serious cross-border crimes. These member states prefer to use 
other channels like Interpol, because it is more flexible and it includes the possibility for 
transferring judicial information (not only police information). Third, some member 
states have not fully implemented the SIENA data protection features,955 and this 
                                                
951 There are currently three handling codes available with the following description: H1: Not to be used 
as evidence in a judicial procedure without permission; H2: No dissemination of the information without 
permission; and H3: any other restriction. 
952 Council of the European Union, 10303/14, 28.05.2014, p. 5. 
953 The ECD does not include any explicit provision of SIENA either. Even though it could have been 
included in the provision on AWFs, but this did not occur. 
954 SWD(2013) 99 final, 27.03.2013, pp. 2-3. 
955 See Joint Supervisory Body, Opinion 13/31, p. 4. 
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technical obstacle impedes their use of the tool. Fourth, SIENA only exchanges 
information classified up to EU Restricted. It excludes any information filed as Secret 
or Top Secret – which makes it less likely to be used by intelligence/ security services. 
In this sense, the Council has recommended increasing the SIENA confidentiality level 
in order to extend its use.956 Lastly, another flaw of SIENA is that this tool offers a 
standardised channel to be utilised by all law enforcement agencies in the EU, but it 
excludes any information exchanged by intelligence services.  
 
2.3. Europol’s data protection regime 
 
The compliance of SIENA with the privacy-by-design approach shows the significance 
that the right of data protection and privacy have for Europol. The agency claims to 
have one of the strongest data protection regimes in the world,957 with higher standards 
than those found in the majority of member states. This section focuses on the 
examination of three main data protection safeguards in Europol: the compliance with 
the purpose limitation principle; the right of access, correction and deletion of data; and 
the external supervision by an independent body.  
 
2.3.1. Purpose limitation principle 
 
The current ECD processes personal data through two different systems: the Europol 
Information System (EIS) and the analysis work files (AWF). The former processes 
data introduced by member states – and Europol itself in the case of third country data – 
and it is used for cross-checking purposes. According to the last Europol General 
Report, information from nearly 71,000 people is held in the EIS.958 The purpose 
limitation principle applies here, since the data processed belongs only and exclusively 
to either criminals or suspects of a criminal offence. The objective is to provide member 
states with relevant information for future investigations involving such criminals or 
suspects of a crime. 
Regarding the AWFs, they have a completely different raison d’être. It is a system 
that provides information within a specific criminal investigation, and supports either 
                                                
956 Council of the European Union, 10303/14, 28.05.2014, p. 8. 
957 ‘Data protection at Europol’, Publications Office of the European Union, 2012, pp. 4 and 11.  
958 Council of the European Union, 10426/14, 06.06.2014, p. 17. 
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strategic analysis or operational cases. AWFs process information not only from 
criminals and suspects of a crime, but also from victims, witnesses and other relevant 
contacts. Yet, the AWFs are also structured in a way that it complies with the purpose 
limitation principle too.  
There are currently two AWFs: the AWF for data on serious and organised crimes 
(SOC) and the AWF on counter-terrorism (CT) data. Each of these work files include 





FP959 MTIC FP SUSTRANS FP MONITOR 
FP CANNABIS FP PHOENIX FP TWINS 
FP COPPER FP TERMINAL FP CYBORG 
FP HEROIN FP CHECK POINT FP COPY 
FP SMOKE FP EEOC FP GNST 
 
AWF CT 




Today there are twenty-five different focal points,960 many of which include target 
groups. Each focal point stores different types of data complying with the purpose 
limitation principle. The annex of each focal point regulation, developed by the Europol 
analysts themselves, details what types of data can be processed. For instance, in the 
focal point HEROIN, dealing with investigations related to heroin dealers and heroin 
trafficking, any data concerning an alleged victim is hardly justified as necessary for 
such investigations. In the same way, any sensitive data relating to the sexual 
orientation of a drug dealer is also considered unnecessary and, therefore, not processed. 
In contrast, for the focal point TWINS, which deals with child pornography cases, 
                                                
959 Abbreviation for ‘focal point’. 
960 Until 2011 there were twenty-three AWFs. Then they were reduced to two, and the concept of focal 
point and target groups was introduced. That new structure permitted an extended use of the Index 
Function, which is now able to search data among the different focal points in a common AWF. 
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information about victims or the sexual orientation of the offender might be relevant for 
the investigation and, hence, processed. 
Europol analysts working in focal points tend to follow the list of categories of data 
that they normally need to process during an ongoing investigation. Moreover, regular 
audits conducted by the Europol DPO take place to supervise the adequacy of the data 
processed. One of the tasks of the DPO is drafting the audit plan for the coming year. It 
then scrutinises the selected focal point and verifies that the information processed is in 
line with the purpose limitation, proportionality and necessity principles. 
Another mechanism – not foreseen in the legislation – which reinforces the 
compliance with the purpose limitation principle in both the EIS and the AWFs is the 
use of the so-called ‘handling codes’ for any information up to EU Restricted.961 Every 
time a piece of information is sent by a Member State to Europol, an opening order is 
filled in, and the Member State has the competence to decide the restriction level 
applied for that particular information. This is possible through the handling codes. 
There are currently four handling codes available: a) The H0 or no-handling code, 
which permits the distribution to all member states as long as it is necessary for the 
purpose of preventing and combating crimes, b) H1, which prevents the information to 
be disclosed in judicial proceedings without the permission of the provider, c) H2, by 
which cross-matched information cannot be disseminated without the permission of the 
provider, and d) H3, which allows free text for other restrictions (e.g. only accessible 
for a specific target group). 
The Member State originally providing the information to Europol is also in charge 
of deciding the level of classification – public, restricted, secret, top secret. That 
Member State has discretion in making that decision, and Europol cannot modify it 
without prior consent from the country.962 Data access by Europol officials will depend 
on the level of security: officials with higher data security clearance will gain access to 





                                                
961 There is currently a Europol initiative to allow handling codes up to Confidential. 
962 Abazi V 2013, ‘Unveiling the power over Europol’s secrets’, Amsterdam Centre for Law and 
Governance, Working Paper Series 4, Amsterdam, p. 14 
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2.3.2. Right of access, correction and deletion of data 
 
The right of access is established in Article 30 ECD. According to this provision, 
individuals who want to access data that Europol stores about them need to contact the 
competent national authorities, normally the national data protection authority (DPA) or 
a special police department. The procedure can be explained through the following 




         








A German man, whose name is Paul, wants to access data about him held on 
Europol’s databases. First, he needs to issue the request to the Bundeskriminalamt in 
Germany. He will be required to send a copy of his ID or passport and a letter with the 
data request by post. The Bundeskriminalamt will then notify Europol of the particular 
query within one month.963 The agency will check all systems and databases, and 
respond to Paul directly within the period of three months. If there is no hit, the agency 
sends a message to Paul explaining that there is no information held about him in the 
systems. If, on the contrary, there is a hit, Europol contacts the Member State that owns 
the information, which ultimately authorises the data disclosure. It might occur that 
there is an ongoing investigation in relation to Paul or that, by releasing it, national 
security is jeopardised. In such cases, the information is not revealed. Hence, Paul will 
                                                
963 Some individuals contact Europol through their solicitor instead. This is also possible as long as the 
individual has signed a letter authorising it. 
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only get access to his data if there is no objection by the country originally owning the 
data. 
In case of a refusal, Paul can still appeal to the JSB, which will conduct an inspection 
at the Europol’s premises, making sure that the request has been properly addressed.964 
It is worth noting that the responsibility is always from Europol, even if the agency has 
only followed orders from a Member State. If the JSB finds that Europol has failed to 
comply with the right of access, Paul may receive compensation for the damage. 
Articles 31 and 32 ECD address the right to correct and delete information. The same 
procedure as in the right of access applies here. For instance, it could occur that Paul 
already knows that Europol has information about him, and has asked for the deletion of 
that information because it is not accurate. In this case, Europol will contact the 
Member State owning the information to determine whether it can be deleted. If the 
answer is positive, Europol will proceed to remove Paul’s data from its databases. As in 
the right of access, the right to correct and delete information provide the possibility to 
appeal before the JSB. Yet, one of the problems detected is that, even once the 
information is corrected or removed from Europol databases, there is no efficient 
mechanism to certify that it has also been modified in the particular Member State. 
 
2.3.3. Europol’s oversight 
 
Europol has a model supervisory scheme composed of two bodies: the Europol Data 
Protection Officer (DPO)965 and the Joint Supervisory Body (JSB).966 Despite the 
existing complementarity between them, they play different roles in the protection of 
the data processed by Europol, as examined below. 
The DPO is part of the agency’s staff and, therefore, carries out an internal form of 
supervision, which according to Article 28 ECD is independent from the rest of 
Europol’s activities.967 The DPO has many mechanisms at its disposal to ensure that 
Europol complies with the data protection rules. In this sense, Article 28(4) ECD 
establishes that: 
 
                                                
964 The JSB publishes the decisions in its website: http://europoljsb.consilium.europa.eu/about.aspx [7 
December 2014]. 
965 Article 28 ECD and Article 10 of Council Decision 2009/936/JHA. 
966 Article 34 ECD. 
967 Disley et al. 2012, p. 5. 
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‘If the Data Protection Officer considers that the provisions of this Decision 
concerning the processing of personal data have not been complied with, he or she shall 
inform the Director, requiring him or her to resolve the non-compliance within a 
specified time.’ 
 
However, the position of the DPO is at times a difficult one. Despite its formal 
independence, the office’s funds come directly from Europol’s budget. Therefore, the 
DPO has a dual role. One the one hand, it must ensure compliance of the agency, 
working hand in hand with the analysts responsible for the processing of personal data, 
and advising them on the spot (rather than ex-post). On the other hand, the DPO must 
offer loyalty to the agency. 
Besides the DPO, Europol has another oversight mechanism via the Joint 
Supervisory Body. Although some scholars have criticised the JSB for its lack of 
objectivity,968 this body is composed of representatives from national DPAs and is, 
therefore, completely independent from Europol. The JSB, operational since 1998, aims 
at reviewing that the processing of personal data from Europol to other parties is carried 
out according to the agency’s data protection principles.969  
The JSB carries out periodic inspections and external audits with the purpose of 
verifying whether Europol has properly implemented the data protection rules. It is not 
a judicial body, so it cannot impose sanctions in case Europol infringes a rule. However, 
its reports have always had a great political influence. In case of a violation, the JSB 
will require the Director of Europol to address the issue.970 The JSB is also the only 
body entitled to decide whether a recommendation has been adequately fulfilled.971, 
Furthermore, it submits periodical reports to the European Parliament (EP) and the 





                                                
968 Especially when it approved the first Europol-US agreement. See Hillebrand 2012, p. 175. 
969 Disley et al. 2012, p. 96. 
970 Article 34(4) ECD. 
971 This could at times be an obstacle since Europol is not always capable of implementing the JSB 
recommendations, sometimes for budget reasons, sometimes for the lack of resources needed. 




2.4. Main features in the proposed Europol regulation 
 
On 27 March 2013 the Commission launched a proposal for a Europol regulation, 
which will replace the current Europol Council Decision.973 One of the goals of the 
proposal is to increase the flow of information on crime to Europol.974 Although this 
enhancement has raised concerns among member states and scholars, the proposal 
should be perceived as a positive development for the following reasons: first, Europol 
has gradually built a coordinated and efficient infrastructure which connects all member 
states in the prevention and investigation of crimes. Second, the agency offers high 
standards in terms of data security, mainly through the SIENA tool. Finally, Europol’s 
data protection safeguards are robust and strong, and the guarantees it offers to 
individuals are often higher than those in the national legal frameworks. Yet, the 
proposed regulation also introduces some issues of debate, which will be addressed in 
this section. 
 
2.4.1. Enhanced powers of Europol 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced significant changes with respect to Europol. The 
agency now has an explicit legal basis in Article 88 TFEU, whose first paragraph is also 
found in the proposed Europol regulation.975 Two new main functions of Europol are: a) 
it coordinates investigations, and b) it has broader powers to retrieve and process 
information.  
The coordination role was given to Europol in December 2009, with the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 88(2) TFEU states that Europol has competence to 
coordinate criminal investigations together with the member states. Keeping the same 
wording, the proposed Europol regulation establishes that Europol has the duty to 
‘coordinate, organise and implement investigative and operational action’ in Article 
4(1)(c). Yet, the regulation does not establish particular rules on how Europol and the 
member states should distribute their competences when they work together in an 
investigation.976  
                                                
973 European Commission, COM(2013) 173 final, 27.03.2013. 
974 Council of the European Union, 10213/13, 29.05.2013, p. 3. 
975 Moreover, Article 88 para. 2(b) TFEU is reproduced in Article 4 of the proposed regulation. 
976 Joint Supervisory Body, Opinion 13/31, p. 6. 
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The possibility for Europol to participate in joint investigative teams (JITs) is kept in 
Article 4(1)(d) and 5 of the proposed regulation, with a clearer wording than that found 
in the current ECD. JITs allow participants to access information stored in Europol’s 
databases and, at the same time, Europol can obtain new information and add it in its 
systems. Another new feature is that there is no longer a need for prior arrangement if 
Europol wants to participate in JITs. This will facilitate the involvement of Europol in 
the investigations. In addition, Article 5(3) states that Europol will ‘take measures to 
assist [Member States] in setting up the joint investigation team’. Althought this 
paragraph is somewhat symbolic, it enhances the role of Europol and is necessary for 
Europol in relation to the JITs. 
Europol’s coordination role is found in several other provisions of the proposal. For 
instance, Article 4(1)(g) permits Europol to ‘develop, share and promote specialist 
knowledge of crime prevention methods, investigative procedures and technical and 
forensic methods, and to provide advice to Member States’. Likewise, Article 4(1)(h) 
allows Europol to provide technical and financial support to Member States; and Article 
4(1)(l) empowers the agency to develop centres of specialised expertise for combating 
certain types of crime (e.g. the current EC3 or the office for counterfeiting). Article 6 on 
Europol’s requests to initiate criminal investigations does not present many changes 
from the wording in the current ECD. The only new issue is the need to inform Eurojust 
in some cases (Articles 6(1) and (5)) and the one-month deadline for the member states 
to initiate the investigation (Article 6(4)). 
The proposal also enhances Europol’s access to crime-related information. It is 
particularly foreseen in Article 7 of the proposed regulation. Article 7(5) introduces an 
obligation for member states to provide the agency with information. Yet, the 
ownership remains with the member states, so it will ultimately have to authorise such 
data access.  
Within this context, Article 23(3) of the proposed regulation states that ‘Europol may 
retrieve and process information, including personal data, from information systems, of 
a national, Union or international nature’. Under the current legal framework, the 
agency can only access information that national authorities have introduced to 
Europol’s databases.977 However, the practice shows that several Europol Liaison 
Officers do have access to national police databases in their own countries, according to 
                                                
977 This is also foreseen in Article 7(5) of the proposed regulation. 
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their security clearance. Therefore, and despite the EDPS opposition to such 
provision,978 it seems reasonable that the Commission adds a legal basis for this, 
underlining that it will be possible ‘in so far as authorised by Union, international or 
national legal instruments’. 
 
2.4.2. Data protection 
 
Although the JSB has argued that the draft regulation might result in a weaker 
Europol’s data protection regime,979 data protection rules will not necessarily lose 
strength under this new act. One of the amendments to be highlighted is that, for the 
first time, data protection rules are all in one single instrument. Following the previous 
structure, this section examines whether the new regulation will comply with the 
purpose limitation principle; the right of access, correction and deletion of data; and the 
external supervision by an independent body. 
 
a.  The purpose limitation principle 
 
The proposal introduces a more flexible system for the processing of personal data, 
which does not require specific data systems as in the current Europol Council 
Decision. Data processing will depend on dataset levels. According to the explanatory 
memorandum on the proposal, the reason for this change is ‘to better establish links 
between data already in its possession and subsequently analysing them’.980 However, in 
line with the JSB argument, the reduction from 23 to 2 AWFs in May 2012 was created 
for this same purpose,981 and therefore the Commission’s argument is out of date.982 
Particularly, Article 24 (1) establishes that: 
 
             ‘Europol shall process data, including personal data only for the purposes of: a) 
cross-checking aimed at identifying connections between information, b) analyses of a 
strategic or thematic nature, c) operational analyses in specific cases.’ 
                                                
978 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Law enforcement Cooperation and 
Training (Europol) and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA, 31.05.2013, p. 24. 
979 Joint Supervisory Body, Opinion 13/31, p. 2. 
980 Explanatory Memorandum of the proposed regulation, p. 7. 
981 See also recital 20 of of the proposed regulation. 




From Article 24 it is deduced that the new data processing structure will consist of a 
single depository with different data set levels of processing. It will be only capable to 
store data for three specific purposes, namely, cross-checking, strategic analyses, and 
operational analyses. The first debate encountered on this issue is that it is hard to see 
how the future single ‘Europol Information System’ is going to function. The regulation 
does not include any indication on this issue other than stating that privacy-by-design 
will be introduced.983 Considering that the current ECD also complies with the privacy-
by-design principle, the only difference in the proposed regulation is that the system 
will no longer apply as a large-scale tool, but rather in a small-scale manner.  
The Commission has justified the introduction of this new approach by stressing that 
the technical separation between the EIS and the AWFs is inefficient, since ‘data must 
be stored at least twice (or three times) with duplicated obligations for the data owner as 
well as for Europol to maintain (update, delete) the data’.984 For this reason, the 
Commission has decided that data protection rules in the future Europol regulation will 
no longer be ‘database-oriented’, but data protection safeguards will be rather attached 
to each piece and type of data.985 
Although there is a significant chance that the current Europol systems are replaced 
by a single depository, the agency might maintain the existing structure in the future. In 
fact, oversight bodies such as the JSB and the EDPS have recognised the compliance of 
the existing AWFs and the EIS with the purpose limitation principle.986 They have also 
expressed doubts about a future new structure, since Article 24 is presented in a very 
broad and ambiguous way, and it needs to be concretised.987 Specifically, the JSB has 
highlighted its opposition to this more flexible IT structure, stressing that the purpose 
limitation and the necessity principles are already applied in the current ECD through 
the flexibility clause.988  
The second debate refers to the scope of Article 24, which limits the data processing 
to purposes of cross-checking, strategic analyses, and operational analyses. In the 
current ECD there is a flexibility clause allowing the creation of new information 
systems other than those expressly foreseen in the law – however these must be 
                                                
983 Joint Supervisory Body, Opinion 13/31, p. 9. 
984 SWD(2013) 99 final, 27.03.2013, p. 3. 
985 SWD(2013) 99 final, 27.03.2013, p. 5. 
986 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 31.05.2013, p. 10. 
987 See European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 31.05.2013, pp. 12-13. 
988 Joint Supervisory Body, Opinion 13/31, pp. 2-3. 
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authorised by the Management Board, the Director and the JSB.989 The fact that this 
clause has never been used to date confirms that the current system is sufficiently 
flexible.990  
A similar flexibility clause is not found in the proposed regulation. Many Europol 
officials argue that this limitation of purposes for data processing will be a step 
backwards for the agency, which seeks to enhance its competences and become more 
operational in the future.991 For instance, under the future regulation, Europol will never 
be able to create a public portal for ‘most wanted people’ (similar to that found on the 
FBI website). Such a portal does not correspond to any of the three purposes listed in 
Article 24(1), so it would never be possible under the proposed regulation.  
Therefore, the Council has suggested an amendment that would include a fourth 
purpose allowing Europol to process information for ‘facilitating the exchange of 
information between Member States, Europol, other Union bodies, third countries and 
international organisations’.992 If accepted by the Commission and the EP, it would 
maintain the current existing possibilities under Article 10 ECD. 
Article 25 refers to the purpose limitation principle too. This provision tackles the 
need for member states, EU bodies, third countries or international organisations to 
decide for what purpose the information is processed. If they fail to do so, Europol will 
take the decision. The EDPS has expressed its opposition to leaving the decision in the 
hands of Europol.993 However, this is already occurring under the current system: 
information introduced mainly by member states arrives at the department O1 by 
default. Department O1 decides whether the information is relevant and, if so, it is 
distributed to the other departments (e.g. AWF FP TWINS). If not, the information is 
deleted from the pool within a period of six months. 
 
b. Right of access, correction and deletion of data 
 
Any individual whose data is stored in the Europol database has, as in the current ECD, 
the right to access,994 correct, delete and block data,995 the right to a judicial remedy,996 
                                                
989 Article 10(2) ECD. 
990 Joint Supervisory Body, Opinion 13/31, p. 9. 
991 Council of the European Union, 6517/10, 22.02.2010. 
992 Council of the European Union, 8596/14, 07.04.2014, Article 24(1d). 
993 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 31.05.2013, p. 25. 
994 Recital 37 and Article 39 of Europol Regulation. See particularly the possibility for the data subject to 
lodge a complaint to the EDPS in Article 39(6). Currently, Article 30 ECD. 
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and the right to compensation for damages or unlawful data processing.997 The only 
difference from the current legal framework is that, in the proposed regulation, the 
appellate body will be the EDPS instead of the JSB.  
For the rest, there are no changes on this issue. The only criticism on individual 
rights has been raised by the EDPS, which has suggested modifying the wording of 
Article 39 for a more plain language.998 In my view, however, this provision does not 
present complexities as it is drafted. In fact, the practice shows that the data access 
procedure is working well at Europol. The DPO responds to all data requests in a clear 
and efficient manner, despite the high number of queries lately. In seven years the 
number of data requests received by Europol has increased from 10 to 600 hundred, but 
each of these requests has been properly examined on a case-by-case basis. 
 
c. External supervision of Europol’s data processing 
 
Europol’s supervisory body will be modified under the proposed regulation. According 
to the proposal, the supervision of Europol’s data processing will be conducted by the 
EDPS,999 replacing the current JSB. The main reason for this change is that Europol 
became a full EU agency in 2009. Before Lisbon, Europol was a third-pillar 
organisation subject to an intergovernmental convention ratified by all member states in 
1998. Therefore, its activities were supervised by an independent body, the JSB, in 
accordance with the convention and within the scope of the former third pillar.  
The EDPS is today in charge of supervising the EU institutions and bodies’ 
compliance with data protection rules – including AFSJ agencies such as Frontex and 
the new eu-LISA.1000 The only agencies that still have their own supervisory bodies are 
Europol and Eurojust. Therefore, the proposed Europol regulation (and also the 
                                                
995 Article 31 ECD, and recital 37 and Article 40 of Europol Regulation. 
996 Article 32 ECD, and recital 45 and Article 41 of Europol Regulation. The current ECD only allows the 
judicial redress for access, not for correction or deletion, see Boehm 2012, p. 198. In the proposed 
regulation any processing activity can be challenged to the EDPS and appealed to the CJEU. See Articles 
49 and 50 of Europol Regulation. 
997 Article 52(1) ECD, and articles 51-52 of Europol Regulation. 
998 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 31.05.2013, p. 28. 
999 Recital 39 and Article 46 of Europol Regulation. 
1000 Regulation (EC) 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 8, 
12.01.2001, pp. 1-22. 
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proposed Eurojust regulation) will align the supervisory mechanisms of all agencies and 
bodies of the EU.1001  
The EDPS has participated actively in the drafting of the proposal, and has expressed 
satisfaction with the new Article 46.1002 On the contrary, the director of Europol and 
many powerful countries such as the UK, Germany and Sweden have stressed their 
discontent about the replacement of the current JSB with the EDPS. The JSB has also 
highlighted its objection to giving the EDPS the sole responsibility for Europol’s 
supervision. Instead, it suggests creating an independent structure with equal 
participation of each national DPA, the EDPS and the Europol DPO.1003  
The EDPS’s supervisory role will consist of carrying out prior checks,1004 
consultations, complaint handling,1005 visits, and inspections.1006 In addition, the body 
will authorise automated processing of sensitive personal data,1007 investigate 
complaints lodged by data subjects,1008 and carry out ‘joint supervisions’ with national 
supervisory authorities in some cases.1009 Finally, the EDPS will be informed if Europol 
stores data for more than five years.1010 
The EDPS will have powers to rectify, block, erase, or destroy data; to refer a matter 
to the CJEU, and even to impose temporary or definitive bans for data processing.1011 
This last new power has been received with criticism among member states and 
Europol, and, therefore, the body has clarified that it will be, in any circumstance, a very 
exceptional remedy.1012 Articles 47 and 49(2) of the proposal refer to the national 
authorities’ cooperation with the EDPS. These provisions are particularly relevant 
considering the EDPS’s lack of experience in auditing and inspecting Europol. The fact 
that the legislator has foreseen the possibility for national experts (for instance, the 
                                                
1001 The EDPS today supervises more than sixty institutions and bodies. 
1002 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 31.05.2013, p. 2. 
1003 Joint Supervisory Body, Opinion 13/31, pp. 3 and 10. 
1004 Article 42 of Europol Regulation. The EDPS has issued more than 600 opinions on prior checks to 
date. 
1005 The EDPS has received more than 650 complaints to date. 
1006 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 31.05.2013, p. 15. 
1007 Preamble of Europol Regulation, p. 8. 
1008 Recital 44 of Europol Regulation. 
1009 Preamble of Europol Regulation, p. 9. 
1010 Article 37(3) of Europol Regulation. 
1011 Article 46(3)(f) of Europol Regulation. 
1012 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 31.05.2013, p. 16. 
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current JSB members) to participate in these EDPS audits is thus seen as a positive 
development.1013  
The proposed regulation also gives the EP stronger supervisory powers.1014 This new 
role has its origins in Article 88(2) TFEU and Article 218(6) TFEU. Since the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the EP has been co-legislator in the AFSJ, which means that the EP plays an 
important role in ‘ensuring that these agencies fulfil their mandates effectively’.1015 
Since the current ECD was adopted before the Treaty of Lisbon, these new EP 
compentences are not regulated.1016 Therefore, Europol’s draft regulation incorporates 
several provisions promoting the cooperation between the EP competencesand the 
national parliaments (NPs) in the scrutiny of Europol.  
Under the current ECD, the EP only controls Europol’s policies, administration and 
financial aspects.1017 These competences are enlarged in the future Europol 
regulation.1018 The proposal adds the following new tasks for the EP: a) the Management 
Board will have to consult the EP (and the national parliaments) on the annual 
programme,1019 b) the EP (and the national parliaments) will receive strategic analysis, 
non-confidential threats, situation studies and evaluations, and working arrangements 
from Europol,1020 c) the EP will be able to make requests for classified and sensitive 
non-classified information,1021 d) the EP will receive all activity reports from Europol, e) 
the Director of Europol will send reports to the EP,1022 and f) the EP will appoint the 
Europol’s Executive Director.1023  
It is yet unclear how the EP will actually adapt its infrastructures according to these 
new tasks. Some scholars state that the EP will create an oversight sub-committee of 
LIBE called ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny Unit, which will have access to privileged 
                                                
1013 However, the EDPS has suggested clarifying the provision and the specific scope of cooperation. See 
European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 31.05.2013, p. 17. See also Letter from EDPS to Mr. 
Juan Fernando López Aguilar, PH/HH/mk C 2013-0879D(2013) 0430, 13.11.2013. 
1014 Articles 53-54 of Europol Regulation. 
1015 Vermeulen & Wills 2011, p. 19. 
1016 COM (2010) 776 final, 17.12.2010; Hillebrand C 2013, ‘Guarding EU-wide counter-terrorism 
policing: The struggle for sound parliamentary scrutiny of Europol’ in European Security, Terrorism and 
Intelligence.   Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe, eds. Kaunert C & Léonard S, Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 96-124. 
1017 Preamble of Europol Regulation, p. 6. 
1018 Article 62(2) and 53(1) of Europol Regulation. 
1019 Article 15(4) of Europol Regulation. 
1020 Article 53(3) of Europol Regulation. 
1021 Article 54 of Europol Regulation. It is expected that both institutions will conclude a working 
arrangement on that issue in the future. See Preamble Europol Regulation, p. 6. 
1022 The Council has suggested that the appearance of the Executive Director before the EP will only be to 
discuss non-operational matters. See Council of the European Union, 8596/14, 07.04.2014, Article 53(1). 
1023 Article 56(2) of Europol Regulation. 
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information.1024 However, as Abazi points out, it might clash with the principle of 
originator control.1025 According to this principle, member states originally sharing 
confidential information with Europol will retain the powers to decide whether the 
information can be accessed by the EP or not. Therefore, the new EP scrutiny 
competence might be de facto limited.  
Finally, when the proposed regulation enters into force, the agency will fall under the 
CJEU’s full jurisdiction. It conforms to Protocol 36 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Article 10(2) of that protocol specifically states that the amendment of an act adopted 
before the treaty will entail the applicability of new powers by the Commission – which 
will have competence to launch an infringement procedure – and the CJEU.  
 
2.5. Comparison with data protection standards in the member states 
 
After examining the data protection rules in the current ECD and the future Europol 
regulation, this section compares Europol’s provisions with data protection rules in 
some Member States. The particular member states chosen for this study are Bulgaria, 
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1024 Vermeulen and Wills 2011; Abazi V 2014, ‘The future of Europol’s parliamentary oversight: A great 
leap forward?’, German Law Journal, vol. 15 no. 6, p. 1132. 
1025 Abazi 2014. 
1026 This choice is based on the interviews that the author conducted during 2013 and 2014 with several 
police officers of these member states. 
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As shown in Table 3.2., law enforcement authorities of the member states often use 
regular email or the telephone to communicate with each other during a criminal 
investigation. Some departments also have encrypted channels of communication, but 
not all of them. The problem with not having secured communication tools is that 
crime-related data can easily be intercepted or accessed by third persons.  
One of the data protection principles ensured by Europol is the purpose limitation 
principle. According to this rule, personal data collected and processed for one purpose 
may not be used later for other unrelated purposes. Law enforcement authorities in the 
member states do not always comply with the principle. In several countries, if a piece 
of data is introduced in the database, it remains in the system for ‘as long as necessary’. 
Normally, police officers have different levels of clearance. Officers with high levels of 
clearance are able to access any data in the system relevant to their investigation, and 
use them for any ‘necessary’ purpose within the scope of their duties.  
Only two of the countries examined in this study have data protection departments in 
charge of overseeing that information stored in the law enforcement database is 
adequately processed. The majority of countries do not have independent bodies that 
control data processed by law enforcement authorities. Annual audits are conducted, but 
it is not always clear by whom and how police databases are scrutinised. An example of 
adequate data protection audits is found in Finland. Finnish law enforcement authorities 
are subject to annual audit plans that define the amount, targets and the themes. Audits 
are carried out by the National Police Board Audit Unit. This unit conducts a 
comprehensive inspection, which includes an in-depth examination of data protection 
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issues. Besides this, Finnish police offices have other type of audits, conducted by a 
specific police unit. Finally, the collection of intelligence is controlled by the Finnish 
parliamentary ombudsman. 
Most of the member states offer citizens the possibility to access their personal data. 
However, the procedure is subject to broad limitations and it varies from one country to 
the other. In Spain, for instance, police officers have one month to respond from the 
moment they receive the request.1027 Yet, according to the Spanish law, data controllers 
(police) can deny the access, modification and suppression of data if it jeopardises 
national security, the freedoms and rights of a third person, or any ongoing 
investigation.1028 
For all said above it can be concluded that, in the processing of information, both the 
current ECD and the proposed Europol regulation offer higher data protection standards 
than the majority of safeguards applied within the member states. Therefore, in 
principle, the Europol data protection framework could be taken as a model for member 
states in the future.  
 
3. Europol’s data exchanges beyond the EU  
 
It is well known that 9/11 set in motion the creation of a global security infrastructure. 
The goal was to create a global system that would connect law enforcement authorities 
in different countries for the prevention of similar terrorist attacks. At the EU level, 
measures on issues related to criminal law and external relations fell under the scope of 
the intergovernmental competence – former second and third pillars. Yet, due to the 
increasing number of cross-border crimes and the fear of global terrorism, EU 
institutions started to propose initiatives within the scope of the external dimension of 
the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. In this regard, on 21 September 2001, the 
European Council expressed its determination to elevate Europol to ‘an effective 
information and intelligence exchange medium’.1029 One of the EU goals was to achieve 
a coherent external relations’ framework between Europol and third parties, as part of 
the overall EU external action.1030  
                                                
1027 Article 15 LOPD, articles 27, 28 and 29 RLOPD. 
1028 Article 23 LOPD. 
1029 Bures & Ahern 2007, p. 196. 
1030 Council of the European Union, 14366/3/05, 30.11.2005; and Disley et al. 2012, p. 107. 
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Today, Europol is not only the EU agency dealing with the largest amount of 
information within the EU, but it also has an important role with respect to the exchange 
of data outside the European territory. The agency exchanges more than 20,000 
messages a year with third parties, retrieving personal as well as non-personal data.1031 
Consequently, external activities of Europol have not only led to the strengthening of 
the internal security architecture within the EU member states, but they have also had an 
influence on the EU’s external security decisions.1032  
The impact of Europol on external matters tackles both the CFSP and the AFSJ. 
Regarding the CFSP, Europol exchanges information with military agents within the 
context of EU’s civilian CSDP missions.1033 On the external dimension of the AFSJ, 
Europol has numerous cooperation agreements with third countries. These cooperation 
agreements will be precisely the focus of this section. Europol’s cooperation agreements 
are separated from the international agreements signed between the EU as a whole and 
third countries. Yet, Europol’s agreements have often positioned the EU security policy 
as a reference for third countries, since such third countries had to implement Europol’s 
data protection standards as a condition for the agreement. Because of this, I will 
examine whether Europol is becoming a normative actor within the area of the EU 
external relations. 
This section will first look at the current legal instruments used by Europol for the 
exchange of data with third parties, focusing on Europol’s cooperation agreements. 
After that, it will analyse the special relationship existing between Europol and the 
United States (US). These parties have two cooperation agreements, one supplementing 
the other, signed in 2001 and 2002 respectively. In addition, Europol has developed a 
relevant role in transfers of financial data taking place between the European company 
‘SWIFT’ and the US Department of Homeland Security. Finally, the last part of the 
section will discuss the proposed Europol Regulation and the changes it introduces with 




                                                
1031 Submission by Europol, House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union. Call for Evidence. 
File no. 3100-174, 28.04.2008, section 6.1, pp. 20-21. 
1032 Mounier G 2009, ‘Europol: A new player in the EU external policy field?’, Perspectives on European 
Politics and Society, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 593 and 597. 
1033 For instance, on the EU missions in the Western Balkans, see Europol, ‘Europol experiences of 
cooperation in the Western Balkans’, EDOC 416612, 01.09.2009. 
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3.1. Europol cooperation agreements with third parties 
 
Europol is not only in charge of giving support to the member states in the prevention, 
combat or investigation of crimes, but it also has a legal personality to negotiate and 
conclude cooperation agreements with third parties as part of its external relations.1034  
The Council of Ministers is the European institution in charge of laying down rules 
governing Europol’s external relations. In line with Article 42 of the former Europol 
Convention, the Council adopted on 3 November 1998 an act on the rules governing 
Europol’s external relations with third states and non-European Union related bodies.1035 
That act established the following main features: a) the possibility to incorporate liaison 
officers at Europol’s headquarters,1036 b) the opportunity to organise missions by 
Europol staff to the relevant third states or non-European Union related bodies,1037 and 
c) the possibility to establish regular meetings between Europol and third parties.1038 
The act also regulated the participation of the Council of Ministers during the 
negotiations and adoption of cooperation agreements.1039 Particularly, the Council is 
first entitled to draft a list with the third states and international organisations accepted 
for starting negotiations with Europol.1040 Then, the Council has to authorise Europol’s 
Director to enter into negotiations with the specific third country.1041 After the 
negotiations, which take around two years on average,1042 the Council will also authorise 
the conclusion of the agreement. In that sense, current Article 23(2) ECD1043 adds that 
cooperation agreements with third states may be concluded ‘only after the approval by 
the Council […] and, as far as it concerns the exchange of personal data, obtained the 
opinion of the Joint Supervisory Body via the Management Board’. 
                                                
1034 Mounier 2009, p. 586. 
1035 OJ C 26/19, 30.01.1999, pp. 19-20. 
1036 Article 3 of Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing Europol’s external 
relations with third States and non-European Union related bodies. 
1037 Article 4 of Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing Europol’s external 
relations with third States and non-European Union related bodies. See also ‘Plans emerge for the 
collection of personal data outside European borders to obtain ‘comprehensive situational awareness and 
intelligence support’, Statewatch, 30.10.2012. Available from www.statewatch.org [10 December 2014]. 
1038 Article 5 of Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing Europol’s external 
relations with third States and non-European Union related bodies. 
1039 Article 2 of Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules governing Europol’s external 
relations with third States and non-European Union related bodies. 
1040 Article 23(2) and 26(2)(a) ECD. 
1041 This was first established by Council of 27 March 2000, OJ C106, 13.4.2000, pp. 1-2, but the list of 
third countries has been updated since then. 
1042 For instance, negotiations between Europol and Colombia took around two years. See also Mounier 
2009, pp. 588-589. 
1043 OJ L 121, 15.05.2009, pp. 37-66. See also O’Neill 2012, pp. 172-173. 
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Europol cooperates externally with eighteen non-EU countries to date: Albania, 
Australia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Canada, Colombia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Republic 
of Serbia, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States of America.1044 
As will be examined below, some of these countries have concluded an operational 
agreement with Europol, whereas others have only a strategic agreement in force. 
The agency has also concluded agreements with nine EU bodies and agencies, as 
well as with three international organisations, including Interpol. It is also worth 
mentioning that Europol hosts liaison officers from nine non-EU countries and 
organisations, which are Albania, Australia, Canada, Colombia, Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland, Interpol and some United States’ law enforcement agencies. Regarding the 
future cooperation agreements with Europol, negotiations have recently started in 
Brazil, Mexico, Georgia and the United Arab Emirates.1045  
As for the exchange of information between Europol and a third party, the Council 
did not adopt specific rules on this issue until 2009, exactly one day before the Treaty of 
Lisbon entered into force. Particularly, Council Decision 2009/934/JHA establishes the 
implementing rules on Europol’s exchange of personal data and non-personal data with 
third parties, including a list of third states and organisations with which Europol can 
conclude agreements.1046 
Article 23(2) ECD states that ‘such agreements may concern the exchange of 
operational, strategic or technical information, including personal data and classified 
information, if transmitted via a designated contact point’. There are thus two types of 
cooperation agreements that Europol can conclude with third countries and international 
organisations: i) strategic agreements, which do not exchange personal data,1047 and ii) 
operational agreements, which do allow the transfer of personal data.1048  For 
exceptional situations, the ECD establishes the possibility to share information with 
                                                
1044 Council of the European Union, 10036/12, 24.05.2012, p. 105 
1045 ‘The spider's web: Europol goes global in the hunt for intelligence and analysis’, Statewatch, 
5.3.2013. Available from www.statewatch.org [10 December 2014]. 
1046 OJ  L 325, 11.12.2009, pp. 6-11. 
1047 Article 1(g) of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing 
rules governing Europol’s relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified 
information. 
1048 Article 1(h) of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing 




third states without a cooperation agreement, in the terms of Articles 23(8) and (9) of 
the ECD. 
 
3.1.1. Strategic agreements 
 
Europol currently has strategic agreements with the following third countries: Albania, 
Australia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Canada, Colombia, Iceland, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the US, Turkey and 
Ukraine.1049 A strategic agreement between Europol and a third state, as the name 
indicates, only allows the exchange of strategic and technical information. Strategic 
information includes, for instance, enforcement actions to suppress offences, trends in 
the methods used to commit them, and threat assessments. Similarly, technical 
information deals with any data about investigative procedures, crime intelligence 
analytical methods, and forensic police methods, to name a few.1050 Any transmission of 
data related to an identified or identifiable person falls outside of the scope of these 
agreements. 
Strategic agreements permit the designation of the National Bureau of Europol in the 
police directorate of the third country. This bureau acts as a national contact point and 
participates regularly in high-level meetings with Europol. It is also in charge of the 
majority of information exchanges between both parties. Interestingly, liaison officers 
of a third country can be appointed even if there is no operational agreement between 
Europol and the third country. For instance, this was the case of Colombia and Albania 
before 2013. Both countries had only strategic agreements with the agency but they had 
liaison officers at Europol’s premises – yet, they did not process personal data. 
Two other observations need to be made with regard to strategic agreements. First, 
these agreements normally include a provision prohibiting the onward transfer of the 
information shared to other third countries, unless there is prior consent by the 
providing party.1051 Second, each contracting party will be responsible for the choice of 
                                                
1049 In addition, Europol has strategic agreements concluded with CEPOL, FRONTEX, ECB, EU, ECDC, 
UNODC, OLAF, ENISA, World Customs Organisation, European Monitoring Centre of Drugs and Drug 
Addiction. Information available from https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/external-cooperation-
31 [5 December 2014]. 
1050 Article 2 of the Agreement on Strategic Co-operation between Montenegro and the European Police 
Office. 




the appropriate classification level of information as regards data security standards. In 
this sense, there is always a table of equivalences between the third country and 
Europol.  
 
3.1.2. Operational agreements 
 
It is usual that a third country first signs a strategic agreement with Europol and, a few 
years later, it concludes the operational and strategic agreement. By doing that, the third 
country makes sure that it has enough time to build an adequate data protection 
framework before operational relations with Europol start. Europol has concluded 
operation agreements with Albania, Australia, Canada, Colombia, Iceland, Monaco, 
Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, the US, Macedonia and Liechtenstein to date.1052 This 
type of agreements exchange information, including personal data, in the form of 
specialist knowledge, results of strategic analyses and crime prevention methods1053 that 
can add value for investigations.1054  
As in strategic agreements, operational agreements require the appointment of a 
national contact point in the third country. This contact point participates in high-level 
meetings with the agency, and ensures the exchange of information between both 
parties on a 24-hour basis.1055 In addition, both parties agree on appointing one or more 
liaison officers,1056 who will be located at the Europol’s headquarters. Third countries 
and organisations with an operational agreement with Europol are also capable of 
accessing analysis work files (AWFs) and focal points.1057 Therefore, these third 
countries are required to have adequate data protection standards before concluding an 
operational agreement with Europol.  
                                                
1052 Europol has also operational agreements with Interpol and Eurojust. Information available from 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/external-cooperation-31 [5 December 2014]. 
1053 See Article 4 of Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and the 
European Police Office. 
1054 Mounier argues that only operational agreements  ‘have a real added value for investigations because 
the strategic agreement merely allows the exchange of threat assessments and analytical reports’. See 
Mounier 2009, p. 587. 
1055 Article 7(2) of Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and the 
European Police Office. 
1056 Article 14 of Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and the 
European Police Office. 
1057 Mounier 2009, p. 589. 
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In this sense, a provision extinguishing personal data transfers if the adequacy is no 
longer in place is included in these agreements.1058 Clauses on accuracy and the purpose 
limitation principle integrate the agreements, too. When a third country sends 
information to Europol, it specifies its purpose and access restrictions. Europol will then 
check whether the data is necessary for Europol’s tasks and, if not (or no decision is 
taken within six months), it will be deleted.1059 
Data protection rules included in operational agreements are similar to those in 
strategic agreements. For instance, operational agreements establish limits on the 
information sent to third countries. Moreover, they include clauses on individual rights. 
Any person has the right to access information collected by the government of the third 
country and transferred to Europol, but the agency needs prior consent from the 
supplying party before the release.1060 Regarding data security issues, third countries 
need to ensure that personal data received from Europol is protected through technical 
and organisational measures.1061 Lastly, as in strategic agreements, the supplying party 
is in charge of choosing the classification level of such information.1062  
Europol can also sign working arrangements on a particular focal point with those 
third countries that have operational agreements with the agency. In this regard, Article 
14(8) ECD allows Europol, under certain conditions, to invite experts from third 
countries or international organisations to be associated with the activities of an analysis 
group. For instance, Switzerland and Australia have recently joined the focal point 
‘Check-the-web’. These countries already have operational agreements with Europol, so 
the level of data protection in these countries is adequate. Finally, third countries 
accessing a focal point need to provide analysis data that justifies the necessity of such 





                                                
1058 See Article 7(8) of Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and the 
European Police Office. 
1059 Articles 8 and 9 of Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and the 
European Police Office. 
1060 Article 7(7) of Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and the 
European Police Office. 
1061 Articles 9(3) and 12 of Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and 
the European Police Office. 
1062 Article 13 of Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Australia and the 
European Police Office. 
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3.1.3. Data exchanges between Europol and private parties 
 
Europol can exchanges data with private companies too. However, the agency does not 
have agreements or other arrangements with private entities. Therefore, the general rule 
is that information exchanged between the agency and private companies needs to be 
transferred via Europol National Units (ENU), never directly.  
If the private company is not established within the territory of a Member State, the 
third state’s regime will apply. For instance, Europol often needs to contact the credit 
card company Visa, located in the US. When that occurs, Visa sends the requested data 
to Europol via the US competent authorities.1063  
As mentioned above, if the third country has a cooperation agreement with Europol, 
information from the private organisation is transmitted to Europol via the contact point 
of that state. However, if there is no agreement between Europol and the home (third) 
country of the private company, Europol can process data only if the organisation is on 
a list approved by Europol’s Management Board. In addition, a memorandum of 
understanding and an opinion of the Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) are required.1064 
 
3.2.  Europol’s receipt of information from third parties without an agreement 
 
Europol does not need to conclude a cooperation agreement with a third party if the 
agency only wants to receive information from that country. It is regulated in Article 
10(4) ECD, and Articles 19 and 20 of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.1065 These 
provisions state that when Europol only seeks to receive information from a third 
parties, it can do it, even if there is not a cooperation agreement in place. The only 
condition is the flow of information has to be one-way only. If Europol does not only 
receive but also sends information to that third country, a cooperation agreement with 
that third country will be required.  
This procedure permits Europol to receive information from any third country 
rapidly.  It is an advantatge in comparison to the two years on average that it takes for 
the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with third countries.  
                                                
1063 Disley et al. 2012, p. 117. 
1064 Disley et al. 2012, p. 116. 
1065 OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, pp. 6-11. 
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The following requirements take place for every receipt of information: a) the 
assessment of the reliability of the source;1066 b) the communication of any deleted or 
modified information to Europol;1067 c) the communication of the receipt to the 
Europol’s data protection officer (DPO), the Director and the JSB; and finally d) the 
deletion of any information that has been obtained in violation of human rights. 
It is worth adding that Europol’s receipt of information from a third partner without 
an agreement has to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, if Europol 
receives regular information from a particular third partner, Europol will require the 
conclusion of an agreement with that partner. 
 
3.3.  Data protection rules for data transfers to third parties 
 
One of the current debates regarding Europol’s external relations refers to whether 
Europol data transfers to third countries comply with the same data protection standards 
as data transfers within the EU.1068 This section will answer that question, and it will 
also examine Europol’s influence on data protection laws of those third countries with 
which the agency has cooperation agreements in force. 
Some scholars have raised doubts about the adequacy of data protection rules when 
Europol transfers data to third countries.1069 Indeed, this is the impression given by 
Article 23 ECD. The provision regulates the relations of Europol with third states and 
bodies, but it does not include specific rules on data protection for Europol cooperation 
agreements.  
Detailed rules on the transmission of personal data by Europol to third states and 
bodies are found in Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.1070 It requires the establishment of 
an independent authority responsible for data protection matters in the third country 
(Article 5(4)); an agreement on confidentiality for transmitting classified information 
                                                
1066 Article 19 of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA. 
1067 Article 20 of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA. 
1068 Ruthig J 2008, ‘Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen der Tätigkeit von Europol – Bestandaufnahme 
Ausblick’, Alternativenentwurf Europol und europäischer Datenschutz, eds. Wolter J, Schenke WR, 
Hilger H, Ruthig J & Zoller MA, C.F.Müller Wissenschaft, p. 112. 
1069 Gless S 2008, ‘Zusammenarbeit von Europol mit Drittenstaaten und Drittenstellen’, 
Alternativenentwurf Europol und europäischer Datenschutz, eds. Wolter J, Schenke WR, Hilger H, 
Ruthig J & Zoller MA, C.F. Müller Wissenschaft, p. 346; Kaunert C 2010, ‘Europol and EU 
Counterterrorism: International security actorness in the external dimension’, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, no. 33, pp. 661-662; Boehm 2012a, p. 210. 
1070 It derogates Council Act of 12 March 1999, OJ C 88, 30.3.1999, pp. 1-3, amended in 2002 by OJ C 
76, 27.03.2002, pp. 1-2. 
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(Article 6(2));1071 the need for concrete provisions on the recipient of the data, the type 
of data to be transmitted and the purposes (Article 15); a limitation of transmission to 
the competent authorities (Article 17); and the obligation to include a clause for 
correcting and deleting data (Article 16). Besides it, any data exchange between Europol 
and a third country has to comply with the principles of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD)1072 and the Council of Europe (CoE).1073  
From Council Decision 2009/934/JHA it is inferred that Europol data transfers to 
third countries are only allowed when i) there is an adequacy decision on the level of 
data protection, b) there is an existing agreement between them or, c) exceptionally, to 
protect the fundamental interests of a country, or to avoid an imminent threat.1074 
Therefore, the general rule is that Europol’s data transfers will not take place in 
countries without an adequate data protection regime.  
As seen above, there are two types of cooperation agreements: strategic and 
operational. For operational agreements, an adequate level of data protection is required 
(unless it is a ‘ticking bomb’ situation).1075 Europol has to examine the data protection 
regime in countries and organisations outside the EU before it concludes the operational 
agreement.1076 In order to do so, the agency observes the nature of the data, the purpose 
for which the data is intended, the duration of the data processing, the general/specific 
data protection provisions, and other specific conditions.1077 The steps to carry out this 
assessment are the following:  
First, a data protection questionnaire is sent to the third country. If the Europol DPO 
is not convinced by the answers to the questionnaire, a data protection study visit is 
arranged. This is usually a one-week visit at the institutions of the third country that will 
carry out the data transfers, as well as the data protection authority (DPA) of the 




                                                
1071 This is also regulated in Article 23(7) ECD. 
1072 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 23.09.1980. 
1073 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
Council of Europe, 28.01.1981. 
1074 Ruthig 2008, p. 112. 
1075 Article 23(8) ECD. See also Data Protection at Europol, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2010, p. 23.  
1076 Disley et al. 2012, p. 112. 







As illustrated in the table above, the study visit report is sent to the Management 
Board (MB), which forwards it to the JSB. Then, the JSB provides an opinion to the 
MB on the study visit report. The JSB opinion will allow the MB to adopt its own 
report. If the MB report is favourable, Europol enters into actual negotiations. Once the 
negotiations are finalised, Europol submits the resulting draft agreement to the MB. The 
draft is then forwarded to the JSB, which sends a second opinion to the MB. Finally, the 
MB forwards the draft, together with the JSB opinion, to the Council for approval.1078 
The conclusion of operational agreements can take years. Yet, Article 23(8) and (9) 
provides a possibility for derogation from the general provision. Although the 
derogation has only been used once to date, it allows Europol to exceptionally transmit 
personal data to third parties without an operational agreement in urgent or exceptional 
cases. 
The general procedure for Europol to conclude operational agreements is similar to 
that for international data transfers originating in a Member State. According to Article 
31(2) of Directive 95/46/EC, the proof that a third country has an adequate level of 
protection starts with a Commission proposal, and it is then followed by opinions from 
the Art. 29 WP and the Art. 31 Committee.1079 After that, the EP can undertake a thirty-
day scrutiny and, finally, a decision is taken by the Commission.  
                                                
1078 Disley et al. 2012, p. 113. 
1079 The Committee is established in Article 31 of Directive 95/46/EC and it is composed of 




In the terms of this procedure, the impact of Europol’s data protection framework on 
third countries and international organisations has been notorious. Europol has become 
a key actor for exporting the European model and, particularly, the EU data protection 
standards. The reason for that is that Europol’s external strategy presents less political 
pressure than the overall EU external strategy, so it becomes easier to negotiate with 
third countries. As a result, Europol has developed a role as normative actor. Third 
countries have often changed their domestic laws, adapting them to the European 
standards, in order to gain access to the agency’s data.1080 
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated that Europol has been a norm exporter, 
influencing many third countries’ data protection laws and principles. This influence 
has taken place during the Europol’s visits to the country, through guidelines sent by the 
agency to the third country, or by organising internships and training sessions at the 
Europol headquarters. 
 
3.4.  Special relationship with the United States 
 
The importance of a strong cooperation between the US and Europol is unquestionable. 
On several occasions Europol has participated in US operations that have resulted in the 
successful detention of criminals.1081 This section will analyse the existing agreements 
between both parties, signed after the terrorist attacks that occurred on 11 September 
2001. It will explore whether the US is also recognising Europol’s actorness, and 
whether Europol’s data protection rules have had an impact on the US legal framework. 
  
3.4.1. Cooperation agreements between the US and Europol 
 
Europol has concluded a strategic and a supplemental operational agreement with the 
US. After the 9/11 attacks, Europol decided to make use of the emergency clause to 
share information with the US without having any agreement in force.1082 However, the 
                                                
1080 Mounier 2009, pp. 589-593. 
1081 See, for instance, the operation Joint Hammer, which included the involvement of USPIS, ICE and the 
FBI. Europol was in charge with the analysis of the seized material, and it was coordinated by the US 
Department of Justice. It was a success, resulting in 240 suspects identified, 61 child sex offenders 
arrested, and 11 child victims identified.  
1082 Current Articles 23(8) and (9) ECD. 
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abusive use of the clause was strongly criticised and, therefore, the agency decided to 
formalise a data-sharing agreement with the US.1083 
The strategic agreement entered into force on 6 December 2001.1084 It was negotiated 
with very little time due to the urgency of the matter.1085 That agreement was not seen as 
controversial since it did not allow the exchange of personal data. However, one year 
later a supplemental agreement was concluded between Europol and the US for the 
exchange of personal data.1086 On 16 October 2001, the former US President George W. 
Bush sent a letter to the ex-president of the Commission Romano Prodi requiring access 
to all of Europol’s information, including information on individuals.1087 
The supplemental agreement was concluded without first assessing the US level of 
data protection.1088 Consequently, the provisions of the agreement do not correspond 
with the majority of operational agreements later adopted by Europol. For instance, in 
the US agreement the purpose limitation principle can be circumvented if there is prior 
consent from the providing part,1089 and onward transmissions of information are also 
possible.1090 Moreover, there is no clear time limit for the data retention period, and 
individuals have no right to correct or delete their data. The negotiations for this 
operational agreement were tense. They raised strong criticism because of the low data 
protection standards, as well as the exclusion of the EP, national parliaments and NGOs 
from the negotiations.1091 Privacy experts feared that it could establish a precedent for 
other future cooperation agreements.1092 However, as will be seen below, it did not 
become the model for subsequent agreements.  
There are several liaison officers established between the agency and the US.1093 
Although the US removed its officials from the Europol headquarters at first, contact 
                                                
1083 Hillebrand 2012, p. 143. 
1084 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Police Office, 06.12.2001, File nº 
3710-60r2. 
1085 On this issue, see Opinion 01/38 of the JSB in respect to the 
data protection level in the United States of America, 26.11.2001. 
1086 Supplemental Agreement between the Europol Police Office and the United States of America on the 
Exchange of Personal Data and related Information, 20.12.2002. 
1087 Letter available from http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/nov/06Ausalet.htm [10 December 2014]. 
1088 De Busser 2009, pp. 335; de Busser E 2010, ‘EU data protection in transatlantic cooperation in 
criminal matters. Will the EU be serving its citizens an American meal?’, Utrecht Law Review, vol. 6, no. 
1, p. 96. 
1089 Article 5(1) of 2002 Europol-US Agreement. 
1090 Article 7(3) of 2002 Europol-US Agreement. 
1091 Hillebrand 2012, pp. 145 and 183. 
1092 Mounier 2009, p. 588. 
1093 Article 8 of 2001 Europol-US Agreement. 
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points were re-established in 2007.1094 These come from the following US law 
enforcement agencies: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Secret Service (USSS); Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS); and US Postal Inspection Service (USPIS). In addition, Europol has two 
liaison officers seconded at Washington D.C. (and one at Interpol’s headquarters in 
Lyon).1095  
Therefore, Europol and the US authorities have been cooperating closely since 2001. 
They participate together in diverse joint projects,1096 developing trainings and 
information sharing.1097 SIENA is progressively becoming the tool of choice for 
exchanging operational information between both parties.1098 In particular, the US has 
become a key partner for Europol on issues related to terrorist financing,1099 as examined 
in the section below. 
 
3.4.2. The role of Europol in the TFTP  
 
In June 2010 the EU and the US signed the second Terrorist Financing Tracking 
Program (hereinafter, TFTP) on the processing of financial data held by the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). Europol has three main 
activities as regards the TFTP. The first is defined in Article 9 of the agreement and it 
consists of allowing the US Department of the Treasury ‘to spontaneously provide to 
Europol […] the results of their processing of the data’.1100 The second is established in 
Article 10 and it allows the agency to request searches of data obtained by the US 
authorities. The TFTP Unit (or O9), located at the Europol’s premises, is in charge of 
                                                
1094 Hillebrand 2012, p. 120. 
1095 Council of the European Union, 10036/12, 24.05.2012, p. 19. 
1096 See, for instance, the joint project on countering violent extremism, where cooperate the EU member 
states, Europol and the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Council of the European Union, 
10036/12, 24.05.2012, p. 111. 
1097 For example, in January 2013 Europol signed a letter of intent between U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the agency in which the two agencies committed to developing ongoing, 
cooperative efforts through support, training, and information sharing on cybercrime, cyber fraud and 
online child sexual exploitation. Available from 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1301/130111thehague.htm [10 December 2014]. 
1098 This has been recently promoted by the Council. See Council of the European Union, 13516/11, 
25.08.2012, p. 19. 
1099 Council of the European Union, 12667/12, 17.07.2012, p. 17. 
1100 Europol Activities in Relation to the TFTP Agreement Information Note to the European Parliament 1 
August 2010 – 1 April 2011, File no. 2566-566, 08.04.2011, p. 2. 
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these two tasks. It is composed of three qualified staff members, and it has its own focal 
points to process data sent by the US.1101  
The third and most controversial activity is described in Article 4 of the agreement. It 
regulates Europol’s verification process and consists of reviewing that requests specify 
the categories of data, their time limits, the geographical scope, and the compliance with 
the necessity principle. Each request has fifty pages on average and, in most cases, they 
do not contain personal data.1102 The verification process is carried out by the 
operational officer, the Legal Affairs Unit and the DPO.1103 Only if Europol authorises it 
will the designated provider (i.e. the SWIFT company) have the green light to send the 
information, in an encrypted format, to the US Treasury Department. In this sense, the 
EDPS has complained that Europol is not a judiciary authority and therefore it should 
not be entitled to decide on the adequacy of the US requests. 1104 
Europol has no access to the amount of data transferred to the US. The agency can 
only verify the request by taking into account other documents provided by the US. In 
addition, TFTP documents kept at Europol HQ cannot be inspected by external 
supervisors like the European Ombudsman without prior consent of the US 
authorities.1105 The role of Europol as supervisory body is, therefore, very limited. In 
this regard, Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie have questioned the neutrality of Europol in 
the verification process. They state that ‘Europol will almost certainly be pressured to 
maintain good relations with the US in order to successfully obtain TFTP leads, 
compromising its effective review’.1106 Even if it is certain, Europol must still apply data 
protection safeguards during the verification process, concretised in Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 
12, 15, and 16 of the agreement.  
The TFTP agreement also includes data security provisions. For instance, the US 
requests under Article 4 are classified as ‘SECRET UE/EU SECRET’ due to their high 
operational sensitivity and, therefore, highly secured. The majority of data exchanged 
                                                
1101 Europol Activities in Relation to the TFTP Agreement Information Note to the European Parliament 1 
August 2010 – 1 April 2011, File no. 2566-566, 08.04.2011, p. 5. 
1102 Except for in particular investigations, for instance some requests with general references to Osama 
Bin Laden.  
1103 Europol Activities in Relation to the TFTP Agreement Information Note to the European Parliament 1 
August 2010 – 1 April 2011, File no. 2566-566, 08.04.2011, pp-4-5 and 7. 
1104 European Data Protection Supervisor Opinion on the proposal for a Council Decision on the 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP II), 22.06.2010, pp. 5-6.  
1105 This has been critisised by the European Ombudsman. See Emily O'Reilly letter to the Chair of LIBE 
Committee, 27.02.2015, at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/mar/eu-ombuds-europol-letter.pdf 
1106 Ripoll Servent & MacKenzie 2011, p. 397. 
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between Europol and the US is channelled through the secure tool SIENA, which offers 
the possibility for additional future encryption measures.1107 Unfortunately, a secure 
communication channel between Europol and the designated provider has yet to be 
established.  
The JSB and the Commission oversee the implementation of the TFTP agreement in 
the EU.1108 In 2011 and 2012 both bodies found that the US had to issue more specific 
requests under Article 4 TFTP, and that the information had to be provided in 
writing.1109 The US implemented these recommendations successfully.1110 In the US, the 
oversight comes from two EU independent supervisory authorities. They are in charge 
of checking that the information is processed according to the agreement. In order to do 
that, they can access data, review searches, and monitor the data protection rules, 
similarly to the role of the JSB within the EU.  
The role of Europol in the TFTP agreement demonstrates that the agency can also 
take part in EU international agreements for the exchange of data with third countries. 
The role of Europol for the control of TFTP data requests is particularly relevant, since 
it could lead the agency to participate in other future international agreements. For all 
that, it must be concluded that Europol plays a key role in data exchanges between the 
EU and the US.  
 
3.5.  Data transfers to third partners in the proposed Europol Regulation 
 
As mentioned earlier, on 27 March 2013 the Commission launched the proposal for a 
Europol regulation,1111 which will repeal the current ECD. The proposed regulation 
includes new provisions on data transfers to third countries, the receipt of data from 
third countries, as well as the adoption and supervision of the cooperation agreements.  
 
                                                
1107 Europol Activities in Relation to the TFTP Agreement Information Note to the European Parliament 1 
August 2010 – 1 April 2011, File no. 2566-566, 08.04.2011, pp. 6 and 13-14. 
1108 However, documents on the TFTP implementation are not always public, as can be seen in the recent 
case between Europol and the EU Ombudsman. See Decision of the European Ombudsman closing the 
inquiry into complaint 1148/2013/TN against the European Police Office (Europol), 02.09.2014. 
1109 See Report on the inspection of Europol’s implementation of the TFTP Agreement, conducted in 
November 2010 by the Europol Joint Supervisory Body, Report nr. 11/07, 01.03.2011, pp. 5-6; and 
Europol JSB inspects for the second year the implementation of TFTP Agreement, Public Statement, 
14.03.2012, p. 3. 
1110 Implementation of the TFTP Agreement: assessment of the follow-up of the JSB recommendations, 
Ref. 13/01, 18.03.2013. 
1111 European Commission, COM(2013) 173 final, 27.03.2013. 
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3.5.1. Transfer of personal data to third countries 
 
Data transfers to third countries or international organisations are regulated in Chapter 
VI of the proposal. The general rule is that ‘Europol may directly exchange all 
information, with the exception of personal data’,1112 unless it is expressly restricted in 
the sense of Article 25(2) of the proposal. In other words, transfers of personal data to 
third countries will be generally prohibited. Yet, in very exceptional cases and to the 
extent it is necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks, Europol will be able to 
transfer those personal data beyond the EU borders on a case-by-case basis.1113 
In line with the current legal framework, Article 31 of the proposed regulation 
establishes three possible scenarios under which data can be exchanged between 
Europol and a third country. The first possibility is the existence of an adequacy 
decision,1114 similar to that foreseen in Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC for member 
states’ transfers to third countries. It will require a proposal by the Commission, in 
conjunction with an EDPS study on the national data protection standards. The EDPS 
will apply the same procedure as that established in Article 9 of Regulation 45/2001 for 
EU institutions and bodies not subject to Directive 95/46/EC.1115 The Art. 29 WP, which 
will be named European Data Protection Board, will also release an opinion on the 
agreement. After that, the EP will carry out a thirty-day scrutiny, which will result in a 
recommendation. Finally, the Commission will adopt the decision. The average time for 
this procedure will be one and a half years. 
A second option that will enable Europol to transmit personal information to a third 
country is the adoption of an agreement between the agency and the particular country 
pursuant to Article 218 TFEU. As established by Article 31(1)(b) of the proposed 
regulation, the international agreement needs to include adequate data protection 
safeguards. The conclusion of the agreements between Europol and third parties will be 
in the hands of Europol, as it is today. In line with the procedure in other EU bodies, the 
Commission will be the institution in charge of the conclusion of the international 
agreements between Europol and a third country.  
                                                
1112 Article 29(2) of Europol Regulation. 
1113 Article 31 and recital 27-28 of Europol Regulation. 
1114 Article 31(1)(a) of Europol Regulation. 
1115 For a detailed analysis on the procedure, see ‘The transfer of personal data to third countries and 




The involvement of the Commission in Europol’s activities is enhanced in the 
proposed regulation. Besides the new task of concluding international agreements, the 
presence of this institution at Europol’s headquarters will be enhanced. Article 13 of the 
proposal includes the establishment of two members of the Commission in Europol’s 
Management Board, which will be able to vote on Europol’s future decisions. The 
Commission has already pointed out that it will still require the technical support of 
Europol on aspects relating to law enforcement, and that pre-existing international 
agreements will continue to be valid.1116 It is, however, not fully clear how Europol will 
be involved in the procedure of Article 218 TFEU. In this regard, the JSB has argued 
that a legal basis for that should be included in the proposed regulation, ensuring that 
such additional tasks are in accordance with Europol objectives.1117 Also, the EDPS has 
claimed that the new procedure should require an EDPS report during the negotiations 
of an international agreement between the EU and third countries or international 
organisations.1118  
Finally, it will be possible to transfer personal data to a third country if it has a prior 
cooperation agreement with Europol.1119 The EDPS has asked for a transitional clause 
for this option, so that such existing agreements will be reviewed and aligned with the 
proposal within a maximum period of two years from the adoption of the regulation.1120 
If this clause is finally introduced, the US-Europol agreements will probably be revised. 
As stated above, such agreements do not fully comply with adequate data protection 
standards. Since many current cooperation agreements already include a mechanism to 
amend the scope of application of the agreements according to Europol’s new 
mandate,1121 the revision of existing Europol agreements in the future is highly probable. 
Notwithstanding the three possible ways for transferring personal data to a third 
country, there is a carve-out clause for emergency situations in the proposed Europol 
regulation.1122 If the proposal is adopted, it will derogate Article 31 ECD, requiring no 
formal assessment of data protection safeguards, either for cases of one single transfer, 
or for transfers of a set of data. If it is a single transfer, the derogation will take place 
                                                
1116 COM(2013) 535 final, 17.07.2013, p. 6. 
1117 Joint Supervisory Body, Opinion 13/31, p. 8. 
1118 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 30.5.2013, p. 20. 
1119 Recital 29 and Article 31(1)(c) of Europol Regulation. 
1120 European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 30.05.2013, p. 21. 
1121 See, for instance, Article 3(3) of the Agreement on Strategic Co-operation between Montenegro and 
the European Police Office, or Article 3(3) of the Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation 
between Australia and the European Police Office. 
1122 Article 31(2) of Europol Regulation. 
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after Europol’s Executive Director authorises such transfers on a case-by-case basis. 
The data transfer will be authorised if: a) it is absolutely necessary to safeguard the 
essential interests, b) it is absolutely necessary to prevent imminent danger, c) it is 
required on important public interest grounds, and d) it is necessary to protect the vital 
interests of the data subject.1123 Yet, despite the derogation, the Executive Director will 
not abstain from examining the data protection standards of the third country, informing 
also the Management Board.  
If instead of a single transfer a set of data is transferred to the third country for an 
emergency situation,1124 the derogation can only apply for one year maximum, and it 
will require an additional authorisation from the MB and the EDPS. 
In order to implement a cooperation agreement or an adequacy decision, Europol will 
be able to sign a working arrangement with the third country.1125 As it is today, working 
arrangements need an existing agreement between Europol and the third country. 
However, the regulation fails to define in what cases a working arrangement will not be 
allowed. It is thus unclear in what specific situations the adoption of these arrangements 
will and will not be pertinent.  
One of the new uses for these working arrangements will refer to the EP data access 
to the EU Classified Information and sensitive non-classified information processed by 
or through Europol.1126 Another new task of the EP will consist in scrutinising the 
adoption of such working arrangements.1127 The next section discerns future EP tasks 
relating to Europol’s external relations. 
 
3.5.2. The enhanced role of the European Parliament 
 
Before Lisbon, the EP had a limited role in the adoption of agreements between the EU 
and third countries. That institution was consulted but its recommendations were not 
binding. In that sense, neither the former Europol Convention nor the current ECD 
conferred decisive powers to the EP. Article 26 ECD states that the EP should be 
                                                
1123 The EDPS has argued that the terms ‘essential interests’ and ‘important public interests grounds’ are 
too vague, and he has suggested requiring at least ‘that this public interest is recognised in Union law or 
in national law of a Member State of the European Union’. See European Data Protection Supervisor 
Opinion, 30.5.2013, pp.21. 
1124 The EDPS has proposed to replace the term ‘transfer of sets of data’ by ‘occasional transfers’. See 
European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of 30.05.2013, pp. 22. 
1125 Article 31(1) of Europol Regulation 
1126 Preamble of Europol Regulation, p. 6. 
1127 Article 53(3)(b) of Europol Regulation. 
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consulted for the determination of the list of third countries with which the agency can 
conclude agreements.1128 It is not a coincidence that both Council Decision 
2009/934/JHA on Europol’s data exchanges with third parties and the first SWIFT 
agreement were adopted exactly one day before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force. 
The reason was to avoid the participation of the EP in the decision-making processes.  
Since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force the EP is no longer a mere consultative 
body. This institution now has competence to participate in the decision-making process 
for the conclusion of international agreements. For instance, in October 2012, Europol’s 
Management Board proposed that Mexico, Brazil, Georgia and the United Arab 
Emirates be added to the Council’s list, and the Council amended the list 
accordingly.1129 Negotiations for operational agreements started with Mexico and Brazil 
in 2013.1130 However, the EP voted against these initiatives arguing that the proposals 
for these agreements did not conform to EU laws.1131 The EP asked Europol’s director 
and the Management Board to reconsider the proposal, and the negotiations were not 
started.  
In addition to these new powers, when the proposed Europol regulation enter into 
force, the EP will have access to classified information1132 processed by or through 
Europol. Especially interesting will be the EP role as regards the TFTP agreement. One 
of the past controversies regarding this agreement referred to Europol’s refusal to send 
the TFTP inspection reports to the EP.1133 The constant dispute on document secrecy 
between Europol and the EP1134 led to a CJEU decision on 4 May 2012 in favour of the 
EP document requests.1135 The Council argument that it would ‘negatively impact on the 
European Union's negotiating position’ did not convince the Court, which found that the 
Council had ‘not established the risk of a threat to the public interest’.1136    
                                                
1128 Wesser, Marin & Matera 2011, p. 295. 
1129 Council of the European Union, 15951/12, 12.11.2012. 
1130 ‘The spider's web: Europol goes global in the hunt for intelligence and analysis’, Statewatch, 
14.03.2013. Available from www.statewatch.org [02 December 2014]. 
1131  EP report on the draft Council decision amending Decision 2009/935/JHA as regards the list of third 
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1132 Article 54 of Europol Regulation. 
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1134 Nielsen 2012.  
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1136 Fox 2012. 
 
 213 
Although the new regulation will broaden the EP tasks relating to Europol, it is not 
clear yet whether these will also apply to the existing international agreements or only 
to those adopted after the regulation enters into force. 
 
3.5.3. The lack of a SIENA provision  
 
The tailor-made communication tool SIENA represents one of most secure measures 
created by Europol in order to exchange personal and non-personal data. Besides its use 
for data transfers between Europol and member states, as well as among member states 
themselves, there are today several third countries connected to SIENA. According to 
the last Europol General Report, forty-two third parties are connected to SIENA 
(thirteen directly and twenty-nine indirectly).1137 
 When a third country uses SIENA as a communication tool, a message can be 
exchanged directly between the following actors: a) Member states and Europol, b) 
operational or strategic third parties and Europol, and c) among operational or strategic 
third parties among themselves. 
Norway and Australia were the first two third countries directly connected to the 
system, on 18 January and 7 April 2011 respectively. Ghana, Croatia and Iceland also 
joined the system that year. In 2012, eight other third countries connected to SIENA: 
the US, Switzerland, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Albania, Turkey, 
Monaco and Canada. The tool is expanding its borders year by year.  
Moreover, its use is no longer limited to third countries having operational 
agreements with Europol, but it is also offered to third parties with strategic agreements. 
Specifically, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro and Turkey are strategic partners of 
Europol and they use SIENA. Also, many US agencies are connected to SIENA.1138 The 
problem is that, although each of these agencies has a liaison officer at Europol, there is 
no contact point in the US territory. 
The JSB has often underlined the necessity to regulate the use of SIENA as a 
messaging system between third parties.1139 The body has also reiterated that SIENA is 
an adequate tool for exchanging information in terms of data protection and data 
security, including those communications sent beyond the EU borders.  
                                                
1137 Council of the European Union, 10426/14, 06.06.2014, p. 13. 
1138 Particularly these are the ATF, DAA, FBI, ICE, NCIS and USSS. 
1139 Joint Supervisory Body, Opinion 13/31, 10.06.2013, p. 8. 
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However, there is no regulation of SIENA in the proposal. The absence of a SIENA 
provision in the proposed Europol regulation is particularly disappointing, since there 
are no rules to date about the exchange of data through this tool. Moreover, the 
inclusion of a SIENA clause in the proposal could have engaged other third countries to 
join it.  
It has been seen above that a disparity currently exists within and beyond the EU 
regarding the channels and tools to exchange crime-related data. This could be 
minimised by establishing SIENA as the common default communication tool. The 
proposal underlines the importance of introducing privacy-by-design systems in 
Europol. SIENA definitely complies with the requirements to be considered a privacy-
by-design tool. Yet, the proposal, which was the perfect context for it, has missed the 
opportunity to introduce specific rules on this tool. 
 
3.5.4. Processing of data from third countries to Europol 
 
As in the current legal framework, Europol will not need a cooperation agreement for 
receiving information from a third country. Nonetheless, the proposal includes a few 
new rules in this respect. First, it expressly establishes the possibility to receive 
information from a private party in a third country.1140 This will be feasible as long as 
one of the following conditions is met: a) it is through a contact point of a third country 
with which Europol has concluded a cooperation agreement in accordance with Article 
23 of Decision 2009/371/JHA, or b) it is through an authority of a third country or an 
international organisation with which the EU has concluded an international agreement 
pursuant to Article 218 TFEU.  
Second, the proposed regulation explicitly states that Europol will not process ‘any 
information which has clearly been obtained by a third country or international 
organisation in violation of human rights’.1141 This new provision seeks to regulate what 
has been Europol’s praxis for many years. For instance, negotiations with Russia for a 
cooperation agreement took a very long time due to the several violations of human 
rights by that country. Europol suggested many institutional and political changes as the 
conditions sine qua non for the adoption of a cooperation agreement with Russia. 
Today, the agreement has been concluded, but it still needs to be implemented. Lastly, 
                                                
1140 Article 32(1) and 33(1) of Europol Regulation. 
1141 Recital 31 of Europol Regulation. 
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the proposed regulation introduces specific evaluation codes on accuracy and reliability 
in Article 35, which will also apply for the information received from a third country or 
international organisation.1142 
A related debate emerging from new Articles 24 and 25 needs to be highlighted. In 
the proposed Europol regulation, Article 24 makes a distinction between operational 
and strategic analyses. However, then Article 25(1) states that:  
 
‘[A] Member State, a Union body, a third country or an international 
organisation providing information to Europol determines the purpose for which it shall 
be processed as referred to in Article 24.’ 
  
Thus, a third country can discretionarily decide to send a piece of information to one 
or several member states, but exclude Europol. Europol has no voice in deciding if 
certain information from a third country is necessary for its investigations, since the 
main objective of the agency is to support member states in the prevention, combat and 
investigation of crimes, but it does not include the support of third parties. Therefore, 
any petition from Europol to be included in data exchanges between third countries and 
member states is beyond the agency’s mandate. 
Finally, the Council has suggested including a paragraph in the proposed regulation 
that would allow the receiving of data sent by private parties in a third country with no 
cooperation agreement. The only limitation that the Council sets for that procedure is 
that Europol forwards the information to the member state that has concluded an 
agreement with the third country.1143 Similarly, if Council’s amendments are approved, 
Europol will be able to share data with private parties as long as the data subject has 
presumably consented to it, or if it is necessary for the prevention of an imminent 
threat.1144 
 
4. Shortcomings and limitations of Europol’s data protection rules 
 
As revealed in this study, Europol has become a comprehensive EU police actor due to 
its robust data protection framework. Europol’s data protection rules are stronger than 
                                                
1142 Article 35(5) of Europol Regulation. 
1143 Council of the European Union, 8596/14, 07.04.2014, Article 32(1b). 
1144 Council of the European Union, 8596/14, 07.04.2014, Article 32(3a). 
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those applied in the majority of member states and third countries. However, there are 
several issues today that impede such a scheme from becoming a reference for EU and 
non-EU countries. These are listed in the following paragraphs. 
First of all, there is a lack of will from member states and third countries have to 
share information with the agency. National law enforcement authorities often prefer to 
share information bilaterally rather than multilaterally.1145 They are reluctant to send data 
to Europol for several reasons. Sometimes these countries follow a rather ‘national-
minded’ approach,1146 and sometimes they simply do not trust the agency.1147 Another 
reason is that some member states do not believe that the agency offers any ‘added 
value’ to their national investigations. In this sense, many scholars refer to an inherent 
‘chicken-egg dilemma’: Europol is not granted executive powers by the member states; 
but it is precisely this limitation that causes the agency’s lack of ‘added value’.1148 As a 
result, Europol does not make full use of all its capabilities and loses effectiveness as a 
EU police agency. 
Second, Europol has no enforcing powers. This means that the agency has a very 
limited power over national law enforcement agencies’ actions. An example of this is 
found in the paragraph proposed by the Council for the proposed Europol regulation. 
The Council suggests in Article 41 that ‘if Europol becomes aware that personal data 
[…] are factually incorrect or have been unlawfully stored, it shall inform the provider 
of that data accordingly’. This is what currently occurs for data that Europol identifies 
as incorrect or out-of-date. Even if Europol modifies its database accordingly, there is 
no way to certify that the originating Member State has also amended the data. 
Third, data processed by intelligence agencies is out of the scope of Europol. As 
examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis, a large part of the information processed for 
security reasons is collected by intelligence services of the member states. For instance, 
in some countries police agencies are in charge of counter-terrorism policies, whereas in 
                                                
1145 Bures & Ahern 2007, pp. 222; Kaunert 2010, p. 656. 
1146 Occhipinti JD 2013, ‘Availability by Stealth? EU information-sharing in transatlantic perspective’, 
European Security, Terrorism and Intelligence. Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe, eds. 
Kaunert C & Leonard S, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, p. 160. 
1147 Rozée S, Kaunert C & Léonard S 2013, ‘Is Europol a Comprehensive Policing Actor?’, Perspectives 
on European Politics and Society, vol. 14 no. 3, pp. 372-387. 
1148 Bures 2008, p. 513; Bures 2011, pp. 85-109; Leonard S & Kaunert C 2013, ‘Introduction - Beyond 
EU Counter-terrorism Cooperation: European Security, Terrorism and Intelligence’,  European Security, 
Terrorism and Intelligence. Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe, eds. Leonard S & Kaunert C, 
Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, p. 9; Bures O 2013, ‘Europol's counter-terrorism role: A chicken-egg 
dilemma’, European Security, Terrorism and Intelligence. Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe, 
eds. Kaunert C & Léonard S, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 65-93. 
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others these fall under the scope of the intelligence services’ tasks.1149 Data collected by 
intelligence services is rarely shared with Europol, since the EU has its own 
supranational intelligence body called IntCen. Although IntCen and Europol have a 
cooperation agreement in force, Europol only assesses trends on a general level and it 
cannot conduct intelligence analysis outside the EU borders.1150 Therefore, the 
participation of Europol in police investigations is constrained by the lack of access to 
information collected by intelligence services. 
Finally, there is a lack of convergence between some provision in the proposal for 
the Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive and those in the future 
Europol regulation. A confluence in the wording of both instruments is crucial to have a 
consistent EU data protection framework in the field of law enforcement. The proposed 
Directive, despite excluding Europol from its scope, impacts directly on the future 
Europol legislation. The necessity to align both instruments is in fact mentioned in 
recital 32 of the proposed Europol regulation: 
 
‘Europol should be autonomous and aligned with […] Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA on the protection of personal data processed in the framework 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters [to be replaced by the relevant 
Directive in force at the moment of adoption].’ 
 
It is unclear what pushed the Commission to launch the proposal for a Europol 
regulation before the Data Protection Directive was in force. As the JSB noted, it would 
have been preferable to wait for the outcome of the proposed data protection 
package.1151 In any event, it is probable that ultimately the Europol regulation will not 
be adopted until the new EU data protection legal framework is in force.1152 For the 




                                                
1149 Kaunert 2010, p. 656. 
1150 Cross 2013, p. 391. 
1151 Joint Supervisory Body, Opinion 13/31, pp. 2 and 5. 
1152 The indicative date by which the data protection directive will be adopted is Summer 2015, but EU 
lawmakers have already noted that serious differences among member states could delay the approval 
until 2016. See http://www.euractiv.com/sections/infosociety/eu-lawmaker-warns-data-protection-rules-
delay-till-2016-311100 [8 January 2015]. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
Europol’s cooperation with member states has intensified over the years –  especially 
since 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon and the Europol Council Decision entered into 
force. The first part of this chapter has demonstrated that Europol’s involvement in 
national police investigations is advantageous from a privacy perspective. The agency 
offers high data security and data protection safeguards for both member states and 
individuals.  
One of the data-sharing problems that member states have experienced lately is that 
they do not have a common communication channel for transferring information. While 
some member states have moved towards a more systematic use of the Europol channel 
(ENU), others continue to rely on the Interpol channel because of the traditional central 
role and ease of use of this instrument. Sometimes, such a multiplicity of available 
channels entails ineffectiveness at the EU level. Therefore, this chapter has studied the 
possibility to centralise every cross-border data transfer for law enforcement matters 
into the SIENA tool. SIENA could ideally be the default communication tool for all 
data transfers, ensuring the same data security standards in any data exchange.  
This study has demonstrated that Europol includes higher data protection standards 
than many of the member states. In particular, Europol has exemplary data protection 
rules on the right of access, correction and deletion; purpose limitation principle; 
retention periods; SIENA as privacy-by-design tool; data quality; and external 
supervision, to name but a few. These will be maintained in the proposed Europol 
regulation. This study has examined the latest issues and controversies of this new 
proposal. 
Third countries willing to conclude a cooperation agreement with Europol must first 
comply with the data protection standards of the agency. Europol has made several third 
countries align their legal frameworks to the Europol’s data protection rules. In fact, 
negotiations between Europol and third countries are subject to much lower political 
pressures and lobbyism than an agreement adopted between the EU and third countries. 
Therefore, it is easier for non-US countries to find accordance with Europol than with 
the EU as a whole. 
In light of the foregoing considerations, it can be concluded that Europol plays a key 
role in the global security environment. Its structure complements the existing networks 
of law enforcement officials for exchanging information within and beyond the EU. As 
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Mournier noted in 2009, the agency ‘exports European standards of policing and 
contributes to shaping local police systems’.1153 Therefore, the Europol data protection 
framework could be taken as a reference for all crime-related data exchanged among 
EU and non-EU countries. Yet, as pointed out earlier, intelligence services’ data 
transfers do not follow the same data protection standards. This is examined in the next 


























                                                
1153 Mounier 2009, p. 584. See also Carrapiço H & Trauner F 2014, ‘Europol and its influence on EU 
policy-making on organized crime: analyzing governance dynamics and opportunities’, Justice and Home 

































Chapter 4: Data safeguards for the intelligence collected and shared by 
member states 
 
The previous three chapters have studied systems used by law enforcement authorities 
(mainly, police officers) to process data within and beyond the EU. They have 
examined the consistency between EU internal and external measures for data 
processing, as well as the impact they have on the EU fundamental right to data 
protection. Particularly, Chapter 3 has suggested looking at Europol’s legal framework 
as a guideline for establishing common data protection principles in the field of law 
enforcement.  
However, in the field of security, data is not only processed for law enforcement 
purposes, but also by intelligence services. Despite the existing legal differences of data 
processed by intelligence services and data processed by law enforcement authorities, in 
practice, the line separating their tasks has become difficult to draw. In the past, the law 
enforcement authorities’ methodology was clearly to ‘see and strike’, whereas 
intelligence services’ functions were to ‘wait and watch’.1154 In that sense, Germany still 
has a law of separation (‘Trenungsgebot’) that divides the roles between intelligence 
and police forces.1155 However, this division became more and more blurred over the 
years. The ‘wall’ that separated law enforcement agencies from intelligence services 
crumbled after 9/11.1156 Today, police agents and intelligence analysts maintain regular 
contact, to the point that in some member states (e.g. Spain), the intelligence community 
has a special department assigned to police agents, which allows direct contact between 
the two entities. In these cases, every time the intelligence agency gathers relevant 
information on a current or imminent crime, the centre informs police authorities, who 
will initiate an investigation based on that premise. The same occurs at the EU level 
with regard to the information sent from IntCen (intelligence centre) to Europol (law 
enforcement agency). 
This chapter studies the main challenges that member states have with regard to the 
regulation and control of intelligence processed within the EU. As a general rule, the 
EU has no capacity to cover standard intelligence service activities. Yet, there is a 
                                                
1154 Svenden ADM 2011, ‘On a “continuum with expansion”? Intelligence cooperation in Europe in the 
early 21st Century’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 7, no. 4, p. 523. 
1155 Hillebrand 2012, p. 94. 
1156 De Busser 2010, p. 98. 
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blurred line between intelligence services and law enforcement activities today. In this 
sense, the aim of this chapter is to identify whether the EU could have legal competence 
to adopt legislation on data exchanges among intelligence agencies. First, the Snowden 
revelations and the activities that intelligence services conduct within and beyond EU 
borders will be studied. After that, a comparative study of intelligence agencies in 
France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom will be conducted. The choice of 
countries has been based on the locations where terrorist cells have been identified 
(Hamburg and Paris) and terrorist attacks have recently taken place (Madrid, London 
and Paris). 
In summary, this study seeks to examine whether the lack of coordination of 
intelligence agencies, the systematic storage and data access by intelligence services, 
and the divergence in external supervision mechanisms could negatively affect the 
establishment of global data protection standards.  
 
1. Data processed by intelligence services 
 
According to Article 4(2) TEU and Article 72 TFEU, data processing for ‘national 
security’ purposes falls outside of the scope of the EU laws. This purpose is also 
expressly excluded from data protection instruments like Directive 95/46/EC or the 
Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (108 CoE Data Protection Convention). Thus, 
national security measures are not protected by European privacy laws. But what 
exactly is ‘national security’? A formal definition of this term is still missing in the EU 
laws.  
Security policies in member states are essentially organised through law enforcement 
authorities, intelligence services and military staff. Whereas the former has a role at the 
EU level through Europol and laws adopted under the AFSJ, the regulation of 
intelligence and military agencies remain, for the most part, in each Member State. 
However, the division of roles between law enforcement and intelligence services is not 
always clear, and it causes confusion about what the EU can and cannot regulate. As the 
‘Future Group’1157 of the Council of Ministers pointed out: 
 
                                                
1157 Informal High Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy. 
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‘While an exchange of information between national police forces is 
increasingly seen as common sense, the exchange of information between intelligence 
services creates a considerable challenge for the European Union.’1158  
 
Unlike law enforcement authorities, who are subject to several EU laws (e.g. the 
recently annulled Data Retention Directive) and international agreements (e.g. the PNR 
agreements), there is little Brussels can do to regulate laws governing intelligence 
services. Rules on these agencies are exclusively enacted by member states. 
In June 2013, the ex-analyst of the US National Security Agency (hereinafter, the 
NSA)1159 Edward Snowden revealed numerous controversial activities conducted by the 
NSA. According to Snowden’s documents, the NSA access millions of personal data 
from Americans and foreign citizens every day. That revelation sparked a controversial 
debate about the NSA, because these activities have been kept secret for a long time and 
they constitute direct violations of the right to privacy and data protection. For its part, 
the US government justified the actions by explaining that all data accesses were carried 
out according to proportionality and necessity criteria, and that the only goal was to 
fight the global terrorism that emerged after 9/11. 
The Snowden revelations have questioned the legality of the US intelligence 
services’ practices of mass surveillance. However the US is not an exception. Most 
countries in the world are engaging in similar surveillance practices. There are many 
studies stating that Internet surveillance programmes in the EU are equivalent to those 
of the NSA.1160 Thus, in the EU (as in the US) a significant part of the information 
exchanged for the prevention and combat of serious crimes is collected by intelligence 
services.  
Information processed by intelligence services is, in 85% of cases, originally 
obtained through public sources and then transformed into intelligence (it is called Open 
Sources Intelligence or OSINT). The other 15% comes from private sources. They use 
software that allows them to crack passwords in a very short time. Hence, the main 
challenge of any intelligence agency is not the collection of data in itself, but rather the 
                                                
1158 Council of the European Union, 11657/08, 09.07.2008, p. 38. 
1159 On the history of the NSA, see http://www.nsa.gov/history/index.cfm [5 November 2014]. 
1160 Heumann S & Scott B 2013 ‘Law and policy in Internet surveillance programs: United States, Great 
Britain and Germany’, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, vol. 25, no. 13, pp.1-17; Biermann K 2013, 
‘German intelligence service is as bad as the NSA’, The Guardian, 4 October. Available from 
<http://www.theguardian.com> [5 November 2014]. 
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selection and analysis of the immense amount of data, and its transformation into useful 
intelligence.1161  
Thus, the main goal of analysts and experts of intelligence services is to provide 
useful knowledge rather that raw data.1162 However, on occasion, the overabundance of 
information collected by intelligence services has been counterproductive. The Madrid 
terrorist attack of 2004 is an example of the inefficiency resulted of collecting too much 
information. Analysts of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) tracked 
a public document on the Internet about Islamist terrorism. It included a detailed 
analysis of the Spanish political situation and a lengthy explanation of why the country 
should be seen as a target for Islamist terrorist groups after it aligned its policies to 
those in the US and the UK.1163 Unfortunately, that document did not end up in the right 
hands to prevent the attack in Madrid. As this proves, only with a coordinated system is 
data collected by intelligence services a relevant tool for the prevention and combat of 
terrorism.  
 
2.  The blurry scope of national security and implications for the EU legislation 
 
In the US, surveillance activities conducted on US citizens within the US territory but  
falling under the scope of ‘national security’ are not protected by the US Fourth 
Amendment. This exception was first established by the US Supreme Court in Katz v. 
United States (1967).1164 Since then, the US Supreme Court has invoked the national 
security exception in numerous cases, in order to justify warrantless surveillance 
activities.1165 
                                                
1161 There is no globally accepted definition about ‘intelligence’. According to Michael Warner 
‘Intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities’. Warner M 2002, 
‘Wanted: A Definition of “Intelligence”. Understanding our craft’, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 46, no. 3. 
Available from https://www.cia.gov [5 November 2014]. 
1162 Lowenthal M 1998, ‘Open Source Intelligence: New Myths, New Realities’, Defense Daily 
International, Special Reports. Available from http://www.oss.net [5 November 2014]; Taplin W L 1989, 
‘Six general principles of intelligence’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 
3, no. 4, pp. 475-491; Davenport TH & Prusak L 2000, Working knowledge: How organizations manage 
what they know?, Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
1163 Navarro Bonilla D 2005, ‘Introducción’ in El papel de la inteligencia ante los retos de la seguridad y 
la defensa internacional, Grupo de Trabajo número 5/04, Dirección General de Relaciones Institucionales 
de la Defensa. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Madrid, pp. 10-11. 
1164 Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 (1967). 
1165 United States v. United States District Court, 407 US 297 (1972); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 
418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Butenko, 494 F. 2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.1974); United States v. 
Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.1980); 
In re Directives to Yahoo! Inc., 551 F. 3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). 
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Similarly, in the EU, national security measures do not offer a full privacy protection 
for the EU citizens. Article 4(2) TEU excludes aspects related to national security from 
the scope of the EU legislation. This provision was introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon 
after the UK insisted that intelligence matters should not be part of the EU 
competences.1166 The clause expressly states that national security matters remain 
competence of the member states. However, there is today no single accepted definition 
in the European and international treaties on what ‘national security’ covers.1167 
Numerous scholars and politicians have offered definitions.1168 Most of them agree that 
the term describes certain actions that society entrust to the governments to prevent 
adversaries from inflicting harm.  
Security actions are often carried out by member states, but this is not always the 
case. For instance, the EU is not a state, but it can still adopt security measures. As 
Matlary points out, the EU security policy ‘is both de-territorialised as well as de-
nationalised’.1169 Since 9/11, threats to security have been perceived as global. In that 
sense, the EP has noted that: 
 
‘While both the threats to national security and the responses to these threats 
have become increasingly globalised, accountability mechanisms have remained 
territorially bounded.’1170  
 
The global war on terror has reshaped the essence of the state and, consequently, the 
concept of ‘national security’.1171 Member states are no longer limited to their domestic 
security strategies, but they also implement national security policies adopted by 
supranational organisations, such as the UN, NATO, and the EU. In the EU, Article 73 
TFEU establishes that it is the responsibility of member states to cooperate and 
                                                
1166 Coolsaet 2010, p. 865. 
1167 WP 228, 05.12.2014. 
1168 Maier CS 1990, Peace and security for the 1990s. Unpublished paper for the MacArthur Fellowship 
Program, Social Science Research Council, NYC; Mangold P 1990, National security and international 
relations, Routledge, NYC, pp. 1-14; Paleri P 2008, ‘National Security: Imperatives and Challenges’, 
Tata McGraw-Hill, Delhi, p. 521; Sarkesian SC, Allen Williams J & Cimbala SJ 2008, ‘National 
Security. Policymakers, processes and politics’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, p. 4; Omand D 
2010, Securing the State (Intelligence and security), Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 9. 
1169 Haaland Matlary J 2013, European Union security dynamics. In the new national interest, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, p. 23. 
1170 ‘Democratic oversight of Member State intelligence services and of EU intelligence bodies’, 
European Parliament, Working Document 5, 12.12.2013, p. 4. 
1171 Buzan B 2007, ‘What is national security in the age of globalisation?’, Utenrisksdepartementet. 
Available from <http://www.regjeringen.no> [5 November 2014]. 
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coordinate between themselves for the safeguarding of national security.  
In the EU, the concept of ‘national security’ is thus intertwined with the terms of ‘EU 
internal security’ and ‘EU external security’.1172 The EU regulates internal security 
matters as part of the AFSJ, 1173 and external security issues as part of the CFSP.1174 
Instead, the regulation of national security issues falls under the exclusive competence 
of the member states. The EU’s role in this area would be purely coordinative, if any. 
For instance, one of the few examples of this limited EU role in national security 
matters is found in the regulation of the Schengen Information System.1175 Article 93 of 
Schengen Agreement Application Convention (SAAC) states: 
  
         ‘The purpose of the Schengen Information System shall be in accordance 
with this Convention to maintain public policy and public security, including national 
security, in the territories of the Contracting Parties and to apply the provisions of this 
Convention relating to the movement of persons in those territories, using information 
communicated via this system.’ (Emphasis on my own) 
 
The areas of national security, EU internal security and EU external security overlap 
with each other. Intelligence services are identified as the bodies in charge of national 
security matters in each Member State but, in fact, they have a role in certain 
supranational bodies too. For instance, within the scope of the AFSJ, the European 
Cybercrime Centre (EC3) collects and processes cyber intelligence. The centre, 
established in 2013, is composed of national experts (police and intelligence agents) in 
the member states, as well as representatives of other institutions like the EEAS or the 
US Secret Service. Moreover, as part of the EU external security, the intelligence centre 
IntCen1176 should be highlighted. IntCen is a central part of the EEAS, composed of 
representatives of intelligence services in the member states. Hence, the centre’s 
activities are related to national security.  
                                                
1172 ‘Draft Report on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States 
and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home 
Affairs’, 2013/2188(INI), European Parliament, 23.12.2013, p. 9; Opinion of the Advocate General Bot 
on the case C-658/11, 30.01.2014, para. 113. 
1173 Articles 67-89 TFEU. 
1174 Articles 21-46 TEU. 
1175 See Chapter 1, section 3 of this thesis. 
1176 On IntCen, see Chapter 2 section 1(2), and section 5(3) of this chapter. 
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For all said above, it can be concluded that the EU has de facto certain competences 
in the regulation of intelligence services’ activities, despite the national security 
exception. The scope of Articles 4(2) TEU and Articles 72/73 TFEU needs to be 
concretised by the CJEU.1177 The Court is the EU institution that can better distinguish 
this concept from the similar terms of ‘State security’, ‘internal security’ and ‘public 
security’. It can also discern whether the exemption of Article 4(2) has a general nature 
or if it applies only for certain activities of intelligence agencies. 
The lack of precision of the national security exclusion may lead to abusive 
situations by law enforcement authorities with respect to the right to data protection. If 
all intelligence activities are considered part of the national security exclusion, it means 
that no EU data protection laws are applicable for these agencies. What is the purpose of 
protecting individuals’ data collected by law enforcement authorities, if intelligence 
services can still freely break into their computers or intercept their calls? As Scheinin 
pointed out in 2009, the shift in tasks from law enforcement to intelligence agencies 
may serve as a way to circumvent the privacy protections in a Member State.1178 
 
3. The significance of the Snowden revelations at the EU level 
 
Since the summer of 2013, mass surveillance activities conducted by intelligence 
services became an issue of concern in the EU. The close cooperation that the NSA has 
with some member states has called into question to what extend it violates the EU’s 
right to data protection protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 108 CoE 
Data Protection Convention, Directive 95/46/EC and Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA. 
This section studies the history of the NSA, the data collection programmes that the 
NSA uses, and its secret cooperation with some member states. It also examines the 
reaction to and potential consequences of the Snowden revelations with respect to the 
current EU-US data-sharing agreements. 
 
                                                
1177 Korff D 2014, ‘Expert Opinion prepared for the Committee of Inquiry of the Bundestag into the 
“5EYES” global surveillance systems revealed by Edward Snowden’, Committee Hearing, Paul-Löbe-
Haus, Berlin, p. 38; WP 228, 05.12.2014. 
1178 Scheinin, M 2009, ‘Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights, including the right to development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’, General Assembly of 




3.1. The start of the NSA and ECHELON 
 
The origins of the NSA date back to the end of the First World War (WWI).1179 
However, the NSA was not officially created until 1952, a few years after the 
establishment of the CIA.1180 The NSA has its headquarters in Fort Meade (Maryland, 
USA). This agency is bigger than the CIA and the FBI combined. The main building in 
Fort Meade has more than 95,000 workers and it classifies from 50 to 100 million 
documents a year. During the first ten years after the establishment of the NSA, its 
existence was unknown among the general public. The history of this agency is based 
on secrecy. Analysts working there cannot reveal anything relating to the centre and 
they have minimal contact with the external world. The NSA is thus both the largest and 
the most clandestine of all US intelligence agencies.  
Originally, the main purpose of the NSA was to provide detailed knowledge about 
the strategies and activities of the Soviet Union.1181 It initially intercepted foreign 
communications in the political and military fields, but over the years the activities of 
this agency have expanded.1182  
The NSA has used different methods to intercept telephone, fax and email 
communications. Initially these interceptions were mainly conducted via microphones 
or laser equipment in small rooms, which sent out radio waves within an area up to 
thirty meters, and through wiretapping.1183 The interception of radio signals was called 
SIGINT1184 and it was divided into two subsystems: COMINT1185 and ELINT.1186 The 
SIGINT system was based on several antennas that synchronised communications and 
electronic information with no awareness from the targets. This system was utilised 
                                                
1179 For a further analysis about the Agency’s activities during WWI, see Powers T 2004, ‘Intelligence 
wars: American secret history from Hitler to Al-Qaeda’, NYREV, NYC, pp. 231-234. 
1180 The CIA was created in 1947 with the aim of detecting terrorist threats, and it was a direct 
consequence of the US failure after the Pearl Harbour attacks.  
1181 Powers 2004, p. 239. 
1182 An in-depth analysis of the NSA activities in Bamford J 1982, The Puzzle Palace - A Report on 
America's Most Secret Agency, Houghton Mifflin, Boston. 
1183 ‘Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial 
communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))’, European Parliament, A5-
0264/2001 PAR1, 11.07.2001, p. 30. 
1184 SIGINT comes from as ‘SIGnals INTelligence’ and it is obtained from electronic signals that produce 
foreign communication systems, radars, etc.  
1185 COMINT comes from ‘COMmunications INTelligence’ and it is a subcategory from SIGINT, which 
collects foreign messages and voice communications.  
1186 ELINT comes from ‘Electronic INTeligence’ and it collects intelligence through electronic sensors. It 
is used to detect nearby ships and aircrafts. 
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during the Vietnam War in the 1960s and the Gulf War in 1990-1991 to spy on 
enemies.1187 The NSA has also conducted interceptions via submarine cables, although 
this was rather unusual. That method was used, for instance, in 1971 when the 
American submarine Heli Bot recorded communications coming from a Soviet Union 
cable. The submarines had a magnetic system that allowed the reading of signals 
running through the cables. However, submarines were mainly used during wartime to 
eavesdrop on enemy communications.1188 
Two controversial operations came to light in the 1970s, after the Watergate 
scandal:1189 Minaret and Shamrock. The Minaret operation started in 1967 and consisted 
of warrantless interception of domestic electronic communications. The NSA spied 
famous people like Jane Fonda, Malcolm X, Joan Baz, Dr. Benjamin Spock and Martin 
Luther King.1190 More than 6,000 foreigners and 1,000 Americans were spied on during 
that operation.1191 The Shamrock operation dated back to as early as 1945 and it 
consisted of NSA bulk collection of telegrams when one end was outside the US. The 
three largest telecommunication companies in the US – Western Union, RCA and ITT- 
provided the NSA with the transcriptions of all telegrams arriving and leaving the 
country every day. That information helped the agency identify left-wing individuals 
who demonstrated against the war. The information collected was then sent to other US 
authorities like the FBI, the CIA, the Secret Service, the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), and the Defense Department. That practice was carried out 
for four decades, until a Senate committee chaired by Senator Frank Church made it 
public.1192 The report issued by Senator Church explained that the NSA collected 
150,000 communications a month, which meant that at least one message was 
intercepted every forty-five minutes.  
After the Watergate scandal, there was a big debate about the two operations and 
thus the NSA decided to terminate them. However, a more powerful system was still 
ongoing: ECHELON. In 1943 the UK and the US signed an agreement to share 
intelligence collected via signal interferences. The UK had the necessary equipment to 
                                                
1187 Powers 2004, p. 257. 
1188 ‘Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial 
communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))’, European Parliament, A5-
0264/2001 PAR1, 11.07.2001, p. 31. 
1189 For further information: http://watergate.info [5 November 2014]. 
1190 Webb DC 2008, ECHELON and the NSA, IGI Global, Hershey, PA, p. 459. 
1191 Documentary ‘Echelon de secret power’, 2002, min. 29. Available from www.youtube.com [20 
December 2014]. 
1192 Webb 2008, p. 460. 
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read codified messages, so the country worked with the US in the deciphering of 
messages sent by their enemies, the Germans. They learned about the Germans’ strategy 
and that helped them to win the war. Once the war was over, the two countries decided 
to sign a new secret agreement called UKUSA (in March 1946).1193 According to Article 
4(a) of that agreement: 
 
‘The parties agree to the exchange of the products of the following operations 
relating to foreign communications: 01. Collection of traffic. 02. Acquisition of 
communications documents and equipment. 03. Traffic analysis. 04. Cryptanalysis. 05. 
Decryption and translation. 06. Acquisition of information regarding communications 
organizations, procedures, practices and equipment.’ 
 
Later, three nations of the British Commonwealth joined the agreement: Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand. Together with the US and the UK they formed the so-called 
‘5-Eyes’. Other countries like Germany, Japan, Norway, Denmark, South Korea and 
Turkey became third parties of the agreement. All of them had a common enemy, the 
Soviet Union, so the intelligence agencies of the five countries started to cooperate 
closely. In fact, today they still have a special relationship with each other, as proved in 
the Snowden disclosures. 
In the 1970s, intelligence services noticed that High Frequency (HF) waves could be 
easily intercepted. By locating a satellite in the right position in the space, all 
communications could be easy intercepted. Thus, ECHELON was born.  
ECHELON was the codename of a giant satellite called P415. The five intelligence 
agencies which had access to data collected by ECHELON were the National Security 
Agency (NSA) in the US, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in 
the UK, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) in Canada, the Defence 
Signals Directorate (DSD) in Australia, and the Government Communications Security 
Bureau (GCSB) in New Zealand. None of them could have created a global system like 
ECHELON individually. 
The initial objective of ECHELON was to intercept communications from the Soviet 
Union, but that goal expanded to the point that it currently intercepts and shares data 
from stations of commercial satellites around the world. In the last ten years, many 
                                                
1193 Amended version of 1955 available from http://www.nsa.gov [5 November 2014]. 
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revelations by former analysts working in these five agencies have spoken out. These 
confirm that from the 1980s, intelligence agencies started to track activists such as 
Green Peace, the Red Cross, and Amnesty International; public figures like the Princess 
of Wales, the Pope, and Queen Elizabeth II; and even public bodies like the 
governments of Quebec, France and Japan.1194 
The image below was leaked by Edward Snowden. The orange dots show the current 







For many years, ECHELON was more powerful than the Internet itself. It collected 
and shared more than two million communications per hour,1195 and it was not subject to 
any regulation. Through giant satellite disks established at each intelligence agency, it 
could globally intercept telephone calls, fax, Internet and email messages. Intelligence 
agencies received communications through specific antennas called ‘radomes’. After 
processing the information, it was shared with other UKUSA members.  
ECHELON not only collected millions of data, but also processed them. Several 
super-computers interconnected with each other scanned the information according to a 
                                                
1194 Documentary ‘Echelon de secret power’, 2002, min. 34. 




list of key words that were integrated in the system. Each super-computer was known as 
a ‘Dictionary’ and its functions were similar to those conducted by a search engine 
today, but instead of scanning websites, it scanned landline and mobile phone calls. 
Every member in the ‘5-Eyes’ had its own ‘Dictionary’. They could modify the 
keyword list at their will. The super-computers had semantic intelligence and they 
filtered every word of a communication. If a word coincided with one in the list, the 
subjects of the communication automatically became targets. Then, that information 
was shared with other intelligence services via a global computer system called 
‘Platform’.1196 
The activities of the NSA were ignored by the world for decades. The ‘5-Eyes’ tried 
to hide the existence of ECHELON but that task became harder after Minaret and 
Shamrock came to light. In fact, the Watergate scandal led to a reform of the NSA laws. 
In 1975, a special committee of the US House of Representatives called the Pike 
Committee made a list of recommendations that became the premise of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.1197 FISA was created to obtain evidence 
for foreign intelligence. That law established the creation of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC), which issued warrants based on probable cause that the 
target was an ‘agent of a foreign power’. The court had to authorise surveillance 
activities conducted by the NSA and the FBI. According to the Snowden documents, in 
thirty-three years (1979-2013) the FISC received 34,000 requests, of which the court 
only rejected eleven (0.03%).1198  
 As ECHELON was not subject to any regulation, the individuals whose data were 
intercepted did not have any protection, since they were not residents in the country 
where the interception took place.1199 ECHELON was first revealed by the journalist 
Duncan Campbell in his article ‘Somebody’s listening’, published in New Statesman in 
1988.1200 The article was later complemented by the Nicky Hager1201 and Steve 
                                                
1196 Webb 2008, p. 455. 
1197 For a criticism of the law, see Khan Z 2006, ‘The National Security Agency (NSA) eavesdropping on 
Americans.   A programme that is neither legal nor necessary’, Utrecht Law Review, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 61-
80. 
1198 ‘Edward Snowden Testimony to the European Parliament’, March 2014, p. 7. Available from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201403/20140307ATT80674/20140307ATT806
74EN.pdf  [5 November 2014]. 
1199 ‘Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial 
communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))’, European Parliament, A5-
0264/2001 PAR1, 11.07.2001, p. 24. 
1200 Campbell C 1988, ‘Somebody’s listening’, New Statesman, 12 August. Available from 
http://www.newstatesman.com [5 November 2014]. 
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Wright1202 findings. All of these reports on ECHELON pushed the EP to constitute a 
temporary committee – not an enquiry committee – on the ECHELON Interception 
System on 5 July 2000.1203 The committee lasted twelve months and it comprised thirty-
six MEPs.1204 
 The results obtained by the committee were not especially fruitful. They could not 
confirm the statements made by Campbell and Wright on the economic espionage 
conducted through ECHELON. These authors explained in their reports that ECHELON 
was not longer used to defend the US against the Soviet Bloc but rather to spy on big 
companies such as Airbus or Thompson CFS. However, the EP limited its report to a 
call for member states to ensure that intelligence services in their countries did not 
process competitive intelligence. The Parliament stated that these practices would 
interfere with the loyalty duty, the common market, and the principle of free 
competition among states. As for the legal framework of ECHELON, the EP concluded 
that it fell beyond the scope of the EU laws since it was an instrument used in the field 
of ‘national security’.1205  
 
3.2. The NSA data collection programmes 
 
ECHELON is not the only NSA system to have been uncovered. The biggest revelation 
on the NSA’s secret activities came from Edward Snowden, an ex-analyst who 
disclosed more than 1.7 million US top-secret documents that proved the intrusiveness 
of the Agency since 2001. 
After 9/11, former US President George W. Bush announced that the country had 
entered into a ‘War of Terror’.1206 In consequence, the powers granted to law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies needed to be expanded in order to prevent and 
                                                
1201 Hager N 1996, ‘Secret Power - New Zealand's role in the International spy network’, Craig Potton 
Publishing, New Zealand. 
1202 Wright 2005. 
1203 OJ L 121, 24.04.2001, p. 131.  
See details at: http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/tempcom/echelon/mandate_en.htm [20 December 
2014]. 
1204 Piodi F & Mombelli Y 2014, ‘L’affaire ECHELON. Les travaux du Parlement européen sur le 
système global d'interception 1998 – 2002’, EPRS Service de Recherche du Parlement européen, PE 
538.877, Brussels, p. 19. See also Görlitz N 2013 ‘Le droit d’enquête du Parlement européen’, Cahiers de 
droit européen 49, pp. 783-820. 
1205 ‘Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial 
communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))’, European Parliament, A5-
0264/2001 PAR1, 11.07.2001, pp. 18, 22 and 80-82. 
1206 9/11 was used to justify all NSA programs. See NSA, FOIA Case: 71184B, 17.10.2013. 
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combat terrorism. In that sense, the NSA Inspector General stated in a report: 
 
‘Here is NSA standing at the U.S. border looking outward for foreign threats. 
There is the FBI looking within the United States for domestic threats. But no one was 
looking at the foreign threats coming into the United States. That was a huge gap that 
NSA wanted to cover.’1207 
 
The 9/11 attacks were carried out by individuals from outside the US, in 
communication with people within the US (the 9/11 hijackers). Therefore, on 26 
October 2011, the US Congress passed the Patriot Act.1208 This act lowered the 
threshold of the so-called ‘FISA wall’, which minimised the interaction between law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies. Yet, after 9/11, former US President George W. 
Bush decided to promote the communication between all security agencies. Section 215 
of that act1209 enabled the US government to collect bulk telephone metadata of US 
citizens provided there were reasonable grounds that it was relevant for international 
terrorism or any foreign intelligence investigation.  Metadata includes telephone 
numbers, the origin/destination of the call, and the date of the call. These are stored for 
a five-year period. 
A few years later, in 2008, an act amending FISA (hereinafter, FISAA)1210 expanded 
the US government’s powers for the collection and processing of foreign intelligence. In 
particular, Section 702 of FISAA1211 permits the government to target communications 
of non-US individuals ‘reasonably believed’ to be outside the US without a FISA 
warrant. The NSA only needs to send an annual report to FISC determining the targets 
for the coming year.1212 As in Section 215, most of the data collected is retained for five 
years in the NSA database. 
For almost a year, Snowden downloaded top-secret documents while working in 
                                                
1207 ST-09-0002 Working Draft, Office of the Inspector General National Security Agency, Central 
Security Service, 24.03.2009. Available from www.theguardian.com [29 November 2014]. 
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Hawaii at Booz Allen Hamilton. He then travelled to Hong Kong and shared the 
information with The Guardian and The Washington Post. The first programme 
disclosed by Snowden was PRISM. In general terms, PRISM operates under Section 
702 of FISAA and consists of collecting data from targeted individuals stored in the 
servers of nine major Internet companies: Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, Pa!Talk, 
YouTube, Skype, AOL and Apple. Through PRISM, the NSA and the FBI exchanged 
information provided by those companies. These companies have cooperated with the 
US government,1213 and those that have sought resist it1214 have usually been coerced by 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). In 2011, FISC stated that the NSA 
was collecting 250 million Internet communications per year under PRISM. The data is 
held for five years. 
FISC is comprised of District Court judges who do FISA work as an additional part 
of their duties. The Department of Justice issues the application to a single judge, who 
will decide whether the warrant is issued or not. The threshold is set on the existence of 
probable cause. This decision can be appealed to the FISA Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review (FISCR) and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Originally, FISC judges just reviewed the facts for individual surveillance orders. Yet, 
following the Patriot Act in 2001, FISA judges increasingly considered legal arguments 
too. These judges had to make very difficult legal decisions and they generally heard 










In the EU, the collaboration of telecommunication service providers’ (TSPs) with the 
                                                
1213 However, in the beginning they denied any knowledge of the existence of PRISM. Greenwald 2014, 
p. 109. 
1214 Exceptionally, in July 2013 Yahoo! won a case against the disclosure of users’ data through PRISM. 
See Neal RW 2013, ‘Yahoo wins victory against PRISM: FISA court orders NSA to declassify 
documents’, Ibtimes, 16 July. Available from <http://www.ibtimes.com>  [5 November 2014]. 
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NSA was condemned by the Art. 29 WP. Reports released by this group are not 
binding, but they have a great political impact on the EU institutions and member states. 
Regarding the collaboration of Google, Facebook, Apple, etc. with the NSA, the Art. 29 
WP pointed out that they could be infringing the EU laws: 
 
‘Companies need to be aware that they may be acting in breach of European law 
if intelligence services of third countries gain access to the data of European citizens 
stored on their servers or comply with an order to hand over personal data on a large 
scale.’1215 
 
Other programmes used by the NSA under Section 702 FISAA were based on 
interception methods. Companies were not aware of such practices, but foreign 
governments were. For example, through BOUNDLESS INFORMANT the NSA 
collected more that three billion phone calls and emails passing through US 
telecommunication systems.1216 MUSCULAR is another interception programme, which 
collects traffic and content data of Yahoo and Google’s users.1217 Similarly, 
RAMPANT-A is a programme that taps into cables and intercepts the content of phone 
calls, faxes, e-mails, Internet chats and even calls using VoIP like Skype.1218 
UPSTREAM surveillance consists of collecting data as it transits a network in real time. 
Telephone and Internet companies knew about the data collection but they had 
previously been compelled to sign a cooperation agreement with the NSA to lawfully 
permit that interception.1219 All of these programmes have not been claimed illegal 
because the NSA does not break into the servers of the TSP but only intercepts the 
communications as they flow over fibre optic cables.  
Programmes like BULLRUN, CHEESY NAME, EDGEHILL, and 
QUANTUMHAND have a more sophisticated nature. Through these systems, the NSA 
                                                
1215 WP 215, 10.04.2014, p. 7. 
1216 Greenwald 2014, pp. 81 and 92. 
1217 Peterson A 2013, ‘PRISM already gave the NSA access to tech giants. Here’s why it wanted more’, 
The Washington Post, 30 November. Available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com> [5 November 
2014]. 
1218 Gallagher R 2014a, ‘How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet’, The Intercept, 18 
June Available from <https://firstlook.org/theintercept/> [5 November 2014]. See also RAMPART-A 
Project Overview, 01.10.2010. Available from http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jun/usa-nsa-
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is able to break encryption technologies. For instance, BULLRUN is a decryption 
software that circumvents online protocols such as HTTPS.1220 Likewise, CHEESY 
NAME singles out encryption keys and EDGEHILL is used to decode encrypted traffic 
of major IT companies. Finally, QUANTUMHAND is a programme through which the 
NSA installs a malware in the target’s computer and uses a fake Facebook account to 
access the target’s computer.1221 
Once the NSA obtains the encrypted information, a programme called 
XKEYSCORE enables the agency to glean information from it. It is distributed in 
connection points across the globe (it has 150 sites and over 700 servers). This 
programme allows targets to be monitored in real time as they are writing an email or 
surfing the net.1222 The mechanism used by this programme consists of ‘slowing down 
the Internet’ so that analysts can go back and recover sessions that otherwise would 
have been dropped by the front data. Content data is kept from three to five days, 
whereas metadata is saved for longer, for approximately thirty days. Much of the largest 
collection occurs in the UK under the basis of Executive Order 12333,1223 therefore it 
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Some of the programmes disclosed by Snowden are based on Section 215 of the 
Patriot Act. For example STELLAR WIND allows the NSA to collect bulk metadata 
from a TSP, after a FISC order is issued. The metadata belongs to US and non-US 
citizens and the FISC order can be renewed every 90 days.1224 Data collected by the 
NSA through all of the above-mentioned programmes (and more) is stored in a ‘broker’, 
which is connected to a Google-like search engine. It is called ‘ICReach’ and enables 
the intelligence community to search for any name or piece of information they need.1225 
The NSA has always stated that it uses all these programmes for the prevention and 
combat of global terrorism. After the revelations, great criticisms were raised about the 
lack of efficiency of these programmes, which have not always led to the interruption of 
terrorist plots. In light of these criticism, the NSA felt obliged to explain in which cases 
these programmes had effectively contributed to stop terror plots. The NSA stated that 
Section 215 programmes had detected fifty-four terrorist activities,1226 whereas Section 
702 programmes had helped stop at least forty-two attacks.1227 However, the agency has 
always used the case of Basaaly Moalin1228 to justify the effectiveness of Section 215. 
As for the programmes established under Section 702, the agency has usually 
mentioned the cases of David Coleman Headley,1229 Najibullah Zazi,1230 Khalid 
Ouazzani,1231 Jamshid Muhtorov and Bakhtiyor Jumaev,1232 and Jihad Jane1233 as its 
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In June 2014, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence revealed that 89,138 
people were targets under Section 702 FISAA in 2013 alone.1235 Considering these 
numbers, one might wonder whether the forty-two success stories really justify the fact 
that almost 90,000 people were exposed to the NSA’s scrutiny. Moreover, another 
public debate questioned the work of the NSA after it was unable to prevent the Boston 
Marathon bombings in 2013.1236  
The NSA has also explained that any interception made under Section 702 indergo 
executive, legislative and judicial oversight. The executive review is conducted by an 
independent inspector general, who carries out regular on-site reviews and sends reports 
to the Congress.1237 The legislative oversight is conducted by the Intelligence 
Committee and the Judiciary Committee of the House of the Representatives and the 
Senate. As for the judicial review, the NSA has ensured that any interception or 
intelligence gathering needs prior order from FISC. Also, every thirty days, the NSA 
sends a report to FISC about the state of the investigation.1238 However, this court has 
been highly criticised by pro-privacy experts and activists due to its secrecy; the poor 
information it gets to effectively assess the NSA activities;1239 the number of targets that 
a single order can involve;1240 and the low number of cases the court has rejected to 
date.1241 
The Snowden revelations sparked several legislative and political changes in the US. 
For example, Congress is currently studying several proposals for a reform of the 
NSA.1242 Likewise, a list of five basic principles was released by key IT companies 
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against the NSA mass surveillance,1243 and recommendations were published by the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board on Sections 215 and 702.1244 The NSA has 
started to publish regular transparency reports,1245 and it now has a chief privacy 
officer,1246 as well as a Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies for the oversight of the agency.1247 All of these changes are taking place in 
the US. Yet, the Snowden revelations have also had an impact outside the US territory 
and, especially, in the EU.  
 
3.3.  Secret collaboration of the EU member states with the NSA 
 
Since 9/11, the cooperation of intelligence services in the EU with the US authorities 
has increased significantly. The common goal is to prevent a major terrorist attack. 
Today it is well documented that a few months before the 9/11 attacks many warnings 
came into the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence 
services about Al Qaeda’s intentions, but they were not considered a threat.1248 In July 
that year, an FBI agent in Phoenix claimed that terrorists could be attending flight 
schools in preparation for an attack. Around that time, the CIA informed former 
President George W. Bush about a possible Al Qaeda plane hijacking that would take 
place on 6 August 2001. Also, by early September three foreign intelligence services 
reported to the CIA that Bin Laden had ordered his four wives to urgently return to 
Afghanistan.1249 None of these dots were adequately connected.  
Following the attacks, the US government handed a list of recommendations to the 
CIA, the FBI and the NSA. It urged for the recruiting of more spies (especially those 
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with connections to terrorists groups), as well as hiring new agents who could speak and 
translate relevant languages. From that moment, the NSA had to transform itself from a 
passive gatherer into a proactive terrorist hunter.1250 In 2004, the Bush Administration 
released the 9/11 Commission Report through which it called other nations to engage 
‘in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism’.1251 
Consequently, national intelligence services within the EU committed to collaborating 
closely with the US government and, most particularly with the NSA, in the prevention 
and combat of terrorism and serious crimes. 
As discussed above, the NSA has been maintaining a special relationship with four 
other English-speaking countries: Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom (UK). This collective group is known as the ‘5-Eyes’. The only EU country 
among the 5-Eyes partnership is the UK. A close cooperation has existed between the 
NSA and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), a British 
intelligence organisation, since the Cold War,1252 when they signed the UKUSA 
Agreement. More recently, and according to the latest documents released by Snowden, 
the GCHQ receives fifty billion data messages per day through different 
programmes,1253 some of which are provided by the NSA. The GCHQ does not need any 
warrant to access bulk NSA data.1254 One of the most controversial systems the GCHQ 
uses is the above-mentioned PRISM. Through this programme, the GCHQ is technically 
able to circumvent any formal British legal procedure and obtain data collected by the 
main TSP located outside the country.1255 As mentioned in previous chapters, it is not 
uncommon that law enforcement agencies informally contact TSPs in order to obtain 
users’ data. The same occurs with respect to intelligence services. The Snowden 
documents reveal that TSP such as Verizon, British Telecommunications, Vodafone, 
Global Crossing, Level 3, Viatel and Interoute have long cooperated with the GCHQ 
providing it with users’ information when requested.1256 
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Another programme used by the GCHQ is TEMPORA. Due to its privileged 
location, the UK hosts a quarter of all Internet traffic in the world. In consequence, the 
UK is able to tap into dozens of undersea transatlantic cables and gather 
telecommunication data. TEMPORA was created precisely to collect and store such 
information. The Snowden documents unveiled that the NSA also has access to that 
data.1257 A debate has arisen because TEMPORA is supposed to be used by the GCHQ 
to intercept foreign communications only. Yet, communications originating in the UK 
can still be intercepted by the NSA and then passed onto its ‘5-Eyes’ partners, including 
the UK.1258 In other words, through TEMPORA the GCHQ is able to obtain 
communications from British citizens, circumventing the prohibition established in the 
British laws. 
Besides the GCHQ, intelligence services in other EU member states have also been 
cooperating with the NSA. Specifically, these countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.1259 After the UK, Germany is the member state 
that has intercepted the most personal communications. Snowden used the following 
example when he told a German newspaper about the collaboration between Germany 
and the NSA: 
 
‘For example, we tip them off when someone we want is flying through their 
airports (that we for example, have learned from the cell phone of a suspected hacker’s 
girlfriend in a totally unrelated third country – and they hand them over to us). They 
don’t ask to justify how we know something, and vice versa, to insulate their political 
leaders from the backlash of knowing how grievously they’re violating global 
privacy.’1260 
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The collaboration between German intelligence services and the US has increased 
significantly since 9/11 due to the fact that Al Qaeda established terrorist cells in 
Germany to prepare the attacks. The cooperation between the two countries dates back 
to the Cold War, when the US assisted German troops in Afghanistan.1261 Today, the 
Federal Intelligence Service – the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) – mostly spies on 
foreign communications in countries such as Russia, Central Asia or the Middle East, 
but it has also permission to target Germans on a case-by-case basis.1262  
However, the relationship between the US and Germany has been damaged since it 
was revealed that the NSA had been tapping the German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
mobile phone for more than a decade.1263 The surveillance began three years before she 
became Chancellor because the US wanted to gather information about the German 
position on the Iraq war.1264 Germany has always had a special sensitibity towards issues 
concerning personal privacy and data protection due to its horrific experiences during 
the Nazi regime, and later by the East German secret police.1265  
Another EU country that carried out enormous surveillance during 2013 is France. It 
collected data from more that seventy million French phones in only one month. The 
French intelligence community is divided into the Direction de la Surveillance du 
Territoire (DST), a domestic intelligence agency, and the Direction Générale de la 
Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE), an external intelligence agency. The programme used to 
intercept communications is called US-985D, which targets both suspects and non-
suspects. Phone calls and SMS messages registered by that programme have also been 
shared with the NSA.1266 Ironically, one of the documents disclosed by Snowden reveals 
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that France has also been considered a NSA target when the UN Security Council was 
preparing a resolution about the sanctions on Iran.1267 
Another Member State that has been collaborating closely with the US is Spain. The 
cooperation between the two was reinforced in 2001. Two months after the 9/11 attacks, 
the former president of Spain, José María Aznar, gave the green light to the US 
intelligence services to operate on Spanish soil. In return, Aznar requested advanced 
interception equipment from the US government for Spain’s Centro Nacional de 
Inteligencia (CNI). The documents leaked by Snowden show that the NSA intercepted 
data from more than 60 million Spanish citizens in only one month.1268 After the leak, 
the Spanish public prosecutor argued that such surveillance should take place without a 
prior court order. However, he added that it is especially complicated to learn more 
about the alleged violation since the interceptions are classified information and, 
consequently, the Ministerio Público has no access to them.1269  
This analysis demonstrates that intelligence services of member states have 
individually consolidated a strong link with the US agencies. In return, the NSA equips 
all of these agencies with new technology and surveillance programmes.  
 
3.4.  EU reaction and consequences for the EU-US agreements 
 
The Snowden disclosures put the spotlight on all of the current and future data-sharing 
agreements between the EU and the US. One of the main concerns of EU officials was 
that if data was collected by the NSA under Section 702 of FISAA then EU citizens had 
no redress mechanisms at all.  
 After the revelations, the former Vice-president of the Commission Viviane Reding 
sent a letter to the US Advocate General Eric Holder, asking several questions relating 
to the EU citizens’ data that the NSA was gathering.1270 Likewise, the Art. 29 WP 
pointed out some aspects about PRISM that needed to be clarified.1271 In order to find 
more answers, the Commission and the US government decided to create a transatlantic 
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group of experts: the ad-hoc EU-US Working Group on Data Protection. Also, at the 
national level, governments of the majority of member states launched initiatives to 
improve data security against intelligence services’ intrusions.1272 
 Many aspects of the current version of the proposed EU Data Protection Regulation 
have been questioned since the disclosures. In particular, there are two provisions of the 
proposal that have been given special attention: ex Article 42 and Article 43a, suggested 
by the EP. Article 42 was included in the original draft of the proposal, leaked in 
December 2011, but it was later removed. Paragraph 1 stated: 
 
            ‘No judgment of a court or tribunal and no decision of an administrative 
authority of a third country requiring a controller or processor to disclose personal data 
shall be recognized or be enforceable in any manner, without prejudice to a mutual 
assistance treaty or an international agreement in force between the requesting third 
country and the Union or a Member State.’ 
 
 That provision was commonly known as the ‘anti-FISA clause’. The US authorities 
intensively lobbied for the removal of the clause before the official document was 
released. The US considered that the anti-FISA clause would impede public regulatory 
agencies from accessing the data necessary for investigations and thus hinder the EU-
US cooperation.1273 Consequently, Article 42 was removed from the draft. 
 Once the proposal was published, it was sent to the EP, particularly to the LIBE 
Committee, for inspection and the suggestion of amendments. The LIBE Committee 
made more than 4,000 amendments. Among them, it decided to include Article 43a, 
which has almost the same wording as the original Article 42. If Article 43a is finally 
added, the US authorities might have more difficulties in obtaining EU citizens’ data 
through court orders, subpoenas, letters of request and letters rogatory.1274 Also, 
companies could be sanctioned if they transfer data to the US authorities outside the 
scope of a MLA treaty or a specific international agreement, or without the approval of 
a data protection authority. However, the real impact of the provision is unclear, 
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considering that member states’ national security exclusion is maintained in the 
proposal. 
 Current EU-US agreements have also been affected by the Snowden revelations. One 
of the concerns referred to the Safe Harbour scheme, which was called for suspension 
by the EP. In 2000, the Commission adopted the Safe Harbour principles1275 to solve the 
problem of the lack of a complete data protection framework in the US. The principles 
had the aim of complying with the adequacy requirement of Article 25 of Directive 
95/46/EC. Today the scheme includes more than 3,000 certified companies based in the 
US. According to the agreement, US companies implementing Safe Harbour principles 
comply with the adequacy standards in the terms of Article 25 of Directive 95/46/EC. 
However, some controversies arose when it was found that at least 10% of the 
companies claiming membership to the Safe Harbour scheme were not actually listed 
there.1276 Moreover, one of the NSA programmes disclosed, PRISM, showed that Safe 
Harbour did not prevent companies from transferring personal data to governments 
without EU approval.  
 After the revelations, the former Vice-president of the Commission Viviane Reding 
expressed concerns about Safe Harbour and issued recommendations in order to 
improve the legal framework.1277 She noted that ironically ‘[t]he Safe Harbour may not 
be so safe after all’.1278 Similarly, the Art. 29 WP released recommendations on the 
scheme in April 2014.1279 For its part, the EP has taken a more drastic position calling 
for the immediate suspension of the scheme. That would be possible according to 
Article 3 of the Safe Harbor Decision. Yet, this option has been already discarded since 
the termination of Safe Harbor would most likely hinder the economy on both sides of 
the Atlantic.1280  
 Safe Harbor continues to function for the moment. However, two EU actions might 
impact on the future of the agreement. On the one hand, the Commission will soon 
assess whether the US has taken into account the recommendations. Unfortunately, they 
have no binding effects. On the other hand, the CJEU is currently examining a 
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preliminary ruling brought by the Austrian student Max Schrems on the data protection 
adequacy of Safe Harbour.1281 After the annulment of the Data Retention Directive, 
some scholars have considered the possibility that the CJEU similarly invalidates the 
agreement.1282 
 The revelations have also raised concerns about the current SWIFT agreement. One 





    
Source: Greenwald 2014, p. 135 
  
This revelation was met with huge disappointment among EU institutions, especially 
the EP, which had long fought to achieve adequate data protection standards for 
SWIFT. Therefore, the EP called for the immediate suspension of the agreement.1283 The 
MEP Jan Albrecht drafted an unofficial joint motion, pointing out that: 
 
‘Although the Parliament has no formal powers under Art. 218 of the TFEU to 
initiate a suspension or termination of an international agreement, the Commission will 
have to act if Parliament withdraws its support for a particular agreement.’1284 
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 Similarly, the former EU Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom initiated 
formal consultations with the US as the first step towards a suspension of the 
agreement.1285 The Belgian and Dutch Data Protection Authorities also investigated 
whether the NSA had been unlawfully accessing bank transaction data at SWIFT,1286 but 
they finally concluded that there had been no violation.1287 SWIFT and Europol officials 
arrived at the same result too.1288 Therefore, the SWIFT agreement has not been 
suspended for the moment. 
 The EU-US PNR agreement has also been in the spotlight. The Joint Review for the 
implementation of the agreement stated that during 2012-2013 the DHS made twenty-
three disclosures of PNR data to the NSA.1289 However, the Joint Review stated that 
these were made on a case-by-case basis and according to the terms of the agreement. 
What the Joint review did not mention is that those EU citizens whose data were 
transferred to the NSA lacked judicial and administrative redress.1290 It goes against the 
safeguards that the PNR agreement endorses. Therefore, if it is found that there has 
been a violation due to the lack of redress, the agreement could still be suspended, in 
accordance with the terms of Articles 24 and 25. 
 Finally, a few words on the expected Data Protection and Privacy Agreement 
(DPPA) between the EU and the US. As seen in Chapter 2 of this thesis, negotiations 
for the DPPA have suffered an immense delay. They officially started in March 2011 
but they are still ongoing. The main reason why these negotiations are at a standstill is 
precisely the issue of judicial redress for EU citizens. The former Vice-president of the 
Commission Viviane Reding tried to include a clause on this issue during the 
negotiations, but the US kept blocking the EU demands. The Snowden revelations have 
brought some changes to the negotiations in this respect. The US, which has always 
been leading the decisions on the agreement, is now more willing to consider the EU 
suggestions on redress. In November 2013, Reding announced the US efforts to 
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accelerate the completion of the agreement.1291 The EP has also highlighted the 
importance that the DPPA incorporates a clause permitting EU citizens to enjoy judicial 
redress, irrespective of where they have their residence.1292 Hence, it seems that the 
revelations have helped the EU negotiate the provision on judicial redress in the future 
proposal of the agreement. 
 In conclusion, trust needs to be rebuilt on both sides of the Atlantic. The revelations 
have clearly damaged the cooperation between the EU and the US in the field of 
privacy. As Reding pointed out ‘We are not seen as partners, but as a threat’.1293 The 
Snowden revelations do not only involve the NSA. Similar activities take place in 
intelligence agencies in the member states within the EU. For instance, most of the 
intelligence services in the EU do not require any prior judicial authorisation to get 
private information from foreign persons. This and other aspects are examined in the 
next section. 
 
4.  Systematic storage and access to data by intelligence services in the EU 
 
The previous section has shown that intelligence services of the member states have 
maintained a close collaboration with the NSA. However, these intelligence services 
are also using massive surveillance programmes themselves, even if the information is 
not sent to the US. These programmes might violate the EU right to data protection, but 
due to their secrecy, it is not easy to get information about their actual functions and 
scope.  
As seen in previous chapters, individuals of a Member State are able to go to the 
national and European police forces and request access to all information they keep 
about them. Yet, this right does not always exist for data collected and stored by 
intelligence services.  
GCHQ in the UK has one of the most controversial legal frameworks in the EU. In 
2013, the Interception of Communications Commissioner released a report stating that it 
                                                
1291 Video of Mrs. Reding speech, available from http://www.euractiv.com/video/eu-commissioner-
reding-us-meetin-531789 [5 November 2014]. 
1292 Baker J 2013, ‘EU Parliament could block data sharing with the US’, CSO, 19 November. Available 
from http://www.cso.com.au [6 November 2014]. 
1293 Reding R 2013, ‘Towards a more dynamic transatlantic area of growth and investment’, 
SPEECH/13/867, 29 October, pp. 6-7. 
 
 250 
is lawful for GCHQ to intercept communications and acquire communication data.1294 
Two laws regulate the GCHQ functioning: the Intelligence Services Act (ISA) 19941295 
and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000.1296  The ISA sets rules 
about the warrant that the Secretary of State needs to give before certain actions. RIPA 
regulates all surveillance activities conducted by intelligence and law enforcement 
authorities. It establishes two types of interception warrants: the Section 8(1) warrants 
and the Section 8(4) warrants. They normally last six months and are authorised by the 
Secretary of State.  
As for Section 8(4) warrants (also known as ‘certified warrants’), they allow the 
intercepting of external communications and are issued by the Foreign Secretary. 
Debates have been raised because of the broad certificates given by the secretary.1297 
Section 8(1) warrants are required for the interception of content data stored in 
telecommunication service providers (TSPs). Yet, if GCHQ seeks to access traffic data 
hold by these service providers, an authorisation by a senior official is sufficient.1298 
RIPA also serves as the legal basis for surveillance carried out by GCHQ via satellites 
and fibre-optic undersea cables. Since it does not involve direct contact with the TSPs, 
there is no need to send them a notice in the sense of Article 33(4) RIPA. In fact, these 
interceptions are not authorised by a senior official, but they require Section 8(4) 
certificates issued by the Foreign Secretary.1299 However, UK laws on intelligence 
services need to be tightened up, since many questions are still unanswered about these 
interceptions – for instance, it is unclear how domestic communications and foreign 
information are sorted out by the British intelligence services.1300  
Besides the interception of communications, intelligence services in the UK may 
obtain information through voluntary disclosures by private entities. According to the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, even if someone volunteers to disclose information to the 
intelligence agency, such information still needs to pass the tests of necessity and 
                                                
1294 2012 Annual Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner, HC 571 SG/2013/131, 
03.07.2013. Available from http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/jul/uk-ann-rep-interception-of-
communications-2012.pdf [6 November 2014]. 
1295 Intelligence Services Act 1994, 05.12.1994. 
1296 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 28.07.2000. 
1297 Bunyan T 2013, ‘Interception Commissioner fails to report on Section 8(4) certificates authorising 
GCHQ's mass data collection’, Statewatch. Available from www.statewatch.com [6 November 2014]. 
1298 Article 22(3) RIPA. 
1299 Bunyan 2014; MacAskill E, Borger J, Hopkins N, Davies N & Ball J 2013, ‘Mastering the Internet: 
how GCHQ set out to spy on the world wide web’ 23 June. Available from www.theguardian.com [6 
November 2014]. 
1300 Article 16(3) RIPA; Heumann & Scott 2013, p. 9; Bunyan 2014, p. 12. 
 
 251 
proportionality before it is processed by the agency.1301 However, these criteria might be 
very ambiguous at times, since there is no judicial or independent body in control of the 
compliance. 
Systematic processing of data is also present in the French intelligence services. In 
fact, due to its overseas territories, France possesses the technical infrastructure to 
operate a global interception system without cooperating with foreign countries.1302 The 
French Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 2011 in order to enhance law 
enforcement and intelligence services’ powers for the collection of data. This law 
authorises practices such as the decryption of protected computer data, numeric 
infiltration and the enrolment of online chatroom conversations.1303 Likewise, the so-
called Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM), adopted in December 2013, enables 
French secret services to intercept any communication if it is authorised by the Prime 
Minister. Many debates have emerged with regard to this law, since its individual 
safeguards, adequacy and collected categories of data are undetermined.1304 Lastly, 
another systematic collection of French citizens’ data comes from the Direction 
générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE). The DGSE systematically collects the 
electromagnetic signals launched by computers and phones within the country, as well 
as the communications between France and other countries.1305 
The German Foreign Intelligence Services or Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) are 
based on a law passed in 1990.1306 This law authorises the BND to collect information 
from foreign communications and to request data obtained by TSP. Surveillance 
activities by German intelligence agencies are also regulated in the Gesetz zur 
Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses, also known as G-10 
law.1307 The law has been highly controversial since it provides additional surveillance 
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powers to the BND, by limiting Article 10 of the German Constitution (protection of the 
privacy of correspondence, posts, and telecommunications). According to the supreme 
law, the BND can access letters and communications in order to avoid a) an armed 
attack, b) an international terrorist attacks, c) illicit foreign trade transactions in goods, 
data processing programmes and technologies, d) an unauthorised commercial shipment 
of narcotics into the EU, e) the impairment of monetary stability in the euro zone, f) 
international organised money laundering, and g) commercial organised smuggling of 
foreign persons in the territory of the EU.1308 The BND monitors international 
communications (mostly e-mails) through the largest German Internet point ‘DE-CIX’, 
located in Frankfurt. The agency identified thirty-seven million communications in 
2010 through DE-CIX, but the number was reduced after that year because the BND 
started to use other automatic filtering programmes.1309 
Germany has established some limitations for the BND surveillance activities. The 
German Constitutional Court declared in 2008 that secret online searches of private 
computers by domestic intelligence services were unlawful, and stricter conditions were 
imposed after that.1310 One of the changes was the amendment of G-10 Law in 2009,1311 
incorporating new safeguards and restrictions on surveillance. For instance, the 
collection of data about an untargeted individual’s basic private life is now prohibited 
(Article 3a); the information on the private life of an individual that has been collected 
with no judicial supervision needs to be deleted (Article 5a); and new conditions have to 
be verified for the BND’s transfer of intelligence to foreign public bodies (Article 7a). It 
confirms that data protection provisions are more visible in the G-10 Law than in other 
countries.  
It can be concluded that intelligence services in member states often have a carte 
blanche to collect and process information and turn it into intelligence. Data collected 
does not only belong to EU citizens under suspicion or linked to criminal groups, but it 




                                                
1308 Article 5(1) G-10 Law. 
1309 Heumann & Scott 2013, p. 12. 
1310 Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) decision of 27 February 2008, reference 
number: 1 BvR 370/07. 
1311 Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Artikel 10-Gesetzes (1. G10uaÄndG k.a.Abk.), 30. Juli 2009 
(BGBl. I S. 2437). 
 
 253 
5.  Could the EU set up data protection standards for the exchange of intelligence? 
 
Two interesting points have been examined in this chapter so far: the first refers to 
the rupture of the EU-US confidence since the Snowden revelations. From the moment 
the NSA’s programmes and practices were disclosed, current and future agreements 
between the two parties have been called into question, and some members of the EU 
institutions have even suggested suspending them. These drastic statements have borne 
fruit: We see now a more flexible US government, willing to adapt to the EU demands 
in the field of data protection.  
The second interesting issue seen in the previous section is that intelligence services’ 
activities might hinder the effective establishment of global data protection rules in the 
field of security. Intelligence services, unlike law enforcement, are only regulated at the 
national level. There are no EU laws regulating the information processed by these 
bodies. As a result, EU data protection rules can be circumvented via intelligence 
services. This is particularly alarming if we bear in mind that the division of tasks 
between intelligence services and law enforcement authorities is becoming very diffuse 
today.  
Taking all this into account, the third and final issue this chapter will examine is the 
possibility to approximate and harmonise EU data protection rules that affect national 
intelligence services, especially those provisions relating to individual safeguards and 
rights. These norms should not clash with articles 4(2) TUE and 72 TFEU, which state 
that the adoption of laws on the safeguarding of national security is the responsibility of 
each Member State. 
 
5.1. Lack of coordination of intelligence services within the EU  
 
All member states except for Ireland1312 have their own intelligence agencies, which act 
according to their specific domestic laws.1313 Intelligence agencies collect and analyse 
the data they deem necessary and, once it becomes intelligence, it is forwarded to 
national governments. 
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Espionage practices in Europe have their origins in ancient civilisations. Several 
historians of Greek and Latin civilisations have found documents revealing episodes of 
espionage during these periods. In the Middle Ages, such practices were improved by 
the inclusion of diplomatic services within governments, and the practice gradually 
developed over the centuries until the institutionalisation of intelligence services, and 
new forms of data collection and processing through cryptographic techniques became 
available. During the 20th century, espionage became an extremely entrenched practice 
among European governments, who took advantage of the developments in signals 
intelligence technology that were made during that period. The First and Second World 
Wars, the civil wars in some European countries, and the period of the Cold War were 
all characterised by the important role of secret services in gathering intelligence and 
counterintelligence related to rival countries. In contrast, the nineties was a somewhat 
quiet decade for the intelligence centres. This is precisely why 9/11 came as such a 
shock. 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 caused a revolution in the global intelligence 
society. Terrorists communicate globally and use all types of Internet services (email 
accounts, fora, social media, VoiP systems, etc.). Consequently, intelligence activities 
are no longer conducted at a state-to-state level, and coordination among public and 
private actors around the world is increasing. In particular, the US and the EU embarked 
on a significant joint effort to improve the coordination among its national 
communication systems by establishing a common political authority.1314  
Austria and Belgium suggested the creation of a CIA-style agency in the EU, but the 
other member states did not support that initiative.1315 Nevertheless, two new bodies 
were established after the 9/11 attacks: The Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) and the 
Intelligence Analysis Centre (IntCen). The CTG is a forum composed of the parties of 
the ‘Berne Club’, namely, all EU member states plus Switzerland and Norway. Their 
heads of security and intelligence services meet regularly in order to discuss data and 
analyses related to terrorism (mostly Islamic extremist terrorism) and to develop 
periodic threat assessments.1316 IntCen is the evolution of a previous European centre 
called Joint Situation Centre (SitCen). SitCen was created by the former High 
Representative of the CFSP Javier Solana one year before the 9/11 attacks, and it had 
                                                
1314 Moret Millás V 2005, ‘El Centro Nacional de Inteligencia: Un aproximación a su régimen jurídico’, 
Foro Nueva época, no. 2, p. 264. 
1315 Bures & Ahern 2007, p. 217. 
1316 Occhipinti 2013, pp. 158-159. 
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three departments: the Operations Unit, the Analysis Unit and the Consular Unit. 
However, it did not tackle counter-terrorism issues at first.  
After the attacks, SitCen enhanced its scope in order to examine internal and external 
threats related to terrorism and other serious crimes.1317 There were other attempts to 
improve SitCen capabilities after the attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and 
Oslo (2011).1318 For instance, in 2005 the Analysis Unit established links with the CTG, 
which started to influence EU decisions on internal security matters.1319 SitCen also 
recruited seconded analysts from member states and internal security services,1320 and it 
began to provide strategic reports to the Council of the EU and to member states. These 
reports are usually in the form of signals intelligence (SIGINT),1321 human intelligence 
(HUMINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT).1322 
In April 2012, the EU re-named the body as ‘IntCen’. IntCen’s legal basis is not 
completely clear. The only mention of the centre is found in the Annex of EEAS 
Council Decision.1323 Although not all EEAS instruments are part of the CFSP,1324 
IntCen would probably fall under its scope. In that case, the current High Representative 
of the CFSP Federica Mogherini would be in charge of the centre. The other possibility 
is that IntCen uses Article 73 TFEU as its main legal basis. This provision does not 
belong to the CFSP, but to the AFSJ. This proves, once more, that the boundaries 
between the CFSP and the external dimension of the AFSJ are ambiguous. Moreover, 
IntCen does not only deal with external security matters, but it also carries out EU 
internal security functions. For instance, it cooperates with Europol and it drafts reports 
that it then sends to the Commission and the Council.1325 Therefore, the legal basis of 
the centre needs to be clarified. In that sense, in December 2013 the EP urged the 
                                                
1317 Occhipinti 2013, p. 160. 
1318 On 21 July 2011, Anders Behring Breivik detonated a bomb in Oslo and subsequently killed 77 
(mostly young) people on the island of Utoya. 
1319 Mills M, Vermeulen M, Born H, Scheinin M, Wiebusch M & Thornton A 2011, ‘Parliamentary 
oversight of security and intelligence agencies in the European Union’, European Parliament- 
Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department c: Citizens’ rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, Brussels, pp. 54-55. 
1320 Busuioc M & Groenleer M 2013, ‘Beyond Design: The evolution of Europol and Eurojust’, 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 14 no. 3, p. 294. 
1321 Particularly from France's satellites Helios and Pleiades, Germany's satellite SAR-Lupe and Italy's 
satellite Cosmo-SkyMed,  
1322 Council of the European Union, 17303/1/10 REV 1, 03.12.2010; Svenden 2011, p. 536. 
1323 OJ L 201, 03.08.2010, pp. 30-39. 
1324 For instance, EEAS measures outside of the scope of CSFP tackle issues related to the neighbourhood 
policy, development, financial matters, the external dimension of human rights, environment, transport, 
etc. 
1325 Council of the European Union, 12243/14, 30.07.2014, p. 2. 
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Commission to present a proposal for a legal basis for the activities of IntCen.1326 
IntCen has recruited military intelligence and police analysts from member states in 
order to increase the cooperation among national intelligence services.1327 The tasks of 
the new IntCen have been viewed with optimism by scholars.1328 Yet, the reality is that 
the competences of the centre are still very small, in comparison with those of a regular 
intelligence centre. In fact, the EEAS has made it very clear that IntCen is not an 
intelligence service, since the centre mainly provides information on crisis management 
situations. In addition, it does not have information collection powers or any operational 
role, and it only shares assessed intelligence among member states, as well as with EU 
institutions and bodies.1329 
IntCen has achieved a certain degree of intelligence integration within the EU. Some 
Open-source (OSINT) partnerships have been consolidated among some member states 
like Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Norway, 
France and Belgium.1330 Member states have discretionary powers on the decision of 
whether to share information with the centre or not. In this sense, there is still a low 
level of political will among member states to cooperate with the IntCen, and they are 
often resistant to share intelligence with the centre.1331 Consequently, the 80% of the 
intelligence stored by IntCen comes from only four EU-countries.1332  
There are many reasons why member states are reluctant to share intelligence among 
each other. First, they do not always trust how other agencies are going to use the 
intelligence. They are very cautious about the risk of manipulation if they forward it. 
Likewise, they are often concerned about free-riding from others, or the loss of 
privileged influence if the intelligence circulates beyond the country. In addition 
intelligence services in the EU seek to establish a close link with the US government. 
Sometimes, they simply decide not to share information with other EU countries to 
maintain the privilege of enjoying a close cooperation with the US.1333 Another reason 
for this lack of cooperation is the fact that there are no clear boundaries of what 
information should be collected by law enforcement authorities and what is to be 
                                                
1326 European Parliament, 2013/2188(INI), PE526.085v01-00, 23.12.2013, p. 25. 
1327 Cross 2013, p. 289. 
1328 Svenden 2011; Fägestern 2014. 
1329 Mills et al. 2011, pp. 55-56. 
1330 Svenden 2011, p. 529. 
1331 Cross 2013, pp. 288 and 400; Archick 2013, p. 3. 
1332 Nielsen N 2015, ‘No new mandate for EU intelligence centre’, EUobserver, 6 February. Available 
from https://euobserver.com/justice/127532 [18 February 2015]. 
1333 Cross 2013, p. 390. 
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obtained by intelligence services. In order to regulate these synergies between police 
and intelligence forces, in 2008 the Council suggested establishing networks of anti-
terrorist centres in all member states, as well as enhancing the role of IntCen.1334 Eight 
years on, this recommendation is still on the table. 
 
5.2. Divergence in the oversight over intelligence agencies 
 
In 2001, the EP released an analysis of the activities conducted by intelligence 
authorities.1335 Intelligence services are characterised as having a secretive nature and 
for collecting a large volume of data. The report highlighted the difficulties for 
evaluating the effectiveness of their activities, as well as their compliance with the laws. 
In particular, one of the recommendations made was the establishment of an appropriate 
legal and parliamentary supervision over secret services in all member states. 
Today most (but not all) intelligence services within the EU borders are monitored 
by oversight bodies. Yet, these supervisory bodies are not all alike. They have different 
tasks and features depending on the Member State. Particularly, three main types of 
control are identified within the EU: i) executive control, ii) parliamentary control; and 
iii) (quasi) judicial control. Sometimes this control will be ex ante, and sometimes it 
will be ex post. This section examines the intelligence oversight in France, Germany, 
Spain and the UK.1336  
The executive (or non-parliamentary) control is found in the British, German and 
French oversight regimes. Concerning the British legal framework, RIPA states that 
interception by intelligence services in the UK1337 needs to be authorised by the 
Secretary of State. The Secretary issues surveillance warrants as long as the interception 
is proportionate and necessary.1338 In addition, such interception needs to pursue one of 
the following purposes: a) national security, b) the prevention or detection of serious 
crimes, c) the safeguard of the economic well-being of the UK, and d) giving effect to 
                                                
1334 Council of the European Union, 11657/08, 09.07.2008, p. 38. 
1335 ‘Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial 
communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))’, A5-0264/2001 PAR1, European 
Parliament, 11.07.2001. 
1336 For an extended comparative analysis on the oversight of national intelligence agencies see Aidan 
Mills et al. 2011, pp. 84-145 and 191-411. 
1337 Intelligence services in the UK include the GCHQ, the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), 
the Security Service or MI5 (SS) and the Secret Intelligence Service or MI6 (SIS). 
1338 Article 5(2) RIPA. Bunyan notes in his article that the ‘Snowden revelations have shown that in this 
context the concepts of “minimum” and “necessary” have no limits’. Bunyan 2014, pp.17. 
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the provisions of any international mutual assistance agreement.1339 In Germany, the 
BND has an obligation to report all activities to the Chancellery, the Ministry of Interior 
and the Ministry of Defence. At the same time, these bodies will report the activities to 
the Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremium (PKG). Moreover, the G-10 Law obliges the 
BND to get the Chancellery’s approval before sharing information with any foreign 
intelligence agency.1340  Finally, in France procedures consisting of tapping cables 
require political authorisation from the Prime Minister.1341 
Control through parliamentary committees is the most usual oversight system within 
the EU. Classical parliamentary control consists of organising regular meetings in 
which several questions are posed to the Ministers. Although Ministers have the 
obligation to answer the queries, in practice they can decline to by arguing that it would 
jeopardise the national security of the country.1342 The four countries chosen for this 
study have a parliamentarian system that supervises national intelligence services. They 
have chosen this type of control because of the idea that, since intelligence services are 
a political tool of the government, the control must originate in the government too.1343  
In the UK, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) is the 
parliamentary body in charge of the British intelligence community. The oversight is ex-
post facto. The ISC publishes annual reports and supervises that the agencies comply 
with their tasks, budget, effectiveness and limitations.1344 However, as pointed out by a 
member of the ISC, the Committee also experiences some shortcomings in its 
supervisory activities.1345 The Interception Communications Commissioner’s Officer 
has also ex-post auditing tasks. It has access to any information from intelligence 
services and law enforcement authorities and it releases recommendations for such 
agencies afterwards.1346 However, there are numerous limitations in its oversight. For 
instance, the body cannot always be fully transparent because of the confidentiality 
                                                
1339 Article 5(3) RIPA. 
1340 Article 7a G-10 Law 
1341 Article 4 of the Loi n° 91-646 du 10/07/1991, Contrôle de l'application de la loi relative au secret des 
correspondances émises par la voie des télécommunications. 
1342 For this reason, parliamentary commissions have been seen as inefficient by part of the doctrine. See, 
for instance, Aranda Álvarez E 2003, ‘Servicios de inteligencia: Un estudio comparado’ in Estudios sobre 
inteligencia: Fundamentos para la seguridad internacional, Grupo de Trabajo número 5/03, Instituto 
Español de Estudios Estratégicos, p. 100. 
1343 Ruiz Miguel C 2007, ‘Problemas actuales del derecho de los servicios de inteligencia’, Inteligencia y 
Seguridad: Revista de Análisis y Prospectiva, no.2, pp.13-46. 
1344 Heumann & Scott 2013, pp. 9-10. 
1345 Rifkind M 2014, ‘Intelligence agencies in the Internet age - Public servants or public threat?’,  
Wadham College, Oxford, p. 8. 
1346 In 2014, it released 350 recommendations. Speech by Joana Cavan, Interception Communications 
Commissioner’s Officer, CPDP2015, Brussels, 23.01.2015. 
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agreements it needs to sign. Also, it is not always easy to reach an effective remedy, and 
errors and breaches are difficult to identify. 
France did not implement a parliamentary oversight over intelligence services until 
2007. That year the country passed a law1347 establishing the Délégation parlementaire 
au renseignement (DPR). However, the DPR has numerous limitations. For instance, 
this institution has no right to conduct investigations and it is not disclosed the details of 
the operational activities conducted within the centre.1348  There are other oversight 
bodies in France, like the Autorités Administratives Indépendantes,1349 but their powers 
are also very small. In December 2013, the French Government approved the Defence 
Bill 2014-2019, which enhances electronic surveillance for French residents.1350 Yet, it 
does not establish changes on intelligence oversight. 
The German Constitution (GG) states in Article 45(d) that the German Parliament or 
Bundestag can establish special committees to scrutinise intelligence activities of the 
Federation. The aforementioned G-10 Law foresees in Article 5 that intelligence 
services will be subject to parliamentary control by two different institutions: The 
Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremium (PKG) and the G-10 Kommission. 
The PKG’s tasks are described in the Law on the Parliamentarian Control of 
Intelligence Services of 2009 (PKGrG).1351 It oversees the Bundesnachrichtendienst 
(BND), the Militärischer Abschirmdienst (MAD) and the Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz (BfV) and it is composed of up to ten members set by the Bundestag 
at the beginning of each mandate. The German government has an obligation to inform 
the committee about the general activities of the intelligence services, as well as the 
most relevant ongoing operations at least once every six months. The committee also 
supervises the annual budget plan of the centres (Article 9(2) PKGrG) and it can even 
ask for a report on specific issues. Meetings are secret and closed-doors and they take 
place every three months on average (Article 3 PKGrG). All the information is then 
                                                
1347 Loi n° 2007-1443 du 9 octobre 2007, JO nº 235 10.10.2007. 
1348 Mills et al. 2011, p. 210. 
1349 Wolf C 2013, ‘Is personal data better protected from government surveillance in Europe than the 
U.S.? Maybe not, IAPP, 20 June. Available from www.privacyassociation.com [4 November 2014]. 
1350 Texte adopté nº 251, Projet de loi relatif à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 2019  et 
portant diverses dispositions concernant  la défense et la sécurité nationale, 3.12.2013. See also Sayare S 
2013,  “France Broadens Its Surveillance Power”, The New York Times, 14 December.  Available from 
www.nytimes.com [6 November 2014]. 
1351 Gesetz über die parlamentarische Kontrolle nachrichtendienstlicher Tätigkeit des Bundes 
(Kontrollgremiumgesetz - PKGrG), BGBl. I S. 2346, 09.07.2009. 
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transferred to the Bundestag, which will ultimately decide whether the German 
government has complied with its obligations or not (Article 13 PKGrG). 
The other parliamentary control over German intelligence services is the ‘G-10 
Commission’, which is appointed by the PKG. The G-10 Commission was created by 
the Bundestag in light of the constitutional right to privacy of correspondence, posts and 
telecommunications of Article 10 GG. It comprises members of the Bundestag, who are 
in charge of deciding on the permissibility and necessity of surveillance activities 
conducted by German intelligence agencies.1352 The objectives and functions of the G-10 
Commission are regulated in Article 15 of the G-10 Law. Members meet at least once a 
month and they control that the agencies’ collection, processing and storage of personal 
data is adequate. The G-10 Commission has access to any information it deems 
necessary, and it examines complaints issued by citizens on potential surveillance 
abuses. In contrast to the rest of the intelligence services analysed in this study, the 
BND offers the possibility for individuals to request access to their data.1353 Although 
the agency can always reject the request if there is an ongoing investigation, this right 
offers better safeguards for Germans than for the citizens of the three other member 
states.   
It is worth adding as for the German oversight intelligence framework that, after the 
Snowden revelations, the German Bundestag established a temporary Committee of 
Inquiry for the investigation of mass surveillance activities by the German secret service 
and its cooperation with the NSA. The committee was unanimously voted in by all 
parties in the parliament, and it is composed of eight members: four conservatives, two 
social-democrats, one socialist and one from the green party. It is a temporary 
committee and it is expected to be operational until 2017. The committee is conducting 
interviews with expert witnesses in the fields of national law, international law and 
technology. It also examines technical issues regarding the intervention of 
communications by intelligence agencies in Germany. Yet, this committee does not 
have access to documents that involve other intelligence services (e.g. documents 
related to ‘5-Eyes’), and its contact with Edward Snowden has been restricted.1354 
                                                
1352 G-10 Statute, Article 15(5); Schwartz PM 2012, ‘Systematic government access to private-sector data 
in Germany’, International Data Privacy Law, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 297.  
1353 Heumann & Scott 2013, pp. 13-14. 
1354 Speech of Anne Roth, member of the NSA Inquiry Committee of the German Bundestag, at 
CPDP2015, Brussels, 23.01.2015. 
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Similar to the British, French, and German systems, the Spanish Parliament is the 
institution controlling the activities of the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI). 
Article 11 of the Law 11/20021355 details the procedure for this control, which requires 
the appointment of the so-called Comisión de Secretos Oficiales (or Secret Funds 
Committee), as part of the Congress. This Committee has access to most of the 
classified information in the CNI.1356 It also oversees that the budget provided to the 
centre is not misused. 
The UK, Germany and Spain have established judicial oversight over intelligence 
services. The British intelligence community is monitored by a) the Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, b) the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner (ICC), c) the Intelligence Services Commissioner (ISC) and d) the 
Investigatory  Powers   Tribunal. The current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation is David Anderson. He is not part of the government and is in charge of 
issuing reports and recommendations about the functioning of the British intelligence 
community to ministers and the Parliament.1357 The ICC and the ISC provide 
independent quasi-judicial oversight ex post and they are appointed by the British Prime 
Minister.1358 The ICC supervises warrants issued for the interception of 
communications1359 and the disclosure of communications data.1360 In contrast, the ISC 
controls the adequacy of warrants issued by the Secretary of State authorising intrusive 
surveillance. Both commissioners give assistance to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal 
when it is required for an ongoing investigation. The Investigatory  Powers   Tribunal is 
composed of nine senior members who hear complaints related to illegal surveillance. 
However, this tribunal has a very opaque nature: because it is not an independent 
judicial body,1361 it cannot initiate investigations in its own, and its decisions are mostly 
secret.1362 
                                                
1355 BOE núm. 109, 07.05.2002. 
1356 Article 7(1) of the Secret Funds Act, Article 11(2) Law 11/2002. 
1357 For further information, see https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk [6 November 
2014]. 
1358 Articles 57 and 59 RIPA. 
1359 Chapter 1-Part 1 of RIPA. 
1360 Chapter 1-Part 2 of RIPA. 
1361 Bickford D 2013, ‘Judicial Scrutiny of Intelligence Agencies’, European Parliament LIBE enquiry, 7 
November. Available from <www.europarl.europa.eu> [6 November 2014]. 
1362 Heumann & Scott 2013, p. 9. 
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German intelligence services are also subject to judicial control, but only if basic 
rights are infringed.1363 This judicial review has a limitation: Article 99(1) of the Code 
of Administrative Court Proceedings (VwGO) allows specific files or electronic 
documents to be classified as secret if they affect the interests of the Federation or the 
Land.  
As far as the Spanish regime is concerned, since 2002 the CNI is subject to judicial 
oversight under the basis of Organic Law 2/2002.1364 According to Article 12 of Law 
11/2002 and the single Article of LO 2/2002, the Spanish Supreme Court can rule on 
cases regarding the infringement of the right to inviolability of the home and the secrecy 
of communications (Articles 18(2) and (3) of the Spanish Constitution). If CNI 
activities clash with any of these constitutional rights, they require prior authorisation 
from a judge. When a court order is requested, the judge must verify that such activity is 
necessary for the goals assigned. Article 12 of Law 11/2002 must be read in conjunction 
with Article 74(a) of the CNI Statue, which establishes an obligation for the agency to 
act according to the Spanish Constitution and the rest of the national laws.1365 Yet, even 
if this is the formal procedure to get information in Spain, the CNI has sometimes 
circumvented the prior authorisation from a judge.1366  
It can be thus concluded that there are no common rules on oversight for data 
protection issues over intelligence services within the EU. From the analysis above it 
has been seen that some national systems are very lax (e.g. France), whereas others are 
highly protective. Therefore, minimum standards on oversight in all member states 
would improve the data protection for the information processed by intelligence 
services. Regarding the ideal control system, some scholars have seen many advantages 
in having an executive or non-parliamentary control,1367 whereas others opt for a dual 
parliamentary and judicial mechanism.1368 For instance, the EP has suggested a two-fold 
system: An ex-ante control by an independent magistrate, and an ex-post parliamentary 
                                                
1363 Article 19 GG. 
1364 BOE núm. 109, 07.05.2002.  
1365 Real Decreto 240/2013, de 5 de abril, por el que se aprueba el Estatuto del personal del Centro 
Nacional de Inteligencia. BOE Núm. 89, 13.04.2013. 
1366 Documentary ‘Salvados’, 17.11.2013. 
1367 Mills et al. 2011, pp. 90-91. 
1368 Hillebrand 2012, pp. 44-57. 
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oversight.1369 For its part, the Art. 29 WP suggests making national DPAs responsible 
for supervising the activities of the intelligence services.1370 
In my view, the ideal situation would be to adopt one single instrument with common 
oversight rules for intelligence services in all member states. This could only occur if an 
EU legal basis for such development was effectively established. In that case, the EU 
rules would operate as a lowest common denominator in all member states. Since 
parliamentary oversight is the predominant system among member states – at least 18 
out of the 28 member states have implemented parliamentary committees,1371 this could 
be the nature of the system. Any executive or judicial scrutiny would have a 
complementary role. Parliamentary committees would have access to all classified 
information (with the appropriate security clearance)1372 and they would oversee that the 
intelligence services’ activities conform to the law and effectiveness criteria. Naturally, 
it is not a perfect mechanism, since these parliaments would lack sanctioning powers,1373 
and there would be a risk of having too many parliamentary bodies involved in the 
scrutiny procedures.1374 However, a single instrument could never be adopted today, 
since the EU has no legal basis to regulate oversight mechanisms for national 
intelligence services.  
 
5.3. Current challenges at the CJEU and the ECtHR 
 
As seen above, Article 4(2) TEU excludes national security matters from the 
competences of the EU so, according to this provision, national security issues are 
beyond the scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ scope and the CJEU 
jurisdiction, too.1375 As for the Charter, Article 51 states that this is only applicable to 
EU citizens to the extent that member states are implementing EU laws. Regarding the 
CJEU, Article 276 TFEU establishes: 
                                                
1369 Democratic oversight of Member State intelligence services and of EU intelligence bodies, European 
Parliament, Working Document 5, 12.12.2013, p. 5. 
1370 It is already happening in thirteen EU member states. These are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland and Sweden. See WP215, 
10.04.2014, p. 10. 
1371 See Table 1 in Mills et al. 2011, pp. 92-95. 
1372 Today there is also a disparity in terms of the information that overseers can access during the 
scrutiny of national intelligence services. See Tables 3 and 4 in Mills et al. 2011, pp. 119, 127-128. 
1373 Hillebrand 2012, p. 48. 
1374 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin’, United Nations, General Assembly, A/HRC/10/3, 
04.02.2009, para. 46. 




‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no jurisdiction to 
review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other 
law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities 
incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security.’ 
 
In accordance with that article, the Court has no competence to examine preliminary 
rulings on operations undertaken by law enforcement authorities for the maintenance of 
‘internal security’ (here equivalent to ‘national security’).1376 Nonetheless, there is still 
one issue under review by the CJEU within the field of public order and the 
safeguarding of internal matters: the compatibility of national security measures with 
EU law. The CJEU has reiterated that even if member states retain exclusive 
competence on certain security measures, the Court can verify if these are appropriate 
and conform to the EU treaties.1377 
As mentioned above, a definition of what national security covers is urgently 
required. In this regard, Germany has recently suggested clarifying the concept of 
internal security ‘in order to avoid overlapping with tasks assigned to intelligence 
services in order to protect the security of the State from internal threats’.1378 The CJEU 
has stated that ‘public security’ encompasses both internal and external security.1379 Yet, 
it is uncertain whether the term ‘public security’ is equivalent to that of ‘national 
security’. The Court should thus demarcate the scope of Articles 4(2) TEU and 72/73 
TFEU, similar to the rulings on the production and trade in arms, munitions and war 
material. In the field of defence procurement, the Court has always maintained a strict 
interpretation of Articles 346(b) and 347 TFEU.1380 Likewise, a clear list on the specific 
national security measures should be established. This list would make it easier to 
determine whether certain operations carried out by intelligence services go beyond 
                                                
1376 For a criticism on this provision, see Hinarejos A 2011, ‘Law and order and internal security 
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1379 Case C-285/98 Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2000] ECR I-69, para. 17.  




national security purposes. If so, the EU principles would still apply for those 
operations.1381  
In fact, a case that indirectly affects intelligence services is now being examined by 
the CJEU. The case was brought to the Irish High Court by the Austrian student Max 
Schrems in June 2014. After the Snowden disclosures on PRISM, the applicant claimed 
to the Irish DPA that data transfers between Facebook Ireland and Facebook Inc. had to 
cease. The DPA maintained that the company fulfilled Safe Harbour principles and, 
therefore, there was no reason for a suspension.1382 The Irish High Court referred the 
case to the CJEU, asking whether the Irish DPA is obliged to investigate a complaint in 
relation to the transfer of personal data by Facebook to the US.1383 The case will 
indirectly examine the lawfulness of PRISM in light of Article 8 of the Charter, 
Directive 95/46/EC and the 2000 Safe Harbour Decision. 
Besides the Charter, any EU citizen can invoke Article 8 of the ECHR (right to 
respect for privacy and family life) against intelligence services’ practices, as long as 
they have exhausted the national remedies. Although it is an exclusive competence of 
the member states to legislate on national security matters, as Contracting Parties of the 
ECHR, national laws cannot violate the clauses of the Convention. Moreover, according 
to Article 52 ECHR, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe can ex officio 
request information from the member states in order to verify that they are complying 
with the provisions of the Convention. In January 2015, the Secretary announced that he 
would use these powers to obtain information about the intelligence services’ activities 
of the Contracting Parties.1384 
The ECtHR has dealt with numerous cases concerning mass surveillance activities 
that clashed with Article 8 ECHR. According to the Court’s jurisprudence, the 
interference could occur even when the information is available in the public domain,1385 
when police install covert listening devices in someone’s home,1386 and when a national 
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surveillance Report, Rapporteur: Mr Pieter Omtzigt, AS/Jur (2015) 01, p. 2. 
1385 Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, Application no. 62332/00, Judgment of 6 September 2006; 
Rotaru v. Romania, Application no. 28341/95, Grand Chamber judgment of 4 May 2000; Shimovolos v. 
Russia, Application no. 30194/09, judgment of 28 November 2011. 
1386 Khan v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 35394/97, judgment of 4 October 2000; PG. and J.H. v. 
the United Kingdom, Application no. 44787/98, judgment of 25 December 2001; Copland v. the United 
Kingdom, Application no. 62617/00, judgment 3 April 2007. 
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judge or a public prosecutor issues certain wiretapping orders.1387 The Court has 
likewise concluded that mass surveillance activities can only be used as long as they 
pursue a relevant national security interest.1388 
The majority of cases brought before the ECtHR refer to police surveillance 
activities, but the Court has examined intelligence services’ practices too. For instance, 
the case Association 21 December 1989 and others v. Romania dealt with surveillance 
activities of anti-government demonstrators by the Romanian Secret Service.1389 
Likewise, in the cases Klass and others v. Germany1390 and Weber & Saravia v. 
Germany1391 the Court examined whether the G-10 Act in Germany was contrary to the 
Convention. 
There are currently two pending applications issued by British and Hungarian 
citizens before the ECtHR. As for the Hungarian application, it challenges the practices 
conducted by the Hungarian Anti-Terrorist Centre (TEK), which includes intelligence 
and law enforcement authorities. Hungarian citizens have claimed that TEK is allowed 
to spy on them with no prior court order.1392 In the UK, several British activists lodged 
an application before the ECtHR in September 2013. They argued that the use of GCHQ 
programmes like PRISM and Tempora (which have no legal basis in UK laws) was in 
breach of Article 8 of the Convention.1393 However, the right to privacy of Article 8 is 
not absolute, and governments can conduct surveillance as long as it is ‘necessary’ and 
serves a ‘legitimate aim’ (Article 8(2)). In previous cases,1394 the ECtHR has stated that 
national laws allowing data processed by member states need to specify the offences 
and categories of persons monitored; the duration for the surveillance; its purpose; and 
                                                
1387 Kruslin v. France, Application no. 11801/85, judgment of 24 April 1990; Amann v. Switzerland, 
Application no. 27798/95, judgment of 16 February 2000; Wisse v. France, Application no. 71611/01, 
judgment of 20 December 2005; Vetter v. France, Application no. 59842/00, judgment of 31 May 2005; 
A. v. France Application no. 14838/89, judgment of 23 November 1992; Uzun v. Germany, 2.9.2010, 
Appication no. 35623/05, judgment of 2 September 2010; Malone v. UK, Application no. 8691/79, 
Judgment of 2 August 1984; Pruteanu v. Romania, Application no. 30181/05, Judgement of 3 February 
2015. 
1388 Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, Application 62332/00, judgment of 6 September 2006; 
Klass and others v. Germany, Application 5029/71, judgment of 6 September 1978, paragraph 48; Marper 
v United Kingdom, Application no. 30562/04 and 30566/04, judgment of 4 December 2008. 
1389 Application no. 33810/07 and 18817/08, judgment of 24 May 2011. 
1390 ECtHR, Application no. 5029/71, judgment of 6 September 1978. 
1391 ECtHR, Application no. 54934/00, judgment of 29 June 2006. 
1392 ECtHR, Mate Szabo and Beatrix Vissy v. Hungary, Application no. 37138/2014, 13.5.2014.  
1393 ECtHR, Big Brother Watch, Open Rights Group, English PEN and Kurz v. the United Kingdom, 
Application no. 58170/13, 4.9.2013. 
1394 See, for instance, ECtHR Klass v. Germany (1978), Liberty and Others v. the UK (2008); S and 
Marper v United Kingdom (2009); Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom (2010); Kennedy v. UK 
(2010); and Brunet v. France (2014). 
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the oversight mechanism. Moreover, Contracting Parties have a positive obligation to 
ensure that private companies do not cooperate in abusive surveillance activities.1395 
In general, no application could be admitted before the ECtHR if national court 
instances have not been exhausted first. However, in that particular case, the ECtHR has 
admitted the application without it first being examined by the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal, since that tribunal does not afford an effective remedy due to its particularly 
secretive nature.1396 A court decision for both the Hungarian and the British applications 
is still pending. 
Because of the limited redress that individuals have at the European level against 
mass surveillance activities, some of them have opted for initiating national procedures 
instead. In this sense, proceedings started in 2014 in German, French and British courts 
about the lawfulness of the PRISM programme. On 3 February 2014, three German 
NGOs1397 lodged a criminal complaint before the German courts against the NSA and 
GCHQ about ‘mass surveillance, illegal covert intelligence activities, violations of the 
basic rights to privacy, and obstruction of justice by tolerating and supporting illegal 
surveillance of German citizens’.1398 In August 2014, in France, The International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the French Human Rights League (LDH) 
filed a complaint before the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris.1399 In the UK, 
Privacy International issued a complaint before the UK’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal 
(UKIPT) on 13 May 2014, challenging the use of hacking tools (particularly, Upstream 
and PRISM) by the British intelligence services.1400  
The only court that has issued its decision to date is the UKIPT. The tribunal stated 
in December 2014 that the interception of the claimants’ communications did not 
contravene Articles 8 and 10 ECHR and, therefore, no breach had been committed.1401 
However, in February 2015 the UKIPT clarified that before the PRISM and Upstream 
                                                
1395 Korff 2014, p. 33. 
1396 Letter of the ECtHR accepting the case, 16 January 2014, available from 
https://www.privacynotprism.org.uk/assets/files/privacynotprism/letter_from_ecthr_to_uk_gov.pdf [16 
November 2014]. 
1397 The International League for Human Rights, Chaos Computer Club (CCC) and Digitalcourage. 
1398 ‘German govt and intelligence agencies face penal charges for spying’, EDRi-gram newsletter - 
Number 12.3, 12.02.2014. 
1399 Available from http://es.scribd.com/doc/153099627/Plainteprism-Finale [23 December 2014]. 
1400 Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Application MPS/FT/002295/000, 13.05.2014; Witness Statement on 
behalf of GCHQ, Case N. IPT/13/92/CH, 16.5.2014.  




disclosures, the regime governing GCHQ data processing originally contravened the 
ECHR but that it was now adequate.1402  
From this examination, it can be concluded that the EU could eventually have a role 
in intelligence services’ matters. However, there are legal and also political issues that 
stop the EU from legislating on intelligence services, under the assumption that their 
activities are part of the ‘national security’ exclusion. Yet, there is no clear definition 
within the EU laws of what this concept includes.1403  
Besides the current judicial cases involving national intelligence services, one might 
wonder whether IntCen could be reviewed by the CJEU. If we consider that IntCen falls 
completely within the scope of the CFSP, the general rule is that the CJEU does not 
have jurisdiction in the field of CFSP.1404 Yet, there are two exceptions to this rule.1405 
One is the Court’s jurisdiction on matters concerning the delimitation between areas. 
According to Article 24 TEU, the CJEU has: 
 
‘[J]urisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to 
review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of 
Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.’ 
 
Under this provision, the Court could decide whether IntCen falls completely under 
the scope of the CFSP or for only certain of its activities. For those actions adopted as 
EU internal security measures, IntCen could be subject to external supervision in the 
future. The body in charge of it may be composed of national DPAs (similar to the 
current Joint Supervisory Body for Europol) or even the CJEU. 
Another exception of the CJEU non-jurisdiction rule concerns those restrictive 
measures that affect natural or legal persons. The most discussed case regarding this 
exception is Kadi and Al Barakaad about economic sanctions.1406 As seen in Kadi saga, 
the CJEU safeguards that all EU measures and EU bodies respect the EU fundamental 
principles such as accountability, the right to fair hearing, the right to respect for 
                                                
1402 [2015] UKIPTrib, 13_77/H. Case no. IPT/13/92/CH, IPT/13/168-173/H, IPT/13/194/CH, 
IPT/13/204/CH, 06.02.2015. 
1403 ‘The relation between the surveillance practices in the EU and the US and the EU data protection 
provisions’, PE524.632v01-00, European Parliament, Working Document 3, 12.12.2013, p. 4. 
1404 Article 275(1) TFEU. 
1405 Brkan M 2012, ‘The role of the European Court of Justice in the field of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy after the Treaty of Lisbon: New challenge for the future’ in EU external relations law and 
policy in the post-Lisbon era, ed. Paul-James Cardwell, Springer, Berlin, pp. 97-118. 
1406 Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, 18.07.2013. 
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property and principle of proportionality, and the right to effective judicial review are 
complied with. In order to do that, the Court can request classified intelligence during 
its reviews. This is established in Article 65 of the Rules of Procedure, which state that 
the CJEU may participate in an inquiry as part of ongoing judicial proceedings.1407 This 
inquiry can include the request of classified intelligence. The Court did not need to use 
this provision for Kadi, but it might have a crucial role if the CJEU ever needs to review 
IntCen activities in the future. 
  
5.4.  The relevance of Article 39 TEU 
 
Article 39 TEU was included for the first time with the Treaty of Lisbon. This clause 
gives a possibility to establish specific EU rules on the processing of personal data for 
activities falling under the scope of the CFSP. As seen in Chapter 2 of this thesis, data 
processed by IntCen and data collected during CSDP missions are two of the activities 
that could be regulated under Article 39 TEU. This provision regulates ‘the processing 
of personal data by the Member States’. IntCen does not currently have any operational 
role, and it cannot collect information by itself. The centre gathers representatives of 
intelligence agencies in the member states for exchanging information and drafting 
terrorism assessment reports. In other words, intelligence processed in the centre comes 
directly from member states and other EU bodies. Therefore, Article 39 TEU could 
certainly serve as legal basis for the activities of the centre. 
The Council is the institution that would regulate IntCen’s data processing activities. 
The kind of measure to be taken would not be a legislative act, since this is not 
permitted under the CFSP.1408 Instead, the Council should adopt a decision, which 
would be voted in unanimously.1409 Such a Council decision on Article 39 TEU, even if 
it constitutes an exception of the general data protection provision of Article 16 TFEU, 
would improve the current situation in which every member state has its own legal 
framework, if they have any at all. 
As mentioned earlier, IntCen connects both EU internal security and external 
security matters. In that sense, Salmi points out that the centre can ‘also provide 
analysis of terrorism and other global threats that are reflected in the EU internal 
                                                
1407 OJ L 265, 29.09.2012, pp. 1-42. 
1408 Article 24(1) TEU. 
1409 Article 31(1) TEU. 
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security’.1410 Article 39 TFEU rules would only apply for external security issues. That 
information collected within the scope of the EU internal security, as part of the AFSJ, 
would conform the general rules on data protection as stipulated in Article 16 TFEU. In 
other words, intelligence exchanged through IntCen to prevent or detect EU threats 
would fall within the scope of the AFSJ and, consequently, it would be subject to 
Article 16 TFEU. In contrast, intelligence exchanged by the centre beyond the EU 
territory to investigate international threats will be processed as part of the CFSP. In 
such cases, Article 39 TEU – never used to date – could serve as legal basis. 
Either way, it is clear that the EU has competence to establish rules for IntCen. A 
transparent mandate for the centre would surely increase the intelligence cooperation 




The Snowden revelations about intelligence services’ data collection and processing 
activities have caused great concern within the EU. The leaked documents show that not 
only is the NSA collecting massive amounts of personal data from untargeted 
individuals, but also that intelligence agencies in the member states are carrying out 
these same practices within the EU. This chapter has identified some of these activities, 
scrutinising their potential infringement of the EU fundamental right to data protection. 
This chapter has presented two different case scenarios in which intelligence 
services’ activities may clash with EU citizens’ right to data protection: 1) when foreign 
intelligence services collaborate with private companies and EU intelligence services to 
process mass data of EU citizens (section 3); and 2) when intelligence services in the 
EU process mass data of EU citizens (section 4). What both cases have in common is 
that EU laws are in principle not applicable.  
Nevertheless, the EU has several forms of redress for EU citizens at the national, 
European and international levels against intelligence services’ activities. At the 
national level, despite all member states having oversight mechanisms over intelligence 
services’ activities, these differ from one country to the other. In some countries, 
intelligence agencies have the power to access information lawfully without a prior 
court order, whereas in other countries more stringent limitations apply. A way to 
                                                
1410 Salmi I 2014, ‘Multilateral intelligence cooperation in the EU’, Gnosis Rivista italiana di Intelligence, 
no. 2. Available from http://gnosis.aisi.gov.it/Gnosis/Rivista39.nsf/ServNavig/24 [28 October 2014]. 
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harmonise these oversight measures would be by clarifying the IntCen’s mandate. This 
chapter suggests the use of Article 39 TEU to establish rules on the information 
exchanged by intelligence services through IntCen, including the data protection 
standards they would have to comply with. 
The EU has assumed that ‘national security’ activities are those carried out by 
intelligence services and, consequently, its regulation and control is almost non-existent 
at the EU level. However, this chapter has showed that national security duties can be 
conducted by either intelligence services or law enforcement authorities. Police 
agencies have been taking on intelligence-gathering roles over the years and, therefore, 
the tasks of both types of agencies overlap at times. Likewise, although intelligence 
services have national security tasks, they may also conduct EU ‘internal security’ and 
‘external security’ functions. Therefore, the ‘national security’ exclusion of Articles 
4(2) TEU and Articles 72/73 TFEU needs to be clarified. 
Finally, even if no express provisions are currently found in the Treaty of Lisbon and 
EU secondary laws, intelligence services’ activities of member states need to comply 
with the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. There are at the moment three 
pending cases involving intelligence services at the ECtHR and the CJEU. On the one 
hand, the ECtHR is examining whether British and Hungarian secret services’ activities 
are infringing Article 8 of the ECHR. On the other hand, an Irish court has issued a 
preliminary ruling before the CJEU asking whether Facebook and other tech companies 
have infringed Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter by cooperating with intelligence agencies 
via PRISM. These might become landmark cases. They will not only show the 
effectiveness of data protection rules for EU citizens, but will also reveal to what extent 
EU laws might be enforceable against global tech companies (like Facebook), secret 
services of the member states (like GCHQ) and even intelligence agencies beyond the 













































Chapter 5: The feasibility of global data protection standards for 
information processed for security purposes 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 presented the existing EU frameworks for data shared by law 
enforcement authorities within the EU and between the EU and third countries. The data 
protection challenges to which these give rise have also been examined. As a response 
to these challenges, Chapter 3 has suggested enhancing the use of Europol during cross-
border police investigations. Europol has strong data protection and security standards, 
which member states and third countries could also incorporate in their own legal 
frameworks. Despite this thesis being mainly focused on law enforcement data 
transfers, Chapter 4 has examined data processing activities conducted by intelligence 
services. The reason for this chapter is that law enforcement authorities work hand in 
hand with intelligence services, and the division of their activities has become more 
diffuse over the years. 
So far this thesis has suggested increasing the role of Europol and IntCen as a way to 
establish global data protection standards in the field of security. The final part of this 
thesis will identify other current international initiatives that put forward global data 
protection principles in the field of security. It will present an overview of the main 
instruments for establishing global data protection standards and it will then discuss 
some shortcomings related to some of these initiatives. 
In order to understand the necessity for common data protection standards in the field 
of security, a first assessment of the compatibility of mass surveillance activities with 
the public international law will be conducted. These activities are mostly carried out by 
intelligence services (rather than by law enforcement agencies), as the Snowden 
documents have proved. After that, it will analyse the principles enshrined in the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines, the APEC Privacy Framework, the UN Guidelines for the 
Regulation of Computerised Personal Data Files, the 1981 CoE Convention and the 
Cybercrime Convention. Other general principles not linked to any international 
organisation will be also considered. This examination will help identify which of these 
rules would bind security agents. 
In sum, this chapter seeks to assess whether it is feasible to have data protection 
standards at the international level establishing rules that compel both law enforcement 
and intelligence services. If so, it will determine what the ideal global data protection 
 
 274 
framework would be. It will particularly discuss whether rules should be enclosed in 
one single law, a dual system, or a multiple legal framework.  
 
1.  Compatibility of mass surveillance systems with public international law 
 
From the international law perspective, the debate on the lawfulness of intelligence 
services’ activities is unresolved. Under public international law, espionage is neither 
permitted not prohibited.1411 But what about the specific mass surveillance activities that 
were exposed by Snowden? 
If mass surveillance activities are seen as an ‘intervention’ in the terms of 
international law, then they are generally prohibited.1412 The principle of non-
intervention in customary international law may only be breached in times of war, and if 
the parties are engaged in armed conflict.1413 Likewise, that ‘intervention’ could also be 
permitted if there is consent from the targeted state.1414 The Snowden disclosures have 
proved that the NSA and the other members of ‘5-Eyes’ have been spying on the 
governments of numerous countries such as Germany,1415 Mexico,1416 France1417 and 
Brazil.1418 When that took place, there was no armed conflict affecting these countries, 
and they never consented to that surveillance.1419  
Another rule stemming from the customary international law is that an ‘intervention’ 
is prohibited if it takes place ‘within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.1420 Because 
of this rule, it becomes very difficult to condemn the activities conducted by the ‘5-
Eyes’ members. Since the communications are, in principle, intercepted from outside of 
the country, the activities are not considered unlawful.1421 
                                                
1411 Aust HP 2014, ‘Stellungsnahme zur Sachverständigenanhörung’, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 
05.06.2014. Available from www.bundestag.de [6 November 2014]. 
1412 Article 2(7) UN Charter. 
1413 Article 51 UN Charter. 
1414 Article 24 UN Charter. 
1415 Oltermann P 2014, ‘NSA tapped German ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder's phone – report’, The 
Guardian, 4 February. Available from http://www.theguardian.com [22 December 2014]. 
1416 Glüsing J, Poitras L, Rosenbach M & Stark H 2013, ‘Fresh Leak on US Spying: NSA accessed 
Mexican President's email’, Spiegel, 20 October. Available from http://www.spiegel.de [22 December 
2014]. 
1417 ‘Success Story’: NSA Targeted French Foreign Ministry’, Spiegel, 01.09.2013. Available from 
http://www.spiegel.de [22 December 2014]. 
1418 ‘Report: NSA spied on Brazilians, Mexican presidents’, CBSNews, 01.09.2013. Available from 
http://www.cbsnews.com [22 December 2014].  
1419 Korff  2014, p. 4. 
1420 Article 2(7) UN Charter. 
1421 Korff 2014, pp. 6-7. 
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Nevertheless, the majority of surveillance activities that have been unveiled have not 
had other states as targets, but individuals. The customary international law regulates 
the possible breach of inter-state norms about respecting each other’s sovereignty, but 
the question of the violation of individual human rights is dealt with as a separate issue. 
For these cases, international human rights law applies as a special branch of the public 
international law. Human rights laws protect individuals, not states, and they are 
characterised for being both treaty-based and customary. There are two specific UN 
laws on international human rights that include a provision on the right to privacy: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Articles 17 ICCPR and 12 UDHR establish that: 
 
‘1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour 
and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.’ 
 
According to these provisions, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,1422 as 
well as the former1423 and the current1424 UN Special Rapporteurs on human rights and 
counter-terrorism have noted that mass surveillance programmes used by intelligence 
agencies are almost certainly illegal under international law. All members of the ‘5-
Eyes’ are parties to the ICCPR and the UDHR, but only the ICCPR has legally binding 
effects for its members. This treaty was adopted by the UN in 1966 (but it did not enter 
into force until 1976) and has 167 states parties, including the US. 
The ICCPR is supervised by the Human Rights Committee. This committee is 
composed of several independent experts and it assesses whether the parties of the 
Covenant are complying with their obligations. In addition, it adopts General Comments 
on the interpretation of each of the ICCPR provisions. Unfortunately, the only General 
Comment on Article 17 ICCPR was released by the committee in 1988. In it, it was 
                                                
1422 The right to privacy in the digital age. Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, A/HRC/27/37, 30.06.2014. 
1423 Scheinin, M 2013, ‘LIBE Committee Inquiry on Electronic Mass Surveillance of EU Citizens 
Hearing’, European Parliament, 14 October, p. 6. 
1424 United Nations, General Assembly, Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, A/69/297, 23.09.2014. 
 
 276 
concluded that the idea of ‘correspondence’ needed to be extended to the digital 
sphere.1425 
The main instrument that can be used to assess whether the NSA programmes violate 
Article 17 ICCPR is the privacy limitation test published by the former Special 
Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism Martin Scheinin in 2009.1426 The test 
consists of seven points that, if complied with, could justify the limitation of any human 
right by the government. The specific requirements are the following: i) the restriction 
must be provided by law, ii) the essence of the human right cannot be restricted, iii) the 
restriction must be necessary in a democratic society, iv) any discretion in the restriction 
must not be unfettered, v) the restriction must be necessary for reaching a legitimate 
aim, vi) the restriction must obey the principle of proportionality, and vii) the restriction 
must be consistent with the other ICCPR rights. 
As Scheinin explained before the EP in October 2013, the NSA mass surveillance 
systems fail to comply with ‘several separate elements of the permissible limitations 
test’ as regards the right to privacy.1427 The failure was based on six elements: a) the 
NSA programmes are not provided by law so they lack of a proper legal basis; b) the 
essence of the right to privacy is violated because the collection of data does not 
distinguish among types and sensitivity of the information; c) the interferences are not 
justified for the actual prevention of terrorism and other serious crimes; d) FISA leaves 
room for unfettered discretion; e) the intrusion is disproportionate in comparison with 
the results achieved; f) and the restrictions clash with other human rights besides the 
right to privacy like the right to non-discrimination (Article 26), the freedom of 
expression (Article 19), the freedom of association (Article 22) and the freedom of 
movement (Article 12). 
The inconsistency of both US and UK security laws with other ICCPR rights is 
particularly visible as regards the right to non-discrimination. The RIPA in the UK and 
the FISA in the US make distinctions between foreign and domestic communications. 
Consequently, there is a distinction between nationals (and long term residents), and 
                                                
1425 United Nations, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 16 (Article 17), para. 10, 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), 27.05.2008, p. 193.  
1426 Scheinin 2009, para. 17. The limitations test is endorsed by La Rue, F 2013, ‘Promotion and 
protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to 
development. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’, General Assembly of the United Nations, 
A/HRC/23/40. 
1427 Scheinin 2013, p. 3. 
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non-nationals. According to RIPA, ‘external’ warrants allow the collection of bulk 
data,1428 whereas ‘internal’ warrants do not permit it. Likewise, FISA discriminates non-
US citizens, whose privacy is not protected by the US Fourth Amendment. In that sense, 
Korff suggested redrafting these laws to conform to Article 26 ICCPR.1429 
The issue of extra-territoriality of the ICCPR is crucial for determining whether the 
‘5-eyes’ activities have violated the Covenant or not. Most of the surveillance 
programmes that have been revealed by Snowden allow intelligence agents to access 
foreign communications without even moving from their headquarters. The Internet has 
changed the way espionage works. Today, simply by installing software, analysts are 
able to break into any computer or tap any phone and collect all types of information.  
That being said, NSA mass surveillance programmes will only be subject to ICCPR 
if extra-territoriality applies. The answer is not clear, since Article 17 ICCPR does not 
include any reference to its territorial scope of application, which means that the 
definition of the scope for the right to privacy is entrusted to Article 2(1) ICCPR.1430 
According to this provision, the Contracting Parties are obliged to comply with the 
rights of the Covenant ‘within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’. This has been 
the argument used by the US government to conclude that the surveillance of ‘foreign’ 
communications does not fall under the scope of ICCPR. 
In contrast, the Human Rights Committee has long taken the position that the ICCPR 
applies extra-territorially. In 2004, the Committee released General Comments on the 
nature of the ICCPR obligations, in which it noted that rules included in the Covenant 
were ‘erga omnes’. The Committee added that the Contracting Parties must ensure the 
ICCPR rights to anyone ‘even if not situated within the territory of the State Party’.1431 
The Committee has kept this position to date, giving rise to numerous cases that confirm 
the extraterritorial reach of the ICCPR.1432  
The International Court of Justice has also addressed the extraterritorial scope of 
human rights treaties, including the ICCPR. In its Advisory Opinion on the Wall built 
                                                
1428 Section 8(4) warrants. See Korff 2014, p. 21; and Bowcott O 2014, ‘Social media mass surveillance is 
permitted by law, says top UK official’, The Guardian, 17 June. Available from www.theguardian.com [6 
November 2014]. 
1429 Korff 2014, p. 26. 
1430 Scheinin M 2014, ‘To the Extent the ICCPR has Extraterritorial Effect, the Right to Privacy Is Not an 
Exception’, written statement for Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board’s hearing on 19.03.2014 
Washington, D.C., p. 3. 
1431 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States 
Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para.10. 
1432 For instance, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (52/1979), Sophie Vidal Martins v. Uruguay (57/1979), and 
Guye et al. v. France (196/1985).  
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by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), it concluded that ‘while the 
jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the 
national territory’.1433  
Similarly, both the former and current UN Special Rapporteurs on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms believe that the ICCPR has an 
extraterritorial effect. On the one hand, Scheinin noted that positive state obligations 
may not apply outside a country’s own territory, but negative obligations not to violate 
human rights apply everywhere and in respect of everyone.1434 One the other hand, 
Emmerson stated that States are legally bound to the Covenant and should offer the 
same protection to nationals and to non-nationals.1435 According to these arguments, the 
US and the rest of the ‘5-Eyes’ members have infringed the negative obligation of not 
violating individuals’ right to privacy. Likewise, intelligence services’ surveillance 
activities, even if conducted from home, are in breach of the right to privacy of Article 
17.1436 
Assuming that the ICCPR applies extra-territorially, one last question needs to be 
answered: what are the legal remedies on public international law when a violation of 
the ICCPR occurs? The supervisor on the compliance of the ICCPR provisions is the 
Human Rights Committee. The UN adopted an Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, which 
allowed individuals within the jurisdiction of one of the Contracting Parties to issue a 
complaint for the alleged violation of any of the ICCPR provisions. Individuals need to 
exhaust all domestic remedies first, and the application cannot be examined by another 
international body (e.g. the ECtHR) at the same time. Also, it must be noted that the 
only ‘5-Eyes’ members that have ratified the protocol are Australia,1437 Canada1438 and 
New Zealand.1439 Thus, since the US and the UK have not ratified it, no individual 
complaint against those countries could be issued today. 
The Human Rights Committee can still evaluate the compliance of the ICCPR, even 
if the Contracting Parties have not ratified the protocol, through two other mechanisms: 
The inter-state complaint procedure (Article 41) and the mandatory reports that parties 
                                                
1433 Cour Internationale de Justice, ‘Consequénces juridiques de l’edification d’un mur dans le territoire 
Palestinien occuppé’, Advisory Opinion 09.07.2004, para. 109. 
1434 Scheinin 2014, p. 5. 
1435 United Nations, General Assembly, Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, A/69/297, 23.09.2014, pp.17. 
1436 Scheinin 2014, p. 7. 
1437 It was ratified on 20 September 1991. 
1438 It was ratified on 19 May 1976. 
1439 It was ratified on 26 May 1989. 
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must submit under the Committee request (Article 40). The possibility to submit an 
inter-state complaint has never been used to date, but it would allow one State party to 
complain about the violation of the Covenant by another party. For instance, it could 
occur that Germany or another targeted country starts an inter-state complaint procedure 
against the US. As for the periodical state reports, the Human Rights Committee has 
recently released concluding observations of the Fourth report of the United States of 
America1440 in which it expressed serious concerns about the NSA surveillance. On this 
matter, the Committee recommended that the US conform to the obligations of Article 
17 ICCPR by specifying in detail the circumstances, duration, procedures and 
safeguards of the surveillance. In addition, the Committee urged a reform of the 
oversight system over surveillance activities and the inclusion of judicial supervision.1441 
The legal nature of the Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations is 
imprecise. Some of the literature establishes that they constitute mere 
recommendations,1442 whereas other scholars describe them as a ‘soft law’ 
instrument.1443 Therefore, even if the Committee Concluding Observations might carry a 
considerable legal weight, it is not certain that they will shape the subsequent practice in 
the US as regards mass surveillance activities.   
After this analysis it can be concluded that the ICCPR appears to be insufficient for 
the protection of the right to privacy against mass surveillance programmes used by law 
enforcement and intelligence services. In that sense, the Art. 29 WP proposed to 
adoption of an additional protocol to Article 17 in which the meaning of ‘data 
processing’ is clarified and its safeguards are guaranteed to all individuals.1444  
However, the proposal has not been successful. Others have urged the Human Rights 
Committee to adopt an up-to-date General Comment on Article 17 to codify and clarify 
the existing law, including on the issue of extraterritorial effect.1445 This has yet to 
occur. 
                                                
1440 Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United Nations Committee on Human 
Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 30.12.2011. 
1441 Human Rights Committee. Concluding observations on the fourth report of the United States of 
America, 110th session (10–28 March 2014), p. 9. 
1442 ‘Implementation of UN Treaty Body Concluding Observations: The Role of National and Regional 
Mechanisms in Europe’, Summary and recommendations form the High Level Seminar held on 19-20 
September 2011, pp. 1-2. 
1443 Guzman AT & Meyer T 2011, ‘International Soft Law’, UC Berkeley, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Berkeley; and ‘Sources of International Law’, Icelandic Human Rights Center. 
Available from www.humanrights.is [6 November 2014]. 
1444 WP215, 10.04.2014, p. 16. 
1445 ‘Privacy Rights in the Digital Age. A Proposal for a New General Comment on the Right to Privacy 
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2.  Initiatives to establish international data protection principles  
 
After the examination of the international rules that could criminalise those mass 
surveillance activities conducted by intelligence agencies, it is crucial to explore 
whether there are also any international data protection principles that compel these 
agencies. If not, could any of the existing data protection legal frameworks be 
established globally in the future? 
Previous chapters of this thesis have analysed the data protection rules adopted 
within the EU legal framework (i.e. those included in Directive 95/46/EC, Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA and Europol Council Decision). That analysis has 
confirmed that the EU has stricter data protection principles than other third countries. 
Likewise, it has concluded the EU does not apply the same rules if data is processed for 
commercial purposes, rather than for security reasons. It has also been shown that EU 
laws do not include, in principle, intelligence services. Because of these complexities, 
the EU can hardly become the model institution for a universal data protection 
framework today. 
That said, it is necessary to scrutinise whether other international organisations 
would be in a better position to export their data protection principles worldwide. In this 
sense, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United 
Nations, and the Council of Europe have included principles on privacy and data 
protection in their legal frameworks. Particularly, this section examines principles 
enshrined in the OECD Privacy Guidelines, the APEC Privacy Framework, the UN 
Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, the 1981 CoE 
Convention and the Cybercrime Convention.  
 
2.1. OECD Privacy Guidelines 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is the 
organisation that represents the major world economies. It released a Recommendation 
of the Council concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (hereinafter, OECD Privacy Guidelines) in 
September 1980. OECD Privacy Guidelines include principles such as the collection 
                                                
under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A Draft Report and General 
Comment by the American Civil Liberties Union’, ACLU, March 2014. 
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limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation and accountability. Back in 
the 1980s, these Guidelines had a crucial role since they served as the source of 
inspiration for other legal frameworks, such as Directive 95/46/EC in 1995; Generally 
Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPP) in 2003, 2006 and 2009;1446 and Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) privacy principles in 2005.1447 
In addition to the OECD Privacy Guidelines, in 2007 the OECD adopted a 
Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting 
Privacy.1448 It was later developed by an Action Plan for the Global Privacy 
Enforcement Network (GPEN), which connects twenty-two privacy enforcement 
authorities from around the world.1449 Unfortunately, neither the OECD Privacy 
Guidelines nor the GPEN have binding effects on the Contracting Parties. 
Because of the massive growth of international data flows in the last thirty years, the 
OECD Privacy Guidelines urged the amendment of the rules. The review of the OECD 
Guidelines was officially announced during the Seoul Declaration for the Future of the 
Internet Economy in 2008.1450 In October 2011 the OECD Working Party on 
Information Security and Privacy (WPISP) released the terms of reference for the 
review.1451 The review of the guidelines finally took place in July 2013 by a Privacy 
Experts Group of the OECD Working Party on Information Security and Privacy.  
The 2013 OECD Privacy Guidelines incorporate new rules on data breach 
notification, risk management and interoperability activities through national strategies. 
All principles that existed in the 1980, however, remain unchanged.1452 This issue has 
caused different reactions among privacy experts: one the one hand, there are some 
scholars who agree with keeping the principles as they were in 1980; but on the other 
hand, there are those experts in favour of changing them. Regarding the latter, a study 
conducted by Cate, Cullen and Mayer-Schönberger in December 2013 suggested 
                                                
1446 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc. and Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants. Generally Accepted Privacy Principles. Last version from August 2009. Available from 
www.aicpa.org [6 November 2014]. 
1447 APEC Privacy Framework 2005. Available from www.apec.org [6 November 2014].  
1448 Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy, 
12.06.2007, p. 9. Available from <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/28/38770483.pdf> [6 November 
2014]. 
1449 GPEN Action Plan, 15.06.2012; Part E amended 22.01.2013. For further information, see 
https://www.privacyenforcement.net/public/activities [6 November 2014]. 
1450 OECD Ministerial Meeting on the Future of the Internet Economy, Seoul, Korea, 17/18.06.2008. 
1451 Terms of reference for the review of OECD Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Working Party on Information Security and Privacy, 
DSTI/ICCP/REG(2011)4/FINAL, 31.10.2011. 
1452 Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, C(80)58/FINAL, 11.07.213. 
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lowering the existing standards of privacy and data protection.1453 In particular, it 
proposed a reduction of the rules on data collection, as well as more focus on data 
processing guidelines. Moreover, that study noted that, instead of specifying the 
purpose by which certain data was used, rules on the ‘not compatible’ purposes should 
be included. In that sense, the authors proposed replacing the ‘collection limitation 
principle’ and the ‘use specification principle’ for a simple ‘collection principle’ and 
‘use principle’. Finally, they suggested including an ‘enforcement principle’ to ensure 
that all countries have the adequate laws and bodies to achieve effective compliance of 
the principles. 
In contrast, a study released in March 2014 by Ann Cavoukian, Alexander Dix and 
Khaled El Emam1454 suggested maintaining the current OECD principles. The only 
change the authors proposed was the addition of the privacy by design principle.1455 
They also criticised the report of Mayer-Schönberger et al., arguing that the OECD rules 
needed to be reinforced rather than diminished.  
It can thus be seen that, even after the revision of OECD Privacy Guidelines, many 
issues are still unclear. The 2013 OECD Privacy Guidelines came out in the same 
month Snowden exposed the mass surveillance conducted by intelligence services 
around the world. OECD rules only cover data processing activities within the scope of 
commercial or economic operations. Any data collected by law enforcement or 
intelligence authorities falls out of the competence of the organisation. However, the 
revelations have proved that a large amount of information collected by private 
companies for commercial purposes is later processed by governments for security 
reasons. 
Because of this, my view is that the OECD guidelines could maintain the same 
foundational principles but they should include rules limiting the use and transfer of 
personal data collected by companies located in one of the OECD Contracting Parties 
(including the US, which is a member of the OECD). In any event, since the OECD 
Guidelines are not mandatory, the possibilities to use this instrument for the 
establishment of global data protection safeguards are minimal. 
 
                                                
1453 Cate FH, Cullen P & Mayer-Schönberger V 2013, ‘Data Protection Principles for the 21st Century. 
Revising the 1980 OECD Guidelines’, Oxford Internet Institute (OII), University of Oxford. 
1454 Cavoukian A, Dix A and El Emam K 2014, ‘The unintended consequences of privacy paternalism’, 
Information and Privacy Commissioner Ontario, Canada. 5 March. 
1455 See Appendix of their study for the 7 foundational principles of Privacy-by-Design. 
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2.2.  APEC Privacy Framework 
 
Another international organisation that has released privacy principles to be met by its 
members is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). APEC is comprised 
of twenty-one economies around Asia and the Pacific, which represent the 40% of the 
world population and the 54% of the world GDP.1456 
In the last ten years, APEC has brought great progress to the field of privacy. In 
November 2004 it established privacy guidelines that protected the information 
transferred among APEC economies. In particular, these guidelines established nine 
core privacy principles: preventing harm, notice, collection limitation, uses of personal 
information, choice, integrity of personal information, security safeguards, access and 
correction, and accountability.1457 However, the rules were non-binding and, hence, they 
could not be enforced.  
Therefore, in 2010, the APEC guidelines were reinforced through the establishment 
of APEC Cross-Border Privacy Enforcement Arrangement (CPEA). It promoted the 
creation of Privacy Enforcement Authorities (PEAs) that would supervise data shared 
among APEC regions.1458 One year later, APEC announced the establishment of the 
Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system ‘to reduce barriers to information flows, 
enhance consumer privacy, and promote interoperability across regional data privacy 
regimes’.1459 Unlike the previous guidelines, these are mandatory for their members. 
For a country to be part of the APEC CBPR system, it needs to first comply with the 
Charter of the Cross Border Privacy Rules Joint Oversight Panel, as well as a self-
assessment questionnaire. The questionnaire is based on the nine APEC Privacy 
Principles mentioned above, and is reviewed by an APEC-recognised Accountability 
Agent, who assesses and enforces the laws.1460  The country must also have a PEA, as a 
public body responsible for enforcing the Privacy Law of the Economy’s 
jurisdiction.1461 A Joint Oversight Panel is the body in charge of supervising the 
                                                
1456 Kropf J & Crompton M 2013, ‘The EU and APEC: A roadmap for global interoperability?’, IAPP, 26 
November. Available from www.privacyassociation.org [6 November 2014]. 
1457 APEC Privacy Framework 2005. 
1458 APEC Cooperation Arrangement for Cross-Border Privacy Enforcement, 
2010/SOM1/ECSG/DPS/013, Data Privacy Subgroup Meeting Hiroshima, Japan, 28.02.2010. 
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12/13.11.2011. Available from www.apec.org [6 November 2014]. 
1460 APEC cross-border privacy rules system. Policies, rules and guidelines, p. 3. Available from 
www.apec.org [6 November 2014]. 
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adequacy of Accountability Agent and PEAs, with powers to suspend them if they 
commit any irregularity.1462 It is composed of representatives from three APEC 
economies, who are appointed for a period of two years. 
The first country to participate in the APEC CBPR system was the US in September 
2012; and IBM was the first certified company in August 2013. The system is binding, 
so the countries and companies subscribing to it must have privacy policies consistent 
with the APEC principles. Unfortunately, there are today only four APEC economies 
(the US, Mexico, Canada and Japan) and four companies (IBM, Merck, Workday, 
Lynda.com and Yodlee) participating in the CBPR.1463 The number of countries can, 
however, increase in the future. In fact, Australia is already on its way to joining the 
system.1464 
 A relevant issue of the CBPR is its to the Binding Corporate Rules (BCR). The scope 
of the BCR is foreseen in the proposal for an EU regulation on data protection. These 
rules will allow the establishing of standards within the EU for the transfer of data, 
irrespective of the data protection framework in the destination country.1465 
 However, the CBPR and the BCR are not fully equivalent. On this issue, the Art. 29 
WP published a study in February 2014 identifying the common aspects and differences 
between the CBPR and the BCR.1466 One of the main distinctions is that the BCR must 
be approved by national DPAs whereas the CBPR have APEC Accountability Agents as 
supervisory bodies.  
In any event, as in the OECD principles, APEC privacy rules would never apply for 
information processed by individuals or governments. Consequently, even if the twenty-
one economies decided to join the regime, it would hardly become a model to follow for 






                                                
1462 APEC cross-border privacy rules system. Policies, rules and guidelines, p. 9.  
1463 Available from http://www.cbprs.org [6 November 2014]. 
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Privacy perspectives, 4 September. Available from https://privacyassociation.org [6 November 2014]. 
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2.3. UN Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerised Personal Data Files 
 
In 1990, after more than ten years of negotiations,1467 the United Nations (UN) released 
guidelines concerning computerised personal data files.1468 This instrument establishes 
that personal information cannot be used for purposes contrary to the provisions of the 
UN Charter. These guidelines include privacy principles such as lawfulness and 
fairness, accuracy, purpose specification, non-discrimination, data security and interest-
person access. They also require the designation of an independent supervisory 
authority, and they foresee sanctions in case of a violation.  
The UN today has 193 members. Therefore, any law adopted under the framework of 
this organisation can already be considered ‘universal’. However, the UN guidelines 
concerning computerised personal data files have been adopted by the UN General 
Assembly and, hence, they do not have binding effects. Moreover, they are guidelines 
that need to be implemented at the country’s discretion. For this reason, these principles 
have often been under-used and undervalued.  
Today, the UN Guidelines concerning computerised personal data files have been 
abandoned. They were created in 1990, but in the last twenty-five years enormous 
technological advances have taken place. These changes have made it a necessity to 
reform all existing privacy laws but, strangely, no amendment on the UN guidelines has 
been announced for the moment.  
The UN Guidelines need to be updated. An alternative to this amendment has been 
suggested by Paul De Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou. These scholars proposed the 
creation of a new specialised UN Agency, similar to the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), to promote the principles.1469 The same guidelines from 1990 
could be utilised, but they would have a greater impact because they would fall under 
the scope of a specialised UN agency.  
The only reaction on privacy changes under the UN legal framework has been 
recently launched by Germany and Brazil. In response to the Snowden disclosures, 
these two countries presented to the UN General Assembly in November 2013 a 
resolution claiming the expansion of the right to privacy internationally, as well as the 
                                                
1467 De Hert P & Papakonstantinou V 2013, ‘Three scenarios for international governance of data privacy: 
Towards an international data privacy organization, preferably a UN Agency?’, I/S: a Journal of Law and 
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end of the mass surveillance.1470 This resolution was replaced one year later by a new 
text, which claimed the limitation of metadata processing, among other 
particularities.1471 The new resolution, which still needs to be voted in the UN General 
Assembly, is entitled ‘Right to privacy in the digital age’ and it specifies the States’ 
obligations in the processing of data for security purposes.1472 However, as with the 
1990 UN guidelines, this resolution will be non-binding. 
 
2.4. Council of Europe 1981 Convention and Cybercrime Convention 
 
For more than thirty years now, the Council of Europe (CoE) has been participating in 
the creation of rules concerning the right to privacy and data protection among its 
Contracting Parties. As a general rule, Article 8 ECHR enshrines the right to respect 
everyone’s private and family life and correspondence. More particularly, the CoE has 
two significant instruments: a) the Convention for the protection of individuals with 
regard to the automatic processing of personal data (hereinafter, 1981 CoE 
Convention),1473 and b) the Cybercrime Convention.1474 Both instruments have binding 
effects for its members but while 1981 CoE Convention covers all fields of data 
processing, the Cybercrime Convention of 2001 deals specifically with crimes 
committed by means of electronic networks. However, none of these conventions has 
direct applicability for the individuals: every Contracting Party needs to adopt the 
necessary measures at the domestic level in order to enforce the principles enshrined in 
the conventions.1475 
The CoE has also released numerous recommendations tackling data protection 
issues in 1981,1476 1983,1477 1985,1478 1986,1479 1987,1480 1989,1481 1990,1482 1991,1483 
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1471 Nichols M 2014, ‘Germany, Brazil push the U.N. to be tougher on digital spying’, Reuters, 6 
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1995,1484 1997,1485 1999,1486 2002,1487 2010,1488 2012,1489 and 2014.1490 However, these 
recommendations are not legally binding and, therefore, only the 1981 CoE Convention 
and the Cybercrime Convention are examined in this section. 
The 1981 CoE Convention sets up minimum standards and values on the right to 
privacy that all Contracting Parties need to observe. According to Article 1 of the 
convention, the right to privacy is guaranteed to individuals irrespective of their 
nationality or the place of residence. The convention introduces principles referring to 
the duties of the parties, categories of data, safeguards for the data subjects, 
transnational data flow rules, mutual assistance provisions, and the role of the 
Consultative Committee, among others.  
The 1981 CoE Convention has been ratified for more than forty countries,1491 
becoming a reference for numerous national legislations that have adapted their privacy 
laws to conform to the CoE principles. Moreover, unlike APEC and OECD principles, 
these are applicable to both private and public sectors.  
The Art. 29 WP found in 1998 that the ‘adequacy’ criteria foreseen in the convention 
are almost equivalent to the adequacy conditions of Directive 95/46/EC.1492 In fact, an 
Additional Protocol adopted in 2001 reinforced the weak points of the convention, 
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bringing it closer to Directive 95/46/EC.1493 Could the 1981 CoE Convention set global 
privacy standards? As many academics have already pointed out,1494 it is a very feasible 
option. The following paragraphs discuss the reasons why these principles would 
comply with ideal territorial and temporal features. 
With regard to the territorial scope of the 1981 CoE Convention, the CoE is an 
international organisation constituted after the Second World War with the purpose of 
establishing common human and social rights among countries in Europe. Today, forty-
seven countries are part of the CoE, forty-five of which have ratified the 108 CoE Data 
Protection Convention.1495 Unsurprisingly, the majority of these countries are located 
within European borders. The fact that this international organisation is focused on one 
continent (Europe) could indeed cause problems in its use as reference for the 
establishment of global data protection standards. However, the 108 CoE Data 
Protection Convention is open for accession to non-CoE parties. In that sense, 
Morocco1496 and Uruguay1497 joined to the convention in 2013, and other countries like 
Mexico have already expressed interest in joining it in the future.1498 Therefore, the 
clause for accession of non-members solves the territorial issue. The fact that the CoE is 
a Europe-oriented organisation does not impede the convention’s principles from 
gaining global relevance in the future. 
The second issue of concern is the fact that the content of the convention is, at first 
sight, outdated. Like the OECD Privacy Guidelines, the 108 CoE Data Protection 
Convention was published in 1981, before the era of the Internet. The original goals of 
the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention have not changed today, but privacy has been 
challenged by phenomena that did not exist at the time it was adopted. In particular, the 
global technological evolution as well as the increasing number of counter-terrorism 
measures have led to massive collection, processing and storage of data, urging the 
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amendment of all current data protection legislations. A small amendment in the 1981 
CoE Convention took place in 1999 to enable the EU to become a partner.1499 As 
mentioned above, an additional protocol was included in 2001 with new provisions on 
transborder data flows and the establishment of DPAs. Yet, a new thorough reform of 
the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention was still needed. Therefore, a full reform of 
the convention started to be discussed in 2011. 
The proposal for the modernisation of the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention was 
launched in January 20111500 in the form of a public consultation.1501 Replies from 
governments, data protection authorities, NGOs, the private sector and professional 
associations were compiled by May 2011,1502 and the report on the consultation was 
issued one month later.1503 The document with the proposals for the new 108 CoE Data 
Protection Convention was issued in November 2011,1504 and the Consultative 
Committee of the Convention released an official report with the most significant 
changes in January 2012.1505 This was reviewed in March1506 and April 2012.1507 The 
proposal for modernisation was finalised in December 2012,1508 and the draft1509 was 
then sent to the Committee of Ministers. A specialised group called the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Data Protection (CAHDATA) has been studying the proposal and 
suggesting amendments.1510 The third and last CAHDATA meeting took place on 1-3 
December 2014.1511 The modernised 108 CoE Data Protection Convention has now been 
submitted to the Committee of Ministers, ready for adoption. Then, the Contracting 
Parties will need to sign it. Like in the current 1981 CoE Convention, there is a clause 
that allows non-Contracting Parties to access the Convention. 
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The new proposal includes several issues that need to be highlighted. First, the scope 
foreseen in Article 3 is broader than that in the current convention. It applies to any 
processing of personal data, and not only to automated personal data files. Moreover, 
the proposal reinforces principles such as transparency, proportionality, purpose 
limitation, the right of access, the right to object, the right not to be subject to an 
automated decision, accountability and the duty to notify data breaches.1512 As for the 
definitions, the term ‘automated processing’ is replaced by the wider concept of ‘data 
processing’. The definition of data controller is also modified.1513 
 Article 12 on transborder data flows is particularly relevant for those countries who 
are non-Members of the CoE or have not ratified the convention. An ‘appropriate’ level 
of protection in any transborder data flow will be presumed when data is transferred 
between Contracting Parties. However, according to paragraph 4, a procedure will be 
required to examine the appropriateness when the recipient is a non-Contracting Party. 
For instance, the US, being a non-Contracting Party, will not have the presumed 
‘appropriate’ level of data protection, and will have to comply with Article 12(4) for 
every data transfer it receives from a Contracting Party (e.g. an EU Member State).  
It is interesting that in previous versions of the proposal, third countries were 
required to have an ‘adequate’ level of protection, instead of an ‘appropriate’ level. It is 
not clear why the term has been modified, but this alteration might weaken the original 
data protection standards required for transborder data flows. As Greenleaf explains, the 
adjective ‘appropriate’ is not as strong as ‘adequate’, so the third country’s compliance 
with some principles of the convention would be here sufficient.1514 While adequacy 
requirements can be found in Directive 95/46/EC and the future Data Protection 
Regulation, the term ‘appropriate’ is not defined in any other data protection law. 
Therefore, there will no longer be a formal equivalence between the EU and the CoE 
data protection frameworks.  
Even if the national laws implementing the convention involve national security 
issues,1515 the application of the convention’s rules can be restricted if the State has 
carried out an activity for national security purposes.1516 Therefore, national security 
                                                
1512 Article 5(1), Article 7(2), Article 7(bis), and Article 8 of the draft Convention. 
1513 Article 2 of the draft Convention. 
1514 Greenleaf G 2013, ‘Modernising’ data protection Convention 108: A safe basis for a global privacy 
treaty?’, Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 29, no. 4, July/August 2013, pp. 430-436. 
1515 Currently, ten of the forty-five members have been implementing the convention but they have 
excluded ‘State security’ matters. WP 228, 05.12.2014, p. 19. 
1516 Article 9a of the draft Convention. 
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issues can be excluded from the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention. Yet, there is 
another CoE Convention that does bind national security matters: the CoE Cybercrime 
Convention. 
The Cybercrime Convention (also known as the Budapest Convention) aims at 
combating all crimes committed through and against electronic networks. It was 
adopted due to the increasing number of digital crimes or cybercrimes, to the detriment 
of former ‘conventional’ crimes.1517 It is not an instrument directly promoting the right 
to data protection but it includes a few data protection safeguards such as the 
establishment of an independent supervisory body (Article 15(2)), the need for data 
retention rules (Article 16), data security measures (Article 19), and the use of mutual 
assistance procedures for transnational data exchanges (Articles 25-28), among others. 
In addition, the Cybercrime Convention establishes a low-intrusive mechanism to 
preserve crime-related data that is exemplary. It is called the ‘quick-freeze’ method and 
it consists of freezing data only after a connected crime has been detected. 
As in the 1981 CoE Convention, non-members of the CoE can still ratify the 
Cybercrime Convention. For the moment, six countries outside the CoE are part of the 
Convention: Australia, the Dominican Republic, Japan, Mauritius, Panama and the US. 
Furthermore, eleven other countries have already signed or showed interest in acceding 
to it in the future. Therefore, the Cybercrime Convention complements the 1981 CoE 
Convention by offering specific data protection rules in the field of law enforcement1518 
in the Internet age. 
Considering the recent revelations proving that intelligence services can access 
unlimited information and interfere in all available communications, the Cybercrime 
Convention is of a special relevance. The convention does not include a ‘national 
security’ exemption, so it applies to certain intelligence services’ activities too. 
However, the problem is that the Cybercrime Convention does not explicitly cover all 
mass surveillance activities, but only those data interferences through computer 
systems. Therefore, it should be amended in order to cover any intelligence services’ 
data processing. 
The Cybercrime Convention could, if amended, establish universal data protection 
standards to be obeyed by law enforcement and intelligence authorities around the 
                                                
1517 Van den Hoven van Genderen R 2008, ‘Cybercrime investigation and the protection of personal data 
and privacy’, Council of Europe, Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, 25 May. 
1518 Also in the field of intelligence, as will be seen below. 
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world. Today forty-five countries are already bound to the convention, including the 
US, Panama, Mauritius, Japan, Dominican Republic and Australia.1519 Also, the 
inclusion of an additional protocol on transborder data flows is currently being 
discussed. However, the prospects are not looking very positive for the moment. There 
is a risk that the new framework will soften the conditions for the exchange of crime-
related data instead. As the former EDPS Peter Hustinx and the EP have warned, it 
could result in easier access of intelligence services to personal data.1520 
 
2.5.   Other global data protection principles 
 
Besides the rules proposed by the OECD, the UN, the APEC and the CoE, there are a 
few other initiatives setting up global data protection and privacy principles. 
Particularly, the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), the Madrid Privacy 
declaration,1521 the Charter of Digital Rights,1522 the International Principles on the 
Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance (hereinafter, 
IPAHRCS),1523 and the Tshwane Principles1524 have been created for this purpose. 
Moreover, Australia, Canada and the EU already have their own core privacy principles. 
These are the Australian Information Privacy Principles;1525 the Canadian Generally 
Accepted Privacy Principles (CICA principles);1526 and Directive 95/46/EC1527 and 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA1528 in the EU. 
 
 
                                                
1519 On the signatures, ratifications and entry into force of the convention, see 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG 
[21.02.2015]. 
1520 ‘The relation between the surveillance practices in the EU and the US and the EU data protection 
provisions’, European Parliament, Working Document 3, 12.12.2013; See also Presstv video ‘EU-US 
data sharing deal seen as NSA's potential spying option’, available from 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/10/08/328223/euus-data-sharing-deal-seen-as-nsas-potential-spying-
option/ [7 November 2014]. 
1521 Available from http://thepublicvoice.org/madrid-declaration/ [22 December 2014]. 
1522 Avaialble from  https://www.wepromise.eu/en/page/charter [22 December 2014]. 
1523 Available from https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/text [22 December 2014]. 
1524 The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information (Tshwane Principles), 
12.06.2013. Available from http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/global-principles-
national-security-10232013.pdf [22 December 2014]. 
1525 Schedule 1 of the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012, which amends 
the Australian Privacy Act 1988. 
1526 Generally Accepted Privacy Principles issued by the AICPA/CICA, August 2009. 
1527 OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, 31-50. 








Table 5.1. identifies the principles enshrined in each of these instruments. In order to 
get a complete overview, it also includes the OECD Privacy Guidelines, the APEC 
rules, the UN Guidelines and the two CoE Conventions studied above. 
As demonstrated in the table, the principles vary from one instrument to the next.  
Rules on notification, redress, data access, purpose specification, data quality, security, 
oversight, limited disclosure to third countries and the processing for special categories 
of data are included in almost all laws. Yet, there is no single principle common to all 
thirteen documents.  
In order to discern the most adequate instrument in the field of public security, the 
principles applying to public entities first need to be identified. In this sense, FIPPs, UN 
Guidelines, the Australian principles, Directive 95/46/EC, Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA, the Madrid Declaration, IPAHRCS, the Tshwane Principles and the two 
CoE Conventions apply to the public sector. However, among these, only the Australian 
principles, Directive 95/46/EC, Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA and the 
two CoE Conventions are mandatory for the Contracting Parties. 
Moreover, even if these five instruments compel public bodies, some of them 
exclude from their scope data processed for ‘national security’ purposes. These are 
particularly Directive 95/46/EC and the 1981 CoE Convention. As mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, there is no clarity about what the term ‘national security’ 
includes.  
The ‘national security’ exemption is also found in Article 4(3) TEU. As seen in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, intelligence agencies’ laws and principles are inexistent at the 
EU level. This is because the EU has always presumed that the activities of intelligence 
agencies were part of the ‘national security’ exclusion, while police and judicial bodies 
activities were part of the AFSJ. Therefore, EU laws within the AFSJ involve law 
enforcement authorities, but not intelligence services. 
The only intelligence agency that has openly claimed its compliance with privacy 
principles is the NSA. Particularly, the agency has stated that it implements six of the 
eight FIPPs: purpose specification, data minimisation, use limitation, data quality and 
integrity, security, and accountability and auditing.1529 However, as observed above, 
FIPPs are not binding rules so they cannot be enforced.  
                                                
1529 Richards RJ 2014, ‘NSA’s civil liberties and privacy protections for targeted SIGINT activities under 
Executive Order 12333’, NSA Director of Civil Liberties and Privacy Office report, 7 October; ‘NSA's 
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In general terms, the establishment of a global data protection charter setting up 
common principles for intelligence services seems a very far-off goal for the moment. 
Some of the intelligence services are not even subject to a national regulation. In order 
to set up global data protection standards for these agencies, an alignment of the 
national laws constraining intelligence services is first needed. 
The establishment of universal data protection principles for law enforcement bodies 
is much more feasible. Binding data protection rules for law enforcement authorities 
already exist in Europe and Australia. In the EU, law enforcement authorities are 
compelled by Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA and by the Europol 
Framework Decision. In Australia, law enforcement authorities are bound by Australian 
Information Privacy Principles.1530 However, it is difficult to turn such principles into 
universal rules, since they are based on specific territorial laws.  
 
3.  The ideal regulatory system for a global data protection framework 
 
Despite the existence of all these instruments enshrining international data protection 
principles, there is no single study to date analysing what the most adequate legal 
approach would be. There are, today, more than a dozen different legal frameworks 
establishing data protection rules. Their coexistence is at times confusing, since many of 
these instruments overlap in scope but they do not invoke the same principles. Also, 
some are non-binding whereas others have an obligatory nature for its Contracting 
Parties. Therefore, opposing the de Hert and Papakonstantinou’s argument, which 
supports a ‘multi-faceted international approach’,1531 this thesis opts for a dual data 
protection approach. 
My particular preference for a global data protection framework is a combination of 
the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention and the Cybercrime Convention. As seen 
above, the principles these conventions enshrine are binding for its Contracting Parties. 
Today forty-five countries have already ratified the 108 CoE Data Protection 
Convention, and a further forty-two are bound to the Cybercrime Convention. The US 
                                                
Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702’, NSA Director of Civil Liberties 
and Privacy Office Report, 16.04.2014, p. 6;  
1530 However, there are some exceptions as regards the compliance of the principles by Australian law 
enforcement authorities. See ‘Privacy and law enforcement agencies’. Available from 
http://www.oic.qld.gov.au/guidelines/for-government/guidelines-privacy-principles/applying-the-privacy-
principles/privacy-and-law-enforcement-agencies [7 November 2014]. 
1531 De Hert & Papakonstantinou 2013, p. 309. 
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has signed the latter and could eventually join the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention 
since it is currently an observer on the Council of Europe's committee.1532 
This two-fold system composed of the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention and 
Cybercrime Convention would establish a robust data protection framework, providing 
even more consistency than the current EU data protection regime. The EU today has 
two main instruments that protect EU citizens’ data:  Directive 95/46/EC and Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. Whereas the latter applies when the data 
processing is carried out within the context of law enforcement, the former applies for 
all other non-security matters. The same duality is found in the proposed EU Data 
Protection Package released in January 2012. Again, it consists of two instruments: one 
in the form of a directive for law enforcement data exchanges; and a regulation for the 
rest of data-sharing operations. However, as seen in Chapter 4 of this thesis, no EU data 
protection rules are in force for intelligence services’ activities.  
In contrast, by choosing the 108 CoE Convention and Cybercrime Convention as 
global data protection instruments, all fields would be covered, including data processed 
by intelligence services. The 108 CoE Convention would apply for commercial and law 
enforcement purposes; whereas the Cybercrime Convention would be observed when 
intelligence services process information. This is also an ideal framework, since the 
majority of EU data-sharing instruments are already using 108 CoE Convention as a 
threshold.1533 
Another advantage in choosing the two CoE conventions is that countries are not 
required to be CoE Contracting Parties accede them. Thus, its success will depend on 
how non-EU Members perceive the conventions. As an example, numerous non-EU 
countries and international organisations (the UN, OAS, African Union, APEC, etc.)  
have participated in the negotiations for the modernisation of the 108 CoE Convention. 
In order to attract non-CoE parties it is important that the conventions bring credibility, 
efficient functioning, and enough mechanisms for implementation. Only after doing so 
could their principles have a global relevance in the future. 
However, there is still a lot of work to do in the amendment of both conventions. For 
instance, one of the current problems in the current Cybercrime Convention is that some 
Contracting Parties encourage TSPs to move their servers to third countries, which are 
                                                
1532 The non-EU countries with observer status are the US, Canada, Japan, Mexico, the Holy See. 
Accessed from http://www.coe.int/t/der/Observers_en.asp [29 October 2014]. 
1533 See, for instance, Article 8 of Swedish Initiative; Article 27 of Europol Council Decision; and Article 
25 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA (Prüm). 
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not part of the convention, in order to circumvent the law. Another issue that should be 
included in the amended convention is a mechanism by which security actors could 
directly request data from TSPs and maintain the necessary safeguards for the 
individuals at the same time.1534 
It can be concluded that the CoE is the primary candidate among all the existing 
international organisations for the establishment of data protection and global privacy 
standards. The organisation has the 1981 CoE Convention, the Cybercrime Convention 
as well as Article 8 of the ECHR. After the appropriate amendments, these conventions 
would cover all data protection fields, including intelligence security activities.  
 
4. The EU’s role in designing global data protection principles through the CoE 
 
As seen in Chapter 2 of this thesis, although the EU is now gaining increasing relevance 
as an international actor in the field of security, such ‘actorness’ is not always strong in 
practice. The CFSP/CSDP and the AFSJ policies are still very much influenced by the 
interests of member states and third countries. 
In the area of data protection, continuous pressures from both private and public 
entities at the domestic and international levels have caused a lowering of the data 
protection safeguards in the EU. This has been seen in the current proposal for a EU 
Data Protection Package, which is composed of two instruments: a regulation and a 
directive. The regulation establishes data protection rules for information processed in 
all fields except for law enforcement. The first draft of the regulation included a 
provision (ex Article 42), which prohibited a government from accessing data stored by 
a private company without a prior mutual assistance treaty or an international 
agreement. One month before the proposal was launched, the US government pushed 
the Commission to remove that clause, and it succeeded: the provision is no longer 
found in the proposal. Similarly, the proposed directive for data exchanged among law 
enforcement authorities has been softened because of political interests. First, the fact 
that the nature of the instrument is a directive and not a regulation means that there will 
be no uniformity among member states in the implementation of its rules. Moreover, the 
future directive excludes sectoral data-sharing agreements as well as data processed by 
EU agencies like Europol and Eurojust. Finally, the proposal will not cover any data 
                                                
1534 Speech of Cornelia Kutterer (Microsoft) at CPDP conference, 23.1.2015. 
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transfer conducted by IntCen and national intelligence services, since these are not 
considered part of the EU internal security policy. 
Chapter 3 has explained how, through Europol, the EU has influenced third countries 
to adapt their data protection laws as a condition for the adoption of a 
strategic/cooperation agreement with the agency. If, after a questionnaire, Europol has 
doubts about the adequacy of the rules in the third country, the agency will visit in situ 
the institutions in charge with the compliance of data protection laws and will advise 
about the necessary modifications prior to the adoption of the agreement. This 
procedure is much faster and effective than that in the Proposal of Police and Criminal 
Justice Data Protection Directive. According to Article 34 of the proposal, the 
Commission will also assess the adequacy of data protection rules in a third country 
before accepting international transfers. Yet, Article 36 allows the derogation of such 
adequacy in case of a) vital or legitimate interest, b) immediate and serious threat to the 
public security, c) prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and d) establishment, exercise or 
defence of legal claims. These situations, if interpreted broadly, could be used abusively 
to transfer massive amounts of data to any third country.  
A similar carve-out provision for emergency situations is found in the proposed 
Europol Regulation too.1535 However, if we compare these two articles, we see that the 
list of cases included in the Europol Regulation is much more restrictive than Article 36 
of the proposed directive.1536 Moreover, any derogation under the scope of the future 
Europol Regulation requires the approval of the Executive Director, the Management 
Board and even the EDPS, if the transfer is of a set of data. The same conditions do not 
apply for the proposed directive. 
The EU has also used another mechanism to export high data protection standards 
without directly operating through its own instruments and institutions. This is the 
Council of Europe (CoE). Despite it being an international organisation outside the 
scope of the EU institutional structure, the close link between both parties is 
unquestionable. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) expressly 
stated that the EU provided human rights protection equivalent to that of the 
                                                
1535 Article 31(2) of Europol Regulation. 
1536 The reasons are: a) it is absolutely necessary to safeguard the essential interests, b) it is absolutely 
necessary to prevent imminent danger, c) it is required on important public interest grounds, and d) it is 
necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject. 
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Convention.1537 This presumption gained consistency with the inclusion of a provision 
for the accession of the EU to the ECHR in the Treaty of Lisbon.1538 
Regarding their data protection principles, the same equivalence has existed since the 
1980s. In a disconnection clause, the 108 CoE Convention explicitly refers to the 
Commission’s involvement in the negotiations, and its intention to conclude an EC 
instrument on the same subject: 
 
‘The Commission of the European Communities, which carried out studies 
concerning harmonisation of national legislation within the Community in relation to 
transborder data flows and possible distortions of competition, as well as problems of 
data security, kept in close touch with the Council of Europe. The Commission decided 
to await the outcome of the work on this convention before deciding on its own action 
in the field of data protection.’1539 
 
As prognosticated in the convention, the first data protection instrument in the EU 
had much in common with its predecessor. In Directive 95/46/EC, the Commission had 
included exactly the same data protection principles as those in 108 CoE Convention. At 
first glance, it may seem that the CoE influenced the EU, but in fact the Commission 
took an active role in designing the convention that it would then cite as a reference in 
its own directive. 
In 2001 an additional protocol was included in the 108 CoE Convention.1540 It 
incorporated provisions on supervisory authorities, and the adequacy criteria for data 
transfers to countries not part of the convention. It is not a coincidence that similar 
clauses were already found in Directive 95/46/EC. The CoE clearly sought to base its 
convention on the EU data protection standards. Unfortunately, the additional protocol 
has not been ratified by all Contracting Parties. At the time of writing this thesis, thirty-
                                                
1537 ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, Application no. 
45036/98, 05.06.2005. 
1538 For further information about the accession, see Blasi Casagran, 2010, pp. 16-20; see also CJEU 
opinion 2/13, 18.12.2014. 
1539 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
ETC No 108, para.16. 
1540 2001 Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention for the protection of individuals with 
regard to automatic processing of personal data, ETS, no. 181. 
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five countries have ratified this protocol, and a further nine have signed it but are 
pending for ratification.1541 
Finally, the same mutual influence occurred recently during the negotiations of the 
108 CoE Convention’s amendment. They started in January 2012, the same month that 
the Commission released the proposals for a new EU data protection framework. The 
EU participated actively in shaping the modernised convention.1542 As in the EU Data 
Protection Package, the modernised 108 CoE Convention includes clauses on basic 
principles, sensitive data, data security, transparency, rights of the data subject, 
sanctions and remedies, data transfers to third countries, and oversight. It has however 
omitted controversial provisions such as the ‘right to be forgotten’ or the new sanctions’ 
system that includes the proposed regulation. The negotiations for the new 108 CoE 
Convention were subject to a lot less pressure from the US government and private 
companies that the EU Data Protection Package. And still, the EU played a key role in 
the final outcome. 
As this section demonstrates, that there are alternative ways in which global data 
protection standards could adopt an EU ‘style’ without coming directly from EU 
instruments. Besides the Europol’s role in exporting EU data protection standards, the 
CoE has also been the reflection of EU principles since the 1980s. There has always 
been a mutual influence between both organisations: the 108 CoE Convention has 
influenced Directive 95/46/EC; and now the EU Data Protection Package is influencing 




The great technological progress that has occurred in the last fifteen years has prompted 
the need to establish global odata protection principles for data processed for the 
prevention and investigation of crimes. This chapter has examined the feasibility of 
such principles. 
There are many limitations found in the current proposals to establish a common data 
protection framework for information exchanged in the field of security. One of the 
                                                
1541 Information available from 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=181&CM=1&DF=08/11/2014&CL
=ENG [25 February 2015]. 
1542 ‘Commission to renegotiate Council of Europe Data Protection Convention on behalf of EU’, 
European Commission, 19.11.2012. Available from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-
877_en.htm [30 October 2014]. 
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obstacles seen in many of the initiatives for universal data protection principles is that 
some of them are not binding for its members, and other exclude activities conducted 
for ‘national security’ purposes. This study finds that only one international 
organisation could establish binding common data protection rules for both law 
enforcement authorities and intelligence services: the Council of Europe. A combination 
of the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention and the Cybercrime Convention would be 
the best option for expanding common data protection principles covering all sectors, 
including the field of security. These two conventions already have more than forty 
Contracting Parties, including all EU member states and even the US in one of them. 
Once the modernised 108 CoE Data Protection Convention is released, it could attract 
further third countries, bringing the institution closer to becoming ‘global’. The EU has 
indirectly participated in the negotiation procedures of the 108 CoE Data Protection 
Convention and its amendment. Therefore, through the CoE, the EU has found a way of 
exporting its own data protection principles, free of pressures from private and 
governmental interests. 
It is essential to set up universal principles of data protection that bind any piece of 
information processed, regardless of its purpose. For data processed for security 
reasons, more accountability and control needs to be built up. Our history has shown 
that when governments have unlimited power, it can be easily abused. Therefore, basic 
principles need to be enforced to avoid abusive restrictions of human rights. Security 
cannot be used to justify a world in which individuals are permanently monitored by the 
State with no limitations. Any intrusion needs to be necessary and proportional in 
relation to the objective it pursues. There is no doubt that privacy is a universal right, so 


















































This thesis has investigated the possibility of establishing global data protection rules 
for data processed in the field of intelligence and law enforcement. In this regard, it has 
identified several challenges that need to be overcome for its accomplishment.  
Chapter 1 has determined that the creation of global data protection rules requires the 
EU to first harmonise its data protection framework within the AFSJ. This chapter 
offers an in-depth analysis on the state-of-play of the instruments and systems that the 
EU has adopted in order to process data for law enforcement purposes. There are at least 
nine different EU systems today (Prüm, the Swedish initiative, EIO, ECRIS, VIS, SIS, 
Eurodac, CIS, ENUs) that exchange information among law enforcement authorities in 
the member states. In addition, four other EU systems are are likely to be established in 
the future (EU PNR, TFTS, EES, RTP).  
However, the EU data protection regime is rather fragmented. Each of these 
instruments has its own data protection rules, which in turn differ from the general 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. Chapter 1 has also identified some of the member 
states’ problems relating to the lack of implementation and usage of these instruments. 
Police authorities do not use the European information systems in a clear and consistent 
manner, and some of them do not have the systems fully operational yet. For instance, 
none of the member states has yet the DNA data searches of Prüm up and running, or 
the technical infrastructure to use ECRIS. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is 
impossible to create a global data protection framework if the EU itself does not provide 
homogeneous rules for the exchange of law enforcement information. 
Another challenge to overcome is the lack of an equivalent legal framework on data 
protection between the US and the EU. Chapter 2 has delineated how the two parties 
have tried to overcome their legal differences by concluding numerous sectoral data-
sharing agreements in the field of law enforcement. These are, in particular, the PNR 
agreements, the SWIFT agreement, and the EU-US agreement on the security of 
classified information. Moreover, negotiations for an umbrella EU-US data protection 
and data privacy agreement are currently ongoing. All of these instruments demonstrate 
the enormous efforts of both parties to reach a common approach in terms of data 
protection. However, in practice, all the existing EU-US agreements on data protection 
matters differ from the EU legal framework for data exchanges in the field of law 
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enforcement (i.e. Framework Council Decision 2008/977 and the EU proposal for a 
Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive1543).  
A third problem encountered in the creation of common global data protection 
standards is that any law would in principle exclude data exchanges carried out by 
intelligence services. Chapter 4 of this thesis has examined the increasing synergy 
between law enforcement and intelligence authorities. In the past, these two 
communities had very distinctive roles. While intelligence services were mainly 
conducting pre-emptive analytical tasks (‘wait and watch’), police agents had an active 
role in enforcing the law (‘see and strike’). Over the years, that division has become 
more and more blurred. Law enforcement agencies include analytical departments 
where police officers collect and process intelligence for the prevention of crimes. 
Similarly, many intelligence agencies have police departments within their 
headquarters, allowing a fluent communication between both entities.  
Taking all of this into account, Chapter 4 has scrutinised whether the EU could adopt 
laws and issue court decisions affecting data shared among intelligence services. As 
seen in chapters 1 and 2, the AFSJ has rules concerning data exchanged among law 
enforcement authorities within and beyond the EU. The CJEU annulment of the Data 
Retention Directive case can be seen as one of the main EU achievements in the 
protection of data processed for law enforcement purposes. The court, for the first time, 
annulled an entire EU directive for being contrary to the provisions of the EU Charter. 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter are to be respected by any EU instrument that processes 
and shares data for the prevention, combat, investigation and prosecution of crimes. 
Also, the court stated that a directive must require member states to implement it in a 
Charter-compliant way. This is significant for the future of a more centralised, EU-
level, harmonised system and, perhaps, for the content of EU-third country agreements. 
However, the Charter does not apply for areas falling outside the scope of the EU, like 
national security issues. 
Article 4(2) TEU expressly excludes ‘national security’ matters from the competence 
of the EU laws. The concept of national security has been associated with intelligence 
services, but there is no clear definition of what the exact scope of this term is. 
Moreover, the EU has a new body called IntCen through which intelligence services of 
the member states are able to meet and exchange information with each other. This 
                                                
1543 These instruments have been discussed in chapter 1 sections 4.2.1. and 4.2.3., and chapter 2 sections 
3.1.1. and 3.1.2 of this thesis. 
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implies that the EU currently has a certain degree of participation on intelligence 
services’ matters. 
For the establishment of global data protection rules, Chapter 3 suggests using 
Europol laws as a model. Europol currently operates on the basis of a council decision 
(ECD), although this will be soon replaced by a regulation. The ECD includes strong 
data protection provisions that refer to the right of access, correction and deletion; the 
purpose limitation principle; data retention data quality; and external supervision. Also, 
Europol uses the privacy-by-design tool SIENA to exchange information with member 
states and third countries. Thus, Europol’s laws offer strong privacy rules, higher than 
most data protection laws in the member states. Therefore, this study proposes 
enhancing the role of Europol in cross-border criminal investigations, so as to increase 
the impact its rules and international agreements could have on EU and non-EU 
countries.  
In fact, Europol has already been expanding its competences over the last ten years. 
It started as an intergovernmental organisation, regulated by a convention and with the 
purpose of supporting member states’ criminal investigations when it was required. 
Europol’s powers also increased in 2008 when it became an EU agency. Once the 
current proposed Europol Regulation is adopted, the agency will acquire new 
competences. For instance, the proposed regulation establishes in Article 6 that Europol 
will be able to request the initiation of a criminal investigation by national units when it 
considers that it adds value. Member states will have a deadline of one month to reply 
on the initiative. If a member state replies with a rejection, this will have to be 
accompanied by a reasoned justification.  
However, the scope of Europol is limited to data shared among law enforcement 
authorities. Data exchanges among intelligence services are excluded from both the 
ECD and the future regulation. A way of clarifying intelligence services’ activities 
would be by enhancing IntCen’s role. IntCen was created in 1999 as a forum for 
exchanging sensitive information among intelligence services. At that time, it was 
called the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) and was comprised of only seven member 
states. In 2012 the body was renamed IntCen and transferred to the EEAS. It has 
undergone organisational and structural changes but a concrete legal basis for its 
mandate has never been clarified. Chapter 4 of this thesis suggests the use of Article 39 
TEU as a legal basis to regulate IntCen’s data processing activities.  
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The terrorist attacks that occurred in Paris in January 2015 could lead to the political 
will to reinforce Europol and IntCen’s powers. Previous terrorist attacks in the EU have 
led to legislative initiatives, or the unblocking of the legislative processes. Enhancing 
the Europol and IntCen’s mandate and including high data protection standards could 
give the EU a consistent data protection legal framework in the field of security. 
Intelligence services and law enforcement authorities in the member states would then 
have a common body at the EU level, which would end the current divergences within 
the European borders.  
Additionally, Chapter 5 examines the existing initiatives setting up international data 
protection principles that could regulate data exchanges for law enforcement purposes. 
These are specifically the Fair Information Practice Principles, the UN Guidelines, the 
Australian principles, the Madrid Declaration, the International Principles on the 
Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, the Tshwane Principles, 
the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention and the Cybercrime Convention. Yet, some of 
these principles are not binding for the Contracting Parties, and others exclude national 
security data transfers. After a substantial analysis, Chapter 5 focuses on the principles 
of the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention together with those in the Cybercrime 
Convention. Each of these two conventions has more than forty Contracting Parties 
today. A reformed version of these instruments (a modernised 108 CoE Data Protection 
Convention is about to be adopted) could serve as a reference for the establishment of 
global data protection rules among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
National security issues are excluded from the scope of 108 CoE Data Protection 
Convention. The same exclusion is found in other instruments such as Directive 
95/46/EC, Council Decision 2008/977/JHA and the Treaty of Lisbon itself. However, as 
mentioned above, neither the CoE nor the EU institutions have formally defined what 
‘national security’ really means. If national security is associated with intelligence 
services activities, these will not be bound by the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention, 
but the principles included in the Cybercrime Convention will still apply. 
The level of data protection of the CoE and the EU is presumed equivalent. It is not a 
coincidence that all the principles in the 108 CoE Data Protection Convention are also 
found in Directive 95/46/EC. Also, the Commission is currently participating in the 
modernisation of the CoE convention. Whereas Chapter 2 highlights the US influence 
on specific EU international data-sharing agreements as well as the future EU-US Data 
Protection Agreement, Chapter 5 identifies the EU’s active contribution to the CoE data 
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protection legislation. The EU has thus been expanding its data protection standards 
through the CoE. This close relationship could be the keystone for establishing strong 
data protection rules around the world. 
This thesis has shown that the notions of privacy and data protection do not oppose 
the objective of security, but rather complement it. Chapters 1, 2 and 4 have mentioned 
numerous mass surveillance programmes and systems consisting of collecting large 
amounts of data from untargeted individuals. Apart from the potential clash between 
these systems and the right to data protection, its effectiveness has been questioned. 
This was precisely one of the issues raised by the CJEU in the Data Retention case. The 
‘collect-it-all’ approach risks overloading databases with irrelevant data, which could 
divert attention from crucial data. This overabundance of data was an obstacle in the 
prevention of past terrorist attacks such as those occurred in Madrid and London or, 
more recently, in the 2012 Boston Marathon bombing. There was an available amount 
of intelligence, but it was improperly identified and processed. 
The importance of privacy and data protection is underlined throughout the five 
chapters of this thesis. In the field of security, this right can easily be suppressed. 9/11 
presented the ideal context to adopt measures that reduced privacy and enhanced 
security through laws like the Patriot Act. These measures are mostly preventive in 
nature, and now they have become operational it is extremely difficult to remove them 
because there are always potential threats that justify them.  
For society, the over-surveillance creates the false notion that there is always 
someone watching and monitoring our actions. In particular, governments believe that 
constant surveillance can reduce criminal activity because an individuals’ fear that 
someone might be watching may deter them from committing a crime. Jeremy Bentham 
first propagated the idea of ‘permanent visibility’ in the 18th century with his design for 
an institutional building called the ‘panopticon’. His panopticon prison was to be a 
circular structure with prison cells surrounding a central tower (the ‘inspection house’) 
from which prison guards could view every cell. The central tower might not always be 
occupied by guards, but the fact that the prisoners could never know whether they were 
being watched or not would cause them to self-regulate their own behaviour. Although 
Bentham’s prison was never built, the notion of continual control by the government is 
found in many other contexts today. As seen in Chapters 1 and 4, law enforcement 
authorities today have the means to monitor our daily lives with the help of the Internet 
and phone companies. New technologies play a decisive role in the collection of 
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information for criminal investigations. Chapter 1 has also shown that private actors 
collecting information for their own commercial purposes may be required to hand over 
such data to police or intelligence agents. In order to restrict that phenomenon, the 
purpose limitation principle should be included in the future global data protection 
framework. 
At the time of finalising this thesis, new EU security measures are in the pipeline. 
Following the terror attacks linked to Al-Qaeda in Paris on 7 January 2015, member 
states of the EU activated their security alerts to the highest levels and have decided to 
adopt new counter-terrorism measures. As an example, fifteen member states have 
announced that by 2016 they would incorporate national PNR systems for the collection 
of data from passengers arriving in their countries. Also, other member states decided to 
enhance the power of the police, allowing them to intercept communications without 
prior judicial authorisation. These measures assimilate the controversial Patriot Act, 
adopted in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. 
At the same time, new data protection legislation in the field of law enforcement will 
soon be passed on both sides of the Atlantic. In the EU, a directive on data protection 
for police and judicial matters will replace the current Council Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
In addition, more concrete EU instruments such as the proposed Europol Regulation and 
the EU PNR Directive will include new data protection provisions for data processed 
for law enforcement purposes. In the US, several Patriot Act provisions are going to 
expire in May 2015 so new debates on their necessity and proportionality will surely 
arise by then. Likewise, US President Obama recently announced that stronger 
safeguards will be included for data processed through the US Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) and the EO 12333. Mainly, the US President seeks to end the 
bulk collection of data and to establish better oversight mechanisms for US intelligence 
agencies. Finally, the EU-US Data Protection Agreement is on its way, and it will set 
down minimal rules that both parties will need to comply with in the exchange of crime-
related data. This agreement is likely to be compatible with the 108 CoE Data 
Protection Convention, facilitating the establishment of data protection global standards 
in the future. 
Current and future security measures need to strike the right balance between data 
protection and privacy principles. In June 2013, the Snowden revelations demonstrated 
that a lack of restrictions for security agents in the collection and processing of personal 
data could cause serious conflicts with individuals’ fundamental rights. In particular, the 
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exposé about the surveillance programmes used by the NSA has irrevocably damaged 
the trust that individuals, companies and governments all over the world once had for 
intelligence services. The curent lack of confidence in security authorities will only be 
repaired by reinforcing accountability and individual rights. Hence, data protection rules 
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